Holy Grails and Thameslink Fails (part 2): The plan that went wrong

In looking at why the new May national rail timetable went so horribly wrong in the case of Thameslink and Great Northern services, it is necessary to look not only at the immediate causes but also the underlying problems that helped steer the bad ship Disaster towards the rocks. In doing so we find a contrast with how the original Thameslink scheme was successfully introduced without fuss as recorded in part 1.

With a Transport Select Committee having looked at the issue and an inquiry commissioned by the Secretary of State to investigate what happened we don’t claim that we can pre-empt all the answers. But we are beginning to build up an understanding what went on thanks to analysis, informative talks, information provided to us and attendance at the most recent London Travelwatch meeting.

When looking at issues such as this it is hard to know how far to go back and how helpful it is to delve into the past. After all, one can produce a case for giving privatisation of the railways as a factor but such blame can neither be conclusive nor helpful given that it is not easy to turn the clock back and there is no fundamental reason why the timetable should not have worked on a privatised railway.

Problems at the commencement of franchise

Probably the most sensible place to start is with the commencement of the franchise to Govia Thameslink Railway in 2014. Looking back to that time, four potential causes for concern stand out when considering the future introduction of the 2018 timetable. As it turned out, two were resolved and two continued to cause problems in 2018.

The four potential issues were then:

  • The challenge of the December 2018 timetable as then planned
  • The archaic reliance on Rest Day Working
  • The Wimbledon Loop decision
  • Too few drivers

Driver shortage – resolved

We have highlighted the issue of too few drivers before. This was most notably a problem in July 2016 when Southern (part of the new GTR franchise) were forced to introduced a revised timetable due to lack of drivers. The primary cause of the issue was that DfT had not intervened to stop GTR’s predecessors for the previous Thameslink franchise, First Capital Connect, from cancelling their driving recruitment programme the moment then knew they would not get the Thameslink franchise. Once they took over, GTR found that that they were considerably short of the total number of drivers they expected to have to cover the various different train companies in their charge (Thameslink, Great Northern, Gatwick Express and Southern).

It took a lot of hard work and a massive recruitment programme by GTR to overcome this problem but now GTR insists that shortage of drivers as such is not an issue and they are currently actually over establishment – incidentally, Northern Rail say the same thing. Whether the establishment level is the correct realistic number of drivers a franchise requires is another matter – possibly not, in this case, as we shall see.

Wimbledon Loop – not a problem in this case

In a similar way, there was concern back in 2013 that the decision to continue with through Thameslink trains on the Wimbledon loop would make a future Thameslink timetable difficult to either implement or be an impediment on trains running to schedule with huge potential for knock-on effects. It seems that this has had no bearing on the May 2018 timetable implementation. The only notable impact when it comes to delayed trains is that trains on this route may omit stops more often than on other routes due to the lack of a terminus at which a short delay can be recovered from. There have, unfortunately, been quite a lot of cancellations – but for a different reason.

Rest Day Working – the problem never tackled

We have covered the issue of reliance on Rest Day Working before. This is rather insidious and tends not to be recognised as an issue unless the unions put a ban on rest day working – which in the case of GTR they have not done so on the run up to the May 2018 timetable (although they did temporarily withdraw from a rest day working agreement in the case of Northern Rail). Rest Day Working is really a 20th century hangover from British Rail when employees’ attitudes were very different.

The reason rest day working is relevant to the May timetable problems is because even though, nationwide, it is less relied on for Sunday working, it is still the case that there is a culture of expecting drivers to learn new routes on their rest days. Not surprisingly, many drivers do not want to do this and, of course, they are under no obligation to do so. It must be a total anachronism in the 21st century that a significant level of on-the-job compulsory retraining is expected to be undertaken outside the normal working week.

Even if drivers were willing, in principle, to work rest days for route training, it does not appear to be a very practical means of learning an entire new route given the amount of training required. If one had to learn a complete new Thameslink route that could well amount to 25-30 days. At one rest day worked per week, one is looking to start learning a route six months in advance of being proficient on it. Realistically, it would be better to start learning around nine months to a year in advance of needing to be competent on driving on a completely new route.

If one knows in advance that a lot of route learning is required then perhaps the establishment level of drivers needs to be temporarily higher than it is. Drivers are very expensive but necessary. Following on from route learning, at some point in the future will be ATO training (another four days) so the requirement for more drivers than a normal establishment number would be ongoing.

In addition, if there genuinely are temporarily spare drivers then good use can still be made of them. Some more experienced drivers can, if willing, be trained to be driver instructors – GTR have never had enough of these. They can learn additional routes which always helps planning and operational flexibility. Even if a driver’s knowledge of a route lapses he can relearn it a lot quicker than starting afresh.

In the unlikely event that a TOC still has spare drivers then other traditional activities such as seeing what happens in a signal centre or giving talks to school children on the dangers of being on the railway can mean that time can be usefully, if not strictly productively, used. In practice a genuine surplus of drivers can be quickly rectified by a temporary freeze on recruitment and allowing natural wastage and retirement to take its course.

We suspect that a problem with having the desired number of drivers ideal for a major route reorganisation is that it would make a bid for a franchise look less attractive. The DfT will probably not give sufficient credit in a franchise bid for the applicant who proposes the additional cost of increasing driver numbers beyond a regular establishment number in order to help ensure the smooth introduction of a new radical timetable.

The timetable as intended around 2014

A fundamental problem with the Thameslink franchise from the outset was the timetable. The main issue was that it just was not known if one could produce a workable timetable for 24tph through the Thameslink core. In one sense we still don’t since, if all planned trains were running in the current timetable as originally intended, we are only up to 18tph.

The DfT have pointed out that none of the four bidders produced a timetable that was compliant with the bid requirements. It seems that one reason GTR was selected was that their proposed timetable was less non-compliant than the others. Nowadays, as part of the process, Network Rail not only scrutinise timetables put forward as part of a franchise bid but can theoretically actually veto the franchise application if they believe the timetable cannot work.

Another reason that GTR was awarded the franchise was that their bid seriously addressed the issue of making a 24tph timetable work by planning to recruit experts from elsewhere both in and outside the UK. Unfortunately, it appears that, unknown for sure by anyone at the time, a timetable that worked to the DfT’s requirements was just not possible. The main problem was getting the necessary number of trains through Windmill Bridge Junction just north of East Croydon.

One can, of course, wonder why the DfT put forward an Invitation To Tender (ITT) based on a premise that was false – namely, that you could run the necessary number of trains through Windmill Bridge Junction and East Croydon. One feels that it was a case of ‘this has to work – there is no obvious alternative option’. At least there was no obvious alternative option without straying off GTR territory which was the main reason for making the franchise area so large. It would perhaps be unkind to point out that had the Uckfield branch been electrified this might not have been an issue.

Equally, one can wonder why it took so long for GTR to say that the originally proposed timetable for December 2018 could never work and come up with an alternative suggestion. Many in the railway industry were stunned when in the summer of 2016 GTR proposed an alternative route to Rainham (Kent) for 2tph. Whilst there was a good rationale behind it (and also the prospect of better fare receipts) such a major change at such a late time seemed to be inviting trouble – even if the option was better than sticking to the original plan.

So far bad – but rectifiable

The problems with the original flawed timetable and assumed reliance on rest day working were not fatal. Like a lot of the problems that surface, they can be resolved if other things go right. But, as things go wrong, the exposure to risk is increased as new, less reliable, options are brought into play in order to deal with early failures in the plan.

You gotta have trains

The next really big thing to go wrong is train delivery and it is a mystery to us why this has not been identified as a major cause of the problems that developed. Indeed it does seem that delayed delivery and that failure to introduce a workable remedial plan to cater for this is the biggest factor in what was to develop.

As a reminder, the order for the Thameslink trains was originally given to Siemens in 2013. It came from the DfT and GTR had no involvement at this stage. These trains were due to start being introduced into service from 2016 to give time to build-up to full service by December 2018. This would provide the necessary time for train acceptance and driver training. It would also mean that route learning would take place using the trains to be used for that route. This is always, by far, the preferable way of doing things.

Things started going horribly wrong when it came to arranging finance to pay for the trains. Due to the state of the world economy this was becoming very difficult and it took one day short of two years for the DfT to confirm the order. The extraordinary delay was caused by Siemens and the DfT having great difficulty in arranging a suitable mutually-acceptable finance package.

It is notable that, around this time, the DfT gave TfL approval to buy the planned Crossrail trains outright, contrary to the original plan, rather than risk the same problems being encountered with Crossrail stock. Perhaps, the prospect of no trains at all when a new line was due to open was more serious than no new trains for an existing, but enhanced, route.

The Audit Office were highly critical of the delay in the ordering of new trains. One does wonder if things would have been very different if, in 2013, the DfT fully appreciated the risks involved in delaying purchasing the trains and agreed to buy them outright – as with the Crossrail trains. One can understand the reluctance as £2.5 billion for trains and maintenance facilities upfront is a lot of money to find when unbudgeted for but ultimately the government chose not to take that option so needs to accept the consequences of their decision making.

Bland assurances were made that the Thameslink Programme was still achievable and there were heavy penalties for Siemens if they could not meet the proposed schedule. Of course, putting penalty clauses in contracts is no guarantee of ensuring schedules are met and the manufacturer may well factor the penalties into the costs rather than strive to eliminate them or decline the order.

Graphic evidence

Planned and actual delivery and acceptance of Thameslink trains

As the graph shows, acceptance of new trains was, literally, always behind the curve when compared to when the trains should have been ready for service. Delivery of the first units starts off on schedule in July 2015 but the first units had numerous faults of which most were related to software.

The first unit was scheduled for acceptance in December 2015 but this was around six months late. The initial pace of production was slow, as intended, but after unit 7 was delivered it was ramped up. However, Siemens never managed to deliver (thick orange line) as quickly as was planned (dotted orange line).

By mid 2016, Siemens was not even managing to deliver units prior to their planned acceptance date (dotted blue line). Meanwhile, the time taken to get a unit accepted was excessive (around six months) which led to moratorium on accepting vehicles until basic faults were rectified. This led to a continual improvement in the build quality of later builds until, towards the end of the delivery programme, acceptance was achieved within a matter of days after delivery – as it should have been from the start.

One has to bear in mind that the Thameslink vehicles are the first of a new generation of rolling stock which has software at the heart of the train. This is not just for things like public address but to control most aspects of driving, door opening, acceleration and braking. The driver, of course, only knows that he has a problem when driving a train for acceptance testing. He or she cannot know whether or not software is the underlying cause.

It is believed that around 70% of the problems identified required a software fix. Siemens had a tendency not to ‘batch up’ software for necessary for resolving issues which is standard (and sensible) industry practice used by other rolling stock manufacturers. Instead, Siemens attempted to fix problems as they occurred – a practice that might appear outwardly sensible and can be appropriate in some areas of manufacturing.

Failure to ‘batch up’ considerably increased the overall testing workload. It is notable on the graph (and the graph below) that towards the end of the delivery programme, once software issues were fully addressed and ‘batched up’ for implementation, the acceptance time dropped down to a few days.

Maybe the train acceptance delays should not be a surprise with the first of a fairly radical new fleet of trains and this should have been allowed for. Certainly, Bombardier don’t appear to be doing any better with delays with their class 345 (Crossrail) stock and, more particularly, class 710 (London Overground stock for Goblin replacement and elsewhere).

In simple terms, even with the revised schedule due to delays in the initial order, class 700 Thameslink trains were being delivered roughly when they should have been in service. In some cases the delay between when they should have been delivered (dotted orange line) and when they were accepted (thick blue line) was around a year when it should have been just a few days. The late delivery on top of the severely delayed order had two main consequences.

Inactions have consequences

The first consequence of late delivery was that running the trains until they had delivered sufficient fault-free mileage meant that one required a lot of drivers in a short period of time. This was made worse by the fact that the number of hours that needed to be accumulated to ensure sufficient fault-free miles was considerably more than expected due to issues with build quality. And, every time a fault was discovered the acceptance mileage counter goes back to zero.

GTR came up with a partial solution which was to employ surplus GB Railfreight drivers to do much of the initial class 700 acceptance testing. Unfortunately this could only take place in the GTR area using spare trains paths and mileage could not be accumulated quickly. It also meant that, on occasions, these train paths could not be used for driver training.

This, of course, meant that priority on learning to drive a class 700 train was given not to GTR drivers who would eventually drive them in service but to drivers not route-trained on GTR routes and not trained to drive trains with passengers in them. In other words, great for catching up on acceptance testing but no use for either driver training or driver experience with the new rolling stock.

The second consequence of late rolling stock delivery was simply that there was a shortage of trains actually available, as in surplus to what was needed for day-to-day passenger requirements, to facilitate GTR driver training on the required rolling stock.

The above diagram indicates the complexity and scope of the driver training plan. The black horizontal line shows where GTR hoped to be by the day of the timetable change and the orange horizontal line shows where in reality they actually got to.

Not managing traffic management

At around the same time as the trains were being delivered late there was no sign of the Traffic Management System being delivered at all. Traffic Management Systems are a relatively new concept designed to take tasks such as regular route setting and managing train cancellations away from the signaller or controller so that fewer mistakes are made and the supervisors are not overwhelmed by mundane tasks.

Now, a Traffic Management System was not regarded as essential at this stage of Thameslink introduction but that was presuming a reasonable service was operating. What appears to have happened in the first few weeks of the new timetable is that so much out of course working (cancellations, delays, reinstatements) takes place that signallers and controllers become overwhelmed. To take a simple mundane example, a train to East Grinstead is cancelled but the ‘the system’, as currently installed, does not recognise that it then follows that the train must also be cancelled from East Grinstead since there is no stock at East Grinstead to run it.

The intention for Network Rail to have a Traffic Management System introduced prior to the enhanced Thameslink service was extensively reported in the railway press – as were the delays. Our understanding is that the plan was it would be installed by January 2018 and it would be fully up and running by May 2018. It also appears that GTR was relying on this when deciding on the number of controllers to manage the Thameslink system. In particular, GTR were aware of how challenging the first few days would be for controllers (even if everything else worked perfectly) when the new timetable was introduced. This is a period when controllers cannot rely on previous experience and a traffic management system would have helped reduce the impact of the chaos that was taking place by supplying better information and applying pre-determined rules.

The full Thameslink timetable with 24tph will be challenging but in the opinion of many it is a goal worth striving for. Things are bound to go wrong but it is important to have the tools in place to try and minimise the risk of minor operational errors that lead to problems and to enable recovery to take place as quickly as possible. Unfortunately those tools to assist the decision makers simply aren’t there and seem to show no signs of appearing. One could, of course, blame the suppliers for over-promising, Network Rail for not scrutinising suppliers more carefully or GTR for being too reliant on technology that simply didn’t exist.

A further timetable issue

Rather belatedly, at some point in 2017, it was publicised that there would be serious conflict between the East Midlands Trains timetable and the proposed Thameslink one. As with Windmill Bridge is it a bit puzzling why this wasn’t discovered earlier. Thameslink might only be sending a maximum of 15tph up the Midland Main Line (the same as before) but the duration was longer and the off-peak service was improved. On top of that the Thameslink timetable had to dovetail in with the East Coast Main Line so things were getting rather complicated.

What makes the matter worse was that each company (Thameslink and East Midland Trains) have different objectives. Some of these are down to franchise specifications which is down to the DfT and there is nothing to indicate that any analysis was done to ensure that the different franchise specifications were compatible.

When the crunch should have come

From April 2016 there were people within the industry who could see that that a May 2018 timetable change just was not a realistic proposition and by Christmas 2016 it was, to them, beyond doubt it was not feasible – largely due to the extreme delays in rolling stock delivery. Yet clearly those at the top either thought it was still possible – or they were powerless to stop it.

The Canal Tunnels saga

The problems just kept on coming.

The next big problem was a new section of track and its delayed opening – the Canal Tunnels. The Canal Tunnels are two tunnels that stretch from just north of St Pancras Thameslink to ‘Belle Isle’ north of King’s Cross so that Thameslink trains can join the East Coast Main Line. They were actually built as part of HS1 and prior to the approval of the Thameslink Programme although they were not fitted out.

Network Rail fitted out the tunnels with track and signalling in good time as they were needed for empty stock movements to and from the new Thameslink depot at Hornsey. From here it is hard to get to the truth but it seems that it was only empty coaching stock (ECS) that was permitted. Use of the tunnels appeared not to be authorised for passenger trains in service and, it is believed, train movements solely for the purpose of route training were not permitted either.

Without any evidence, we suspect that GTR would have liked to have started training drivers in the Canal Tunnels between Christmas 2017 and New Year 2018 when major engineering work at London Bridge would have severely curtailed the demand for drivers to operate passenger trains in service.

The problem would appear to be that Network Rail didn’t understand, or couldn’t respond to, the urgency. In fact they were planning to have the tunnels available for passenger traffic in April 2018. This would have given far too little time for sufficient driver training to enable a robust service to be run.

In the event, after a lot of pressure from GTR we are told, the tunnels were approved for use by mid February enabling GTR to start a ‘preview’ service through the tunnels on the 26th February. This preview service did not build up to nearly the level of service that passengers were led to believe was due to happen and it is clear that full advantage was not taken of the tunnels when they were available for use.

It is worth mentioning that Network Rail has some ‘form’ for underestimating time taken for others to familiarise themselves with new infrastructure and get it approved for use. At the same time as this was happening, TfL Rail were attempting to introduce 9-car Crossrail trains between Hayes & Harlington and Paddington. Network Rail promised to have the critical bay platform at Hayes & Harlington extended to 9-cars in late April and they stuck to their word. But TfL Rail are currently only running 7-car Crossrail trains because the route hasn’t yet been approved by the Office of Rail and Road (ORR) for 9-car trains.

The complexity of the depots

There was one further major problem for GTR by the end of 2017 and for once it could be argued that it was very much a self-inflicted wound. GTR had decided to introduce the Rainham route which was well outside existing GTR territory. Many routes on the Midland Main Line stopped short of Bedford yet Bedford was where the main GTR depot was on the Midland Main Line. This was not good if Thameslink was to run self-contained routes which was the (very sensible) plan so as not to propagate delays from one route to another.

Basically, throughout the Thameslink routes, depots were not all in the right places. GTR was keen to sort this out once and for all. They were possibly spurred on by the Gibb report recommending more but smaller depots and knowing how, at the time, the Secretary of State was keen to implement as many of Chris Gibb’s recommendations as possible. A further (very sensible) desire appears to be to have the depots at the outer ends of the routes where possible in order to minimise dead mileage first thing in the morning and last thing at night.

Northern Thameslink Depots with changes highlighted in red

The above table highlights the extent of depot changes in the north. Rather than have everything for the Midland Main Line concentrated at Bedford, depots were to be better distributed. From next May drivers from Hitchin Great Northern depot who transfer to Thameslink will be based at Welwyn.

The problem was that the depot changes had been left very late. In some cases it was a case of essential temporary accommodation only being placed on site days before the start of the new service. If that wasn’t bad enough, the plan required GTR drivers who knew certain existing Thameslink routes needing to be trained for new routes whilst elsewhere other drivers would be needed to be trained on the routes that the displaced drivers did know.

The above table shows the completion date for the depots in the northern area in the penultimate column. Note that Welwyn is not yet ready as it is not yet required. The final column shows the availability of class 700 stock at the depot.

Southern Thameslink Depots with changes highlighted in red

It is a similar story on the southern side. Here it is more a case of depots being increased to accommodate the extra Thameslink services although Blackfriars (counted as on the south side through stradling the river) closes due to the desire to avoid driver changes at any station that will ultimately have to handle 24tph.

When it comes to depot and train readiness, it is mostly a better picture on the southern side but the lack of trains at Gillingham will obviously cause problems.

The scale of driver training unpreparedness

What seems to be inexplicable was how the considerable amount of driver training that was needed was not being successfully tackled. As the chart below shows, routes had to be moved from other railways companies to Thameslink. Along with the routes came the transfer of some drivers. Whilst Southern and Great Northern were part of the same franchise (remember this is part of why the franchise was so big), Southeastern was not – although it was franchise owned by the same company that owned GTR.

The move of drivers from Southeastern appeared to take place very late on and little or no route training was done – though of course they already knew the route from London Bridge to Rainham with the exception of the new approach to London Bridge’s Thameslink platforms.

Another problem which can be identified is the lack of driver route readiness ‘on the other side of the river’. The table below gives an idea of the level of preparedness. One cannot read too much into this. So long as drivers can cover their side of the river it is possible to run a service using two drivers for different legs of the journey but this is undesirable and should be eliminated as quickly as possible. The extent of the problem (when you would expect most boxes to be green) gives an indication of the amount of route learning still to be done before risk factors caused by changing drivers can be eliminated.

Christmas 2017 and it is still ‘go’

Somewhat inexplicably, it appears that as late as Christmas 2017 GTR still thought their plan for the May 2018 timetable would (or at least could) work out fine. This was despite drivers telling them that training should have started at least six months prior to the new timetable. It is not entirely clear why it did not but GTR probably did not have the spare trains and also probably wanted to train the drivers on the routes using spare new class 700 stock.

Despite the delays in acquiring trains accepted into traffic, it is hard to see why drivers weren’t route learning from cabs of existing trains – even if not class 700. There would also be some ability for classroom learning but this appeared not to happen although a route training video of the approach to London Bridge was produced – in one direction only as far as we are aware. We can only presume that GTR were extremely reluctant to bring in a revised timetable to free off some drivers for training so close to Christmas. They probably had bad memories of the last time they introduced revised timetables and the considerable disquiet it caused.

Delays with final timetable approval

GTR (as do Northern Rail) make much of the delay of Network Rail’s timetable which meant they did not know exactly what service they would be operating until about three weeks before the new timetable was due to start.

This explanation, pointing the finger at Network Rail fails to explain why GTR could not have been better prepared despite this. They might not have known all the details and consequently maybe not the exact number of drivers that would be needed for each route but they had much more than a rough idea. It doesn’t explain why on day 1 some Horsham drivers don’t know the route to platforms 4 and 5 at London Bridge let alone all the way to Peterborough.

The final contingency plan

It was clear that GTR weren’t giving up and thought they had a plan to get around the delays in driver training which appear to be largely brought about by the lack of class 700 trains.

At some point fairly early in 2018, certainly well over a month before the timetable change date, GTR were in the midst of a further plan. We don’t know if it was concocted at the 11th hour or whether it was planned much earlier. It was based on the fact that they had some trained drivers for the critical sections where route knowledge was limited. This was basically the approaches to London Bridge from New Cross Gate to Finsbury Park.

GTR also had most of the drivers knowing at least half the route – some the northern half and some the southern half. The idea was that by having new drivers take over at London Bridge or Finsbury Park an individual train service could be covered by two drivers. Any short-term gaps in route knowledge in the centre could be covered by ‘conductor’ or ‘pilot’ drivers who wouldn’t actually drive but would be in the cab ensuring adherence to the relevant signals and speed limits and able to advise what to do in the event of any out of course working – such as being signalled into a platform other than the one booked. The ‘conductors’ would tend to be managers who were trained for the relevant sections of route.

The plan seemed to be an extremely risky one but, in principle, could possibly work on a good day although nothing could overcome the fact that, on certain routes (or halves of routes), there simply were not enough trained drivers. The plan had the big advantage that drivers ought to quickly become trained up on the relatively short critical sections of routes that they did not currently know. In other words, things should get better relatively quickly under this plan.

The risky plan

On the negative side, things always go wrong with the implementation of a new timetable but this one was extremely risky indeed. What if a train turned up at East Croydon, London Bridge or Finsbury Park and the driver did not know the route to continue and no conductor was present? What if the driver for the second half of the route did not turn up? Would controllers make sure they didn’t get into a situation where they sent a driver and a train out that would be unable to complete its journey? If you were short of one driver how many trains would you have to cancel as a consequence? Would the controllers be overwhelmed when things went wrong – as would inevitably happen?

A particular case in point was the route from East Croydon to London Bridge (platforms 4 and 5). Initially a pilot would be needed at East Croydon – the last stop before London Bridge. But before long a driver ought to be familiar enough to pass out from East Croydon to London Bridge platforms 4 and 5 because the only new bit of route he would have to learn would be New Cross Gate to London Bridge. He could then at least drive all the way to London Bridge unescorted which would ease the problem. Once at Blackfriars he would probably be on familiar territory. Once the short section of track, much changed since December 2014, between London Bridge and Blackfriars (and possibly Canal Tunnels) is mastered the driver has done the necessary route learning in order for the ‘two drivers per train journey’ plan to be implemented without additional use of conductors.

One of the reasons the use of conductors and a swap of drivers was extremely risky was because it relied on good rostering to ensure everyone was in the right place at the right time – and if it went wrong in a bad way it would be very hard to sort out. To roster such a complex situation you really need the final version of the timetable and that was something that GTR did not yet have.

Yet more contingency

GTR must have sensed it might go wrong a month or two beforehand because they then started to hire (or rehire) more GB Railfreight drivers to learn the route through the Thameslink core so they could supplement the conductor managers. This they did by means such as watching videos and classroom training. A considerable advantage was that some had actually driven the class 700 trains as part of their mileage accumulation.

Eventually GTR got their final timetable around three weeks before it was due to come into effect. Only now could they finalise details of the rosters and be sure various diagrams did not go over drivers allotted hours and that they had allowed sufficient time to take over the next train. They could also now determine whether ‘conductors’ would make various connections which might influence how many to allocate on a particular route – assuming they had sufficient in the first place.

The stage is set

Why the timetable was so late being approved is a story in itself but it wouldn’t have been so critical if the trains had been delivered on time and all the drivers were both trained to drive the class 700 trains and also route-trained on the complete route that they had been allocated to operate.

With only the Secretary of State having the power to overrule the industry board and cancel or postpone the new timetable it was really only a matter of waiting to find out how many hours the timetable could operate before it would fall over.

The inevitable collapse

Not surprisingly, the timetable completely fell apart on the first Sunday and although the situation has improved somewhat it is still “completely unsatisfactory”. Charles Horton the head of GTR has resigned over the issue but in the official announcement he states

“We are committed to working with the Department for Transport and Network Rail to address recent problems and to deliver a reliable, punctual service for passengers.”

which seems to make it clear he doesn’t think GTR and himself personally are the only people or organisations at fault. Probably, his only sin is not his failure to plan as such but his failure to plan sufficiently for when the plans of others fail.

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Thanks to all who have supplied information to make this article possible especially ngh for considerable research and construction of graphs and tables.

835 comments

  1. The overall impression is a total absence of a “Guiding Mind” – no-one was in overall control or appearing to even attempt to co-ordinate matters.
    As I write this Mr Horton is probably giving evidence to the Select Committee, which could be interesting.
    Regarding a “guiding mind” … Network Rail is government owned & contolled (ultimately)
    The government were intimately involved with the preceding drivers’ dispute on “Southern”, were they not? And I am given to understand that government were “pushing” for Thamseslink to fully open, whilst, at the same time, if only through their intermediaries, actually slowing things down ( the acceptance moratorium, for instance )

    A question naturally presents itself: How long to getting a properly working & reliable time table?

  2. What a lot of detail. Let’s hope that “the newspapers” can see this.

    Oh yeah, I love the flowchart.

    As they say TLDR is SNAFU?

  3. What an excellent article. I really do feel it should reach a wider audience in the national press.

  4. @Greg
    I think the answer to your final question is never whilst GTR are running things. It isn’t a complaint – it’s an observation!

  5. There is a key question:
    “Who, and what point, could have pulled the plug, and said ‘Stop’!”
    “Get this right before we proceed further into the mire.”

    The Thameslink Project was ordained by the DfT. The Project was under huge pressure to deliver. It struggled with the civil engineering etc, as discussed at the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee meeting on 5th Dec 2017.

    https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmpubacc/466/466.pdf

    The follow-on from the engineering, and developed in parallel, was the operational railway and its services. It was DfT which specified what the operational railway should be, in terms of a franchise entity, routes and service patterns, and train procurement. Indeed, only the DfT was responsible for train procurement.

    Only the DfT could tell multiple franchises, all locked into contractual commitments with the client (the DfT), to change course because otherwise many travel needs (something close to 20% of UK rail journeys occur on the GTR network) might fall over, which might in turn be in no-one’s interest.

    A similar parallel was occurring in Northern England, simultaneously.

    There is always a hard judgment in some circumstances, whether it is better to press on and bear a suggested short-term discomfort, or to retrench and prepare more carefully for the next re-engagement.

    However it is the contractual situation which has prevailed in other circumstances as well, going back into history. Which may have meant, you have to press on regardless. Is that written anywhere in the franchise documentation? If not, then GTR had discretion.

    In either case, this is a living, breathing railway. So who might have told the DfT what, when, that the Thameslink Project needed a pause to re-group before a fundamentally new timetable and service organisation – and what did the DfT say in reply?

    No doubt the Gibb Report (2016) offered some solutions. But the solutions don’t seem to have been adequate, and based on the article, were clearly known to be inadequate some way in advance of May 2018.

