In LR Answers, we take an occasional look at topics that have come up in comments on other articles and are worthy of a bit more attention on their own. Here we look at some of the details behind proposals for the 'Second Works Programme'
Commentor: [I] am aware of the Northern Heights project and the Bakerloo extension to Camberwell, otherwise wondering if there was anything new considered in the additional tube extensions mentioned the 1938-1939 discussions for a second New Works Programme that did not make it into later schemes as well as the early beginnings of proposals that were later fleshed out a bit more in the 1946 and 1949 London Railway Plans?
LR answers: There were two starting points for the Second New Works Programme.
One was the potential for other Tube extensions and main line improvements – the main line suburban operations were part of the pooled revenues and planning of the Standing Joint Committee. An ambitious 10-year programme was foreseen in a detailed paper presented by JP Thomas, the London Passenger Transport Board General Manager (Railways), to the 4th November 1937 Second Annual Conference of the Members and Officers of London Transport.
This provides a useful summary of the schemes being thought about, but it is best not to assume that all of them would have been achieved by 1950, even without a war occurring.
A similar compilation of schemes did exist in 1946 with the Standing Joint Committee (SJC). These had a separate and parallel existence to the better known 1946 Railway (London Plan) Working Party plans. It is believed that the person who advised the SJC about the ‘1937’ schemes at least during wartime was the same JP Thomas, now working as a consultant. A £60m+ project bill was expected then. This would be roughly £36bn now (allowing for RPI and real-world railway construction cost inflation). During the war, Thomas had also ensured that the alignment of some deep-level tube shelters matched his longer-term strategy for several express tubes which were mentioned at the 1937 Conference.
Given that this question was asked in the comments of our look at the relationship between London and New York, it is perhaps appropriate to quote Mr Thomas from 1937 on express services:
“…the public urge for speed does not diminish… [including] the passenger moving frequently about town. So far no complete study and estimates have been made of the practicability of express lines within the central area. It is probable that no reliable estimates could be made, for London has no such experience to draw upon. The experience of New York, however, tells us that the underground travel habit in that city has been built up upon the system of express services. The Central Line between Marble Arch and Liverpool Street, with its heavy all-day traffic, would be the most fertile ground upon which to carry out such a scheme in London.”
JP Thomas
The second starting point for a Second Programme – and particularly the reason for raising more funds as soon as possible – was that the First New Works Programme was busting its budget. The belief was that if you could wrap the additional fund raising needed within even a modest Second Programme – particularly for schemes that would be profitable reasonably quickly – then there were merits in pressing for a second round.
The 1935-40 Programme had suffered from poor costing and price inflation. The original basis of the Programme had been a £30m initial estimate (roughly £18bn today) for which a £5m margin was considered adequate. It had included a Bakerloo extension to Camberwell. However strong lobbying from North London councils such as Finchley, had led to a more expensive project being added and the Bakerloo deleted, with a revised version of a Northern Heights electrification and through running scheme.
That project and the others had undergone many previous project mutations. This pushed the nominal costs towards £35m at the Programme's starting point in 1935. Estimates were produced in a hurry, also with differing views on technical requirements between the London Passenger Transport Board (LPTB) and the main line companies. In 1936 two other extensions were added, to Denham (supposedly self-financing in the medium term provided extra housing materialised), and from Edgware to Aldenham because the planned North London train stabling and maintenance situation was considered unsatisfactory (this extension also depended on extra housing).
Revised estimates were prepared in October 1937, when some options were contemplated for project cut-backs.
A 20th June 1939 draft LPTB memorandum to HM Treasury goes into significant detail:
"An additional sum of roundly £10,000,000 is now required to complete the construction of works which are attributable, directly or indirectly to the Programme". It goes on: "The original estimate of the cost of the Programme were produced rapidly at a time of considerable pressure, and in most cases were of a very arbitrary nature. Many of the schemes had not been considered, much less worked out, in any detail. Neither was material available upon which reliable estimates of actual expenditure could be based. It was therefore not possible, apart from the subsequent rise of prices [Author’s note: inflated partly by spending on war preparations], to ensure that the total cost of the Programme was covered."
LPTB Memo
Allowing for other transaction and project costs, the estimated final Programme cost was foreseen as £45,159,000, so nearly £5.2m more than raised (roughly £27bn now). A further significant reason for extra cost was the progress of the tram-to-trolleybus conversion programme. LPTB had committed to "not less than 148 route miles of tramway" to be converted. 223 route miles were to be "completed by the end of the current year [Author’s note: financial or calendar is unclear] and the conversion of the remaining 88 route miles south of the Thames has become imperative. The estimated cost will be roundly £5,000,000."
The memorandum lobbied in favour of this expenditure, noting that the trolleybuses were very popular, and had created "a public demand for the substitution of trolleybuses on the whole of the remaining tram routes". Like-for-like vehicle revenues had fallen by 2½% on non-converted tram routes, year on year, and risen by over 5% on conversion, notwithstanding 28% more trolleybus service miles. Meanwhile, trams were not longer covering their bare working expenses, let alone depreciation or payment of interest on capital.
LPTB was not keen on enlarging the Programme funding, but it was impossible for the New Works as a whole to be self-supporting in the early years of their operation. Already the Board was not in a position to pay the full amount expected on 'C' stock. The Board, in the same memo intended for HM Treasury, concluded that:
"unless the further sum of £10,000,000 can be included with and form part of the New Works Programme, any further conversion of trams to trolleybuses must be indefinitely postponed and the Board compelled to make such arrangements with the Banks as may be possible for a loan equal to its proportion of the £5,192,000, with the result that the Board's financial position will be worsened and the date when it may be on a self-supporting basis and capable of financing its capital needs out of its own resources or on its own credit further delayed".
LPTB Memo
In reality Lord Ashfield then advanced arguments that if £5.2m was needed for Programme financial stability, and another £5m for completing trolleybus conversion, then it would be more palatable to look at a larger loan on the basis that the other millions could be directed towards worthwhile new railway works. I am not aware of a specific list; however it might be expected that schemes would be drawn from the ‘1937’ projects.
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