Two years ago, Network Rail published its Traction Decarbonisation Network Strategy (TDNS) which proposed a rolling electrification programme of 13,000 single track kilometres (stk). Although the Department for Transport (DfT) has not responded to TDNS, it used it to inform its Transport Decarbonisation Plan which states that “we will deliver an ambitious, sustainable, and cost-effective programme of electrification guided by Network Rail’s TDNS.”
Yet is difficult to reconcile this plan’s statement with comments made at recent conferences by Rich Fisher of the Great British Railways Transition Team (GBRTT) and Network Rail’s Andrew Haines, both of whom stated that the UK Government’s 2021 Comprehensive Spending Review considered TDNS to be unaffordable.
Thus, it seems that the UK Government has decided against a large-scale electrification programme. As a result, with only 46% of its tracks electrified, Britain will remain at the bottom end of the European electrification league table. In contrast, Scotland is committed to a rolling programme of electrification to decarbonise its railway by 2035. Transport Scotland’s view is it cannot afford not to electrify Scotland’s railway.
In this feature we consider why, in contrast to Europe and Scotland, the Westminster Government is reluctant to commit to electrification and whether rolling stock solutions are an effective decarbonisation option. To do so it is first necessary to consider some history.
Early electrification
In 1879 Werner von Siemens demonstrated the world’s first electric train in Berlin. This was a 150V DC locomotive hauling three small coaches. Its success inspired early electric railways which included the Volk’s Electric Railway in Brighton which opened in 1883 and is the world’s oldest operating electric railway.
Many railways were electrified in the first 20 years of the 20th century. With their power limited only by the capability of the supply, electric trains offered the high acceleration needed for suburban services and high power for heavy freight trains. Being inherently simpler and more efficient, electric trains also have lower maintenance and running costs.
During the interwar period, the Southern Railway adopted the 660V DC third rail system to electrify its suburban routes and lines to the South Coast. Largely as a result, Britain now has 4,536 stk of 650 DC third rail which now is 32% of the country’s electrified rail lines.
In 1932, a government committee decided that 1,500V DC overhead should be the UK standard, though few schemes were electrified in this way. These included Shenfield to Liverpool Street and the now closed Sheffield to Manchester line through Woodhead tunnel.
After the war
25kV AC electrification was introduced in Germany and France in the early 1950s. Its high voltage transmits a correspondingly higher power with lower transmission losses making it ideal for long distance railways that carry heavy traffic.
In 1956, British Railways (BR) adopted 25kV AC electrification except for third rail extensions. This was a brave decision given the constrained UK loading gauge and the lack of power semiconductors at the time which required the use of mercury arc rectifiers.
In 1960, Crewe to Manchester and the Glasgow suburban lines were electrified at this new standard. This was followed by lines from London to the West Midlands, Manchester, and Liverpool which were completed by 1967. This new electrified inter-city service was a spectacular success as passenger traffic increased by over 80%. This sparks effect was evident on subsequent BR electrification schemes.
This West Coast Main Line electrification was extended to Glasgow in 1974. A BR booklet commemorating its opening advised how electric traction was important “in these days of increased awareness of need to conserve world energy resources, notably oil”. At that time there was no mention of rail decarbonisation.
The 1970s energy crisis led to a system-wide electrification proposal which was rejected as railways did not have political support. Some electrification schemes such as Ayr, Bedford, and Kings Lynn were progressed around this time. This ensured that skilled electrification teams were not disbanded and available for BR’s largest electrification scheme, the East Coast Main Line. This was done in two phases, from London to Hitchin (1976 to 1978) and from Hitchin to Leeds and Edinburgh (1984 to 1991).
At 1983 prices, this cost £344 million of which £206 million was the electrification and the remainder for new trains. The project was only 3.8% over budget and eight weeks late on a seven-year programme. The cost of its electrification work at today’s prices was £668 million for 2,200 stk, or £0.3 million per stk, which is a fraction of current electrification costs. This is not an entirely fair comparison as since then there has been a significant increase in traffic and improvements in safe working practice. Nevertheless, much could be learnt from the way that the ECML electrification was delivered.
Electrification post privatisation
Though an average of 220 stk of electrification per year was delivered in BR’s final 15 years, the first 15 years of the privatised railway saw an average of 15 stk per year.
In 2007, the Government published its White Paper “Delivering a sustainable railway” which mentioned the need to reduce the railway’s carbon footprint. However, it considered that the case for electrification was not yet made, partly due to the possible development of low-carbon self-powered trains.
Three months later, the Chairman of the Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC), Adrian Shooter, and Chief Executive of Network Rail, Iain Coucher, signed a joint letter stating that they believed the Government’s approach to electrification was wrong. Their succinct three-page letter explained why it was inconceivable to contemplate a 30-year strategy for rail which does not foresee much more electrification.
This and other lobbying had the desired effect as, in 2009, a £1.1 billion programme of rail electrification was announced. The Great Western Electrification Programme (GWEP) from London to Oxford, Bristol, and Swansea was to be completed in 2016. Electrification of the Liverpool to Manchester line was also to be completed by 2013.
2010 saw the first significant electrification project for 14 years. This was part of the reopening of the Airdrie to Bathgate line which was completed to time and budget. As the line was electrified as it was built, its electrification was at a significantly reduced cost with no disruption.
Cost overruns
Unfortunately, GWEP and other electrification schemes were significantly delayed and over budget. By 2016, GWEP was expected to be up to three years late with costs increased from £1.6 billion in 2014 to £2.8 billion, or £3.4 million per stk.
In 2017, GWEP was curtailed by omitting Swansea, Oxford, and Bristol. The planned Midland Main Line electrification was also cancelled. The statement advising these electrification cutbacks advised that because bi-mode trains could seamlessly transfer from diesel to electric power, there is no longer a requirement to electrify every line.
Also, that year, Government announced that the new East West Rail link would not be electrified despite the low cost of electrifying a railway as it was built. Instead, the use of alternative green energy traction was to be explored.
Thus, Government support for a long-term electrification programme was lost as cost overruns forced it to conclude that electrification is the wrong technology.
One of the reasons for the high cost of electrification is evident from the graph showing the electrification mileage delivered each year. After many years with hardly any electrification, the industry had to ramp up to deliver 800 stk of electrification in 2018. This was inevitably costly and inefficient with mistakes made due to skills shortages. In 2012, Rail Engineer reported that the plan was to have no less than 11 simultaneous electrification projects by 2016. In the event, at the peak of the programme there were only five concurrent projects!
Nevertheless, much of the responsibility for these cost overruns is within the rail industry. For example, unduly onerous design assumptions significantly reduced installation productivity. Piles were designed to be 12 to 15 metres long whereas long established empirical design guidance showed that they only needed to be 3 to 4.5 metres long. The 2019 Railway Industry’s Association’s Electrification Cost Challenge Report provides a thorough study of electrification costs during this period.
In Scotland, electrification of the Edinburgh to Glasgow main line (EGIP) was also in difficulty. Yet here the response was to ensure that the lessons were learnt rather than cancel electrification schemes. Scotland now has a rolling electrification programme with recent projects delivered to time and budget.