    It is not often that one seeks to define an overall culpability. This may be one occasion when all parties involved, should be asked what they did and didn’t do, at each stage in the process. Hopefully Stephen Glaister is addressing this.

  6. You guys do sterling work pulling together these articles – this is another great work. Thank you.

    Re Greg’s comment – the first comment. Was there really no guiding mind? In a programme of such complexity did no-one have the responsibility to monitor the overall programme readiness across all the various strands you identified? Things are worse than I feared if that’s true.

    My background is large scale integration projects in the private sector. I’d have expected someone to have the responsibility to produce an overall programme status report – and on the basis of what you’ve written here this should have been status red for at least the last year (red going on screaming scarlet).
    That said. I have observed huge work programmes where such a reporting structure does exist – but it doesn’t mean the truth is told. I’ve seen examples where a red status is never shown (even when that’s the truth) because reporting status red would be career suicide for the people involved.
    I believe Mr Bull of this parish refers to that as the thermocline of truth….

  7. Its the flowchart that makes it!

    I hope when LR gets round to hiring a resident cartoonist that they are instructed to use MS Paint liberally!

  8. PoP…..masterful article. It paints rather a different picture to what was presented to the Select Committee. The Select Committee emphasis was that it all went wrong a few seeks before the “go” date – and it was too late to stop. Would you care to have a stab at when it should have been absolutely clear that this was going to be a chaotic AND there was still time to postpone, bearing in mind the impact on all the other players?

  9. “In the unlikely even that they a TOC still has spare drivers”

    even should be event, after that I’m not sure of the intention. Possibly just delete “they”?

    [Corrected. Thanks. Should be ‘In the unlikely event a TOC …’ PoP]

  10. 100andthirty,

    I can’t directly answer your question but…

    The select committee meeting gave the impression to me of a railway industry who had concocted an explanation they all could accept and they universally put that forward. They might as well have just had one witness such was their unanimity.

    This bit about it was all the delayed timetable is clearly nonsense otherwise we would be seeing a far better service by now as rosters etc. are sorted out. If 12 weeks after introduction the timetable dramatically improves (to the extent all trains are restored) I would be prepared to accept they might have a plausible argument.

    By far the most telling moment for me was when Charles Horton explained it was never the intention to have drivers fully route- trained by day one i.e. rely on two drivers for two legs of a train journey. To me this is daft. Introducing a new timetable is fraught with problems. You do all you can in advance to remove the risk. You don’t go into it knowing you are relying on contingency measures from the start. You hold those back for the unknown unknowns.

  11. As a general point, the details, tables and graphs are an essential part of the story and (with the exception of the flowchart which I am rather proud of) these were all done by ngh and it must have taken an incredible amount of analysis.

    There are also lots of other people, some who must remain anonymous, who made this article possible.

  12. A few bits of info to add:

    Company standards state that the route being learnt *must* be driven at least once prior to assessment (and then driven on assessment) unless it is a very basic diversionary line or some other extenuating circumstance. This situation does not meet an extenuating circumstance as it is of the company’s own doing. The fact that they couldn’t get the paths for the training trains in to SE territory to do the necessary train handling was also a major problem with 12 route learners in some class 700 cabs at times. (The whole route and diversionaries from Blackfriars to Rainham is I *think* 25 days route learning.)

    Although some route learning can then be done from SE cabs, one is at the mercy of other drivers there to learn the route and hoping that a SE driver is willing and authorised (certain drivers can’t have company in the cab) to let you in. Then there was the additional problem of the amount of changes needed to learn all the way through to Rainham with diversionaries in SE cabs often resulting at a change at London Bridge, Dartford, Gillingham to name but a few. The drivers doing the route training for Rainham only started learning the route themselves in February. The whole May timetable has been the worst kept secret to us inside the company – I don’t think there is one driver who thought things were being adequately planned.

    Furthermore, two and a half weeks prior to the timetable coming in, all training was cancelled at Selhurst and Hornsey and managers were sent out to learn new routes to conduct or train as necessary. There were also a mass of SE trained TL drivers who were waiting Class 700 traction courses and then required accompanying over the new route for handling experience. This itself I should being hampered enormously by the sheer amount of cancellations. However, Gillingham depot (still not finished) is now up to establishment for the emergency timetable with a handful of drivers off learning Dartford to Blackfriars. For those left they are sat around waiting to see if the trains get through to Dartford in the first place before taking them on to Rainham.

    The T&C drivers were used almost exclusively to drive services between East Croydon and Finsbury Park. The Canal Tunnels themselves are actually a short bit of route learning done via a brief. However you are correct in noting that they were not used at all in passenger service until very late on and as a result no one aside from the T&C drivers on TL signed through to Finsbury Park – the issue was not so much learning Canal Tunnels but learning through to Finsbury Park.

    700 FLU’s [Full Length Units] are still currently banned on all SE routes and this won’t change for some time (the usual signal sighting issues, boards, lighting and the like…)

    And finally I think, as you state the route learning started very late. Drivers didn’t even know which depot they were going to or what route that depot was learning until very late. This further compounded the problem.

  13. Train Management System should be Traffic Management System
    [Oops yes. Now changed, thanks PoP]

    Depending on the TOC, rosters can’t be redone once they are issued. Three weeks to do the diagramming and rostering in a brand new train planning system (yes GTR introduced a new to the industry train planning system in May 18 too!) is far too short. With a timetable change this large, GTR really needed the full 22 weeks since offer response from NR. 3 weeks will likely have produced awfully unproductive diagrams and awful rosters.

    Reports on a different forum also suggest that due to T’s & C’s, there are whole mess rooms of drivers that have little work at their new depot, and sit spare for a few hours before their T’s & C’s allow them to go home as they have no uncovered running turn they can cover.

    All this coupled, means there may well now be the correct establishment, but it may not all be rectified until December, or when the unions next let them change the roster.

  14. Jonathon Roberts
    In response to your question about plug-pulling:
    Either no-one at all – because there was no “guiding mind ” /OR/, the DfT & its boss, Mr G …
    I think I will leave that decision to the select committee, too.

    PoP
    Thanks, but I think life’s too short, given what you have just said!

    130
    Should we, therefore, offically submit this article, with the comments, to the select committee, then?
    Could be highly amusing, for certain values of amusing.

  15. While this article is incredibly detailed and an interesting read, I can’t help but feel that this blog is becoming a little monothematic of late…

  16. @PoP proofing feedback

    [snip for brevity. Thanks for those. Now corrected. PoP]

    Will there be a Pt 3 about the resolution, ‘amended’ temporary timetable – Rainham was withdrawn, also buses used with no ‘timetabled’ arrival time. Someone will have charts about performance, and who/how rescued some regularity to the service.

    [There will probably be a part 3 based on what was originally going to be part 2 and is already written but what the exact content will be about is not finalised at this stage. PoP]

    Also your term ‘conductor’ could be any knowledgable party the implication here was Driver Instructor and Other route certified drivers. In the press statements GTR said ‘Driver Manager’ which in their recruitment job spec is a local Operations Manager for a section of route. So basically anyone in GTR with requisite route knowledge just not enough of them.

    [As I understand it, anyone with the requisite route knowledge can ‘conduct’. It doesn’t have to be a driver but normally is. Ideally it would be a driver who was passed out to drive the train being conducted but this is certainly not essential. PoP]

  17. Some quick thoughts from a speed viewing of the Transport Select Committee session.

    1. Complete detachment of GTR management (and industry readiness board) from
    a) any hand on role in things
    b) any attention to any detail /data sources
    This leads to belief in what they are being fed and complete inability to question or to do critical analysis themselves (also worth noting the level of detail that Chris Gibb was fed information at 1.75 years ago so it is slightly endemic)
    A good thermocline of truth example?

    2. GTR – only trying to do a driver rota when they knew there were no outstanding objections from other TOCs so ORR would sign off the timetable to save themselves extraneous effort, at which point they then discovered the computer said “no” rather spectacularly…

    Needless to say several LR authors and commentators weren’t surprised there weren’t enough drivers (as seen in comments before the Timetable change) as they could all do the basic maths given the relative level of driver training.
    Any competent organisation should have known roughly what the combined level of driver competencies and permutations required to run the proposed timetables was so that when actually competency levels and training rates were falling far short alarm bells should have been ringing earlier. Unless of course those in GTR could do the different maths but only repeating that ingrained in the existing operations.
    TL Driver’s comment ” I don’t think there is one driver who thought things were being adequately planned.” sums up the situation well. But then again DfT accepted a winning bin with low levels of staffing in control and planning (reduced after merging SN and TL/GN functions) because it liked the lower cost this brings is completely complicit in the results.

    3. DfT binning 3 months of industry work when the decided to defer introduction of some parts of the programme after detailed work had begun didn’t get enough attention…

  18. Re PoP and 130,

    By far the most telling moment for me was when Charles Horton explained it was never the intention to have drivers fully route- trained by day one i.e. rely on two drivers for two legs of a train journey. To me this is daft. Introducing a new timetable is fraught with problems. You do all you can in advance to remove the risk. You don’t go into it knowing you are relying on contingency measures from the start. You hold those back for the unknown unknowns

    But this has been the plan for very long time – the rolling stock delays started to make this inevitable 26+months ago but no alternative action was taken just (inaction) the choice to be less resilient and efficient after the timetable change for while, which will get sorted in time.

    GTR are obviously still struggling to see the wood from the trees in that they are trying to blame the deckchair arrangers for the shortage of driftwood to hang on to not Captain Smith et al. for hitting the iceberg in the first place.

  19. Interesting article, albeit a little “over my head” in parts as one with only “enthusiast” knowledge. Love the job advert at the end!

  20. @GREG TINGEY

    OK, being one of Thather’s Children starting out in the adult world in the 1980s, my impression that there wasn’t supposed to be a “Guiding Mind” because, according to professor Sir Alan Arthur Walters et al there was only the “invisible hand of the market”.

    My personal reading of the UK rail privatisation and it’s fall-out is that the attempt to create a “market” in the wrong place, driven by the advice that John Major’s government got. They failed totally to notice the needs/uses of the rolling stock, and that the rail network was a natural government monopoly and that you need over-supply of capacity for competition to work.

    At the time I recall this being described as “over nostalgic” for the Railway Mania era.

    It worked well in telecoms where it was possible to easily create over-supply of the backbone network with fibre-optics; it sort-of worked OK with the electric and gas and utterly didn’t work for rail and water, in my opinion.

  21. I am intrigued by the notion of there being depots at St. Albans and Luton, where there is stabling for approx. 1 train as far as I can tell. What makes a depot a depot in industry terms?

  22. Dave,

    Not knowing the locations involved, I did wonder if ‘signing on point’ might have been better. The cynical answer to your question is an appropriately designated temporary accommodation (often referred to as ‘Portakabin’) where there is a locker for each driver.

    Note that Blackfriars ‘depot’ has closed or is in the process of closing.

  23. Rest day working and retraining on the new class 800’s are causing serious problems with Great Western at the moment, and it doesn’t appear to have been picked up by news outlets.

    My daughter lives in Cheltenham and works in London, travelling up on a Sunday afternoon. For the past 2 months, the service has been getting worse and worse to the extent that last Sunday, there was a single Great Western up train from Cheltenham all afternoon. The ticket office staff told her that they should probably just close the line on a Sunday because the service has got so bad. I too have noticed large numbers of cancellations from Paddington on Saturday afternoons due to staff shortages.

  24. Re Dave,

    All discussion in the article on depots relates to driver depots which often don’t align with train depots where trains are stored and maintained.

    e.g. 4 MML driver depots
    2 align with train depots /stabling i.e. Bedford and Cricklewood
    2 don’t align with train depots /stabling i.e. Luton and St Albans

    Signing on points – all done with tablets these days on GTR so not physicality apart from an office messroooms and some driver parking. A good example of minimum facilities is the new Portakabins at Gillingham. A lot of the time the early Luton and St Albans drivers will be collecting their trains from Bedford and Cricklewood (and v/v the late evening drivers).

    St Albans for example is the effectively just a driver link (mostly ex Bedford drivers) covering the Sutton – Wimbledon Loop services.

  25. Jimbo,

    The cynic in me asks whether there are any winners in this. There clearly are. Passengers on Southern, London Overground (especially East London Line) and Southeastern have an improved service – partly because of a less conflicting timetable. Those TOCs/TfL subsidairies have all produced better performance figures.

    I would also add GWR (but not their passengers), who would be very much in the spotlight if it weren’t for problems elsewhere, are benefitting from all this. The lack of news coverage over their level of Sunday cancellations is a bit surprising but I suspect the news outlets have bigger fish to fry.

    I really think only the DfT can sort out this Rest Day Sunday Working issue as a short term franchise (seven years) has little incentive to rock the boat. It really needs to be in the franchise conditions that sufficient drivers must be employed and rest day working must not be relied upon for running the standard timetable.

  26. Re Jimbo,

    When GTR and Northern are providing big distractions they won’t!

    Needless to say the GWR issues has been noted in LR towers. Needless to say you actually need extra drivers to cover

    The extent of live GWML electrification is actually growing but GWR are focused on class 800 training rather than changing electric – diesel swap over points.

    Again lack of stock this time 800s has been a big problems for GWR and they are playing catch-up by ramping the training rate (resulting in cancellations etc.) unlike GTR who didn’t attempt catch up.

  27. This is interesting, any chance you could also look at the new timetables as planned? It’s not only that the service has been terrible the last few weeks but also that new timetable is much worse than the old one (unless you are the mythical Cambridge-Brighton commuter).

    As a commuter I responded to the proposed timetable changes for Great Northern pointing out the places where it wasn’t going to work -at least for me and the hundreds doing a similar commute i.e. getting into KGX at 8:20 to get to work for 9am, leaving KGX just after 18:00.

    Whilst the local rail user groups have tried very hard to get a better service for us there’s no denying my previously reasonable commute where I always got a seat is now terrible. To get a seat on my one morning train (was previously three between 07:45-08:05) I have to leave the house 5 minutes earlier to catch a train starting 5 mins later. A few stops down the line at Knebworth and Welwyn North people cannot even get onto the train (first class is frequently declassified either by the driver or by unofficial passenger action).

    Leaving work 20 mins early to get the one train going my way that will get me home before 7pm. Slower trains, no express (until they added stops back in on the KGX-Kings Lynn 12/42 services on the ’emergency timetable’).

    The more trains/more seats we were promised just hasn’t happened. Fewer trains, fewer seats, longer journeys and an ever increasing commuting population.

  28. Many thanks. I have also watched (first) the Transport Committee hearing and in the latter I was struck by two aspects. One already mentioned was the parrot like sound as everyone used the same story line.

    More important (and not relevant to Thameslink) was the way Northern seemed to think their “client” was “Rail North” and not the passengers. With Thameslink there was slightly less emphasis on DfT – deliberately because no-one was blaming the paymaster.

    The vertically integrated systems pre-48 and under BR until sectorisation might have stopped Thameslink ever existing (who knows?) – but the GM (or equivalent) had direct reports on stock, civil engineering, operations, revenue and so on. Without a single management structure answerable to passengers then I am not sure our railways can work for the benefit of those who pay.

  29. Am I allowed a second comment please?

    One aspect I do not understand is how there is such poor communication to passengers of what is happening and how short notice changes are being “decided” and “conveyed” to staff and passengers.

    If you are able to explain why this appears to be so poor it would be welcomed as there was no answer given to the Transport Committee either as far as I could determine.

    Thank you

  30. Truly excellent analysis with just the right amount of technical data so even a simple layman like me can understand it. Will you please submit this as written evidence to the Transport Committee along with your wise comments on yesterday’s witness evidence. Donation on its way.

  31. “92TS 19 June 2018 at 00:01

    While this article is incredibly detailed and an interesting read, I can’t help but feel that this blog is becoming a little monothematic of late…”

    There is definitely an emphasis in this blog on those routes where the authors have knowledge and expertise, namely Thameslink/Southern/Southeastern and Crossrail (plus LU of course). Some routes definitely seem to get less attention than they deserve – hard to recall many articles on the LSWR and WCML routes in recent years.

    Not knocking what is written of course – this is another excellent feature.

  32. James,

    Something we are well aware of and we do try to write about areas other than our own back yard. But, it is very easy to get stuff wrong if you are not very familiar with the ground so it is generally harder work. Besides we do write extensively about the Underground (much more prominent north of the river) and it is a case that suburban railways are much more prevalent in the south. And Crossrail only impinges south of the river at a couple of stations until you go out to Maidenhead and we write a lot about that.

    We would love to have a regular writer from north of the river who could enable us to have more balanced coverage.

  33. This article is a monument to investigative journalism; the quality of the analysis and its presentation would shame a number of consultancies who would have been paid …

    @KRW – I think you misunderstand sectorisation; in its end state – OfQ – the sectors, indeed, the subsectors controlled their own infrastructure and the subsector managers were personally accountable for the performance of their integrated ops and infrastructure. The fact that we reached this happy stage one week before Railtrack took over that infrastructure is just one amongst many unhappy features of privatisation.

    @KRW TLK would most certainly happened under sectorisation. As I have explained above, it was developed by the NSE sector and we had firm plans to implement it asap (1998 initially). Unfortunately, the sector, and its subsectors vanished before anything could be done beyond what had been achieved by then…. Even so, the core of today’s TLK was up and running well before BRB quit the scene.

    @Helbel and others – although it is perhaps for the moderators to point out rather than me, and although modesty may prevent them from saying so, it is important to note that this site is free and the articles produced for it are produced pro bono – the authors either have day jobs or are retired, but they are not paid for their work here. In the circs, it isn’t reasonable to demand that they investigate every complaint.

    I fully support those who argue that this article should be sent to the Transport Committee. I don’t myself still have many contacts amongst MPs, but I know some of the contributors and commentators here do; perhaps they might consider helping out, if the authors are willing.

  34. Re James,

    There been a few on LSWR issues and I’ll certainly be aiming to do few more (next stage of Waterloo, LSWR fleet and timetabling changes (probably deferred to May ’19 from this December).

    WCML routes – Watford (Croxley) and HS2 service levels and timetabling impact articles a while ago and some more recent coverage on the LO changes.

  35. @James, NGH:

    Indeed, in regards to Croxley the only news is that the Metropolitan Line Extension (MLE) web page has been quietly removed from the TfL website in preparation for its transport and works act (TWAO) lapsing in August – but that’s hardly unsurprising nor article worthy given the most recent articles, lack of rescue finance package and proliferation of alternate crayonista schemes!

  36. Thank you for a very thorough analysis.
    After listening to yesterday’s Transport Select Committee hearing into the May 2018 timetable I took the liberty of forwarding the article to the clerk of that committee just in case they were unaware of your observations.

    Thus:-
    Dear Mr Clarke,

    Having watched yesterday’s proceedings I would be grateful if you would ensure that the Committee considers the following analysis by London Reconnections of the TSGN decision time-line. Even as an outsider, I thought the claims made by both panels about who knew what and when were inaccurate as I had been aware of possible, specific problems for at least the past two and a half years.

    Please would you record my observation to the committee that the May 2018 timetable change has effectively removed 33% of the choice rail-users have from where I live in West Hampstead. The present emergency timetable is not credible. Still, having 66% left to choose from is a luxury that other, more rural dwellers, do not have. TL 2000 has been a £multi-billion investment where, without the necessary, effective oversight, the service offered now is so much poorer than what it replaced. This should not have been allowed to happen. In lieu of an effective industry structure, responsibility must rest with the DFT.

    I would be grateful if you would acknowledge receipt of these observations.

    Thank you for your attention.
    Donald Mackinnon.

  37. Re Helbel,

    GN is very much in a state of flux at the moment so plenty of unintended consequences going on. there is reason it is called railplan 2020…

    The proposed Timetable changes at a high level were covered 21 months ago:
    https://www.londonreconnections.com/2016/govia-go-via-greenwich/

    There are several ECML issue we haven’t cover in the recent articles yet that may make it into other articles.

    1. The GN network used to be a mix of 15*/20minute timetable basis but is now 15mins* which is needed for Thameslink as well as Moorgate 717 intorduction increased service levels and ATO/ECTS

    *Often seen as 30min repeating

    2. The 8 tph GN Thameslink services have to fit very defined time slots through the core and avoid the flighting/batching of VTEC (today) / LNER (tomorrow) /Open access services on the ECML fasts (from KGX Northbound at xx00/05/08/27+xx30/35/38/48(48 slot is going to change in future)

    So: Pancras Northbound departures from Dec 2019:
    xx00/xx30 TL6 Brighton – Cambridge stopping at the villages (slow)
    xx08/xx38 TL8 Sevenoaks – WGC stopping (slow)
    xx13/xx43 TL7 Ashford – Cambridge North (fast)
    xx15/xx45 TL5 Horsham -Peterborough (fast)

    Note the flighting of the 2 faster TL services on the ECML.

  38. Snowy 12:39

    Actually I think there is a bit more than that. As I understand it, the Mayor, acting on TfL advice, offered a very hi-tech busway and one of the options was to do at least some of the infrastructure to railway standards. The aim being that the busway would be a first stage and leave the railway option open for the future if traffic built up. I got the impression it was flatly rejected the moment the word ‘bus’ was mentioned.

    Mark Wild, LU boss, reckons that just the signalling on an extension would cost between £50m and £60m which gives the impression there is a bit of a mismatch between what is required to incorporate it into the Metropolitan line and what is really needed at an affordable price.

  39. Thanks for the link and info. I do appreciate the articles and the research that has gone into them. I’m drafting my letter of complaint to Great Northern at the moment…

  40. Superb article, as always. Thank you. What a sorry saga!
    I get the impression that it’s not just that there is no overall guiding mind, but that under the present arrangements no-one is actually concerned about passengers. Each organisation is does its best to meet its short-term contractual requirements and none of these seem to relate to seats being available at a published time going to a useful destination when things go wrong.

    As my interest is the Cambridge services I was amazed to read that NR planned for the canal tunnels to be used only for ecs workings until April. Who’s responsibility was this? NR or ORR? What archaic piece of legislation distinguishes between ecs and training workings anyway? Furthermore, surely the only reason passengers should have been banned was inadequate evacuation procedures, and these must have been in place?

    Is there no provision in the modern railway for the concept of ‘risk assessment’, comparing the risks of alternative strategies and going for the least risky?

  41. @ PoP – an excellent detailed article. I sat through the Select Cttee session yesterday afternoon and was open mouthed at the nonsense that Mr Horton was spouting. I’d have been shouting if I’d read this article yesterday lunchtime. As you say above it was clear an “agreed line” had been set by the TOC reps which was “NR are to blame, we are not to blame, the DfT are wonderful”. This, of course, is palpable nonsense as your article sets out. The MPs clearly wanted named individuals to blame but they didn’t get any. How on earth GTR had the sheer “brass neck” to take the stance they did given the vast evidence to the contrary is beyond me but then I appear to be in possession of some scruples. I just hope the Transport Select Cttee members read this article and realise they were “done over” by GTR yesterday and that they drag them back and take them through every point the article raises. If nothing else the poor passengers and staff caught in this mess deserve the answers being made public.

    There are several things that bother me with the GTR situation. Even accepting that elements of the “old job” (old service structure) had to change in May many bits didn’t and yet those services have also fallen to bits. The Sutton loop is a mess, Bedford – Brighton is a mess and yet they ran reasonably before the timetable change. The other aspect, based on comment on other forums, is that the GN service is now seemingly falling apart even if it is not meant to be run by Thameslink stock/drivers. The inners and Kings Lynn services are apparently suffering too. I can’t get my head round why that should be the case – esp late pick up trains from sidings, cancellations of last trains. These should all be “no nos” in any railway operation but GTR seem not to care anymore. Again from comment elsewhere it seems GTR drivers are not in the best frame of mind at the moment. Clearly from some of the comments they are being “mucked about” and having their time wasted which bodes very badly indeed for the future. An unco-operative, demotivated workforce is the last thing GTR needs but this seems to be another issue they are ignoring.

    @ Ngh – love the driftwood, iceberg, ship analogy above. Suitably pointed and “bitchy” to reflect the utter shambles that is prevailing.

    One prevailing theme from the Select Cttee session was the way senior management were locked into what I call “macho can do” mode until almost the last minute when it must have been obvious to anyone with knowledge, experience and a brain that it was a shambles. OK I’m a pretty cynically minded person but sometimes you need some dispassionate analysis and thought to actually spot what’s wrong. I saw this on the old SSR resignalling project and knew it would fail and, eventually, it was scrapped at the cost of many hundreds of millions of quid. Worse in the case of GTR was the apparent use of multiple experts who also didn’t spot (or didn’t shout loudly) that things were going wrong. Were they all in some sort of “Thameslink Trance”? Bizarre.

  42. Re WW,

    As covered several of the recent articles and comments:

    1 .GTR launched a new crew rostering system in May… May be not the best timing to roll out new software.

    2. Sutton – Wimbledon Loop is now the responsibility of the the new St Albans Driver depot rather than Bedford and Blackfriars

    3. The changes have shown that GN management and ops are of the same quality and capabilities and TL or SN/GX (if you like watery metaphors the water level has suddenly dropped due to a Tsumani and the GN have been caught with out any trunks on…). The issues go back well over decade to the WAGN split and FCC not realising that they would have to resource up GN ops.

  43. @WW 13:24 – Isn’t ‘macho can do mode’ built into our present culture? All the advice given to people going for job interviews etc. is to blow their own trumpets, and the jobs go to trumpet blowers rather than realists. In any system based on competition rather than cooperation this seems to be inevitable.

  44. RE WW,

    PS Kings Cross “Control” is in shadow run down mode from yesterday (was in handover mode from May TT change Day till the weekend) with Three Bridges now the lead GN Control centre during ththe second half of the hand over with Kings Cross control closing in a fortnight.

  45. Re Roger B,

    And no one is interested in the detail until it comes back and bites their arm off…

  46. @ Ngh – thanks for the extra details. Perhaps I take too simple an approach but how on earth can control management inadequacies be allowed to last for a decade with no one doing anything about it? Yet another thing which is contributing to a massive ongoing disaster.

    Wasn’t aware of that KX control related change – possibly explains the evident chaos with cancelled / short formed trains yesterday. It does strike me that no one has properly considered the need to perhaps pause things like this change given the all pervading chaos. Talk about adding to the mess.

    Sorry one more question – when Thameslink was ripped away from London Bridge 4 years ago were the drivers already “signed” on the alternative routes via Southern tracks? I ask because there seemingly wasn’t a massive route learning need back then.

  47. Re WW,

    Yes because TL only went through London Bridge Off-Peak and via E&C during the peak so no route training but:

    DfT “forgot” (they were told by the previous TOCs 5 years ago) that going via E&C off-peak too would increase the driver (and stock) requirement as the journey time is longer, hence a second part of the initial GTR era TL driver shortage which was covered for 2 years by Southern with both stock and drivers (the “TL” London Bridge – Brighton services). DfT’s “forgetfulness” helped give GTR another get out of jail card.

  48. Regarding ‘macho mode’.

    I did have a theory about this. GTR have encountered problem after problem with this franchise. Not enough drivers at the start, union troubles, late deliveries of trains, faulty trains, challenges getting the mileage on new units, new timetables in 2015, loads of Network Rail problems and London Bridge off the top of my head.

    To each of these problems they got over them (or they went away but GTR believes they solved them). To give them credit GTR have had a very challenging franchise with most of the problems not of their making. Once you have done all that you develop an attitude of believing you can overcome everything. So you hit another problem and instead of standing back and saying ‘hey, this is too difficult, whoa’ you think you can work to solve this problem too.

    The analogy I drew was with a climber near the summit of Everest at one o’clock in the afternoon. He is not at the summit but so close. He has overcome tremendous challenges to get there . Any rational person would think that you turn back now if you value your life but the idea that you can overcome difficulties, as you have done in the past few days, overwhelms the climber and he goes for the summit only to be added to the statistics of climbers who did not turn round when they should and consequently didn’t make it home.

    I notice that the witnesses at the Transport Select Committee were more or less saying this but not in the same way.

    Apologies for not managing to include a single iceberg or deckchair in my analogy.

  49. NGH – I can’t believe I’m reading this. GN to be run from Three Bridges?
    Not much scope for face to face contact, or cooperation with East Coast?
    Doesn’t bode well for the Kings Cross rebuild.

  50. Walthamstow Writer,

    When Thameslink was ripped away from London Bridge 4 years ago were the drivers already “signed” on the alternative routes via Southern tracks? I ask because there seemingly wasn’t a massive route learning need back then.

    Because:
    a) it was the standard diversionary route (actually there are two) known by all drivers
    b) it was the only route available in peak hours (except for 1tph) so the drivers used it on a Monday-Friday basis.

  51. A fun read. What a nightmare. I can only imagine the desperation on the frontline as the deadline approached.

    It would be nice if “The Stage Is Set” diagram has a logo of the entity most to blame for the decision/situation… Also “Ineffficient” misspelling on there. Try a prettier flowchart tool like Lucidchart (free, online) maybe?

  52. RogerB,

    Well maybe GN will put bodies in Three Bridges just as London Overground do to get that face-to-face contact.

    Another concern from railwaymen with long memories is that York always gives priority to East Coast trains – and it is a belief still widely held today. So maybe at least Three Bridges is better than York.

  53. Thanks for the excellent analysis. I read and listened to the various industry/DfT statements and couldn’t work out which bits are misleading and which are very misleading. Now it is so much clearer.

  54. WW:

    Yes all TL drivers signed the diversionary route via Herne Hill prior to 2014. There were a number of peak services that went that way and thus that route knowledge was essential.

  55. Sykobee,

    Thanks for spotting the error on the chart. I have corrected it.

    Yes, maybe I could learn another software package for a flowchart. And I could learn to use spreadsheets (avoided throughout my life) and perhaps I ought to get to grips with a decent drawing package. And if I mastered html a bit better I could probably improve on the formatting of the text.

    But life is too short and I would rather be doing something else. If someone wants to improve on what I have done then I will willingly use their version rather than mine.

  56. A fantastic article thank you. Somehow I hadn’t seen the delayed trains (dft again!) as a reason mentioned so far.

    One small thing I’m curious on, while it’s well documented FCC help lead to the lack of drivers for thameslink. but the previous franchisee of ‘South Central’ was the very same Govia Southern. So not sure how they ended up with a lack of drivers in 2016 and onwards.

  57. @ROGERB – Doesn’t bode well for the Kings Cross rebuild.

    With visions of the ‘Not another one lady’.
    Are you referencing staffing numbers, relations, training?
    EC franchise, infrastructure, suburban platforms ?

  58. This sounds like the classic project “Death March” where everyone involved knows failure is inevitable, except senior management, for whom everyone pointing out the reality is a work-shy naysayer.

    Indeed, actually understanding the detail and minutiae of what must happen and why it is simply not possible is considered a disadvantage by some management types who insist everything is a matter of belief, teamwork, motivation and will power. Unfortunately management chutzpah has never been able to bend reality (and many have tried!)

  59. Chris Keene,

    That very point bothered me a bit as I was writing it. To some extent it can be explained by the fact that it was now one big company.

    I suspect more pertinent was that the bulk of the driver training was concentrated north of the river – I forget where exactly – and I suspect drivers were allocated to Thameslink posts whereas Southern continued with their trickle of drivers being trained.

    I sort of covered this in Meltdown Monday. One reason given there is that GTR had assumed an unrealistically low rate of staff turnover.

  60. For some reason the headline reminded me of the nursery rhyme “Mary Mary”, so I just had to do this…

    “Horton, Horton,
    Trains transportin’
    Why is your railway slow?”
    “There’s Holy Grails and Thameslink Fails
    So now I think I’ll probably go.”

    (And I know the second line is pretty dubious, but let’s be honest, “quite contrary” was clearly dreamt up as the only thing they could find where the last two syllables rhymed with “Mary”…)

  61. Ref the Traffic Management (TM) system at Three Bridges, while the official line is that it is not needed until the 24 tph service starts, its late development also affects current operation. The Siemens work stations at TBSC (Three Bridges signal box) don’t have IECC (Integrated Electronic Control Centre, ie the signaling control room)-style Automatic Route Setting (ARS). Instead the intention is that the Interfaced TM will download an updated timetable every 15 minutes which the Siemens WestCad control system will run. However, on an inner suburban railway minor perturbations can crop up in five minutes, let alone 15 and these are the sort of changes ASR is designed to smooth out.

    Add the lack of ARS to the situation where new short term timetables for Thameslink are being loaded nightly and I suspect that there is a lot of manual signalling being required at Three Bridges and its fringe boxes at Kings Cross and West Hampstead, adding to the signallers’ workload.

    While the TM at Three Bridges is not ready to control a live railway, I understand it is being used to check the next day’s timetable for potential conflicts.

    [Abbreviation explanations added for clarity. LBM]

  62. Re Chris Keene,

    Delayed trains – they will be when others start seeing the wood for the trees. the focus has all been on recent issues with virtually no one looking back to the start of the chain of events.

    1) The during the London Bridge works the driver requirement went up (lots of increased journey times and longer dwell times at termini for stock /drivers.
    2) As above Southern ran some TL services
    3) With route changes* and increasing service levels the required Southern headcount increased

    *e.g. headcount required to operate Southern and TL East Grinstead services post split is higher than pre-split (all southern) as the timetable was previously optimised to minimise headcount (this is the simplest example of many)

    4) Splitting driver depots between SN and TL e.g. Horsham (50%:50%) means that numbers required to cover for holidays and illness actually increase.
    5) they wanted to reduce the reliance on Rest Day Working which means increased headcount.
    6) Extra drivers are required to cover for additional training
    7) the effective number of southern services has increased (excluding the transfers to TL)

    and plenty more…

    The gist is that recruitment and training to increase rather than maintain headcount had to start happening under both the old TOCs but DfT wasn’t prepared to fund it for the old TOCs only the new combined GTR.

  63. @ ALEKS – yes all of those and more. The plan is (was?) to have 50% of the station closed for 3 months Jan – March 2020. They’d better have the Canal Tunnels running smoothly by then.

  64. Thanks for another fascinating, informative article. One thing that puzzles me and forgive me for asking as I haven’t found an answer or explanation elsewhere … in layman’s terms, what exactly is involved in route learning and why does it require so much time? What does a driver need to know and learn to sign a new route? Don’t you just follow what’s on the dashboard and not go too much over a speed limit? If a driver really had to ‘wing it’ and operate a train on a route he/she hadn’t done before, what would happen? And if something went wrong, what facility is there to deal with it? Maybe this could be an article in itself 🙂

  65. Re Captain Deltic,

    There are 2 Three Bridges signal boxes – You mean 5 year old Three Bridge ROC* but have referred to it has Three Bridges SC which causes lots of confusion with the 1980s Three Bridges ASC** on the other side of the tracks

    * Rail Operations Centre, which controls North of Anerley including TL core and inner South Eastern area

    ** Area Signalling Centre, which controls South of Anerley / Thorton Heath and along the South coast

    GTR was assuming on having it working to reduce control work load – Oops!

    [Abbreviations added for clarity. LBM]

  66. Giovanni,

    Charles Horton actually gave quite a good explanation of this to the Select Committee. Amongst other things you need to know:

    – which signals apply to your route (ignoring all others)
    – what the speed limit is at any time and in time to comply with it (so no good just relying on the speed signs)
    – which routes you must not accept
    – any recognised risk areas along the route e.g. authorised and unauthorised places where people may cross
    -any diversionary route you may have to use e.g. if approaching London Bridge from New Cross Gate and a broken down train is in platform 5 you need to know what to do to use platform 6 when the signalman re-routes you.
    – what to do if the power change at Farringdon or City Thameslink fails

    and you need to be sufficiently competent to do this at night and in all weathers. Get things wrong and you can’t just do an emergency stop in the same way a car driver can.

  67. NGH – I think Ashford to Cambridge North stops at the villages whereas Brighton to Cambridge is the semi-fast, so the semi-fasts to Peterborough and Cambridge actually give a combined quarter hourly service (more or less) rather than being flighted. They swapped the extension from Cambridge to Cambridge North from the semi-fast to the villages service after the timetable consultation without saying anything.

  68. Captain Deltic….I suspect they don’t know their ARS from their elbow

  69. Why is it that I can’t see the full width of comments for this (or Part 1) on my smartphone when I can for other recent articles.

    Really rather annoying as my commute is basically the only time I have to read LR and other sites…

    (I presume there’s a contact us place where I should have put this query but I can’t find that either.)

  70. OK, that’s bizarre. I now can see the full width of comments on Part 2 in landscape mode (but minutes ago I couldn’t) but still can’t for Part 1.

  71. I am hoping that the inquiry includes a human factors assessment. There are a number of factors here that appear to be well documented that could well have led to this really well qualified team of people getting things so spectacularly wrong.

    Starting with the most humerous:

    “’tis but a scratch”: said by the Monty Python and the Holy Grail character, the Black Knight, upon having his arms chopped off by King Arthur. According to John Cleese, this scene is a polemic against the saying that “if you never give up, you can’t possibly lose”

    Then there’s “groupthink” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Groupthink

    Summary: “A psychological phenomenon that occurs within a group of people in which the desire for harmony or conformity in the group results in an irrational or dysfunctional decision-making outcome. Group members try to minimize conflict and reach a consensus decision without critical evaluation of alternative viewpoints by actively suppressing dissenting viewpoints, and by isolating themselves from outside influences.”

    Next “normalisation of deviance”: https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Professionalism/Diane_Vaughan_and_the_normalization_of_deviance

    “Social normalization of deviance means that people within the organization become so much accustomed to a deviant behavior that they don’t consider it as deviant, despite the fact that they far exceed their own rules for the elementary safety”. Although in this case it’s not “safety” but capability; they were so used to implementing workarounds that it became normal.

    And lastly with a nod to Captain Deltic:

    “Boiling frogs”: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boiling_frog.

    Put simply, if you’re flung into the poo, you notice the smell immediately but if poo is introduced little by little, you don’t notice the smell getting worse.

  72. Yesterday I suggested that that the authors estimate when it might have become clear that May would be unworkable. Should it have been as soon as DfT didn’t decide on the phased introduction until after the normal deadlines had been exceeded?

    The NR team at the TSC yesterday suggested that the last chance was in November 2017.

  73. 100andthirty,

    I wholeheartedly agree that human factors really ought to be looked into. In a way it is this rather than technical failings or late deliveries that really lie at the heart of this.

    Just to be really picky, I have never really accepted that explanation of Boiling Frogs although I think it is the one Captain Deltic gives.

    I think it is more about being easier to make a decision when something rapidly changes rather than when it happens slowly. If your building society sends you numerous letters telling you the interest rate has gone down by 0.1% you ignore them all. If you get a letter telling you the interest on your account will go down from 3% to 0.1% you take out your money straightaway. Probably in both cases you know what is going on but in one case it is harder to decide when to take action.

    And so it is on the railway. The trains are late being delivered. We will not get quite as many drivers trained. They are later still so fewer drivers still will be ready. If no-one says at the outset ‘this plan must not go ahead unless we have xxx drivers route trained as follows’ then it is harder to decide to choose the moment at which to shout.

  74. 100andthirty Related , but not similar, to boiling frogs, I think what we are talking about is what is called ‘creeping normalcy’ in aviation safety. Under pressure you take a short cut or don’t follow SOP to the letter. You get away with it once and do it again. and eventually you are doing it all the time. Then the reason for the SOP catches you out and you die.

  75. PoP. Captain Deltic …….Yes creeping normalcy is another way of putting “normalisation of deviance”.

    All these very experienced folk (including the revered Chris Green) were in their own bubble. They were dealing with a unique set of circumstances, almost all going wrong at the same time.

    What seems to have been missing is any “hand calculations” to assess how much slack there was in the crew rosters before the “computer said no”

    By the way, one of the more difficult factors has been adding the SE route to Rainham. It is said that this was necessary because of the constraints of the Windmill Bridge Junction area and therefore the original Tattenham Corner/Caterham option wouldn’t work. Yet, there are trains running on the fast lines from London Bridge to Purley heading to those destinations. Have missed something other than the fact that class 700 trains can’t be split?

  76. Briantist 08.25
    Your political theory nostalgia piece is spot on.
    The various politicos previously & currently who are nominally in charge of railways & transport have still got that Thatcherite mind-set, even though it has been proven wrong ….

    PoP @ 12.13
    Well, you could always try to get the second half of my semi-historical article on the Ex-Ge ( & other ) services published – it was written long ago !

    Donal Mackinnon @ 12.48
    Doubleplusgood.
    Let’s hope they take notice.

    PoP @ 14.19
    “Ja, das ist normal, sehr korrekt!”
    Priority SHOULD be given to East Coast trains … ( Mutter, mutter etc … )

    [Snip. Needless derogatory adjectives used. PoP]

    Cap’n Deltic
    “Creeping normalcy” – not under that phrase, but a constant theme in a classic 1st-year textbook: “Structures, or why Things Don’t fall down” by the late Prof. J Gordon …..

    LASTLY
    The dog that didn’t bark in the night …
    All the organisations & more importantly, people being examined, but not a mention of, nor ( yet ) a peep from the overall head of NR – Sir Peter Hendy.
    Which I find a most “curious” omission

  77. Greg Tingey,

    I have mentioned your article on a number of occasions. One problem is there is no obvious deadline to publish so no sense of urgency. I wonder what theory one applies to that.

    Regarding silence from Peter Hendy. Not at all. You have to get with the times in this Trump era. See his tweet.

  78. Would it be possible to colour code the ‘The stage is set’ diagram so we can see for each box who caused it? This might give the Select Committee an ‘executive summary’ in condensed form they could relate too easier.

  79. Bill Matters,

    We could but that means we decide who we apportion the blame to. But usually it is not as simple as that. We come back the question in The Queen v DfT of what could people and organisations reasonably rely on and did they take reasonable steps to mitigate their losses.

    Still, if you have some nice colour crayons you could print the chart out and colour it in yourself. A new breed of crayonista!

  80. @Captain Deltic:

    Instead the intention is that the Interfaced TM will download an updated timetable every 15 minutes which the Siemens WestCad control system will run.

    How quaint! 😉 Things happen in real time, information needs to be delivered in real time…. Do I need to go on?

  81. 100andthirty,

    I don’t think you have missed anything. Out of necessity, just about all Tattenham Corner trains combine with a Caterham train at Purley nowadays. There is practically nothing left that currently goes to London Bridge that is suitable for diverting to Thameslink.

    I do wonder if they really looked hard enough at the possibility of terminating somewhere north of Windmill Bridge but I can’t really suggest anything although Norwood Junction might be a future possibility.

    A problem could be that the area north of Windmill Bridge is due for resignalling so any intrastructure change prior to that is almost entirely wasted money. On the other hand, part of the rebuilding of East Croydon station will involve some trains terminating at Norwood Junction for a number of years anyway so these trains could have been Thameslink trains.

  82. Once again a very interesting article. This is something that should be read by the National media, so they at least have some idea of the cause of the problems. It will take a lot of work to get trains to arrive in the right order at Windmill Junction. Hopefully, it will eventually succeed.

  83. Re NGH 10am,

    A couple of minor points…

    No signing on with tablets. It either done face-to-face at Bedford or via remote booking on at other locations (ringing up Bedford and try to get through…)

    The minimum facilities/portacabin at Gillingham is because the proper depot hasn’t yet been finished. Once it is the portacabins will go. Though I accept the new accommodation is a portacabin of sorts…

    SFD/POP – fully correct re the diversionary routes for pre London Bridge closure already being signed. The main one via Crystal Palace and the back up ‘back up’ via Streatham and Selhurst. As a result no additional route learning was required. However, because of the London Bridge closure, Bedford drivers eventually had East Croydon – London Bridge Low Level removed from their route cards due to no work in there. This then had to be accounted for again once London Bridge High Level reopened again. Although as previously mentioned this involved mere ‘refreshing’ for those that had previously driven the route, there have been many new drivers in through the doors at TL in the last few years and so some drivers who effectively signed Bedford – Brighton/Three Bridges then needed the additional learning through from New Cross Gate to East Croydon and not just the London Bridge section.

    I should add the new London Bridge layout is much simplified over the old which is one blessing! It also now allows access to the diversionary route via the South London’s/Tulse Hill which although we sign, it had previously limited us to only terminate in Low Level when northbound (we can now get through to High level and so continue to Blackfriars and northwards).

  84. Just one comment given my lack of railway-specific knowledge, unlike most on here.

    If the government puts out a tender for something impossible, someone – pretty much always – will promise to deliver it. This is because if you’re in the type of business that relies on government contracts, you don’t turn down work because it’s impossible. You say what is necessary to get it. You don’t have a choice but to do that, either in terms of satisfying your own directors and shareholders, or in terms of survival as a company (because if you don’t, you’ll win no contracts).

    GTR’s management may be in the doghouse right now, but chances are if they’d not oversold their capabilities when bidding they wouldn’t exist at all. The same goes for all the other companies in this sorry saga who overpromised or underbid. The overwhelming incentive to behave in this way is baked into the system.

    This is why – despite the article stating there’s no reason the timetable couldn’t have worked on a privatised railway – the lesson I draw from it is exactly the opposite.

  85. The TLP doesn’t have a guiding mind – it has a committee! IIRC someone from NR chairs that committee, but we shouldn’t lose sight of the fact that this is a DfT project. I once attended the committee and got the feeling that no-one wanted to be the bearer of bad news to their bosses (i.e. DfT)…

    Those who know tell me that Govia bid less drivers than other bidders and the lower cost helped their bid. I would also point out that they had a massive advantage in bidding the TT as incumbent for a large part of the network, especially given the over-tight timescales allowed by DfT.

    I’m also told that their rolling stock costs were lower because they built in less contingency (you may notice a pattern here).

    DfT could have held FCC’s feet to the fire on driver recruitment/training, but they have been consistently weak on franchise turnover since they took over franchising.

    I can tell NGH that FCC were aware that they needed to resource up GN Ops; however NX left them with a severely depleted department from Day 1 and they then employed a succession of poor Ops Directors who weren’t aware of very much at all.

  86. @Sam
    Yes some company will always offer to do the impossible and then, when the contract is theirs, tell the customer that what they signed up to do is actually impossible (after a suitable gap, of course). Then follows a period of redrafting specifications in line with something that might be possible and redrafting the contract sums with an incumbent contractor who fully holds the whip hand. Lots of extras and champagne all round at the contractor’s head office.

  87. “Is there no provision in the modern railway for the concept of ‘risk assessment’, comparing the risks of alternative strategies and going for the least risky?”

    Yes, we have risk assessments… but these only apply to that part of the Railway. While it would be better to look at safety using a telescope rather than a microscope, the bigger picture is difficult to see and it is even more difficult to weight the different options. Also if risk can be exported off the railway that is perfect. e.g Safe walking routes along A class roads.

    N.B. The chemical industry also exports risk, in their case to China.

  88. @TJ We (the rail industry) actually do Risk Assessments on other areas as well: on operational, financial and reputational risks, for example; and mitigating actions against these risks.

    I don’t know how good GTR management has been at identifying risks, their severity or the best way to mitigate them. From my experience in meeting them I would say it’s highly likely that the answer is, “Not very”.

  89. Excellent article, a brilliant follow-up from Part 1. As mentioned by others, this needs a wider audience, perhaps even providing valuable input to the official enquiry?

    It strikes me that anything possible that could go wrong, did go wrong. One searches in vain for any consolation or crumb of comfort, but in vain. I can’t help but feel that in our country, the more effort and money is put in, the more fruitless is the eventual result. I’m sure it will all be sorted out in the long term but the short term costs are incalculable. For one thing, confidence in our railways is shattered to pieces. How do you quantify that?

    Quite frankly it makes the days of British Railways almost nostalgically wonderful, compared to the misguided and unfocused railway system we have today.

  90. It is perhaps worth pointing out that not all railways require route knowledge in the way the UK system does. There are systems where the signalling indicates the maximum permitted speed, whereas UK signalling is essentially limited to ‘stop’, ‘go’ and advance warnings of ‘stop’.

    Some years back I went on a few trips to the north of Sweden in a preserved railcar that was driven by a train driver who was a member of the owning railway society. He drove trains on the Stockholm suburban network, but had a licence that permitted him to drive anywhere in the country, including over routes he had never been to before. This is because Swedish railway signals have quite a few different ‘proceed’ aspects, which indicate the maximum permitted speed and what to expect at the following signal. This is far from unique; I believe German signalling follows similar principles.

    There is, of course, more to route knowledge than knowing how fast or slow to go. How systems with ‘speed signalling’ cope with local instructions, I don’t know.

  91. @HH, QUINLET. Hill’s first law of contracting: ‘The contractor who leaves most out of his tender gets the job’. (This from the chemical industry).

  92. @PoP: “Passengers on….. Southeastern have an improved service….”

    That’s most definitely NOT what the comments I’m seeing would say. Quite the opposite. I noted in Another Place how the offpeak pattern from Woolwich Arsenal to Dartford is now xx:10, xx:14, xx:40, xx:44. Well, if the TL ones pitch up, that is (the xx:10 and xx:40).

    In 2013, they were xx:09, xx:23, xx:39 and xx:53. 14 and 16 minute intervals.

    Now, its 4 and 26-minute intervals. Totally, utterly, Dagenham. In fact, Rainham (Essex), it’s so far beyond Barking.

  93. MikeP,

    Obviously not true everywhere and locally the timetabled service may be worse. The line you have referenced has a Thameslink service as well which skews things.

    The 28tph to Charing Cross in peak hours (all calling at London Bridge) has been maintained and you now have 23 trains in the peak hour to Cannon St (up from 22) and (if they turn up) the Thameslink trains to Blackfriars and beyond.

    Furthermore the performance statistics (the PPM measure) has improved.

    Note: if you have a mixture of stoppers and semi-fasts there are bound to be some stations that have a more even interval and some that have pairs of trains close together. If this was the service before then, chances are, that some stations have a better service now and others have a worse. Someone (or some station) has to draw the short straw.

  94. Londoner in Scotland,

    Basically our signalling is route signalling. I have been led to understand that most countries have speed signalling, as you describe in Sweden. I don’t know how true this is.

    Of course, when we have the digital railway, we will have speed signalling. And the Underground already has it on ATO lines (even if driven in Protected Manual).

    I cannot envisage a situation in this country where you don’t need to be route trained even if you have ATO. But I can envisage a situation where the time taken for route training will be substantially reduced due to both ATO and electronic information at the drivers fingertips.

  95. I picked that as but one example for the North Kent Lines. It’s not just one point-point service that’s “drawn the short straw” but, it seems, 3 entire lines. In an area of massive housing growth.

    You mention Cannon Street in the peaks. Not the best example to pick as that’s one destination generating a lot of discontent. There used to be 5 arrivals there between 07:30 and 08:30 from Dartford. Now – two.

    Or, 6 between 08:00 and 09:00. Now, errr, one. 08:55.

    Really, given the time taken to get to Blackfriars and on to City Thameslink, those TL routes aren’t a realistic replacement, even if they did take the total number of scheduled trains into the City back up (they don’t – they’re 2tph even in the peak). All I hear from Dartfordians is “I want to get to work in the City, not Luton or Bedford” 🙂

    I won’t even ask how the Elisabeth Line is going to get fed with this huge reduction in access to Abbey Wood.

  96. MikeP,

    If more trains arrive at the London termini then it has to logically follow that overall the service has improved in terms of the number of trains provided.

    I think you are creating a misleading impression as I believe some services have improved by having a semi-fast service from further out and a stopper service leading to some stations having fewer but faster trains. So, for example, Sidcup has a combination of fast trains and stoppers that leave within a few minutes of each other. But, generally, you would either want either the fast or the stopper so the fact they may leave within minutes of each other is immaterial.

  97. An excellent article.

    One thing that strikes me is how much of this could have been avoided had the company listened to warnings from its own staff.

    It seems any new MD will need to urgently reset the relationship with the drivers and their unions of it wants to have any hope of progress at all.

    Unfortunately I think too many see the challenge as ‘breaking’ ASLEF and the RMT. Given the shortage of drivers across the industry and the really low morale in the company the chances of doing this must be virtually nil. Starting listening more is going to be the only way out.

    One of the drawbacks of the Gibb report, was that its only recommendation in this area was increasing the number of depots, rather than thinking about more broadly about how a more effective and productive relationship with staff and the unions could be built.

  98. @RogerB – Had looked at KX briefly, reopening a tunnel to increase approach tracks from 4 to 6 seemed manageable.
    Scheme diagram http://www.townend.me/files/kingscrossremodelling.pdf

    Rail story Dec17 has some prescient comment
    https://www.pressreader.com/uk/rail-uk/20171227/283880163505020
    25% increase in long-distance services planned for the timetable change in December 2021 pending final approval by the DfT, NR had already produced a robust plan to limit disruption to passengers during the partial blockade

  99. @RogerB: There are supposed to be safeguards to stop that happening. However, this was a very poorly let franchise, let before the DfT were ready (the Franchise Agreement wasn’t finalised until after the bids were in, for example) due to perceived political pressure. From experience, there are very few assessors that understand the complexities of train crew management, so that probably got missed; on rolling stock they probably asked Govia questions and were satisfied by the answers – a variant of optimism bias. I’ve seen this happen on other competitions.

    @PoP & MikeP. I’m with Mike. Kent sees some serious worsening of services on several routes. It’s not all about the total number of passengers that can be shipped to London. Indeed DfT made the same mistake, but were eventually persuaded that there wasn’t really an overall improvement. Yes, there are some winners, but I guarantee that we’ll see a lot of bleating from the losers.

  100. HH, Quinlet, Roger B

    “during to the count-down, how did you feel?”
    ” I felt exactly how you would feel if you were getting ready to launch and knew you were sitting on top of two million parts — all built by the lowest bidder on a government contract.”

    (John Glenn, first American in orbit)

  101. So, so sorry. I omitted to preface my first comment on this article with congratulations on a deeply-researched and superbly-written piece. Well done, PoP and team.

    Glad you agree, HH !! The problem with the “winners and losers” argument is that it ignores the years of chaos and disruption that were endured by the losers with the generic promise of improved services. To find that what that means is new journey opportunities to travel direct to Luton and Bedford (it could at least have been Cambridge 🙂 ) whilst seeing the opportunities to make the journey you actually want to make slashed is worse than a slap in the face.

    For any route that previously had a near-as-damn-it evenly spaced 4TPH to go to 4 and 26 minute spacing is indefensible. Not even “for the greater good”.

    It smells, yet again, of the railways thinking their raison d’etre is to get trains from A to B, not people. Or, in this particular case, of sacrificing North Kent to the goal of keeping the promised frequency through the TL core. And look how that’s worked out for people in parts of Hertfordshire, too.

  102. MikeP, HH,

    I get the point you are making. I really do.

    No doubt if you did a customer satisfaction survey you would get the result that things have got worse.

    But, by any reasonable objective measure taken over the whole of the timetable area, there would be an improvement shown. Also that actual delivery of the service specified has improved.

    It is the same on the Brighton Main Line. Even if the timetable had worked (and I still fully believe it will eventually) there would be similar horror stories. Notably at Redhill, which always seems to get the worst of everything, and the Gatwick Express (which now has a 10/20/10/20 interval). Nevertheless the overall benefits of the new timetable (once it works) will be considerable although there will always be people for whom the old timetable was ‘better’ and others who will require a period of adjustment before perceiving the benefits.

  103. “Not listening to own staff” / “Safeguards shoould have been in place” / Better service promised, worse service delivered (etc)
    Which comes down, in the end, quoting the late G Feinnes, again: “A failure of management”
    With or without a “guiding mind”, there was stil a complete failure of management, & I think I know why.

    There is a current fashion, started ( I think ) during the Thatcher/Reagan years, that it didn’t matter (at all?) what the company did for a living, or what its “product” was, all you needed was “Professional Managers” – who could switch industries without even drawing breath & equally-competently manage a: Railway / Airline / municipal Bus Company / Hospital ( etc. ad nauseam ).
    To facilitate this fashion, the MBA ( Masters in Business Administration) was invented.
    We all know the wonders of confusing airline management with railways ( something the politicos of all classes seem particularly prone to) – and all the other cases are equal failures. I have a horrible feeling that this fiasco has “MBA” written all over it – it reminds me of that other fiasco, Railtrack, in that it seems to contain no actual Engineers.
    And Thameslink is, after all an Engineering project.

  104. ALE
    I’m given to understand/it is rumoured that the King’s Cross remodelling has changed & that both sets of tunnels (Gasworks & Copenhagen) will be re-opened & that at least one of them, if not both will now have two tracks, again.
    Can anyone confirm or deny this information, please?

  105. Greg Tingey 08:27,

    And Thameslink is, after all an Engineering project.

    Because of your style of writing, I can’t tell if you mean us to take this at face value or we are somehow intended to understand the deep irony of this statement.

    I will presume that we are supposed to take it at face value.

    The problem is that it is not an engineering project. It is a railway project and engineering is only part of it – the first phase. It is said that the problem with the British and the Channel Tunnel was that we visualised at a tunnel constriction project whereas the French say it as a railway project of which the first phase was building a tunnel.

    Crossrail understood this from the outset and from very early on say it as a railway project designed to make things better for passengers and physical construction was just the first element in this. The railway operators got involved at a very early stage. Jonathan Roberts was very keen for me to compare and contrast the success of Crossrail and the failure of Thameslink. I declined to do so only because we haven’t yet got the physical evidence that Crossrail is successful because it is not fully open yet.

  106. Greg Tingey,

    If you read the links, helpfully provided by others you will see that Gasworks tunnels will have two tracks through it. Sometimes you seem to be overkeen to ask questions when the answers have already been given – although in this case, I concede, not a complete answer to your question.

  107. Re Greg,

    If you look at Mark T’s drawing which ALE linked to and is correct as per current plans you will see the Gasworks tunnels all in use again (3x twin track) but not Copenhagen

  108. The issue per say is not Windmill Bridge Junction . Although it’s a bit of a pest. The real problem is Norwood Fork Jnc; where you can go between the Up and Down Slows and the Up and down Fasts. The now axed Tattenham Cnr services would have needed to make this move twice an hour all day long along with the now axed peak Caterhams. There is a 30 sec time penalty in making this move. Thus trains coming out of LB via TL will be running at 2.5 min intervals, on a railway which is designed to run with 2 min headways. Add in the extra 30 secs and suddenly you’re on effectively on 3 min headways with a following TL service, trying to join the Victoria line trains (running on 2 min headways). This just results in wasted capacity.

    On the up, it’s a similar issue, as soon as you get a single yellow on T82 signal, with a 12car train you are again on a 3 minute headway, running on a railway planned for 2 mins. But when you get to LB its going to be 2.5!

    Scheduling in such circumstances is not only a nightmare, it relies upon almost perfect timekeeping. This links to the need for ARS with a TM overview. At the moment it takes up a lot of signallers brain power just to manage this bit of railway as it’s still on Three Bridges ASC which runs only on manual decision making.

    What works well in slotting trains through Norwood Fork Jnc can have major impacts miles away.

  109. PoP

    1. I have serious doubts that TL will ever run smoothly with the full number of trains intended to run through the core. IMO that can only happen if the rest of the network is improved substantially.

    2. “By any reasonable objective measure”. Like what? IMO this is the mistake the DfT made – we’ll have more overall capacity towards London in the Peak. Actually, following the recent capacity increase agreed with LSER there are no major crowding issues in the peak. I doubt whether that will be the case with the new “improved” timetable.

    They’ve solved a problem that doesn’t exist and created problems where there weren’t any previously. That’s my objective measure and why I say that Kent (as a whole) has a got a bad deal, regardless of the improvements for some.

  110. I have to say it’s very, very difficult to see where the improvements are when even GatEx has moved to an uneven spacing. One of the key components of customer-friendliness – ease of knowing when a train is, at least, timetabled to turn up – seems to be have been sacrificed on a wholesale basis to other less-obvious goals.

    I must, however, bow to your detailed research and knowledge of the new timetables rather than my anecdotal snippets (and that isn’t being sarky :-)) so will shuddup now.

  111. Thinking in turn about moving the Tattenham Cnr and Caterham services into North Kent. Also creates a “Norwood Fork Junc” effect in trains having to switch running lines at North Kent East Junction and again at Surrey Canal Junction (I think NR now refer to this as Engine House Junc). But the impact is just the same, making these moves takes time and thus eats up capacity. South Eastern have had to strip out a number of Cannon Street trains from places like Hastings and Tunbridge Wells, to create slots for TL trains.

    The same thing goes for the new Ashford/Maidstone East services when they start running later. They will need to go via the Chatham Loop from Bickley Junction through to Chislehurst Junction. They will then need to go FL to SL (and vv) somewhere in the New Cross area. Again, time penalties which eat up capacity.

    Performance purtabation now becomes a big risk with the cross transfer of Victoria (LCDR) line trains with Charing Cross (SER) trains.

  112. Re Gordon,

    “they will then need to go FL to SL (and vv) somewhere in the New Cross area. ”

    Done at Courthill South Jn with parallel moves of CHX- Hayes Services from the Hayes Line to the fasts thus not eating capacity.

  113. A couple of points:
    ‘But TfL Rail are currently only running 7-car Crossrail trains because the route hasn’t yet been approved by the Office of Rail and Road (ORR) for 9-car trains.’

    I thought that the ORR no longer approved things – the government stopped taking responsibility after Ladbrook Grove ?

    I am always suprised that in these days of highly realistic simulators that Route Learning has to be done on a real train. New aircraft pilots are trained to co-pilot status on simulators and that means they have to be able to fly & land the aircraft if the captain is incapacitated. I have seen PC based systems used to train tram drivers – these were apparently adequate even when they were driving in the 80+ kph country areas on ex National Rail track.

  114. HH,

    They’ve solved a problem that doesn’t exist and created problems where there weren’t any previously. That’s my objective measure

    That’s my whole point. It is in your mind and so is a subjective opinion. The critical word is ‘measure’ and so that implies facts and measurable figures not perceptions.

    Putting it bluntly, you can think what you like but it is not an objective measure. I am talking about something completely different.

  115. Gordon,

    To slightly paraphrase ngh’s answer…

    But the whole point in choosing the routes they did was precisely because it didn’t create an impact (if both Southeastern and Thameslink are in sync with each other).

  116. PoP

    And my point is that the total peak capacity is not a good measure of how effective a timetable change is. The capacity needs to be at the right place at the right time.

  117. @NGH In the arcane world of signalling and weekly operating notices (WON) pedantry abounds – for good reason. Because ROCs will eventually takeover the network there is a tendency to term all signalling centres ROCs – Wales ROC instead of Cardiff Area Signalling Centre (CASC). But in a WON the title is important. The driver can’t assume that Wales ROC means CASC. And I wasn’t sure about the status of Three Bridges when writing the comment, so apologies for the confusion.

    Meanwhile, since I fancy myself as analogy master, I must go down on my knees and genuflect before the new twist on deckchair rearranging on the Titanic.

    @100andthirty. ‘Hand calculation’. Something professional training followed by a long career gives you is a mental ‘sense check’, the immediate reaction of ‘that can’t be right’ even before you have got out the envelope or done some quick mental arithmetic. A classic example was DfT’s belief that if you had more powered axles a train would outperform another with less power – disproved when the IEP Bi-modes entered service running to HST timings. As TransCom hearing showed, when it comes to operations that sixth sense seems to have been lost or atrophied among railway management.

    @Southern Heights (Light Railway). I wouldn’t like you to think that the railway is totally backwards when it comes to Traffic Management. In Integrated Electronic Control Centres Automatic Route Setting runs the timetable, making corrections for minor perturbations in real time. The new Integrated Traffic Management on the Great Western Main Line can detect potential conflicts up to an hour ahead or can be used to replan the timetable to react to sudden changes – such as the track through a platform being closed due to a fault. this can be done in a minute and the revised timetable is then downloaded to the ARS which runs the new timetable..

  118. I note the comment in the excellent article about DfT setting unworkable timetable requirements in the original ITT.

    DfT have repeated the mistake with the latest Kent ITT where the service specification, in seeking to improve the lot of commuters from both Hastings and Orpington (note the local MPs’ roles at the time it was issued), is incompatible with the severe infrastructure constraints of the twin track section from Tonbridge to Orpington.

    When asked about this at a public meeting, a DfT official brushed this off and said it was for the bidders to propose a solution! On further probing the DfT official admitted to having only a limited grasp of the consequences for stopping patterns of those infrastructure constraints.

  119. HH,

    And my point is that the total peak capacity is not a good measure of how effective a timetable change is. The capacity needs to be at the right place at the right time.

    So your challenge is to find a way of measuring this objectively so that we can see from timetable to timetable whether things are getting better or worse without relying on intuition.

    Perhaps I should have originally written ‘by any objective measure currently available‘.

  120. HH: The total peak capacity is one important measure of the effectiveness of a timetable change. Of course the ultimate measure is passenger satisfaction, but that is very difficult to aggregate: how many slightly-improved journeys will compensate for one totally-destroyed journey opportunity (or vice-versa)?

    But given how overloaded the peaks are, increasing total peak capacity is probably a necessary condition for improving overall passenger satisfaction. Of course it is not a sufficient condition, and passengers can make the claim that it has been done so badly as to have provided a long-term overall disbenefit. However, judging such claims is tricky in the present state of crisis, while the timetable being run is neither the old one nor the complete new one.

  121. Captain Deltic: The DfT belief was doubtless wrong, as you mention. However, your description of it ( if you had more powered axles a train would outperform another with less power) is confusing because it is unclear which train has less power. Did you mean that they believed that train 1 could outperform train 2, even if train 1 has less total power than train 2, if train 1 has more axles powered? (Assuming the two trains weigh the same, of course).

  122. Total peak capacity is all very well, but does it match demand? If every train from Charing Cross and Cannon Street ran non-stop to Snowdown (half via Dover, half via Faversham) you could probably manage 50tph on the four track section of the South Eastern main line through Chislehurst. Great for capacity (and for the approximately ten people a day who use Snowdown – ORR stats for 2016/17 show about 7000 entries and exits). Not so good for anyone else in South East London or Kent.

  123. timbeau: I like your example. It might be a challenge terminating 50 tph at Snowdown, you’d have to build a few more platforms. But for the purpose of your example, you could just let them accumulate in a long queue on the approach lines, and deal with them all after the peak.

    But it does support my claim that increased peak capacity is necessary, but not sufficient.

  124. Another fantastic article.

    Touching on the Thameslink route to Rainham and its issues, it has meant a loss of a clockface timetable along the Woolwich line. Not a huge issue for most.

    I think one of the most baffling things about the new timetable is no increase in trains from Kent to Abbey Wood in the peak to connect with Crossrail. Unless another re-write of timetables is coming in December it remains as two trains an hour in the peaks provided solely by Thameslink 8 car 700s from Medway.

    Sidcup line is the winner with another 2 tph off-peak though that does little to help connect Medway with Crossrail.

  125. Also of course the TL route is now as slow as SE all-stoppers from Dartford to London Bridge despite skipping three stations (Belvedere, Erith and Woolwich Dockyard).

    So whilst on the face of it SE may have benefitted, the Metro routes haven’t to any great degree in terms of connections.

  126. Malcolm…

    There are two aspects controlling train performance – tractive effort and power. Both are influenced by train mass. Tractive effort is an approximation of how good the train’s initial acceleration will be. At zero speed, peak power is rarely needed. At some speed, the train will not be able to maintain maximum tractive effort because to do so would exceed the maximum power of the train.

    Friction or adhesion between the wheel and the rail can affect the maximum tractive effort, and the more axles that are motored, the more likely it will be that the train can actually deliver its maximum tractive effort.

    All this illustrates several things for two trains of similar mass:

    1) Train A with more axles motored than train B might have a higher maximum tractive effort than train B despite train B having much higher peak power
    2) Train A’s initial acceleration might be better than train B’s despite the latter’s power advantage
    3) In a drag race, train B will overtake train A eventually.

    This is the situation with the IEP (train A) vs the HST (train B). GWR did issue a video showing the drag race, but all commentators, including Rail magazine’s Richard Clinnick have reported that on diesel, IEP sectional running times are inferior to HST and to IEP on electricity.[and when the IEP is on electricity its running times are superior to HST? PoP]

    Final point…. back to peak power being rarely needed when starting from standstill, This is why so called last mile locomotives can work. The electric capability might be 4MW, but on diesel, the power might be 0.7MW, yet the peak tractive effort might be the same. However the speed at which the tractive effort starts to fall away will be much lower on diesel than on electricity

  127. Malcolm , 20 June 2018 at 11:44 & timbeau,

    It is not only the number of platforms that is a problem – clearance of the points on the approach is a big constraint. This is what determines the capacity at Brixton (Vic). To get to 50 TPH you would have to do something clever with the tracks that may involve some flyovers. A loop with multiple platforms on the loop would be better as the arriving trains are then seperated and therefore do not conflict with departing trains. The 36TPH at Brixton is only obtainable with uneven headways.

  128. The puzzling aspect of the whole debacle is the apparent failure of the industry Thameslink Readiness Board to pick up on all the high risk issues and impossible timescales alluded to in the article. This ‘guiding mind’ consists of representatives of Network Rail, TOCs, DfT, ORR and is chaired independently by Chris Gibb, with Chris Green acting as Independent Assurance Panel representative. How was the wool pulled over the eyes of these highly experienced railway managers?

    My theory is that industry executives in general are so totally focussed on micro managing franchises that they have become detached from the people who are the doers – timetable planners, drivers, signallers, engineers etc. Many executives, recruited from other industries such as oil or retail, lack the knowledge and experience of our very complex industry to ask pertinent questions and drill down to understand the issues.

    Once upon a time there was one integrated railway with the roles of Chief Operating Officer, Chief Signal & Telecommunications Engineer, Chief Civil Engineer etc who were highly experienced people with the necessary level of authority to guide projects and ensure provision of sufficient time for preparation of timetables, driver training, testing of signalling systems etc. Today senior managers in these vital functions no longer have executive status, nor a strong voice. They fear that speaking out will impact their performance related pay or promotional prospects and are resigned to toe the line.

  129. JohnM,

    The 36TPH at Brixton is only obtainable with uneven headways.

    Just to be totally clear. This means uneven headways at Brixton. By inserting a pause at Stockwell as appropriate the headways are then even all the way to Blackhorse Road. It is similar in the reverse direction.

  130. @Malcolm @100andthirty

    First, apologies for some sloppy technical writing.

    DfT’s IEP heresy was that with more axles motored an IEP with less power would outperform a more powerful train. The acceleration curve in the IEP specification was a wonderful thing to behold with metro-level initial acceleration.

    The basic formula is Power = Speed x Tractive Effort and with a bi-mode under diesel power is fixed, so tractive effort falls with speed irrespective of the number of powered axles. I was lying in bed one night doing some light mental arithmetic on IEP performance to encourage the drop into the arms of Morpheus . When I worked out that this blitzing start would barely last into Gas Works Tunnel, I became fully awake and had to check my sums, which continued to give the same answer.

    Next day I ran a spread sheet which confirmed the heresy. Inter Alia that basic formula also showed that the heavier IEP would have less tractive effort than a Deltic + 8 by the time it entered Copenhagen Tunnel.

    Yet the heresy was propounded with such certainty by DfT that there were still those who were expecting the GW IEP bi-modes to run to IC125 timings because of the distributed power with more axles motored. The silly GWR tweet refers. The IC125 catches up very quickly

    When I was driving the Virgin’s IEP simulator recently I mentioned that the bi-modes would struggle over the climbs north of Edinburgh compared with an IC125 Oh no, I was assured, it has more axles motored.

    Not sure if this is too far off thread, but is does illustrate how a powerful reality suspension field can affect policy decisions, and a similar field seemed to have enveloped Thameslink.

  131. Interesting parallel to a conversation on another site about the new P2 class vs Clan Line (steam engines for the unwashed) – the P2 protagonists think it will be better because it has more axles motored (being a 2-8-2 vs a 4-6-2) – however we are now completely off topic so I’ll stop.

    Excellent article PoP and NGH – thank you. I would like an opinion on David B’s question above about the Thameslink Readiness (Advisory) Board of the good and great who, if anyone would, should have called out the plan and resources available to implement the new timetable as unworkable. That this did not happen indicates either institutional blindness or DfT bullying IMHO.

  132. Another example of DfT not helping matters. Raised at PMQ’s today by Wigan MP, Labour’s Lisa Nandy. She’s written a Twitter thread on it.

    It may be about Northern but reading some of the comments here on ITT’s and the like I feel it is appropriate.

    I’ve been handed emails showing that Ministers and DfT officials were warned about Northern rail chaos 2 years ago. They show utter contempt for Northern passengers.
    DfT officials describe key routes as ‘not really valued’ and discuss giving a “sop” to campaigners. They admit key Northern routes will be axed as early as 2015…but Ministers continued to assure MPs those routes will be saved. DfT officials discuss spreading false information to deflect public attention from route closures.

    https://twitter.com/lisanandy/status/1009399963443519489

  133. @PoP

    Could you go further into how these uneven headways at Brixton work, if it’s not too far off topic? I guess that when a train departs from the down platform it has to wait for the following train to fully enter the up platform first and clear the crossing, while a train departing from the up platform can leave sooner, so we end up with trains through Brixton flighted in pairs with the one using the up platform following close behind the one using the down platform. Or putting it another way, trains cross the crossover at even intervals, but since the sequence of events is (arriving) train crosses over – (up) train arrives – (down) train departs – (departing) train crosses over – (down) train arrives – (up) train departs – (arriving) train crosses over etc, arrivals and departures become unevenly spaced. Do I have the right of it?

  134. PoP
    “A Railway OR an Engineering Project”?
    OTOH, I take your point, so I was wrong as well – it’s an Engineering AND a Railway project …
    And the engineering includes things like proper forward planning. Which is why I referred back to “GANTT” earlier.
    On that understanding – OK – let’s advance the discussion.

    Gasworks & Copenhagen Tunnels -oops – I saw an earlier version of that diagram, which only showed a single track …..

    FtMD (& others)
    I find it incredible that, just before CR1 ( The Lizzie line) opens, the main feeder service to it is halved. Am I going bonkers, or is it “them”?

    Captain Deltic
    Of course, one can, quite logically follow the “more axles motored” fallacy to the point where every axle is powerd by a man with a bicycle, compared to, say 3000hp of a Deltic – at which point the penny might, just might drop. 😵
    When it comes down to it, there is no substitute for “Grunt” -provided you can get it down to the track.

  135. There’s a few ‘he’s in here when referring to drivers – shouldn’t they be ‘they’, or at least ‘he/she’?

    I comment only because I know LonRec has stated it’s trying to improve on these things and I thought you’d like them flagged.

    First I noticed was the fifth para under ‘Rest Day Working’ but Ctrl+F and ‘ he ‘ should pop up other examples.

  136. lmm: Your explanation is confusing (to me at least) because of the use of up and down, referring not to the direction of train travel but as labels for the platforms.

    My simple approach is to say that the crossover can be used by two trains simultaneously, provided that their paths do not cross. As platforms are filled alternately by successive trains, this non-conflicting crossover use is possible once for every two trains. This explanation avoids the use of left-right-up-down-northbound and similar words.

  137. NGH & PP – Thank you.

    I was certain there was a plan. It just re-enforces my belief that to take the Maidstone service away from the Catford Loop (in the original bid) and have these FL to SL moves just risks added perturbation.

    All this to an area with no TMS planned.

  138. Gordon,

    Although you got me thinking. The plan is fine off-peak but in the peak hours the Hayes fasts are every 20 minutes (morning, think it is 22 minutes evening) yet the Thameslink Maidstone Easts are half-hourly. So maybe we need to keep an eye on this one.

  139. Another explanation: Imagine, temporarily, that trains can pass through each other. Then each platform can be filled alternately, and departed-from after the minimum platform interval.

    Then to get a real-world frequency, you just delete one of the paths requiring ghost trains. That results in a melody in 4/4 time, going da da da pause, repeated indefinitely.

  140. Imm, Malcolm

    I am sure Imm has got it right. But apart from conflicts you need to take into account that it takes longer to cross a crossover than a straight run in or out of the platform and this all has to be taken into account. So, if you imagine trains departing Stockwell in even intervals, they won’t arrive evenly spaced apart at Brixton. Similarly if they leave Brixton at even intervals they won’t arrive back at Stockwell in even intervals. So uneven headway somewhere – if only at Brixton.

    In practice, rather than try and adjust all this at Brixton, it is a lot easier to spread the load and start modifying the sequence on departure from Stockwell and again on arrival back there.

  141. Malcolm 14:51,

    I really like that way of thinking. So, having taken out the ghost train you just adjust the times of what you have left so you don’t miss a beat.

  142. @LMM/Malcolm
    If by “up” is meant southbound than I think you have it – trains arriving at Brixton have a straight run into platform 2 but have to use the scissors crossing to enter platform 1. Thus a train can leave platform 1 at the same time as one is arriving in platform 2, but not vice versa. Thus, a two-minute interval service can be achieved in the following manner
    00:00;00 train 1 leaves platform 1, train 2 arrives platform 2
    00:01:20 train 2 departs platform 2 (waits 40 seconds at Stockwell to even out the interval)
    00:02:40 train 3 arrives platform 1 having been delayed by 40 seconds for the crossing to clear)
    00:04:00 train 3 leaves platform 1, train 4 arrives platform 2 etc

    @Malcolm
    “It might be a challenge terminating 50 tph at Snowdown”
    No need: they would be Charing Cross – Folkestone (pass) – Snowdown – Chatham (pass) – Cannon Street services, 25tph each way round the loop! I chose Snowdown rather than Swale (SER’s least-used station) for my illustration for that reason – 50tph on a single track branch would indeed have been a challenge)

  143. @Malcolm – why is it I now have this mental image of offices full of timetablers all humming Da Da Da |Dum?

  144. @Malcom – I like this idea of trains that can pass through each-other. It could solve a lot of capacity issues across the entire network.
    When should we expect to see that introduced?
    🙂

  145. @Captain Deltic

    The “all axles powered” fallacy would suggest that Sebastian Vettel should swap his Ferrari SF71H for a Land Rover.

    Power and weight also come into it. And an IEP may have a lot of power, but it also carries a lot of excess weight.

  146. Timbeau…hence adhesion comes into the mix too.

    Also, as far as I’m aware the average formula 1 car achieves a coefficient of friction (adhesion) that can be greater than 1, compared with the nominal 0.1 to 0.2 for steel wheel on steel rail.

  147. DJL: well, it has already been around since 1881 (*), in the form of flying junctions.

    (*) Weaver Junction, according to the source which must not be mentioned.

  148. “But given how overloaded the peaks are…”

    But @Malcolm, as I explained, they are not, at least on SouthEastern. The recently agreed capacity Change, which added additional Class 377s from GTR, targeted the top 20 most crowded trains and SE wasn’t the most crowded railway anyway.

    Moreover, LSER cart loads of fresh air around off-peak, mainly because they have problems stabling during the day – and TLP is taking some of that stabling.

    Throwing ‘random’ additional capacity at the SE network is not what’s needed.

  149. Re Malcolm,

    Weaver Jn – Completely Wrong

    If you try the more authoritative London Reconnections website you’ll find the grade separated Norwood Fork Jn was the first in 1842.

    …And Norwood Fork Jn has already got mentioned in couple of times in comments under this article….

  150. I rarely comment in London Reconnection these days, but what a brilliant yet succinct analysis of the issues, one of the best articles I have ever read on the site. I love the job advert.

    Only half in jest . .. Pedantic … your talents are surely sorely needed at GTR, much as we would hate to lose you.

    David

  151. David,

    It is one thing to be able to point out what was wrong retrospectively. It is another to be able to put it right!

    Actually not so retrospectively. We could see things were going wrong but didn’t then entirely understand the cause.

  152. Re: JOHNM 20 June 2018 at 09:28

    This has been done to death a bit on other articles recently but put simply, route learning on the railways is not suitable to simulators. Not even a little bit.

    We have two Class 700 sims that are line of route. They would be terrible for learning anything more than very basic route knowledge – also bear in mind how many you would need available to train a decent number of drivers on! An aircraft simulator is far more advanced and you get a far less detailed view of the land when flying a plane. This isn’t important to a pilot but driving a train you need to get out there and see what’s what. I fully accept I didn’t appreciate this until I started actually having to route learn but I consider my route knowledge my number one ‘get out of jail card’ and far more important than any rule or traction based knowledge. It is absolutely essential to the safe and punctual running of the railway. When training new drivers I realised that it wouldn’t make any difference if they were blindfolded. They are following instructions from me to take action at a certain location/speed/circumstance. Of course if they were blindfolded then they’d never learn the route. We do have route videos which are a fairly new phenomenon and very useful these are too but they still don’t give you the feel of passing over a bit of track or preferably driving over it. Also, years ago, drivers had much larger route cards and so even if a route was out of competency, as already mentioned it could be refreshed without much issue. Drivers route cards are becoming shorter and shorter due to the issues and costs involved highlighted in this article and others.

    Tram drivers drive on line of sight. Train drivers do not.

    A good point made about ETCS by another contributor though. It totally changes the landscape. Of course, you still need your knowledge for braking points for stations and local instructions but speeds and routing become irrelevant.

  153. Re David and PoP,

    I started the rolling stock analysis spreadsheet in mid December 2016 as I was struggling to see how they were going to have enough stock in 2018 but as PoP says fitting the picture together was difficult given the lack of info on training levels (or lack there of) till relatively recently.

  154. RE: Norwood Fork Jnc

    It’s only a “flying” Junction in respect of the Up and Down Wallingtons (ie to/from West Croydon). Everything else is on the flat.

    What’s more, the Up Brighton Slow has to cross the Down Slow line at Cottage Jnc. So adding to the potential conflicts.

  155. This weeks timetable shows the Rainhams terminating at Gillingham half-hourly, but returning from Rainham ? Otherwise boards are showing on-time.

  156. Re Gordon,

    “It’s only a “flying” Junction in respect of the Up and Down Wallingtons (ie to/from West Croydon). ”

    Which was its original purpose in 1842 – separating the experimental pneumatic powered tracks (now the Up / Down Wallingtons) from the conventional ones that went to East Croydon and Redhill, the rest started appearing a few years later and the local station was still called The Jolly Sailor (the adjacent pub it was named after is still open).

  157. Gordon: But ngh was completely correct in rubbishing my hopelessly late Weaver Junction example. Regardless of exactly what happens at Norwood Fork, it certainly permits (and has always permitted) trains (when projected onto the plane of the geoid) to “pass through” each other.

  158. PoP’s “which now has a 10/20/10/20 interval” and other comments about “clock-face timetables begs the answer to the question of what is the purpose of running a service.

    If you are running a metro service – tube, DLR, tram, overground – then fixed intervals make sense because pax want a ‘turn up and go’.

    But TL is regional (outside the core) – as will be Crossrail outside its core – and especially in peak periods commuters will head for services at known times which meet their personal schedule. You can only travel on one train at a time, after all, so as long as the timetable is published. That the _time_ of a particular service, or its intermediate stopping pattern, may have changed is, surely, one of those things which happens every so often. There is no god-given right to expect a 7:42 train into town every day for life.

    Eventually, and hopefully the sooner the better, the trains, staff training, signaling improvements, and permanent way works will all be completed and services will happen as scheduled.

    ps. Truly great article.

  159. Alison: You are right, of course, about commuters’ personal schedules. But even from that point of view, an even interval is better, other things being equal, because without it, rather more people will have their personally preferred time fall awkwardly into one of the bigger gaps.

    But of course, that is only a small difference, and other things are not at all equal, so the uneven interval may be a small price to pay for the other benefits. Once these other benefits turn up, of course.

  160. @PoP – bravo, this is a wonderful piece of journalism and anlysis, and ought to be a textbook example of how to do the “lessons learned” stage of a disastrous project – except that I’m not sure any of the lessons actually have been learned.

    Picking up on Greg Tingey’s point [20 June 08:27] about MBAs, I have had a few scarring experiences with people who had MBAs but seemingly no common sense. My impression is that there’s a tendency to treat every project as dealing with the delivery of a product in a perfect market. And that’s where I confess to some sympathy with HH’s point of view [20 June 10:10] – in a perfect market, it’s possible to have winners and losers, and a supplier can abandon elements of a product if the change makes it more successful overall. The perfect market should ensure that this creates an opportunity for someone else to step in with another product that meets that need.

    However, railways are a monopoly supply of a critical service for their customers – there is no effective market, and customers are dependent on the service for their ability to remain employed, feed and clothe their families, and pay their mortgages. Given that level of criticality, I think that any change that produces significant numbers of losers is unacceptable, and if the measure used still says the project is delivering value when this is happening, then the wrong thing is probably being measured to determine value.

    Not that I know what the right measure is in these circumstances, but using the wrong measure to determine progress and value does seem to happen quite a bit with unsuccessful projects. If you combine that with a management culture that is only prepared to accept positive news, the stage is usually set for a disaster.

    Finally, Timbeau’s recollection [20 June 07:02] of John Glenn’s thoughts reminded me of a *very* unofficial cartoon from inside one of the suppliers mentioned in this article (although in this instance not a railway division), of a Saturn 5 rocket (prominently branded with the supplier’s logo) on the launchpad: from the capsule on top comes a speech bubble: “Has it been… tested?” and from the blockhouse comes the reply: “Pardon??”. Its origin has some passing similarities with the testing-related issues mentioned in the article…

  161. Let me be clear; I’m not advocating that there should never be any losers. That has actually been the general DfT position, much to the detriment of efficient timetabling. Here though, because TLP is a DfT project, they have been prepared to sacrifice a number of SE services to accommodate their project.

    Perhaps in the future the extra capacity that will be delivered on Metro services from new rolling stock will be needed – although given recent growth on SE that’s not certain – but that has nothing to do with the detriments to other services, which is largely down to TLP.

  162. @Mike:

    Thameslink Readiness (Advisory) Board of the good and great who, if anyone would, should have called out the plan and resources available to implement the new timetable as unworkable

    One possibility is that the Readiness Board actually made things worse by intervening too late in the process with the proposal for phased introduction of services, exacerbating the problems with too late planning of rosters and timetables. Another is that the existence of the board and its independent panel gave a false confidence to GTR management and gave them an excuse not to ask the searching questions they needed to.

  163. Excellent article followed up by some very informative comments.

    Did I miss an explanation of the NR timetable approval process and how this may have played a part in this debacle (I’d use the word complete cluster fluff but this is a family blog)?

  164. @IanJ The GTR excuse is that they only discovered very late that the diagrams didn’t align with their driver resource (I’m not convinced that this is the whole story). If that is correct to the extent that this has caused such a misalignment of requirement and resource to cause the current situation, then that is at an unprecedented level, so it’s impossible for anyone with no access to the detail (like the readiness board) to have anticipated this.

    There are two major flaws in GTR’s story – firstly, why hadn’t they done some draft diagrams earlier and discovered this mismatch and secondly, why hadn’t they trained more drivers which would have mitigated this risk. Possibly the board should have picked up the latter, but they won’t have had the detail and would have relied on GTR assurances. As something like this has never happened before, I don’t think we can be too hard on them.

    As to whether GTR relied on the readiness board, then the simple answer is that they shouldn’t have – this was still their responsibility.

    @ Brightonreader. Google Network Code and read Part D. It’s a long, involved process and extremely boring to read, let alone write!

  165. @HH/IanJ – does anyone know what was fed to the Readiness Board (which itself appeared on the scene after some of the fatal decisions were already taken)?

    One possible fall guy in the whole saga is Siemens for their failure to deliver enough sets early enough and then to handle the software defects by batching. It’s by no means the whole story and by no means let’s GTR off the hook, but I can see it being a convenient answer that ensures the obloquy storm falls well away from the department.

  166. Re Brighton Reader,

    “Did I miss an explanation of the NR timetable approval process and how this may have played a part in this debacle?”

    Symptom being blamed rather than root cause. (The only thing not directly attributable to GTR or DfT)
    If GTR had enough (or even better all the planned) drivers trained then the late approval would’t have mattered.

    The worrying thing is that GTR say (TSC) they only did the rostering attempts 3 weeks out and then discovered it wouldn’t work –> Gross negligence + incompetence. The other factor is of course the completely new (driver) rostering software (new to rail industry) which was only available as short time before hand so it looks like they didn’t try using the old software and processes to check as they wouldn’t ever use them with the new timetable so why waste the effort? They have to had done the calculation when working out how many drivers they need so they could work out the hiring requirements but those calcs were probably done by others.

    As Captain Deltic says “hand cranking” calculations for sense checking is vital (and drummed into engineers but not many others) and it appears this wasn’t done by GTR or equally importantly the the readiness board so they appeared to /claim to have had no clue. Given that LR towers were picking up reports 8 months ago from numerous drivers who had done the hand cranking (knowing the number of drivers already trained, the training plans and actually achieved training rates) that they could see enough drivers being ready for the Timetable change.

  167. @NGH 0820

    Handcranking on number of drivers available relys on having enough trained, planning staff available to be able to do it, whilst doing the “day job” of keeping the railway pre May on the rails. Especially with Informed Traveller timescales shrinking by the day, and an allegedly over stretched and under-resourced planning department (s) putting even more pressure on the rostering teams.

  168. Reggie
    Given that level of criticality, I think that any change that produces significant numbers of losers is unacceptable, and if the measure used still says the project is delivering value when this is happening, then the wrong thing is probably being measured to determine value.
    How apt … my highest qualification is an MSc in Engineering Measurement ( “Metrology” ) …And using the wrong measuring-stick was almost the first mistaken thing we were told of in our course. And, I first met the MBA’s during that course & your description is spot on – they certainly seemed to suffer from “Masters of the Universe” delusions of grandeur.

    Again: If you combine that with a management culture that is only prepared to accept positive news, the stage is usually set for a disaster.
    Well, now!

    The previously-mentiond Prof J E Gordon classic, “Structures” has “A chapter of Accidents”, one of which was the complete groupthink & political/management arrogance that led to the R101 disaster. The concentration on details, the drive to finish “On time” no matter what the cost or result … he described it as having (paraphrase) ” a certain Gadarene inevitability about it, as the whole thing slides to disaster before one’s eyesr”

  169. Re Graham H,

    I think it will emerge that DfT (as the ultimate relationship owner with Siemens) weren’t on the ball enough about realising the effects of issues with the later than planned deliveries.

    Siemens were aware as the problems /delays increased their working capital requirements up by a low 9 figure (£ or €) sum (ignoring penalties and additional costs (the cost of stabling 35 units in siding in Western Germany, Netherlands and even Belgium at one point)). DfT (and Treasury) might have even been happy as they didn’t have to start coughing up till (delayed vs plan) acceptance without realising the practical consequences for May 2018.

    There was also an internal contractual issue within Siemens in that their software division was brought in to do the software due to the much greater requirement for software on the 700s vs previous Siemens products (especially compared to Bombardier). Hence Mobility (the rail division) made the trains but didn’t have much control over “software’s**” resourcing, processes or management. Siemens were a bit upset that the NR infrastructure environment was considerable more complex and inflexible than they anticipated and that this had to be compensated for in considerably more software tweaks than expected* (ditto SWT /SWR 707s with different contract structure leaving the end user responsible for some of the software cost which is one reason SWR will be returning the 707s and aren’t spending any more on software (hence the PIS problems aren’t going to be resolved.)

    *For example the balises used for checking the train is correctly platformed (for ASDO and CSDE) couldn’t be uniformly positioned relative to stop markers because of existing infrastructure already located there in some stations thus necessitating the software to be adapted with custom distance limits from the balises for far more individual locations than anticipated.

    **Insert CEO’s new unit name for the quarter as appropriate.

    Needless to say both DfT and Siemens would probably prefer NR’s timetable unit staff under resourcing was discussed instead. for which ORR can also be blamed.

  170. @GrahamH: Asking what the Readiness Board knew would have been a good question from the PSC as outside the board probably only a handful of people know. However, given the level of detailed knowledge required, I doubt whether they were ever in a position to make a meaningful intervention on this.

    Siemens are at fault for not delivering fully working units on time, but GTR should have been prepared for this – new rolling stock introduction rarely runs smoothly. I have heard that this is another area of their bid where they shaved costs – so they weren’t as prepared for these delays as they might have been.

  171. @BOB – there just aren’t enough skilled/trained staff for this area in the industry. At one point FCC didn’t have a single member of staff who knew how to resource plan train crew, for instance – and they didn’t even realise it. Hopefully, with all the recent publicity, this will be a wake-up call to the industry.

  172. NGH: If GTR had enough (or even better all the planned) drivers trained then the late approval would’t have mattered.

    Precisely. There was no built-in contingency. Unlike Northern, GTR have known the requirements for driver training from day 1. Unfortunately, they probably got distracted from doing the day job in order to push Wilkinson’s agenda on Guards (which, incidentally, Horton handled very badly to boot).

    The dead hand of the DfT is all over this.

  173. Re Bob @0858,

    Exactly see my comment under this and in both the article and comment so the previous Cicada article about planning resources.

    Given how wide of the mark GTR levels of trained drivers were you didn’t need to be “trained planning staff” to do the calculations showing a large train wreck was imminent. Any numerate person with some rail knowledge looking at the raw data on training levels should have rung alarm bells without even reaching for pencil / envelope / calculator / spreadsheet / C / python / railplan, mental arithmetic is sufficient.

    The question is why the raw training level data wasn’t show to the readiness board?

  174. RE HH/GH,

    The actual (ignoring the plan) 700s roll out is still the most aggressive EMU introduction in Europe by a fair way, How much was this fact in DfT /GTR continual thinking and assessment???

    Of course we don’t know what Siemens coughed up in penalties (were the seat tray tables retrofit and wifi thrown in for free?)

    GN planning /control – That is exactly what I meant in my original comment on coming out of the WAGN split badly. Ditto the inept Ops directors incredibly generous RDW agreement in 2009.

  175. Re Andy Dean 19 June 2018 at 11:57
    “Will you please submit this as written evidence to the Transport Committee along with your wise comments on yesterday’s witness evidence”

    RE Donald MacKinnon 19 June 2018 at 12:48

    “…Having watched yesterday’s proceedings I would be grateful if you would ensure that the Committee considers the following analysis by London Reconnections of the TSGN decision time-line. Even as an outsider, I thought the claims made by both panels about who knew what and when were inaccurate as I had been aware of possible, specific problems for at least the past two and a half years….”

    Given that the Committee Chairperson has been tweeting about this article I think it is fair to say the TSC are aware…

  176. This one will run and run and if handled correctly could be a huge positive for British railways if we learn from it. Listening to the Transport Select Committee I didn’t see much evidence of self criticism or self awareness unfortunately so the chances of history repeating itself are high. Didn’t the DfT appear at the same hearing. I don’t recall them turning up. I hope the Glaister inquiry is independent. In tandem with a comment further up I am sceptical of the full timetable ever being operable. So far I’m winning my bet with my drinking chums who acussed me of miserableness when I put forward my guess for the outcome prior to May 20. The annoying thing is I really want it to succeed. Thanks for the article and the work involved.

  177. Re HH @ 0904 & 0918,

    The question is did DfT require GTR to have plans to mitigate against 3rd party (effectively DfT) non performance?

    The ITT and Franchise doc suggest not…

    DfT would also be paying GTR to provide the contingency!

  178. @NGH – I’m not sure I can answer your question directly as I am not privy to the eventual Siemens contract, although I don’t imagine it was significantly different. Certainly, its predecessor, on which I was advising Bombardier’s bankers, was regarded as tough but not “aggressive”, and deliverable. My fellow advisers specialising in rolling stock manufacture did flag up the penalties attached to the risks of late delivery/acceptance/entry into service and also drew some pretty bathtub diagrams, but BT regarded these as acceptable. Presumably Siemens took the same view.

    More generally, all the bidders and their advisers believed that DfT was being unusually gung-ho and prescriptive in the contract requirements – reflecting a certain nervousness in the Department about the actual operability of the franchise. This came over particularly when assessing the risk of such things as dwell time and driver performance where the department’s advisers became very defensive if not downright dogmatic. (It was not my job to challenge their views, merely to work with the manufacturer’s legal team to ensure that none of this fell on BT financially).

    DfT did, in fact, provide a sample timetable for the manufacturers which was unworkable, (It assumed 1 minute turnrounds at the outer termini) and didn’t like it when it was pointed out that this wasn’t a feasible basis for determining the size of the fleet. I don’t know whether reality subsequently obtruded and it’s not directly relevant to the current problems, except insofar as it betrays a mind set and knowledge of railway operations which may well have failed to understand the significance of the combo of driver training and set acceptance.

  179. Sorry – one further thought to add to an already overlong post. The risks that the manufacturers were asked to accept where for late delivery and acceptance, and these they could see and price. The risks related to driver training were visible only to franchise bidders – who couldn’t see the rolling stock manufacturers’ views on the delivery risks. The only ONLY people who could see both classes of risk and therefore assess their interaction were in DfT. Given the organisational split between franchise procurement and procurement generally within DfT, it may well have been the case that no one could see the interrelationship between these two risk classes, (Clearly, both streams of work would have been submitted to a single minister, but given the rapid turnover at Minister rather than SoS level, there would have been no continuity, even if your average minister would have had the wit to ask the right question).

  180. @NGH 09:28 “The actual (ignoring the plan) 700s roll out is still the most aggressive EMU introduction in Europe by a fair way,”

    Was the 700 order the biggest ever single order?
    If so it stands to reason since you can reasonably expect the rate of rollout (both average and peak) to increase with larger orders, partly due to economies of scale, but also the increase in knowledge.

    Having said that, it is interesting to note that this “most aggressive rollout” is still true despite the delays.

    I’m struggling to think of any single order that might have been bigger (especially if counted in cars, rather than units) except possibly the networkers , but these were split between 2 manufacturers, I think?

  181. Re DJL,

    “Was the 700 order the biggest ever single order”
    No but the delivery rate is higher.

    I’m aware of several larger orders in Germany and France but with deliveries over much longer timescales e.g. 8 years etc as part of a rolling fleet replacement.

  182. Not even the largest order in the UK – not by a long way.

    Class 700 (sixty 8-car and fifty-five 12-car) 1,140 vehicles

    S stock: (133 S7 and 58 S8) 1,397 vehicles. (The S7+1 for the Watford extension was a separate order).

  183. It could be summed up much more briefly:
    Govia Thameslink are incapable of running a railway franchise and always have been – the service fell apart and descended into chaos within two weeks of them taking it over in 2014.
    The (two and more to come) new timetable(s) is/are a red herring. The service has been consistently shit for four years.
    Why their franchise has not been cancelled is beyond comprehension.
    If a franchise turns into continual chaos over four years, the franchise holder should carry the can. If multiple line franchises all turn into continual chaos, the franchise holder should carry the can. This failed Thameslink franchise has lasted almost as long as the Second World War but with even longer queues.

  184. Going back to @ HH 06:37, I had a look at Part D and it looks to me like a model of clarity compared to most Contract Documents, presumably not written by a lawyer?
    What it does make very clear is that it is almost impossible for there to be any effective ‘competition’ in the rail industry: Clause 1.1.1 “Network Rail establishes the timetable”.
    I could find no definition of ‘Timetable Participants’ so can only guess at how difficult it must be for a would-be competitor to get a seat at the table and claim a path in that timetable.

  185. @John Fleming 12:37

    I have to disagree with you there. My experience of Thameslink under Govia has been much better than it was under First – the previous franchise.

    Up until this TT change, that is.

    While it was FCC the service was an utter shambles, without any major changes to blame it on!

  186. John Fleming. Really ?
    I’m never going to defend GoVia – but if you think they alone are responsible for this shambles you need to go back and read the article again.

  187. @RogerB I don’t know who wrote this particular section, but BRB were definitely involved, as were BR and external lawyers (Eversheds IIRC).

    Some documents (probably including this) have been amended by ORR since.

    ‘Timetable Participants’ basically means anyone who wants to timetable a train. To do that you have to have a license, etc. which means going through the ORR. You really wouldn’t want any Tom, Dick or Charles to be running trains now, would you? 🙂

  188. ROGERB – A Timetable Participant is ANY organisation who holds (or expects to be granted) access rights to run trains on the network during the timetable period.

    There is a hierarchy rights. Level 1 (or Firm Rights) are those rights currently held (or authorised by ORR) which exist on the Priority Date.

    Level 2 Rights are those held by Network Rail and cover such things as No Trains Periods, 2-track periods on multi-track routes, planned disruptive possessions.

    Level 3 rights (Contingent Rights) are those rights held by TOCs but currently not exercised (maybe because you don’t have the rolling stock).

    Level 4 Rights are those rights which are obtained after the Priority Date and includes all NRs activities which were developed after the Priority Date.

    Rights are considered in the same order. Thus NR cannot exercise its rights (Level 2) if they cut across an existing (Level 1) Right. Unless the TOC concerned is agreeable.

    Basically the timetable is an expression of Level 1 Rights and Level 2 Rights with Level 3 and Level 4 Rights added in if they can be timetabled within the existing rules.

    Thus if you wanted to run your own train service from (say) Brighton to London Bridge, you would be treated as a Timetable Participant if NR thought you were a serious applicant. However until you hold some Level 1 or 3 Rights you can’t actually participate in the timetabling process!

  189. HH – whilst I’m sure BRB had *some* input to the legal aspects of the timetabling process, we weren’t allowed much room. Templates were issued by ORR. The main inputs to ORR would have come from RT, their consultants, and their lawyers, who may have been Eversheds (although I thought they worked for DTp at the time – a role in which they failed to endear themselves to any other magic circle firm, their competitors quite openly replacing the final e and d with two other letters, to form a well known phrase or saying). BR’s lawyers were Clifford Chance.

  190. Graham, ORR didn’t exist back then. It was ‘the Regulator’ IIRC. 🙂

    I’m sure I recall Evershed’s name on some of the original documents – maybe they were acting for RT or DTp though.

    I also seem to recall that someone at BRB signed them as approved. But it’s 20+ years ago and a few beers under the bridge since then.

  191. Anyone can be let down by their suppliers, but a company that continues with a plan that the supply failure invalidates holds the responsibility. GTR may have had fewer trains and less network access than they like, but their insistence on continuing with their new timetable when they could see these shortcomings months and even years out is entirely their fault.

    Their complaint about late timetable approval preventing them rostering is particularly feeble. They should have run their proposed timetable through their old system to validate it before submission, and have entered sample timetables to commission their new management software. I can’t believe the tweaks that NR might have introduced before authorising it are the cause of the meltdown.

  192. As an Ex driver over the core thameslink route at the time when govia took over from FCC, it was the standing joke that no one would have believed that anyone could be worse than FCC, but GTR managed it in spades over the first few months with ease, and have continued in much the same way ever since…. !!!

  193. @HH – sorry, a proleptic lapse – yes, indeed, Mr Swift was hard at work as the Rail Regulator. That BR signature would have been, like enough, mine as I was the Board’s universal signatory and signing things was one of my day (and night) time jobs as Company Secretary. Did I read all the 60 000 documents I signed over those three years – no – I relied on teams of BRB lawyers to do that for me. There was not a single magic circle law firm, of course, who weren’t involved in some aspect of the rail privatisation work. The total legal fees for the public sector were understood to be around £752m. (Indeed, the fees were so large that the depratment (I know this is misspelled but i will let it stand) openly said that cancellation would cause the service sector to take too large a hit in prospective fees.

  194. *Actually* the Network Code is “owned” by Class Representatives Committee (CRC). Both NR and ORR from time to time propose changes which are debated by the industry and if approved by both CRC and ORR become the industry bible.

    Part D has, I think, been changed 5 times since 1.4.94.

  195. Go-Ahead Group appoints Patrick Verwer as CEO of Govia Thameslink Railway
    The Go-Ahead Group plc (GOG) has today appointed Patrick Verwer, former Managing Director of London Midland Trains, as CEO of Govia Thameslink Railway (GTR).

    David Brown, CEO of Go-Ahead commented “I have full confidence in Patrick’s ability and determination to lead GTR and its team through the current difficulties and to deliver the long term benefits of the new timetable. Patrick brings with him a long history of collaborating with industry partners such as Network Rail and the DfT to deliver for customers.”

    Patrick Verwer said “ I look forward to working with my new colleagues to deliver on the transformation that is already underway at GTR. My focus will be on ensuring we meet the needs of our customers each and every day.”

    Patrick will join GTR in early July.

    Patrick Verwer was Managing Director of London Midland between January 2012 and December 2017. Before that he worked in the transport industry in the UK and Europe, specialising in rail and airport services. He first came to the UK in 2003 as Managing Director of Merseyrail. Born and educated in the Netherlands, Patrick started his career in the Rotterdam Police Force rising to senior officer level.

    https://www.go-ahead.com/en/media/news/2018/go-ahead-group-appoints-patrick-verwer-as-ceo-of-govia-thameslin.html

    Not much of a surprise as he was Govia’s most senior thumb twiddler after the loss of the LM franchise last year.

  196. NGH – BBC referred to him as Patrick Viewer! Wasn’t it announced in March that he would replace Nick Brown as COO?

  197. As an interested outsider this is all fascinating stuff.
    I imagine something like the present fiasco was never anticipated by those involved in the privatisation process because, despite all the rude jokes about curled up sandwiches, BR did know how to run trains.
    So there was no provision for a competitor to step in and take on a few diagrams within a failing franchise. I.e. there never was any prospect of actual competition that might have disposed of the no-hopers.

  198. RogerB: Criticisms of that kind can certainly be leveled at “those involved in the privatisation process”. The specific notion which you mention, though (a competitor stepping in and taking on a few diagrams) does not strike me as particularly sound or practical. The relationships and interfaces between the various parties involved in running train services are complex and delicate enough already, without making any provision for fiddling with them on a short term basis.

    There is a difficult choice to be made if an operator appears to be a “no-hoper”. The way things are, if such a situation is detected or suspected, the only choices are to try and improve its performance, or to take the franchise away, something of a nuclear option.

  199. @Roger B
    “So there was no provision for a competitor to step in and take on a few diagrams within a failing franchise. I.e. there never was any prospect of actual competition that might have disposed of the no-hopers.”

    On the contrary, I understand the aspiration/expectation amongst the privatisation enthusiasts was that the franchises would be a temporary arrangement, and in due course private “open access” operators would run most of the services. (Roger Freeman’s “cheap and cheerful Typists’ Specials” and “luxury services for civil servants” – which must have confused civil service typists!)

    Of course, what actually happened was that the franchisees wanted a guaranteed monopoly, and wouldn’t countenance open access operators on their patch, even running pointless services in free paths to boost the number of services they were running and prevent ORCATS raids.

  200. @timbeau – the rail privatiseers believed, as you say, in the purest form of competition and Salmon said to me that his sole role was to let the first round of franchises. He didn’t think there would be a second (on the grounds that the market would then have established itself). Franchises “withering away” was the buzz phrase du jour. All this, of course, rests on that fatal Treasury misunderstanding that capitalists love competition; real world people know the opposite. As reality dawned in the Treasury and the “cash is king” faction gained over the “competition solves all” faction, the mood music changed and we found that the answer was going to be “competition by emulation”, with the fatuous (but one actually suggested by the emulation gurus) East Coast example of “better sausages” in Operator A’s services compared with Operator B.

    Irony lovers will have noticed that even emulation has been discarded now that transferrable branding is a specific franchise requirement. [The growing and now nearly universal number of franchises won by scratch bands of consortia would have sounded the death knell of brand loyalty anyway].

  201. Timbeau & Roger B
    Indeed. The current model of privatisation, as pushed onto the Major government by its own ideologues was unworkable from the word “go” – if only because of the deliberate misinterpretation of the financial separation of train/track directive.
    Privatisation could have worked, if a modern version of either the pre-or-post1922/3 model had been used.
    Trains from other operators regularly ran over other people’s tracks – there were also things like Joint lines & statutory agreements like Running Powers & the Railway Clearing House to act as independant adjudicator/referee.
    Whether we could still go to that arrangement, along with the massive upheaval it would cause, is another matter & is probably a Grand Projet version of crayonism, so I think I’ll stop right now ….

  202. Re 130,

    Starting 10 weeks early and as CEO rather than COO which leaves another big hole to fill and all the obvious long list of experience battle-hardened candidates (with local working knowledge) all gainfully employed elsewhere in more senior roles (post Govia) often having been passed over by GoVia for role initially with GTR.

    David S 1 (now Boston) ex [Southern MD / COO / chief fixer / in charge of the last big Southern TT changes in 2008 / chief rolling stock engineer] AND with expertise in post Horton clear up…
    Alex H ( now Scotrail alliance)
    Chris B (now Arriva MD) ex Southern MD
    David S 2 (now SE MD) with expertise in post Horton clear up…

  203. Re Graham H,

    “rests on that fatal Treasury misunderstanding that capitalists love competition; real world people know the opposite. ”

    Exactly – My first job post uni and having had enough of engineering for a while was working for a strategy consultancy specialising in working for companies in effective duopoly “markets” (Civil Aircraft manufacture / Soft Drinks / Chocolate…) or similar

  204. A parallel to the operating fiasco of the GTR timetable was the PPP engineering fiasco on the London Underground long since replaced (expensively) with the rational intergrated model it should have been all along. Not so noticed by the passengers as the effects didn’t have such a huge impact on operational performance but it was there. For example the money spent on PPP instead of other things and the delayed introduction of night tube. There was one civil servant in the build up to PPP who wanted all the sets of escalators at a station to be franchises with competing companies, the gate lines to be operated by others and so on. The PPP was the most expensive way to borrow money and the most inefficient way of spending it.

  205. A late but instructive comment (I hope!).
    Southern have had the same timetable constraints in terms of delivery times etc and issues re-rostering drivers at short notice as Thameslink have. There has been a great deal of change behind the scenes to change shifts and get drivers in the right place every day,
    And yet their service is operating the best it has ever done.

    Any article that focuses on anything other than driver training is missing the point by a mile, so credit to LR for passing the test.

  206. Just to add, albeit late that Traffic management hasn’t really played a part in all this yet so its unfair to blame any of it on those systems. From what i gather from experienced people its presently unknown in my circles if indeed ARS will make any difference at all. As for the “Control GUI” that is TMS – thats potentially another world of hurt yet to come 😉

  207. @ Sam 19/6 2114 – not quite sure I share your view of the procurement process. I know for a fact that bidders will have their own list of contract weaknesses, areas for potential claims / disputes etc. Happens on every large scale contract. If the Client is half awake they have their own list about the bidder’s weaknesses, errors and other issues. I find it all a tad pathetic but there you go. It is clear that not all bidders are keen to keep chasing govt contracts – National Express quietly, and perhaps cleverly, withdrew from the UK market. Seems Dean Finch has good “rune reading” skills.

    The more worrying thing about the Thameslink integrated franchise is NGH’s earlier remark that no one put in a compliant bid. Now that may be because the requirements were rubbish and no sensible bidder could, in all conscience, submit a rubbish answer to rubbish requirements. However the DfT should really have taken pause at the point at which all bidders were non compliant and asked what on earth’s gone wrong. Whether this happened is not clear but I struggle somehow to see how such an enormous contract could possibly be concluded legally with such a flawed requirement and non compliant responses. I assume something was somehow sorted out but I suspect that it is lurking in the background as another root cause for the current shambles.

  208. There have been so many excellent comments it’s hard to know what to respond to. I will just pick up on the timetable headway issue.

    The earlier comments were made in the context of commuters which is fair enough. However given that someone above observed that South Eastern, for example, carts large quanties of thin air around off peak I’d also make the point that what I call “daft” headways is a major turn off for me. I simply look at the timetable and if I am left with a potential 25 mins wait on what should really be “turn up and go” territory then I won’t bother thus 1 lost prospective passenger. I understand the complexities and inevitable compromises that result in these timetables but that doesn’t fix the underlying issue that unattractive timetables and headways are a deterrent to usage. There seems little industry appetite to develop better timetables and to secure the requisite investment to make them feasible where current infrastructure imposes constraints and pinch points. The Dutch have long worked to provide attractive regular interval, connecting rail services. We seem happier to have low frequency, unwieldy complex operations that typically don’t connect. This applies as much to Northern Rail as it does to many London and South East operations. Both areas *have* had investment but the end result doesn’t seem very attractive at all. I’ll never understand why.

  209. @ Ngh – thanks for confirming that Mr Verwer had actually remained with Go Ahead after London Midland ceased operation. That little gap was not explained in the Go Ahead press release.

    Also thanks for highlighting that the TSC are aware of the article. Saves me writing to Lillian Greenwood to ask her and her committee to read it and then drag GTR back to answer all the issues they oddly missed out in their “this is what went wrong” session. I see that GTR are in front of the Assembly Transport Committee next week. Here’s hoping Ms Pidgeon and her colleagues are suitably prepped and will pick up on some of the issues that have not been properly aired in public.

    @ Graham H – re alternative name for large legal firm – 🙂 🙂 🙂

  210. Wimwom,

    We are saying that TMS is a factor because, had it been there and working properly, the initial chaos would have been less bad. Although not in common use (only one live example in the UK so far) it would have helped and was due to be in use on this route.

    More accurately ‘No traffic management system that GTR was relying on’ but that would not fit in the box. Although it was planned to be in use, the commitment for it was only for the 24tph use If it is true that GTR were relying on it, as we believe, then they were being unduly optimistic and relying on something they shouldn’t have done. Equally Network Rail should have done what they could (maybe they did) to make sure it was available. And maybe the supplier shouldn’t have over-promised.

  211. Walthamstow Writer,

    Re: Non-compliant bids.

    Just to be clear. The timetables in the bids were handed to Network Rail (all four of them) for comment. The DfT choose the time available for this without, I believe, any consideration of how long Network Rail thought they needed. It was also a period over Christmas so a decision had to be made as to how much priority to give to this as opposed to allowing staff a Christmas break.

    At the time Network Rail had no veto. They deemed some of the timetables non-compliant but believed that they could be made compliant. Clearly either that turned out not to be the case or, if there was a solution, no-one discovered it.

    I think this is typical of where the process went wrong. As implied by you, I think there should have been a halt until Network Rail said ‘yes, the timetable will work’ – which has to apply to the successful bidder’s offering.

    I can see various different possible scenarios to remedy the situation varying from having to resubmit the timetable bit to the DfT having to make it easier to provide a compliant timetable. And if Network Rail says it works but it turns out it doesn’t where does the responsibility lie?

    It is just one extra factor that makes this whole procedure a complete mess.

    And let us not forget that Network Rail’s computer said that the January 2015 timetable wouldn’t work but no-one took enough notice. I think even Network Rail had thoughts that their computer might be wrong.

  212. PEDANTIC OF PURLEY,

    This isn’t a negative view of TMS – rather, the complexities that have to be managed when things are late.
    So theres actually many elements of TMS that have to work for it to be effective.
    Just to be clear, all these systems are part of the overall digital railway package.
    So in the main Thameslink core section you have automated driverless control, ATO over ECTS and all that.
    Those technologies were already in place, albeit separately, and whilst its the first time in use in the world using those technologies, together, its just from Blackfriars to St Pancras. But they work.

    So then, as mentioned, there’s to be ARS coming in the Three Bridges ASC Area (so Selhurst/Norwood – Brighton, plus Cat/Tatt/Horsham/East Grinstead branches). Its thought to be at least 2-5 years away and if based on present ARS in areas such as Ashford/Wimbledon – its likely won’t work too good for locale such as Windmill Bridge/Selhurst/Gloucester Road/Cottage Jn/Norwood Fork.
    Its not even known if the logic behind the regulation is the same. And regulation is critical (but only one factor in service management – a pretty big one though).
    Current ARS uses first train to junction priority. But to make Thameslink work it requires the right time/right path to protect them as they’re long distance trains and more exposed to delay plus they go onto different routes which have the obvious potential to cause reactionary delays. Not to mention being a political hot potato, obv. (albeit one thats gone rather cold recently!)
    And theres other factors to consider when regulating against 2.5-3 min headways.
    For example if a train is say 8 late, but only has an 8 minute turnaround – it’s going need priority to recover its next working. Busy railways do not have too long at terminals.
    If that train gets delayed say…5 minutes – very easy between East Croydon and Victoria, then that train will be late back and the potential to lose its path becomes apparent.
    What if a given train carries crew for other trains? What if the stock is used for a train leaving earlier then its booked as its required on a depot finish diagram?
    We all know the complex crew logistics involved with Southern owing to it working tight diagrams with minimum driver numbers.
    The new TT has, at least for some metro trains, actually fixed this – most metro services run up to say 10 late. And they self-recover. You won’t hear about it, but its actually been done very well and when things all die down, you’ll see metro services hitting better targets.
    But this requires intervention to make it work. And not direct signaller intervention – because they arn’t aware of issues elsewhere. They have to be advised that such regulation is required. TMS is designed to aid this, but not have any direct control. At least not for some years….or so i’m told.
    And then you come up against another issue.
    Who controls the route?
    If a train is required to be regulated the the signaller must be told on safety grounds at the very least. Signallers have to grant blockages for staff/track access/repair/inspection purposes yet trains often need regulation at very short notice.
    So you need some kind of window – which might be fine for some mainline trains as theres time to manage those but what about metro trains or thameslink services which will often start say 2-3 late and be 10 late by east Croydon. Within an approximate 10-30 minute timespan (the time it takes to get to or from East Croydon – Victoria or London Bridge)
    And we’re talking trains with 2-3 min headways – so thats lots of trains and lots of factors to take into consideration.

    On top of that, the rules behind PPM are going to change to station based PPM.
    I believe it’ll work something like this…
    A Vic-Caterham late train will fail PPM if its late leaving…say…Victoria.
    So to ensure crews and service recovery is managed it’ll be run fast. It misses all the intermediate stations to say…Selhurst. And is right time again at Selhurst, So its failed PPM at all stations to Selhurst but made PPM from then on as its now on time to Caterham (cynically….this will yield better figures as the current policy is any station missed means the train fails PPM outright!).

    But hang on…ARS uses “first past the post” regulation. That Caterham train requires regulation leaving Victoria, then Clapham Junction, Balham, and Streatham Common.
    And TMS doesn’t manage that. There is no “special priority” controls for such a move.
    So the signaller then has to manually regulate the train and if the metro services are as bad as the last 12 months – well those ARS controls might be better served controlling the Guinness satisfaction hotline.
    And everyone knows GTR performs skip stopping more then any other TOC – probably in the world.

  213. WW & others …
    We appear to have got something that wasn’t what we expected & more importantly, what we wanted … & none of the bids was compliant, either …
    May I point out the existence of something called the Abilene Paradox? which might be relevant under the circs….
    [ Where everybody agrees to do something, that no-one actually wanted to do ]

  214. Greg Tingey…
    Not so sure.
    Its kind of done what it was set out to do. Its serving more stations and will reduce overcrowding (eventually) on both its own trains and on the LU as it’ll save cross London connections. And the TT rewrite will defo. improve the South London Metro and that has multiple gains (drivers should be on time, as will passengers). I can’t speak for the GN though.

  215. Muzer 19 June 2018 at 15:36

    “For some reason the headline reminded me of the nursery rhyme “Mary Mary”, so

    “quite contrary” was clearly dreamt up as the only thing they could find where the last two syllables rhymed with “Mary”…”

    I think you’ll find that the older daughter of King Henry the wife-killer worked very hard at counter-Reformation. Hence the nickname that echoes down the centuries.

  216. So how is the drivers’ new route knowledge training programme going on that OTHER little new cross-London railway that is going to open in a bit of a general rush this year? (Not that they have so much new mileage to learn).
    Or has it already got too ‘TfL’ to match the ‘achievements’ possible in franchise-land?

  217. @PETER KAY

    You mean the service that is 100% new, unused track in December? The service that doesn’t extend the Shenfield service over said new track until next Summer? The one that will only extend from Canary Wharf to the airport the end of 2019, that one?

    Even when everything is “up and running”:

    – Shenfield trains will run only to Paddington;
    – Gidea Park peak-time trains will only run to Liverpool Street High Level (as now);
    – Only six Abbey wood trains will, each hour, make it to Heathrow (4 to T4, 2 to T5), four more than now;
    – Only two trains an hour will make it to Reading, four to Maidstone, two more than the current “preview” service.

  218. @ Briantist
    Is Maidstone a new Crossrail extension? Even the C2E campaign only seeks to reach Ebbsfleet and Gravesend. Mind you, it would make up for the shortfall with the Thameslink Rainham service, using slots that aren’t being operated.

  219. Briantist: Good luck with catching one of the four trains (running “now”) connecting Abbey Wood to Heathrow 🙂

    However, you are absolutely right that the Crossrail service is being introduced gradually, and probably correct with your list of limitations. But none of that alters the fact that some driver training is required, which means that Peter Kay’s question is pertinent.

    The sad thing is that, before the current Thameslink issues, we would have all been able to assume that driver training would be done correctly and at the right time, alongside all the other things that have to be done to open a new railway. Nowadays that question comes to the forefront.

  220. Re Briantist /Peter Kay /Milton,

    Paddington Low Level – Abbey Wood full route testing on ATO started on Monday 11th June (26 weeks before the opening) .

    The level of Crossrail drivers (Non LST -Shenfield) trained on the 345s is already sufficient for December operations, the Paddington Low Level – Abbey Wood route knowledge is different matter as testing is underway but given the current (Non LST -Shenfield) CR driver utilisation levels (low) there is plenty of time and given it isn’t currently running a passenger service so plenty of paths available pre-opening for route training. Hence Crossrail are in a good place at the moment. (TL don’t have enough drivers 700 trained to operate the May TT changes yet let alone the route knowledge)

  221. WW: Whilst regular interval clock-face timetables may be a desired feature for passengers are they necessarily so for operators? Especially if they mean, on occasions, running a service slower than possible so that services meet in the correct order at interchange stations and pinch points? Also meaning you can’t push as many services though.

    Which then leads to pax disliking stationary trains as much as buses announcing they are waiting “to regularise the service”.

  222. Re: Briantist/Milton Clevedon
    Maidstone? Do you mean Maidenhead? I mustn’t get too excited, now.

  223. In the age of journey planners, the only thing that matters to me is the number of minutes to the next train.

    On average regular headways deliver this best, of course, but 4 trains irregularly spaced is probably better than 2 at regular intervals. My phone will remember the details.

  224. @ Briantist – I thought it was the case that post Dec 2019 that Shenfield trains *do* run to Reading. I appreciate you can assume from the fact that only 10 tph run beyond Paddington (Pad) that this “must” mean all 12 from Shenfield plus 2 from Abbey Wood turn round at Pad.

    It doesn’t feel like a sensible or plausible operational or marketing proposition to tell people in East London that they can never travel beyond Paddington without changing trains. You can achieve better than that on the Central / Hammersith and City / District lines today. I’ve no recollection of TfL releasing an up to date service pattern for the Dec 19 timetable and we know that earlier assumptions are “up for review” given the 4 tph to Reading / 2 extra tph to T5 decision. Have you seen something official that the rest of us haven’t or are just inferring something?

  225. @ Alison W – I take your point but I was making two related points. One was about the general attractiveness of properly spaced, reasonably frequent services which allows the public to dispense with the timetable rather than being ruled by it. The second was about an investment strategy that sought to raise service levels generally and to deal with known problem areas that cause the irregular headways people are lumbered with today.

    It strikes me as utterly perverse that Thameslink has provided some bits of *its* network with more frequent, decently headwayed services but at the cost of passengers elsewhere whose services have been recast in a worse manner than before. That says to me that someone didn’t think this through at the start nor did they set any objectives, targets and initiatives in place to stop the perverse consequences.

    I recognise your point about slow services and pauses but that is not quite the same as the bus network. If trains have to pause to allow faster trains to pass then that is usually reflected in the timetable. Slow running speeds are also reflected in the timetable and may be there to reflect infrastructure constraints or the performance regime on the railway or for recovery purposes. Much of the slow running on the bus network is down to councils lowering speed limits, inserting road humps and generally destroying the capacity of the road network plus congestion. When you couple this with bus operators scheduling routes for the worse possible travel conditions you then get the unscheduled “waits for regulation” because buses run too early. There is a more structured approach to the railway’s timetable rules than there is on the road network. I don’t think too many TOCs go out of their way to construct railway timetables for the absolute worst scenario unlike the bus companies. Train timetable info is a bit more accessible than TfL bus timetables so people using rail stand a better chance of knowing their journey time than anyone does using the buses. For example TfL themselves never publish peak running times for buses on the panel “frequency guides” at bus stops. It shows an average off peak journey time and even that is usually a band of times because there is less traffic early morning / late evening than during shopping hours which all count as “off peak”.

    People criticise the Overground as slow (which it is) but a lot of that slowness is to ensure correct dwell times and a reliable “on time” performance. I’d like to see some of the slack removed but there is no incentive on the operator to do so. TfL keep ratcheting up the performance regime up which just creates an adverse reaction from the operators by way of ensuring there is plenty of slack in the timetable. TfL don’t appear to have any desire to see railway services (other than upgraded tube lines) running fast journeys.

  226. @MAIDSTONE JOTTER (SAN FAIRY ANN, MOMPTY)

    Apologies… I had an attack of fat fingers.

    @WW

    I have asked them directly about this and the information that is posted on Wikipedia is correct, the Elizabeth Line will run as two overlapping services: one from Shenfield to Paddington and the other from Abbey Wood to Heathrow/Maidenhead/Reading.

    Yes, it does mean that to get from anywhere from Stratford to Shenfield to Heathrow, you will need to change to another train somewhere between Whitechapel and Paddington.

    I think that in practice this means you can “turn up and go” at (say) Romford for the first train and always be able get to the airport by stepping off and on again: the other choice would be waiting for a “special airport train” from the Shenfield branch, which could take much longer without the timetable.

    I think some said that the people who had paid for their special new station at Canary Wharf rather expected all the non-changing trains to the airport, but I’m not sure if that’s just being jealous.

    It’s not that I personally disagree with your logic.

  227. @ Briantist – OK that’s fair enough. I’m aware of the demand from Canary Wharf for direct trains to the airport and, to be fair, they have actually stumped a load of cash and got a station ready well in advance of everyone else. Money in this case does talk.

    I do wonder, though, how long “no trains beyond Paddington” will last in the face of public comment and usage. There’s not much value, for some people, in having to get on and off trains and potentially losing seats for cross London trips which is what Crossrail facilitates. Any actual time advantage over other services could be eroded by the hassle factor plus platform wait time for a service actually going where people want. Makes me wonder whether TfL have considered this in their trip and revenue modelling. It’s a bit like forcing 50% of people using Thameslink to change trains at Blackfriars which is not the service proposition. Yes Thameslink has more branches and a complex service pattern but there are reasonable (theoretical) frequencies *and* through services from the northern branches to the BML route for example. I’ll concede it gets tougher if you want the Sutton loop or towards Orpington / Sevenoaks but there are at least some through services.

  228. I’m not entirely sure its even possible to facilitate evenly spaced services and good connections at every station based on passenger movement. The network is rather too congested for that, and on every route FCC run into. Given the flat junction network the London metro and thameslink service operates within it doesn’t make things any easier as your constantly clashing with services in the opposing direction and to boot theres so many of them.
    Not to mention certain signalling/overlap and locking restrictions which impede flows at locate such as East Croydon and Gatwick and the fact the new timetable has had to facilitate other big problems like trains that constantly run late and cannot be recovered unless they are run fast (the South London metro has had to be recast completely for this as there were huge numbers of trains being run fast).
    The downside is that is requires more trains on the network as they only way you can recover a late train by not running it fast is to have huge dwell times. But it means more trains have to be on the network at once, and terminals blocked whilst they wait.

  229. @WW

    Destroying the capacity of the road network (good) doesn’t have to be at the cost of making buses slower (bad).

    Congestion charging, bus priority routes/gates, average speed cameras and car-unfriendly (but bus friendly) speed bumps could help achieve both goals.

  230. Re Bob and WW,

    As speed bumps increase NOx and PM levels local council who will soon get handed much of the responsibility for emission reduction on the ground might need to think about removing them… But they probably don’t realise that yet.

    Have a look at Dublin’s new plans for improving bus speeds -then can you imaging an London borough or TfL going for that???

  231. Re Briantist and WW,

    The Canary Wharf deal is that they get virtually all the Heathrow Trains. (They paid for the station and more)

    Apart from the extra 2 Heathrow trains in few years time, the big change will be when the Westborne Park (Paddington) turn back moves to Old Oak Common in 2026.

    The spilt is also about reliability as the GEML or GWML being out of action will only affect 50% of services. Not splitting would effect more services if there were problems and would also increase the required driver establishment.

  232. ngh 07:21,

    Eh? How do you work that one out? Nearly all speed bumps in London are either already in 20mph zones or will be in future. Any well designed speed hump will permit passing over it at the current speed limit i.e. 20mph. Also, as the move away from pure petrol/diesel for cars starts to kick in, the effect will be reduced locally because some vehicles will already be in zero emissions mode.

    Unless, of course, you are advocating that speed limits are ignored.

    Note: This is not an opportunity for a general discussion of the desirability of 20mph limits or otherwise. Not is it an opportunity to discuss the design of speed humps.

  233. ngh 07:33,

    I thought the Canary Wharf deal was that more than half the trains from Heathrow went to Canary Wharf.

    The plan is that at the high peak (24tph) then at least the four trains starting from Terminal 4 go to Abbey Wood – thereby serving Canary Wharf. At 15 minute intervals it either had to be all or none. My guess is that in reality the 2tph from Terminal 5 will do so also.

    At 20tph off-peak it is almost inevitable that only half the trains from Terminal 4 will go to Canary Wharf – but when the peaks are taken into account that will still comfortably more than half in total. At 20tph in the off-peak the 2tph from Terminal 5 will have to have to have the same destination otherwise it makes getting the intervals right very hard. This will almost certainly be Abbey Wood otherwise the >50% rule will be breached.

  234. Re PoP,

    If you look back to the Friday reads from 11 months ago:
    https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/friday-reads-july-21-2017/
    [By far the most commented Friday reads article…]

    There was extensive discussion on the reasons why DEFRA and DfT have lumped lots of the emissions policy decisions on local councils who were/are probably very surprised. When they have sought expensive consultancy they will discover what DfT and DEFRA already know than 20mph zones and lowering the average traffic speed (pushed by local councils) have reduced the fall in NOx levels compared to leaving the urban default at 30mph and improving traffic flow. Therefore a simple solution is for councils to revert to the former speed limits and improve traffic flow (opening up rat runs to). Note that green lighting is now no longer verboten.
    When even 20’s Plenty campaign acknowledge that reducing speed limits in their testing increased NOx emissions for a Euro 6 petrol engine by 8% may it is time to accept it is the case?
    [Also worth nothing that even for much improved current Euro 6 diesel cars (<2L) , ~circa 50% of the emissions in Global Warming Potential terms in real world testing are from NOx compared to a petrol equivalent (1.4L) of about 6%, DfT really didn't know what they were doing with the push for diesel.]

  235. ngh,

    Not disputing any of your later comment. I am just disputing the ‘speed bumps increase NOx and PM levels’ bit. If they are in a 20mph zone (which most are or will be) I don’t think there is anything in your later comment to explain why they increase NOx or PMs other than by enforcing a speed limit that is otherwise flouted.

  236. @NGH

    Any increase in per-mile NOX wouldn’t account for changed behaviour due to lower speed limits.

    (Primarily journeys shifted onto bikes or transit, because they are relatively faster.)

  237. Re BoB,

    That is possibly the case in Zones 1&2 but not in Zones 3-6 and beyond (which seem not to be part of any joined up thinking) especially where there are no realistic public transit options at the moment and none on the horizon (especially for orbital journeys), TfL is degrading the bus network and councils are busy making roads cycle unfriendly (and none of those making decision or or designing seem to own or use a bike so don’t know the cycle friendly) and the journey can be much longer. What about all those tradesmen with tools and delivery drivers. Time spend stuck in traffic or on a bike probably isn’t productive for the economy and time spent on bus / rail / tube / walking might be slightly productive if you can read reports /reply to emails /do some internet shopping. why not try to improve productivity, give people back some of their free time etc.? Rather than reducing both with every change. Falling leisure usage on both LU, buses and many heavy rail routes suggest people may not want to shift.

    The biggest change could just be increased voter apathy to politicians, council and TfL.

  238. @ngh
    Even outside zones1-2, bikes tend to be quicker for journeys less than ~5km than other modes, so for those journeys it is wasted time to go by car, if that is your yardstick. Even for tradespeople, not all need a van full of tools. Certainly my experience of BBC teams shows this well. When I started to be interviewed in the 1980s there was a team of three or four coming in a van. By the turn of the century this was down to a team of two (the interviewer and the cameraman also undertook the sound, lights and directorial jobs). Nowadays it’s just one person on their own, with all the equipment in a backpack, and they go on the tube, bus or bike.

    Contrary to your assertion, many outer London councils are bike friendly, often in the face of some pushback. Waltham Forest comes initially to mind, but also Kingston, Enfield, Richmond, Harrow and Sutton. The tangible results in these boroughs are having an impact in others, too.

  239. Briantist 23 June 2018 at 18:02

    “to get from anywhere from Stratford to Shenfield to Heathrow, you will need to change to another train somewhere between Whitechapel and Paddington”

    which is a lot less grief than across the platform changes at
    1) Stratford
    2) Mile End
    3) Barons court
    and much quicker.

  240. Re PoP,

    DfT have had the evidence for over 20 years ( and paid for the work at TRL) If it is higher under controlled test track conditions then what is it going to be like in real life???

    In simple terms NOx is minimised by constant speed running, at constant work rate with a lowish fuel injection rate, lowish torque in the ideal rpm range:
    a) 20mph is below the ideal rpm range for most vehicles (apart for JCBs / tractors) so has increased NOx levels vs 30mph or even higher (Most of the top 10 selling UK cars this is in the mid 40s)
    b) very few real speed bump /cushion arrangements* result in the driver not easing off and accelerating at 20mph even if they only do a maximum of 20mph. (*many are non compliant).

    You can test what actually happens by plugging a Bluetooth ODB2 port dongle in to most modern cars to do data logging on the ECU* and using a free smart phone app (plenty exist) to record what happens in reality combined with the GPS and 9 axis IMU data in most phones. The data is very informative (Energy loses due to the bump, ESP triggering especially is not at right angles to the bump)

    *Real time data logging of everything from the ECU including
    rpm
    speed
    Horsepower/HP
    Fuel injection rate (consumption)
    MAP and MAF (for calculate turbo boost)
    Engine temperatures
    ECU/BCU accelerometer gyroscope and compass
    and many many more.

  241. ngh,

    The road I live in has a 20mph limit and speed humps. When I drive down the road I drive down at a constant 20mph. Nothing you have currently said and argued convinces me that somehow these speed humps have increase bad emissions when I drive along.

    If it isn’t the case here and it is the case elsewhere (I have my doubts) then the problem is design of speed humps, people flouting the law or people slowing down for no good reason. In other words, there is nothing fundamental about speed humps in a 20mph zone that causes them to increase air pollution and, if there is a problem, then the cause of that problem should be tackled (bad speed hump design, flouting speed limit, drive awareness). It does not follow that speed humps should be removed which was your implication which, in my mind, you still haven’t proved.

  242. Even if the current petrol and diesel vehicles are incapable of running efficiently at 20mph, their days are numbered. Within the next two decades London’s roads will be increasingly populated with vehicles which deliver power to their wheels electrically, whether generated remotely and stored in batteries, or onboard by a low pollution generator (e.g. hydrogen-powered) running at an optimum speed.

    Given that the pollution element will go away (if it even is a problem, which I doubt), it’s all the more important to retain 20mph speed limitation because of its primary benefit: it makes road accidents involving pedestrians significantly less likely to be fatal than if they occur at 30mph.

  243. PoP: “or people slowing down for no good reason”.

    Perhaps that is a little harsh. I tend to drive over many speed humps at about 10 mph or so, my reason being that I expect this to be more comfortable for me, my passengers and my car, particularly if it is a speed hump I am not familiar with. I concede that on a route I use regularly, if I am quite sure that the speed hump is not a rogue one, and provided I am driving a vehicle with good modern suspension, I might increase that closer to 20 mph. But when one of these conditions fails to apply, I consider that I have a good reason for slowing down a bit. I also have a principle “if in doubt, slow down”. Maybe I’m just getting old.

  244. @ngh: The spilt is also about reliability as the GEML or GWML being out of action will only affect 50% of services

    An interesting difference in philosophy to the planning of Thameslink services. Applying similar logic to Thameslink would probably have meant terminating the Cambridge services somewhere south of London Bridge (and including a turnback in the project scope) instead of sending them to Rainham.

    I expect that TfL’s response to people on the Shenfield line asking for direct services to Heathrow will be to point them to Thameslink and ask, ‘do you want that to happen to your line?’

  245. Just to clarify the situation as regards the signalling on the BML as in light of a couple of comments some clarification may be helpful.

    Between Norbury / Anerley / Wallington / Woldingham / Reigate / Godstone / Crawley / Plumpton / Falmer / Hove the railway is controlled by the mid 1980s era ‘Three Bridges ASC’ using 8 NX Panels (manual push buttons for the layperson) and WITHOUT ANY FORM OF ARS (Automatic Route Setting) facility. These panels (with exception of the area around Gatwick) are still linked to relay interlockings and not today’s fancy computer based interlockings. A further NX Panel was added a decade ago to cover Crawley / Dorking to Arundel although this does mostly interface with more modern computer based interlockings.

    At TB ASC Signallers have to manually set the route for every train based on the information contained in wads of A4 paper known as simplifiers and the e-mails from route control sent to the shift supervisor sat behind them. There is zero evidence of any fancy ‘Train management software / displays’ being installed on the panels and equally there are no plans to move any of the signalling controls to anywhere else in the medium term*

    Between West Hampstead and Anerley Thameslink / the BML** is controlled by the new ‘Three Bridges ROC’ using computer workstations linked to Solid State Interlocking. Unbelievably this also lacked ARS as apparently when it started signalling trains as Network Rail did not wish to spend money on the ‘obsolete’ BR style ARS and wait until they had developed the ‘next generation’ version – which is incoperated into the much more powerful / flexible ‘Train Management Systems’ being mentioned these days.

    * If the plan to rebuild the East Croydon area to increase the number of platforms and fully grade separate Windmill Bridge Junction etc go ahead then this area may migrate to the ROC as a logical extension of its controlled area.

    ** Other areas covered by the ‘Three Bridges ROC’ include Norbury to Streatham and more recently the lines around Sutton. There is I believe a strategy to get rid of Victoria Signal Centre (an early 1980s NX Pannel & relay Interlocking based signalling centre that controls the Inner London routes from Victoria towards Surrey & Kent) by gradually moving its functions into the ROC. I understand however this is being driven more by the condition of the signaling equipment in the area with wire degradation being a particular problem in some areas.

  246. Re Phil,

    Cheers, didn’t the Gatwick area pre replacement with CBI have an experimental ARS computer system developed by Captain Deltic’s friends at Delta Rail (now Resonate) that Railtrack refused to pay for upgrades on as all the benefit lay with TOCs and all the cost with RT? Presumably they are still complaining to him about the loss of potential revenue stream after 15years…

    Before LBM gets pedantic on abreviations NX = eNtry -eXit

    Victoria ASC – the condition of the wiring is unfortunately a function of the original subcontractor and their choice of wire supplier rather than just being age related. Indeed I understand that some of the oldest is actually in the best condition (Streatham interlocking was about 2/3rd of the way though). The resignalling work sequence over the last century on the BML has generally been North to South with London Bridge (Early 1970s onwards) Victoria ASC (1981 onwards) and Three Bridges ASC (1983 onwards) so signalling equipment at the northern end has tended to be 5-10 years older than the southern end. Hence there won’t be logical recontrol pattern to TBROC.

    An excellent photo of the Three Bridge ASC paper work in this article near the bottom:
    http://www.lococarriage.org.uk/threebridges.html

    Windmill Bridge etc. rebuild – the first stage of the work will includes rebuilding Norwood Jn and resignalling the lot to CBI to enable the rest of the work to be done in about 10-12 phases.

    Part of the the delay to TMS has been due to the experienced supplier having to conjure up some new maths to understand what Windmill Bridge does to train services (especially 10/12 car ones with the length of some signalling sections at 8-10 car). Apparently any railway else where in the world have rebuild with extra flyovers along time ago….

  247. @WW 23/06 1801.
    According to informed sources the TL timetable and the lack of even split clock face timetable is a direct consequence of running the Cambridge train (s) to Brighton, which have to dovetail with the East Coast (as well as the Fen Line) and as such, to get the BML to work you end up with 10/20 splits on the Brighton’s, which then leads invariably to similar splits on the rest of the network.

    It’s unfortunate both for the end user having to remember the unevenness of the splits, as well as operationally. But in part arguably a political decision to have the Cambridge – Gatwick connection, see also running the Sutton Loop through the core. As they suggested that running 4 Bedford – Brighton would have given you a pretty standard clock face through the core down to Gatwick.

  248. Re NGH @ 07:04

    Gatwick has never had any ARS provided in any form – either in its pre platform 7 configuration as a relay interlocking or its current status as a CBI one.

    What does exist at Three Bridges ASC is the remains of an experimental ARS system developed in the 1980s by British Railways Research division from Derby that was trailed on panel 5 (Haywards Heath area) for a few years. ‘GEORGE’ as it was called was unfortunately not that reliable apparently and fell out of use after a trial period and although it still exists (to avoid having to re-wire the panel) it is unsuitable for use today.

  249. I see the London Assembly made a valiant attempt at chipping away at the well rehearsed “this is an industry process problem” response that NR and GTR now trot out. We did manage to get some acknowledgement that other issues like driver training and rolling stock deliveries were factors. Sadly Assembly Members didn’t really have time to probe and press on these vulnerable areas. We also got “can do mentality” thrown into the mix which confirms my worst suspicions about the actions and thought process of the team working to implement the new timetable. We even got to the point that “we can do this” actually stopped them “waving the red flag”. The other enduring impression of the meeting was the reluctance to mention or blame the DfT or for anyone to take any real responsibility. It’s that amorphous thing called “the industry process” that is at fault.

    Sadly the Transport Committee have decided to put out a statement saying timetable changes planned for December should be stopped. That’s a frankly ridiculous position to take without any further criteria or assessment tests being applied. If their position was to be adopted then Crossrail’s opening (and later, more complex phases) would be delayed. Crossrail may well be self contained initially in terms of passenger services but there are still impacts on the national timetable in order to get empty trains to and from depots. That will inevitably affect other services run by TOCs other than MTR Crossrail. Given the Assembly Budget Cttee has recently cast doubt over TfL’s finances it was more than ironic to see some of the same Assembly Members recommending an action that would damage TfL’s finances.

  250. Walthamstow Writer,

    I was just amazed at how they managed on numerous occasions how they managed to not quite answer the question or point put to them but to answer one that was ever so slightly different.

    You have to wonder if they are not quite telling the truth or not quite aware of the exact conditions on the ground (or in the control room).

    Amongst the things I can remember from the top of my head:

    Traffic Management software wasn’t required and was not the cause of the problems. No-one ever said it was the cause of the problems. What was said was if they had it then their ability to recover from problems (caused by something else) would be significantly greater.

    Traffic Management Systems are complex and it takes years of understanding and use before they can really be of benefit So why was it deemed essential for the original December 2018 full service?

    There is no point in training drivers in route knowledge more than six months in advance because knowledge will lapse. But they didn’t even manage that as far as we can tell. And you can start training before six months in advance of implementation. You just don’t want the driver signing off too soon. In any case, you can relearn a route a lot quicker than learning it for the first time.

    They had enough trained drivers at the start. It was explained that you didn’t need the full depot trained for all routes. Just for each ‘link’ (my term not theirs) and that they had them trained. Except that doesn’t explain why they needed pilots from East Croydon.

    The late timetable meant that the fact they were 55 drivers diagrams short was an unexpected and unwelcome surprise. But, as numerous people have pointed out, you can do a fag packet calculation months in advance and get a reasonably decent answer. There seemed to be an incredible optimism bias here and in numerous other places whereas you really need a pessimism bias and a belief in Murphy’s Law.

    It was never the intention to have the drivers fully trained for the whole route on day one. This is presented as if it were an answer and an explanation rather than a source of puzzlement.

    Canal Tunnels wasn’t an issue but … Raised by an assembly member and the NR guy saying they had it ready when it was assumed to be wanted and the GTR guy saying it wasn’t a lot of use unless you could put trains through to the other side so not much use if ready earlier with neither side wanting to point the finger.

    They had enough trains for the start of the new timetable. But that wasn’t the point about late delivery. The late delivery caused problems with not having trains for route learning and trains on mileage accumulation took up some of limited slots that could have been used for training.

  251. Walthamstow Writer,

    I too am disappointed they have called for a delay to December’s changing which seems like a gut reaction.

    December’s changes involve increasing the peak only Bedford-Littlehampton from 1tph to 2tph and the all day Cambridge-Brighton service from 1tph to 2tph. In other words, no new routes, plenty of easy opportunity for route learning, no major wholesale reconfiguration of depots.

    If you delay this phase you have to delay the next phase and so one and for what point? There will be a new timetable anyway of some kind so it is not even as if you are eliminating risk – just reducing it by a tiny bit. And, in any case, you have to bite the bullet at some point and how does a delay help you?

  252. NGH, your observations about Bluetooth ODB@ and phone apps are fascinating. Can you suggest an iphone app?

  253. Re POP @16:37

    I’m not surprised in the least at your observation that “they managed to not quite answer the question or point put to them but to answer one that was ever so slightly different.” given that:-

    (i) NR is effectively a Government department
    (ii) GTR is effectively operating Thameslink / Southern / etc under the instructions of a Government department.
    (iii) The DfT / HM Treasury were the ones who took ages to finalise the deal for the 700s with Siemens

    Politicians (just have a look at some of the answers given in the House of Commons by ministers) and the Civil Service are masters at just the sort of thing you describe and have no doubt provided ‘help’ to both GTR and NR when it comes to dealing with hostile audiences. Some of those responses are straight out of “Yes Minister”

    The thing is, while on the one hand the DfT quite likes having all the blame being dumped on NR / GTR / Siemens for the timetable chaos, it also knows that if things are pushed too far then the mud will start sticking to them too thanks to the close relationship between said DfT and GTR / NR / Siemens outlined earlier.

    As such there is undoubtedly a strategy in place which seeks to try and find ways of confusing the finger pointers by issuing vague, obscure and off topic answers in the hopes of dispersing the blame across the rail industry in general and avoiding too much of it gathering in any one place, thus causing the DfT to face awkward questions or poisoning relationships (HM Government is acutely aware that recent franchises have suffered from a lack of bidders for example and excessive ‘blaming the TOC’ is hardly likely to encourage more bidders to come forward). The beauty of the privatised railway for them is that unlike the monolithic BR, the sheer number of stakeholder / interfaces / partners / etc means it offers plenty of opportunists to share out the blame.

  254. Re Bob @08:30

    Would a Horsham – Cambridge and a Peterborough – Brighton setup have worked any better in giving an even interval service to Brighton?

  255. Re Tony Williams,

    I’m an Android user (and used Torque Pro a UK developed app) and all the apps (unless OBD2 reader specific) appear to be for iOS or Android and many of the iOS apps look bit rubbish compared to the Android ones but I’ll keep looking. The android apps are more numerous and better for the real time telemetry stuff. The iOS apps tend to have far better fault code libraries and be US developed (“the french make cars!” few apps work with PSA group cars especially the iOS ones) but a slightly different end user purpose.

  256. @ PoP 1637 – that’s a very fair summary. You were clearly taking notes as you’ve remembered the specifics better than me. There was more than one occasion where I was saying “answer the question” or “that’s not true” to my laptop screen which gives a sense of my frustration watching the session. God knows what people inside the companies, who know where the real dirt is, feel about it. And as for some of the phraseology being used – “we are heartbroken” from the NR chap. I mean, come on – what’s he expecting? an Oscar or something? The way you properly “apologise” to people is to apologise sincerely once and then get on with implementing a deliverable plan that restores their ability to travel reliably.

    The worrying undertone is that nothing is actually agreed about putting in a “stable” timetable in July. July is 6 days away. It’s clear the DfT haven’t signed things off yet Northern Rail put a reduced but stable timetable in place in days. GTR is obviously bigger than Northern but why the delay? Makes me wonder what there is to discuss. The other interesting remark from Nick Brown was about the cost of driver training / extra drivers. Clearly there is some sort of claim or dispute with the DfT on that given the cryptic wording Mr Brown used.

  257. Walthamstow Writer,

    You were clearly taking notes

    No. I never take notes. I actually find it helpful not to then the things that I remember are the things that strike me as interesting or odd – or annoy me.

  258. @ PoP 1645 – I agree with you. Forever postponing timetable changes until everyone is 3,000% certain nothing will go wrong gets you nowhere. OK this recent switch was disastrous in two TOC areas but everywhere else seems to be performing reasonably. The railway (and Tube) has done big changes before and delivered them perfectly well. If the railway now goes into a ludicrous risk averse, turf protection mode then nothing will happen including Crossrail’s launch. Is that really what people want? As you rightly say you have to bite the bullet around an enhanced timetable sometime. I fear the Assembly’s “agreed line” is the result of party politics coming into play. Quite clear the Tory AMs were of the “scrap the change” line of thinking whereas it was more nuanced from others. As they always try to reach a political compromise I think their statement reflects this and is the wrong answer. Ms Pidgeon has seen my reply to her tweet on this subject.

    Of course if you were being really machiavellian there is a beautiful escape route for the DfT and Treasury in all this. You declare the railway is useless and incapable of delivering improvements so you then decide that there will be no more large scale improvements. DfT has already taken direct control of this process and hidden it entirely from public view. Kerching – money in the piggy bank for the Treasury, no more pesky post project implementation fall out for the DfT to be scared of. That sounds like a Grayling masterplan to me.

  259. Phil @1909

    Potentially, however the calling patterns south of London Bridge (ie the Peterborough’s call at all stations via Redhill) would mean that journey times on the trains that would terminate at Gatwick would be significantly higher, and one of the reasons for the Cambridge’s extending to Brighton was a fast direct service to Gatwick Airport.

    On paper though, if you were starting from scratch that would seem a more reasonable, and better split, if given the political leeway to do so. You would also arguably give both Bedford’s the same stopping pattern south of Gatwick rather than the semi fast split that currently exists.

  260. @Tonny Williams, NGH

    I use iODB2 because it plays nicely with my dongle and it was generally intended for fault-finding (my previous Jag had frequent diagnostic issues but the present one has had none, so I’ve only used it for ‘playing’). It didn’t have any problem finding my relatively obscure 2004 XJ8. That said, it is not a match for Torque if you want to log driving data and I ended up buying an old Nexus tablet for £30 on eBay for just that purpose.

  261. I’m going to differ on postponing the Dec18 TT change, for two reasons:

    1. Given the current constantly changing timetable, I don’t feel enough resource will be in place to properly plan for December; and

    2. There are still driver training issues and the current fiasco probably means that backlogs will be building up elsewhere.

    This isn’t an indication that every TT should be put back forever more, just that the next TT should be put back a few months. Don’t panic.

  262. Thank you PoP for a most thorough and enlightening analysis. And thank you all for your informative comments.
    Unless I have misunderstood something, ‘The Stage is Set’ diagram inspires a query.
    Am I right in seeing that the ‘Late Decision to serve Rainham’ was just the most headlineworthy example from a wider range of late changes to the proposed timetable? If this is so then: a) Would it be more accurate for the box text reflect that wider picture with its more extensive changes? b) Would there be a direct arrow from that box down to the ‘Late Timetable Approval’ box to reflect the cause and effect relationship there?

  263. HH,

    In that case, why not have a list of things that have to be done by, say 30th September, and if not complete then the plug is pulled? No ifs, no buts.

    In reality, the increase in the Littlehampton service is, I am pretty sure, just one single train from Littlehampton to Bedford in the morning and one single train back in the evening. So really no point in ditching it. The worse that happens is that it is cancelled.

    If you can run a 1tph Cambridge – Brighton service all day (they can’t yet) they should be able to run 2tph in the peaks even if they have to cancel off-peak or weekend services. Again, if the off-peak service gets cancelled then it is no big deal and you can build it up in a controlled way. But, if the slots aren’t there in the timetable, you can’t implement any further change until the next timetable revision.

  264. RayK,

    I don’t think going to Rainham delayed timetable approval.

    One of the few things Nick Brown has categorically stated is that GTR had their bid in for the timetable in August and that would have included the Rainham service. It was the late decision (post August) to pull 2tph from the timetable in May (which meant there had to be replacement services terminating at London Bridge and, I guess, King’s Cross) which was one reason for a November rewrite of the timetable.

    Quite why GTR was so determined to go to Rainham so early on is a bit of a mystery to me but the delayed turnback at Welwyn Garden City(?) may have been a factor. I really would have thought it would make sense to leave Rainham until last.

  265. Re PoP,

    “In reality, the increase in the Littlehampton service is, I am pretty sure, just one single train from Littlehampton to Bedford in the morning and one single train back in the evening. ”

    Close 2 extra each peak.

    Littlehampton-Bedford is driven by Three Bridges drivers as the southern depot so training should be far less of an issues than many other routes currently (indeed you probably could run it at the moment if you were willing to go from 15 to 16tph on the MML)

    Agree with PoP on the deadline approach as there is actually minimal change. The paths are already there for the extra services, as is the rolling stock the issue will be around driver training levels.

  266. Re PoP,

    PS – the Littlehampton training gap probably just needs a few Bedford drivers (and a few more Three Bridges drivers) to learn Preston Park – Littlehampton. Not big ask compared to many other issues.

  267. @POP 09:32
    “In that case, why not have a list of things that have to be done by, say 30th September, and if not complete then the plug is pulled? No ifs, no buts.”

    Yes please!

    But apart from anything else, it seems to me that the Dec TT change might be used to fix any issues that are found with the May TT (possibly including ones that haven’t shown up yet owing to not actually having run the May TT yet. Or possibly also including issues that only affect, for example, the leaf-fall season)
    So cancelling it entirely seems utterly daft to me. However taking stock to consider which changes should be included – that it entirely sensible.

  268. Re NGH.
    Thanks for the info on Torque Pro. I’ve found an old Samsung that might work

  269. PoP
    The delayed turnback was IIRC just N of Stevenage – should have been Letchworth, but that would have meant one ( or two?) extra units …..

  270. @WW, PoP: So management bullshit bingo was a go-go? From the way you describe it certainly sounds like it!

    Maybe you don’t take notes, but have you considered recording them?

    @Mods: Since the GDPR has come into force, my details seem to be forgotten on a permanent basis. Believe me there was absolutely no reason to change behaviour due to GDPR…

    [Others have noticed similar effects; but it is not due to any change at our end. Any prepopulation of user-identification fields in the “submit comment” form is carried out by your browser, not by our site. So any change in this prepopulation behaviour must be a browser effect. Malcolm]

  271. The recommendation to defer the Dec 18 change comes from a letter sent to TSC from London Travelwatch and appears to predate the committee meeting so presumably sent to influence last weeks questioning. Thus the committee has yet to offer a view is my take.

    There is nothing fundamental with the TL uplift in Dec 18 as other observers have noted other than having enough drivers! The timetable does work reasonable well and on a few days they’ve run close to full plan through the core reasonably to time.

    The interim TT now uploaded reveals far more Rainham/Cambridge services than i would have expected given the poor start on these routes but still high levels of gaps on Gatwick-Bedford. The latter seems surprising as the MML crews and ex Blackfriars drivers would have route knowledge.

  272. @ HH – My comment re the timetable ban is based on the fact that politicians tend to like “blanket bans” because they’re simple. However the real world on the railway is not simple and you can’t punish competent operators and their customers just because of screw ups elsewhere.

    This is why I cite Crossrail. The new service in Dec 2018 is largely self contained. NgH has commented that things like rolling stock training and simulator based route learning is well advanced. Lots of trains have been delivered but obviously they need to be run in service to debug them. We don’t know for certain how things will pan out once TfL starts more intensive testing in the core but initial signs look hopeful. The project is not without plenty of risks between now and December but I am reassured that an enormous amount of effort and skill is being expended to achieve a December opening. The political and reputational risks are probably the worst issues as they’ll intensify hugely as each week ticks by. I am sure there already is a “go / no go” milestone set to decide if / what public service starts in Dec 2018. That’s one thing GTR seemingly didn’t have!

    There should be clear criteria and measureable milestones in place for each timetable change per TOC. If a TOC can clearly demostrate they are prepared and so are Network Rail plus anyone else with smaller scale impacts on their timetables / slots then their change should proceed. There is more than enough evidence from the countdown to disaster on GTR to create an effective set of risks and criteria alongside the considerable industry wide knowledge of the process. Milestones are clearly project or timetable specific and should be understood by those charged with both delivery of them and oversight. Again plenty to learn from the GTR and Northern debacles as well as previous successful launches of revised services such as on SWT and London Overground to take two London examples.

    This stuff isn’t actually too hard if you have the right people, knowledge, competencies, culture and mindset. Experience with GTR and DfT highlights some significant issues with a number of these crucial aspects.

  273. @ SHLR – I don’t have to record notes of Assembly meetings. They publish transcripts and minutes and the webcasts are accessible on the website. Therefore people can access them at their leisure if they so wish. I used to do summaries of Board Papers etc for LR but it is tremendously hard work and can still be very tedious for people to read. Furthermore other LR contributors tend to take specific papers and turn them into broader articles or as an update to an existing series. It’s a tough call to turn “dry as dust” Committee papers into interesting articles!

  274. Walthamstow Writer,

    It’s a tough call to turn “dry as dust” Committee papers into interesting articles!

    Yes. It is so hard it is not worth trying. I find being there helps as you get more of feeling as to what goes on and a lot of the almost throwaway comments don’t get recorded in the minutes. Yet sometimes it is these comments which have a lasting impression – or even triggers an article.

    Sometimes at the end of it all you get nothing of real interest. So either one has to choose carefully which meetings to attend or not to report on something not worth reporting about.

    I also make it a rule that I only write about what interests me. Suggestions as to what I really should be writing about (I get them) tend not to go down well.

  275. There is a new twist on the cancelled trains saga this morning:
    “As part of the planning process Govia Thameslink Railway often have to use taxi’s throughout a drivers shift to position them from one place to another so trains can get from A to B. This often is the case to enable drivers to be in position before the first trains of the day and when trains go in and out of their depots and where drivers still have additional journeys left on their shifts to complete.

    Unfortunately however, the taxi provider this morning had suffered a major failure of their booking system and as such a large number of drivers were out of their correct positions or severely late running as a result. This affected drivers across all of the Govia Thameslink Railway network and as a result, disruption has been caused to Southern, Thameslink and Great Northern services.”

  276. @ Edward and Dave – probably the first time this sort of issue has been publicly blamed for train service problems. However not the first time that computer controlled taxi ordering and dispatch has failed and caused problems. I can certainly recall LUL having encountered issues in the past.

    I expect the service is something GTR have tendered out and contracted for. Therefore “just using another taxi provider” is not the “on the day” answer as there won’t be a mass of taxis floating around at affordable rates at 0330 / 0400 in the morning. Plus there is the issue of IDs, routes to collect drivers at predetermined locations and getting the message out to train crew to expect a different cab firm to turn up. I expect it would be easier later in the day if crew transfers are needed then – more resources around, more time to plan an alternative and implement it.

    It’s obviously not good that taxi problems screwed over a train service but computer systems can and do fail – witness recent Visa and TSB banking issues. While long suffering commuters won’t be happy it does, at least, given a further little insight into the real life complexities and dependencies involved in running a train service.

  277. A recent chat with a Peterborough based GTR driver, revealed the following information, which to the best of my knowledge is correct.
    There a now 85 drivers based there. About 90% sign class 700 EMUs, but only around 10% sign Horsham. There is generally around 10% of the depot, sat Spare each day. They considered this to be an excessive number.
    There is no plan, most things happen on an “as and when” basis, which probably explains the large variations in what actually runs, on any given day. To actually get to speak to anyone on the Control desk at 3 Bridges, is considered to be a miracle. For the phone to ring in the first place, is only considered to be slightly less so.
    As for the roughly remaining 90% who still need to learn Horsham. Then they each require 34 days, plus around another 4 days, for ERTMS and ATO. However despite being down to go RL [Route Learning]several weeks ago, the driver I spoke to didn’t go. Apparently it was cancelled at short notice.
    Speaking of ATO, there is a rumour floating around, that it either is currently, or has been OOU, due to an incident that “didn’t happen”.

  278. re: A D RIVER above

    Never a truer word spoken. The situation is repeaed across the board at GTR depots (well, the ones that need route learning)

    The ATO/ETCS training was starting in February. Then March, then April and now September. I suspect it will not be started until December but either way all drivers going through the core will need training on it. I also assume this could hold up some of the extra services as ATO needs to be up and running to squeeze the most out of the core.

    Watch this space for December excuses re:ATO…

  279. @TL Driver/ A N Driver

    All the ATO testing isn’t finished… And I can’t see that finishing before August, considering the other pressures.

  280. Now here’s an interesting by-product of the Thameslink fiasco…. their weekday service is still nothing to write home about, but the WEEKEND service, certainly to Orpington and along the Greenwich/north Kent line (the Rainham service) seems to now be being regularly abandoned…

    But tonight it seems that SouthEastern are not running any trains via the Greenwich line either, probably because of engineering works elsewhere (Sidcup)…
    ….. so S/E appear to have said “ok, we’ll leave it to GTR” and GTR have said “well, there’s still the S/E trains isn’t there” and the result….? NO TRAINS AT ALL serving Deptford, Greenwich, maze hill and Westcombe Park this evening (Saturday) for most of the evening, in both directions!!!

    Brilliant!

  281. Much as I would like to muse further about those recent “insider” comments I won’t for fear of sending the debate in undesired directions. All I’ll say is “oh dear” and make a mental note not to use Thameslink / Great Northern for the foreseeable future (at least I have the choice).

  282. NGH
    But, hypotheticals … IF GoViaT are stripped of their franchise, SOMEONE will still have to try to run the trains & there still are not enough trained ( &/or route-learned ) drivers …
    Who might that be?
    DfT, who are largely to blame for this appalling mess in the first place?
    Who else?

  283. One wonders if it is the expectation of being stripped of the franchise that is resulting in a decision to spend nothing and do nothing?

  284. @ Ngh – this “lose the franchise” stuff is pure politics. It is what MPs and passengers believe they want to hear so Grayling is happy to create the illusion. The newspaper article I’ve read is heavily caveated with remarks about “if GTR have breached their contract” which is, of course, the only real basis that GTR could be legally removed. That the DfT seemingly are not sure if there has been a breach just confirms (in my mind) what has been said here for ages – that the real situation is a murky old mess with both sides having made mistakes and invoking a contract breach would not be clear cut and could result in a lot of s**t flying around. I suspect DfT don’t want that.

    @ Ray K – given GTR are compensated for their costs in running the franchise and take no revenue risk then decisions to “spend nothing” must be coming from the DfT. If such decisions are being made then it strikes me as idiotic given you actually need to incur costs to get out of this monstrous driver training / train availability / route learning / rostering disaster that GTR have landed themselves with. If previous posts from insiders are correct then an awful lot of money is being “wasted” through paying staff to pay to sit in mess rooms or through cancelling planned training sessions. That’s one of the worst forms of inefficiency as you spend the money, get no output and “upset” your workforce who hate having their time and skills wasted. I’ve seen it and experienced it at first hand – it’s no fun.

  285. @Mackay
    The sunday service (and saturday?) to Rainham seems to have been limited to a Dartford to Rainham shuttle, in place of the Luton service, which seems to run successfully – why wouldn’t it?

  286. @Greg T (and others) – the issue about taking back control has become altogether puzzling in recent years, as all that happens is that with a less-than-handful of top posts, nothing changes; all those who are involved in running and planning the service remain. The only change is, in effect, a relaxation or amendment of the contract conditions. The lesson seems to be obvious but unpopular.

  287. @Quinlet
    Thameslink/BedPan/MidlandCity is also a weekend Bedford Blackfriars shuttle – regular 2tph on time.

  288. oh and 2tph semifast through the core to Brighton, can’t see any services through Canal Tunnels.

  289. @Graham H: Of course by the time anybody notices the Secretary hopes to either have moved on or retired or kicked out. So what’s the worry?

    This is just about buying time… Smoke, mirrors, diversions… Maybe he’d like to be Foreign Secretary next? 😉

  290. @SHLR – of course; that is the basis on which many, if not most ministerial decisions are taken. (My point was a generic one, however, about all the recent inhouse moves).

    Foreign Secretary? One hopes we can do better than that,

  291. It is one of the real difficulties in running a good transport policy for the country that ministers are presented with choices that are, in essence, between something which may be expensive or unpopular in the short term but pay dividends in the long term, on the one hand, and something which will sound good in the short term but achieve little or nothing of substance, on the other. It’s hardly surprising that Ministers tend to choose the latter given the average life span of transport ministers.

  292. Quinlet:
    Why wouldn’t GTR just run hourly between dartford and rainham…?

    ….. Because they have an obligation to provide the x30mins service to that line, and everywhere else that they should be doing!!!!

    …and it would be nice if they could also….. 1. Spell out what they ARE running, and admit that they are NOT bothering to service the other places, with apologies and alternatives, on their web site and twitter etc, and 2. even better, do so in ADVANCE also, so as people can plan their journeys and lives…

    Then also, if necessary 3. Plan with the others who also serve the lines they are not bothering to, and make sure that the other lot ARE serving those places, so as the likes of Westcombe Park and Maze Hill etc aren’t left with NO TRAINS AT ALL, and no explanation, no alternative buses or whatever, for lengthy periods.

    Instead of 4 trains an hour each way, Charlton’s last train to Greenwich etc last night left before 8pm, and there were no down trains between about 8.15pm and 11.15pm. There were blank departure screens but no other comment or explanations appeared to be forthcoming from either SE or GTR… There were some large gaps in the early morning service too..

    This now 6 week old disaster is causing ongoing misery for customers, but there seems VERY little chance of any improvement, or anyone taking some actual responsibility for it all at GoVia anytime soon… they seem to be back to sticking their heads in the sand and just hoping it will all go away….

    You may claim delay repay of course, and against the “proper” timetable that they should be running to boot, but you’ll have a job to find an actual copy of that timetable, for weekends, as, like everything else, it’s mysteriously vanished from the GTR and 20/20 websites…. funny that… it’s more difficult to claim if you can’t actually find what they SHOULD be running!!!!

  293. “the average life span of transport ministers”

    Whether you count from the end of WW2, or just since the start of the coalition government in 2010, that average is about two years. Grayling took up post on 14 July 2016.

    (the longest was Ernest Marples, at just over five years 1959-64) -shortest was Tom King in 1983 (promoted in a re-shuffle after 4 months)

  294. @timbeau: there would seem to be an inverse relationship between quality and longevity – anyone who is any good gets promoted to other things, while the incompetent or (in Marples’ case) venal cling on indefinitely.

  295. @Ian J
    “…while the incompetent or (in Marples’ case) venal cling on indefinitely”

    Expect Grayling to stay in the post for another 3 years then…

  296. Mackay
    The “proper” timetables are available form the Network Rail web-site – you can download them, usually the whole lot, but you can pick individual tt’s
    Start here & I hope that helps.
    [ “London Terminals” to Dartford /Strood etc is table 200, FYI ]

  297. MACKAY

    Why do you think you can claim Delay Repay against the original May TT? The Passengers’ Charter doesn’t specify, but I’m sure TOCs would expect you to use the latest published timetable.

  298. Greg Tingey,

    Point taken but you really should not need to know this. From the users point of view you should only need something like a check box with ‘show long term cancellations’ or something like that so you can:

    1) Assess how the TOC is really performing against the timetable they should be running.

    2) Calculate if entitled for delay-repay against the original timetable.

    Mind you, I can see a problem. If you are time-rich, cash-poor and want to make a longish journey you simply plan your journey so you can be pretty sure that they you will be entitled to some delay-repay. Then again perhaps this is good as those for whom the journey is more valuable pay more and those who might have been put off by price can now may the journey .

  299. HH

    GTR’s (eg Twitter publicity specifically mentions that one can claim delay-repay by reference to the original timetable

  300. Claiming delay repay against the published timetable would be open to all sorts of complications. If, when you buy tickets through the NR Journey Planner, it already shows there will be a replacement bus service on that date, should you be able to claim Delay Repay against the original published timetable for that date?

    The principle of Delay Repay is all wrong anyway. Get delayed by 30 minutes on an eight hour journey to Inverness (a 6% overrun, and the sort of delay it might be prudent to allow for anyway) and you would get £85 (half the cost of an Off peak single) – rather more if you are on a Sleeper!
    Get delayed by 30 minutes on a 20-minute journey to New Southgate (150% over-run) and you would get £2.70. (Rather less if you are on a season ticket, and nothing at all if you are on a Freedom Pass!)
    Is the Inverness passenger’s time worth more than thirty times as much as the Potters Bar passenger’s?

    Obviously, different people put different values on time (whether their own time or that of their employers), but in other contexts, the government puts a minimum value on people’s time of £7.83 per hour (National Minimum Wage).

  301. timbeau,

    I am almost reluctant to comment on delay-repay principles as we have done this before I am sure but because I think these are new issues…

    1) Micheal O’Leary of RyanAir points out something similar in but almost the opposite way round because the EU rules on airlines don’t relate compensation to the fare paid so short cheap fares are (in his opinion) unduly well compensated for delays.

    2) In exceptional circumstances (e.g. Lewisham during Beast from the East) you could argue that no-one should be expected to endure those conditions – even if (legitimately) travelling for free. And therefore everyone should get something. And in a sense the TOC gets off lightly because the local council pays for the privilege of a freedom pass but there is no mechanism for either them or the traveller to claim for either consistently poor service or one-off exceptionally bad services.

    3) One thing that has come to the forefront with Southern’s problems with strikes and the current GTR problems are that what people seem to be most upset about is how they are viewed by their employer when consistently late and not having a chance of seeing their children before bedtime. Unfortunately, these two issues are ones where it is really hard to but a financial value on yet probably the ones that matter most.

  302. @poP
    It is fairly easy to put a value on someone being late for work – divide salary by hours worked per annum – whether that cost is borne by the employer in lost productivity or the employee in lost earnings is a matter between them. Missing family time, be it a bedtime story or a funeral, is rather harder to put a value on.

    Correction to my earlier post – the shortest duration for a Transport Minister was actually Helen Liddell (Transport Minister within John Prescotts’ DETR), at ten and a half weeks in 1999. Average tenure since 1945 was 683 days – 22.8 months. Since 1997 it has been 552 days – just over 18 months

  303. timbeau,

    No it is not and that is not the point I was making.

    If you cannot be relied upon to turn up to work on time that can potentially be very disruptive. To provide a simple rebuttal to your argument, consider the case of the person who turns up unreliably but stays late to make up their hours. By your calculation there is no loss.

    I am talking about a loss of reputation. Someone who is perceived as a worker who is no longer reliable when it comes to timetabling the day. So meetings get rescheduled or someone with perhaps vital input does not attend. Ultimately someone may consider themselves either passed by for promotion or at risk from redundancy. Neither is good for mental health (also hard to financially quantify). Then there is self-esteem in the workplace (hard to put a financial value on) and so on.

    Until the law was changed, many years ago, there were lots of jobs (such as a train driver) where if you turned up late you lost pay for either half the shift or the whole shift. The argument was that your late arrival meant that you were of no value to your employer that day and so weren’t entitled to be paid.

  304. @poP

    Point taken – the value of someone’s punctuality can be much greater than their hourly pay rate. But I think we both agree that Delay Repay rates are often far less even than the minimum wage, and in some cases zero. And linking it to the value of the ticket, without factoring in the length of the journey (i.e how long the delay is as a proportion to the expected journey time) is illogical.

    (Most of my Delay Repay claims cost the operator more in postage than the actual value of the vouchers)

  305. timbeau,

    Nowadays you normally get offered a choice of: vouchers for cash or further tickets, card refunded, cheque, paid into bank account or even (some TOCs) donate to charity. In practice I suspect it is rare they send refunds by post.

    The processing cost is high but all the more reason for the TOCs to implement some system of automatically compensating customers. This is done on c2c but it is much easier to implement on that self-contained line if passengers are using a c2c smartcard. It is also a much more graduated system there – and you get an automatic partial refund if your train is delayed by just two minutes.

    I think from the above it is recognised that delay-repay is a bit of a blunt instrument although it has got better with claims now allowed after 15 minutes but that the aim is to improve it with time and new franchises.

  306. @pop
    No choice on my operator unless you apply by Internet. Vouchers or nothing if you apply by post. Despite the postal form itself saying you have a statutory right to compensation in actual money. (When I pointed this out I was told in effect that this was company policy – it seems that company policy now takes precedence over laws made by Parliament!)

    I could apply by Internet but:

    a – I don’t want Them to have my email details

    b – it’s easier to record the details on a form then and there (whilst the details of which train I was on and how late it was are fresh in my mind), rather than wait until I get home, get online, and navigate the depths of their website. (no wifi on their trains, and even if there was I would have to register with them)

    The old system of “void days” may have also been a blunt instrument, but it was administratively simple, for both operator and client.

  307. GTR do auto delay repay on the smartcard and very good it is too. I wouldn’t bother without it as I usually get 70p or 1.40, but clicking a box saying yes please always is done.

  308. The ongoing effects of both the Thameslink & “Goblin” failures continues to spread …
    Other trains & services have been contracted in advance, & now the extra units needed to operate “PiXC” trains [ Additional services to relieve rush-hour overcrowding] on the latter line have vanished, in spite of promises made to keep them until the delayed electric units arrive.
    “BGORUG” – the user group – have just issued a press-release, which doesn’t seem to want to copy across at the moment, unfortunately

  309. Delay repay and Freedom Pass
    Where there are major and long lasting delays (eg on Southern 2016-2018) the councils do get a reduction in the amount they pay the TOCs for Freedom Pass. Whilst this doesn’t help the Freedom Pass holders directly it does reduce the burden on council tax payers. I suppose this illustrates the fact that delay-repay is not compensation for being delayed *per se* but a compensation to the fare payer acting as a proxy.

  310. Train drivers can and are booked late with loss of pay!

  311. Can someone explain how on earth the awfully uncomfortable seats ended up in the new Thameslink trains? Was the designer high on drugs at the time? They have to be the most uncomfortable seats I’ve ever experienced on a train. To make things even worse, a large boxed-in container runs along the train on the window side, which means if you have a window seat, you can’t even put your feet straight in front of you. Goodness knows who was paid for this “design”.

  312. @M – use of the Fensa design of seats was specified by DfT…

  313. Re: Graham H.

    Your comment tickles me. The DfT bang to rights again? 😀

  314. TIMBEAU & POP

    The issue with delay repay and buses is tied up with Licence Conditions. The requirement to produce T-12 weeks timetables pretty much replaces booked trains with booked busses. The T-12 is important because you can’t book a seat before this time and thus you can’t obtain an advance ticket.

    When the line breaks and an emergency bus service is introduced then the total d lay gets covered by delay replay.

    The ongoing GTR saga may only finally be resolved if someone with a fine legal mind takes the matter of court to challenge that it is the National Rail Timetable (NRT) published by NR that is the base line for all claims and not emergency timetables.

  315. @Gordon – or goes for the Consumer Rights Act 2015, Section 49 – “Every contract to supply a service is to be treated as including a term that the trader must perform the service with reasonable care and skill.”
    Section 50 could be entertaining in the current circumstances, too. Especially when it comes to season tickets.
    I was sure, somewhere in that Act, that claims for consequential loss were entertained too, but I can’t find it explicitly mentioned. I know someone has succeeded in getting their air fare back after being delayed for 4 hours by Southeastern.

    It was high time the National Conditions of Carriage were brought dragging and screaming into the 21st Century.

  316. MikeP & Gordon
    This ongoing, erm, confusion has spread, again.
    It seems that, because of the delays & late-arrival of the thameslink timetable ( Let’s not discuss something so mundane as an actual train, shall we? ) the same conditions are now uniform across the whole system, as I found out yesterday.
    Normally, “Advance” tickets go on sale 90 days before due-date [ I want to go to Liverpool in late September ] but, upon enquiry, a notice pops-up saying that because of problems with Network Rail, this period is restricted, now, to 6 weeks.
    [ Yes, I know this happened in April/May, but I thought that, apart from Thameslink & possibly Northern, the rest of the system had reverted to normal practices. ]
    Is the whole thing slowly falling apart, or is some recovery yet in sight?

  317. Beyond perhaps the scope of thie initial discussion, but yes, it feels as if the whole edifice has gone to hell in a handcart

  318. I have been catching up on this thread, and having been involved in many projects over the years, I feel that there has been, continues to be, an unreasonable expectation of success.

    For any kind of project, there are always issues and there are always people waiting to pounce on them, but you hope to fix them before the customer notices. This project has probably been the most complex attempted in UK railway history, and it has gone spectacularly wrong, but to think that it could have been fully successful shows a basic lack of project management understanding. I feel the biggest failing, probably due to “heroic management”, is that the DfT and GTR management didn’t set expectations correctly.

    With large parts of Crossrail going live later this year, I feel the best thing that TfL can do is to dial back expectations. There are going to be teething problems, which they will fix, but they need to be explaining this now. If they try to say it will be a perfect launch, they will get hammered by the public, the press and the politicians, particularly after the current debacle.

  319. Re: GH – I think FENSA is something to do with consevatories and double- glazing…

    Fainsa is the (Spanish) seat supplier, which merged a while back with Compin (French) and is not to be – but inevitably is – confused with Fisa (Italian), producers of the LEAN seat with the infamous sales brochure showing how one passenger’s knees can fit into the recess of the seat in front (but which of course doesn’t *have* to be used in that way).

  320. Re: SJ(LR) – not much systems engineering, though, and was there any timetable change?

  321. Confusing reports in today’s Evening Standard.

    Page 12 headline: “Khan makes grab for beleaguered Thameslink rail”.

    Contradictory contents of page 12 story:
    “TfL wants to run Great Northern services between Moorgate and Enfield, Stevenage and Welwyn Garden City, as well as suburban services out of Victoria and London Bridge to places such as Croydon and Sutton.”
    … but also …
    (Heidi Alexander said) “The Mayor has offered the immediate assistance of TfL staff to work with the DfT to make the franchise work better, ahead of TfL being ready to take over the entire service in 2020.”

    Unsurprisingly the leader comment on page 18 offers no more clarity.

    Any suggestions for what is meant by “the entire service”?

  322. @Balthazar – yes, sorry, I was prompted by a van parked outside my house this morning…. The Fainsa seats appear to be known in the trade as ironing boards. BTW re the Standard – are you sure you should believe *anything* you read in the press?

  323. Balthazar: The claim in the brochure may be reasonable, but if a brochure is produced in two languages, it is wise to have someone who speaks the language give a final check, after any software has finished with it. The niche at the back of the seat hosts the knees of the passenger allowing to contain at maximum the distance between the seats without compromising comfort. Apart from the grammar, the brochure also fails to mention (in any language) the minor detail – which you provide – that there is no need to remove your knees to stow them in the niche.

  324. Re: GH – Of course I should have gone to source:
    https://www.london.gov.uk/press-releases/mayoral/in-deputy-mayors-first-major-speech

    The actual words are ambiguous – hence my question about the direct quote – but I’m pretty sure that TfL is not gunning to oversee the actual Thameslink route at all (or Southern Main Line, or Coastway) despite the constant use of “Thameslink” as shorthand for the whole franchise (which was never going to last more than one franchise term anyway, as was pretty clear when it was first mooted).

    To be precise, it is, I believe, a certain variant of the Fainsa Sophia seat which is known as the ironing board – they will supply others if you specify and pay for it.

  325. Re: Malcolm – Quite so, but what I was trying to convey was that the designer of the train interior is not obliged to use this facility. I do not know, for example, whether the reduced seat pitch permitted by it will or will not be adopted in the East Anglia FLIRTs which will be fitted with LEANs. ( That’s enough questionable acronyms – Ed.)

  326. Re the seats.

    As a daily user of said trains for nearly 2 years, and the Class 387s before them that have the same seat, (not to mention the latter sub classes of Class 377s with exactly the same seat, nor the Class 707s with the same…)

    … They are perfectly comfortable for me. This includes sitting on them for 2 hours trips down to Brighton. They are far better than the seats on the Class 319s we used to have on the line, and far better than anything on any TfL service.

  327. Balthazar 4 July 2018 at 15:31

    Confusing reports in today’s Evening Standard.

    Page 12 headline: “Khan makes grab for beleaguered Thameslink rail”.

    I was at the “way ahead for London’s roads and Streets” event at Kings College today. Heidi Alexander, Deputy Mayor for Transport, specifically referred to

    “Great Northern Services” from Moorgate. ”

    Whether any press release was that specific, I haven’t checked.

  328. I, too, was at the conference and I thought the deputy Mayor’s priorities were clear:
    1: Great Northern services from Moorgate as soon as possible and no later than 2020 when the current franchise expires
    2: West London Line from Willesden to Clapham Junctions, though, given that the Overground already runs most of the services on this line, the only service she could be after would be the Southern service from Milton Keynes to East Croydon, though this does seem a tad ambitious
    3: Metro services on South Western, Southern and South Eastern.

    Of these (1) seems clear and, given the speculation that Grayling wants to give the Peterborough/Cambridge/Kings Lynn services to LNER but that it would be a hard sell, on all sides, to give them the Moorgate services, too, this would seem to be a runner.

    For (2) I think the deputy Mayor would have to clarify her demand.

    (3) is just a general ambition

  329. I was on a Thameslink train yesterday and noticed the in-car line diagrams have been updated. Canal Tunnels services now shown, as well as services to Rainham. But what intrigued me was that it showed oyster availability extends to Gravesend. That’s not right, is it? Or has the Mayor ambitions in that direction?

  330. The TfL takeover went to hiatus from a couple of years ago due to Failing standoff. Time is approaching for ‘promotion’ and crumbs available from GTR breakup.

    The ‘Southern’ MK route was a recommendation of the Gibb Report:
    “I believe there is an option to transfer the East Croydon – Milton Keynes operation to TfL and it’s London Overground concession in 2018.

    TfL may decide to change the service, for example by not running it north of Watford Junction, or running it to an alternative southern destination other than East Croydon. They could also develop the combined West London line service to better match available capacity to demand.

    They would have a number of crewing and rolling stock options, but should be able to operate the service more efficiently than GTR in the longer term, without the involvement of Selhurst.”

    The support was that TfL already run 4tph on sections between Clapham Junction and Watford Junction (where the service has terminated in the past). At the time of the report Southern was suffering shortages and often cutting this route.

  331. @Jimbo:

    I think that the particular issue with Thameslink is not just that there have been the inevitable initial problems with the service, but that the problems have continued for so long, with relatively little improvement or sense that there is a credible plan for recovery, or sense that there is some kind of leadership (whether from the government or GTR) that could develop such a plan.

    The good news for TfL is that the Thameslink experience will have lowered the bar of expectation for any new service enormously.

  332. @ian J

    Crossrail, being a new line, will not have the potential for disruption of long-established travel habits that Thameslink (and the Northern and Goblin electrification projects) did. If the Crossrail core service is delivered a few weeks late, no existing travel patterns will be affected in the way the good folk of Sussex and Hertfordshire have had to put up with over the past couple of months.

    Tying in the GEML and GWML local services to Crossrail next year does have that potential, but they are much less complex systems than Southern and, unlike TSGN, alternative services run by other operators are not far away if it does all go pear-shaped.

  333. Balthazar….re curtailing the South Croydon to Milton Keynes at Watford

    This service has grown and grown since it started with ever longer transcending provided. A lot of people from up north (defined here with southern bias as ‘north of Watford’) find a though service to West London very convenient rather than the hassle of Euston and the tube. I don’t see why a well used service should be curtailed just for the benefit of commercial or political expediency. (Declares interest as an occasional user who detests changing trains at Watford Junction; not the nicest station to wait).

  334. Re SFD,

    Agreed on the seats – excellent for posture.

    I sometimes regret cracking a joke 6 years ago about being able to iron ones shirt on the way to work given the power sockets and head area shape of the seats in the then new 377/6s. The name appears to have stuck more than I could have imagined…

  335. NGH…and so “ironing board seats”, joins “the wrong kind of snow” and “garden shed engineering” as off the cuff remarks by railway professionals that have become well known among the public!

  336. Something has been puzzling me for a while about the operation of platforms 4 (down line) and 5 (up line) at London Bridge. My understanding is both are capable of running up or down, but this is not happening when it could resolve the relatively frequent issue of trains being delayed on the platform for extended periods due to relief crew unavailability. Before the through route reopened at London Bridge the ‘temporary’ shortage of train crew regularly stopped trains leaving, but it didn’t prevent subsequent services leaving from other platforms. Now they run through the regular ‘temporary’ shortage of train crew backs up those subsequent services.

    A good example happened last week; the 16:18 to Rainham arrived on platform 4, the relief driver didn’t show, after 25 mins it was detrained and cancelled. The relief driver showed up 30 minutes late and took it out of service, but during that time platform 4 was effectively out of service and subsequent services via East Croydon to Sussex backed up behind it. Concurrently there were a number of gaps in service to platform 5 (at one point a 12 minute gap opened up) and a temporary switching to down line would have cleared at least two services waiting behind the abandonned Rainham service, but it didn’t happen. Other stations on the Brighton line such as South Croydon and East Croydon seem to handle switching between up and down lines when disrution requires it but these newly redeveloped platforms at London Bridge can’t?

  337. MJW: With hindsight it is clear that your proposed solution of using platform 5 might have worked. (Unless there is a snag which neither of us are aware of). But the signallers did not have that hindsight, presumably they supposed that the relief driver might appear at any moment, rendering the switch unnecessary (and possibly causing other problems).

    This tale, though, does stress the point that the “fix” of using multiple drivers on the same through train is quite a risky one.

    It might also be worth mentioning that the reason for the relief driver’s late arrival was (probably) not that driver’s fault.

  338. Presumably that relief driver might have arrived via platform 5….

  339. Timbeau – I can see the alternative routes to GEML inner-suburban services (C2C/District, Central) but I don’t think there’s so much practical alternatives to GWML.

    MJW – or maybe they were worried about passengers being confused by trains running in unexpected directions.

  340. The deputy mayoral press release as written would solve very little related to the current Thameslink debacle other than perhaps improve journey options with the Moorgate line.

    The Southern services on the North Dulwich Line are actually running ok – it’s the inner Thameslink routes that the operator doesn’t care about as the delay repay is so low that needs shifting although I can’t see having two operators running through the core going down too well. Sutton Loop to St Albans and the Sevenoaks and Orpington services to Kentish Town / Blackfriars are the ones that TfL actually taking over would be a godsend.

  341. @MJW: They can do that. They can also use platforms 3 (and possibly 2), 6 and 7, possibly even 8. Certainly the platform markers are there (RLU, FLU and ALL….

    I have seen one in platform 3 in the rush hour, not sure if that was such a good idea….

  342. @Phil E

    Mainly the West Ruislip branch of the Central Line, and the Heathrow branch of the Piccadilly. No Crossrail station in London is much more than a mile from one or t’other. And I’m assuming that Great Western’s own services would be unaffected. The problem with TSGN (and Northern) is that if one line is a problem, the next nearest line is usually run by the same operator

  343. My interpretation of the Deputy Mayor’s intervention is that she is indicating that:

    – TfL wouldn’t be able to take over the Moorgate services until 2020 – hence the reference to “TfL staff to work with the DfT to make the franchise work better, ahead of TfL being ready to take over the entire [Moorgate] service in 2020” – ie. they don’t want the services dumped in their lap suddenly if the franchise gets terminated before then.

    – TfL could provide some kind of management assistance to the Moorgate services, reflecting the fact that GTR management are (or should be) spending 100% of their time trying to get Thameslink to work. Its hard to see that GTR will be in a position to organise the introduction of the new trains on the Moorgate route under current circumstances, for example.

  344. @Quinlet 4 Jul 20:25

    In general agreement with your analysis, with one glaring exception:



    3: Metro services on South Western, Southern and South Eastern.

    (3) is just a general ambition


    Err, no. Transfer of the third of the listed services was far more advanced 2 years ago than any of those proposals are today. Something pretty much akin to “heads of agreement” were in place between TfL and DfT over the 3rd of those. Upon a change of political control of TfL, that plan was unilaterally cancelled by a certain Transport Minister. This should never be forgotten.

  345. @Mike P: I thought it was “Upon change of political control of the DfT, …”?

  346. @MikeP

    Given the circumstances are indeed as you describe, I think transfer of Metro services is indeed now little more than a general ambition. Even if there was a change of mind by the relevant minister* today, that ship has sailed – the new SE franchise is due to be awarded within weeks, so I think the opportunity has now passed, as it also has for the South Western lines. Come back in seven years.

    *history tells us that you can rarely just change a minister’s mind – you have to change the entire minister.

  347. @Mike P / SH(LR)

    “Upon a change of political control of TfL, I thought it was “Upon change of political control of the DfT”

    Khan had been in office for seven months, and Grayling for five, when the decision not to transfer the services to TfL was made. Unlike TfL, the DfT is still under the control of the same political party, albeit not the same minister.

    However, the infamous letter from Grayling to the Mayor of London expressing his concerns over TfL controlling local services in London was written in 2013, (presumably in his capacity as MP for Epsom rather than Minister of Justice).

  348. Surely this renewed “excitement” about what Heidi Alexander is a tad displaced. The DfT themselves have gently suggested that TfL could be given WLL and Gt Northern inner services. Both have appeared in official statements related to the disaggregation of the current GTR franchise for retendered come 2020. I’d therefore suggest that Ms Alexander is merely gently tapping a slightly open door. The reference to “sending in TfL expertise” is an unwelcome reminder of the Mayor’s previous nonsensical statements over Southern. The hint about inner suburban Southern services is “new” for 2020 but is just a restatement of long held devolution ambitions. I don’t see that happening as long as we have the current SoS in place. I think City Hall are trying to keep in step in DfT’s “hints” and not to trigger too much of a Grayling vs Khan scrap all over again.

    The Assembly Transport Cttee are meeting next week to discuss “suburban rail” and Geoff Hobbs from TfL is one of the invited attendees. As he’s the long term TfL “guardian” of rail devolution it will be interesting to see what he says and whether the tone / aspiration has changed. Michelle Dix from CR2 is also present so what she says about CR2 may be illuminating or depressing!

  349. For those who may be interested GTR have published the “interim” timetables for TLink and GN that apply from 15th July 2018.

    https://www.thameslinkrailway.com/travel-information/plan-your-journey/timetables

    I’m no expert about these services but they seem to be planning to run reasonable looking M-F services but weekends look decidedly thin. I remain to be convinced that the current shambles can be transformed into the proposed service given the scale of cancellations – esp on Great Northern incl the Moorgate services which, in theory, should not have fallen apart in the way they have.

  350. Given the scale of these revisions, the question that remains to be answered as to how on earth GTR ever expected to be able to run the new timetable back when it was introduced. This is just a staggering failure of management at all levels.

  351. It may be slightly pointless to speculate any further about how exactly this “staggering failure” came about. Of course, if there are any hard, or even semi-hard, facts which can be shared here, that would be different.

    But while we are speculating, I could take slight issue with “at all levels”. It is possible (but by no means certain) that lower strata of management correctly and properly reported any concerns to their superiors, and did their level best to get such worries acted on appropriately. There can be no such excuses, however, for higher levels of management. (I am being deliberately vague about these levels, since I know absolutely nothing about how the organisations in question are structured).

  352. In respect of Sussex main line this doesn’t look materially different from what they’ve been attempting to run the last few weeks other than the fact that only 75-80% of that service has ever run daily so whats changed.
    As another observer reports the core via London Bridge/E.Croydon at weekends is pathetic with nothing via the Canal Tunnels.
    Timetables are shown as UFN – either they are expecting to improve them before Dec 18 change or maybe not.
    Also not on RailPlan2020 although thats now somewhat discredited as a brand
    The timetables are to/from London with only a code on top of the column to indicate a through destination so much for promoting journey opportuinties

    Lets see what messr Gibb/Green have to say for themselves at TSC on Monday PM

  353. WW
    I have a retired-railwayman friend who lives in Biggleswade.
    He states that the rush hours services are not too far off the published tt’s, but that mid-morning & even more mid-afternoon, you can get 2-hour gaps in the “service”.
    He recommends that people should aim for a “GN” service, starting/terminating at Kings Cross rather than a “TLK” one, if they want a reasonably reliable journey.

    NoTrainEarlswood
    So Gibb & Green are going before the House – will Mr G be present & if not, why not?

  354. Greg, its the Transport Select Committee and i believe by roping in messrs green/gibb next they are getting all the facts assembled (im sure blogs like this will be reviewed by the committee researchers as well and maybe even Lillian herself to inform there line of questioning) before they put Grayling on the spot although they only have a few weeks before recess.

  355. Looks to me that they are thinning out the off peak service to free up resources for training (and mileage accumulation if any 707s still need that) whilst getting as many people to work as possible.

    Probably the least worst way forward.

  356. Re: timbeau

    Pretty much spot on sir. Every single GN manager with driving competence has been told they’re driving from Sunday 15th July (some quite senior chaps too in fact…)

    They have a vast number of jobs to cover in the hope of getting things where they should be for the emergency TT and have basically been told they’re giving up their summer. Don’t expect to see many 717s anytime soon either (I assume you meant them and not 707s). The GN managers out driving include those writing the training packages for it and who are actually supposed to be running the courses for training the GN drivers on it. That means training will not now start until at least September (and remember ATO/ETCS hasn’t even been started yet on TL).

    Roll on December…

  357. TL Driver…..is it a fair assessment to summarise what you have variously said as “there aren’t and never have been enough drivers, and the late rephasing last year merely prevented all the troubles being even worse”?

  358. @ TL Driver – I actually meant the 700s. Is mileage accumulation complete for them? I’d overlooked that there would be knock on effects for the 717s.

  359. @ 100&30 – GTR have been pretty adamant that they have enough drivers. The issue seems to be that they have changed how they deploy them which has caused route and stock knowledge issues. On top of that we have the demands of new / changed routes which has compounded the route knowledge / learning problem.

    It looks to me that the use of legions of managers is a short term measure to run more trains but also to get the regular drivers through whatever learning / training issues there are as quickly as possible. Once drivers attain / regain their route knowledge then hopefully managers will return to the day job. I assume the postponement of the class 717 training / introduction has been signed off by the DfT or else GTR would be in breach of some of their franchise obligations re these new trains.

    I think GTR were doomed either way round re phasing of the service build up. If it had been “all at once” it wouldn’t have worked and going for a phased approach hasn’t worked either. All that’s different is the scale of service disruption and chaos.

    I do wonder what the scale of the consequential impacts is from this carnage. Contracts have been breached left, right and centre. Fault attribution processes have been trashed. Organisations are under pressure / in chaos. Industrial relations / workforce motivation must have been badly damaged. Managers losing holiday entitlement at short notice and impact on their family life. And that’s just a fraction of the organisational impact. This will take years and years to “resolve” and cost a load of money. And the impact on the travelling public and businesses is probably incalculable.

  360. If GTR are asserting boldly that they “have enough drivers”, then they need to be told “No you don’t”. Having the “right” headcount, but with drivers not having enough skills and training to run the required timetable is not, in the commonsense meaning of the phrase, “having enough drivers”.

    What they might mean is that, due to miscalculation, they bid for the franchise with a particular driver headcount, and they are not prepared to admit to this miscalculation. The miscalculation might be partly or wholly explained by other unexpected issues (e.g. stock and path availability for training). But the fact that it is wrong is borne out every day now by the poor service being provided.

  361. Malcolm/WW…..In the steady state, “having enough drivers” is something of an art but there are rules of thumb which will get you the roughly the right number and software that will further refine the answer. Both these processes result in risk, e.g. from sickness or staff not prepared to work overtime. I suspect this is what WW meant by “enough” drivers. However, everyone who has ever worked though a significant service transition knows that during such transitions a “bulge” of resources is required…….staff, trains, stabling etc. This is required in order to organise and carry out training. Plenty of time is needed to recruit and train these additional drivers, but it appears not to have been done or if it was, it was done too late. WW made the point about new/changed routes, but whilst GTR may not have volunteered these, they should at least have advised the consequences of these in terms of numbers of drivers and time for them to become competent. Whether they advised or whether they were ignored, the new routes seem clearly not to had enough drivers on the day.

    It might be that the facilities to train more drivers (trains, instructors, paths, infrastructure) were not available at the right times, but again, this would have become apparent much earlier than has been claimed.

    Tomorrow’s TSC will be very interesting, given that the members are probably much better informed – not least from here – since the last encounter between them and the railway folk

  362. @Tl Driver
    Do you really think the class 717 will be introduced before 2020
    With the on going introduction of new thameslink routes any sensible management team would put their introduction on indefinite hold

    I certainly would be looking to keep them in Germany until resources available for their introduction

  363. To add the window for class 717 introduction before May 2019 does not look to be the resources for the forceable future must be to get the training needed for the full May timetable.

    You then start in the new year losing Welwyn Drivers to learn new routes as the peak extras are diverted through the core
    (If this does happen)

    One thing one would hope we have learned is not to change to much at a time

  364. It will cost money to store the 717, whether in Germany or here. And when does the lease expire on the 313s?

  365. Only suggested leaving them in Germany to avoid a headline
    Such as “commuters suffer 40 year old train while new ones sit idle”

    Unless another Toc wants them I sure the Rosco will be happy to extend the lease

    The bigger cost implications is that we are paying for 2 sets of train and only using one.

    I believe that it’s better to get thameslink working well. Before you make more changes

  366. “Roll on December…”

    I’m afraid that December is unlikely to sort everything out. NR, at least, don’t believe the TT mess will be sorted out by then (and are planning for otherwise), so while things will hopefully improve over time, there won’t be any big bang.

    I would also note that it seems likely that more annual leave than normal will be carried forward, which will store up future problems and I’m guessing that some drivers will be “rest dayed out”. I don’t suppose that GTR (as GTR) will ever get this totally sorted out.

  367. Walthamstow Writer, Malcolm, 100andthirty,

    GTR had ‘enough’ drivers. They did a calculation, which was presumably based on industry standard approximations, as to how many trained drivers they would need on the basis of drivers changing over at London Bridge or Finsbury Park. They thought they had enough but when they got the final timetable they realised they were 55 drivers short (out of more than 900). At that point they realised that even their contingency plans couldn’t work as they were simply too short of drivers.

    So that leaves various questions:

    1) Why did they have a policy which relied on changing drivers in central London ? It really don’t take a genius to realise this is a plan fraught with risk from the outset.

    2) Why didn’t their training of drivers allow for at least 5%, preferably 10%, contingency available on day 1? As 100andthirty points out, initially you need even more drivers compared to ‘steady state’ as things are bound to go wrong at the start to some extent (e.g. drivers in wrong place, rostering errors, additional stock movements required, signaller errors in routeing trains).

    3) When it was obvious the plan couldn’t work, why didn’t they cut out a lot more trains off-peak from day 1 in order to avoid some of the peak chaos?

    4) To what extent were they limited in the options available as a result of instructions from DfT?

    In the case of 3), with East Midlands Trains missing out Bedford stops in the peak it must be surely obvious that, for political reasons if nothing else, it was vital that the replacement was up and running and this could have been done at the expense of a reduced off-peak service. It also seems incredulous they attempted full working across central London at weekends from day 1. I understand this was because Network Rail hadn’t yet given approval for the plan eventually implemented to run some trains into King’s Cross and London Bridge to ease pressure at weekends.

    In the case of 4) the really interesting thing would be how GTR came to use the figures that they did for working out minimum number of trained drivers needed. At best it seems an extraordinary lack of oversight from the DfT not to insist on more given the timetable was not finalised. At worst, one wonders if DfT provided a figure ‘for guidance’ or even mandated it.

  368. PoP: Indeed. It would be very interesting to learn more about the interaction between DfT and GTR.

    For your question (1), the obvious answer is that it (changing drivers in central London) was an expedient which they were forced into because the route learning had not proceeded far enough, so they had many drivers able to do one end of a route but not the other. Or could there be a different, non-obvious answer?

  369. Malcolm,

    And I am fairly sure the obvious answer you give is the correct answer. But my point is that, as soon as you propose to do this, the plan is too risky and compromised and it should have been delayed at this earlier stage. Doing this should be the contingency when past the point of no return and you then realise you need even more drivers. The plan should not have gone ahead once it was known in advance it was relying on this from the outset – at a time when you didn’t even know for sure how many drivers you would need.

    One would have thought that GTR (and/or the DfT) had well and truly learnt the lesson that it was vital the timetable worked and it should not have been implemented until there was a high level of confidence it would do. Instead, on the face of it, they seem to have thought that the lesson to be learnt from London Bridge in January 2015 and the guards’ dispute is that you can get away with muddling though.

  370. It is not uncommon for long services to change drivers en route, and it could make sense from a rostering point of view – drivers usually like to end their shift not too far away from where it started, so for example if an end to end round trip takes more than half a shift, you can only get one such trip. But there might be time to get an extra terminus-to-London-and-back trips!

    Moreover, some of the longer end-to-end journeys, even if possible withn one shift, may exceed the time limits for “personal need breaks” (loo stops) On the roads, it is recommended you have a break after two hours driving.

    Cutting out off peak services sounds simple until you try – just shunting a train into a siding after the morning peak means it will be in he wrong place to form its rostered evening peak hour duty. And of course by the time an off-peak service from Brighton gets to Blackfriars it will be a peak-hour service to Bedford.

  371. timbeau,

    Point taken but driver changeovers usually take place at a terminus where possible and somewhere where they don’t completely block the service if not possible. And they tend to be close to the drivers depot (so it is ideally within walking distance) to avoid the added complication that a driver needs to catch another train to get to the changeover point – or needs a synchronised change in which he shortly takes out another train. To add to the complications, a lot of GTR out-of-course changeovers have also relied on taxis being available and the booking correctly understood which has added to the grief.

    There is a world of difference in having driver changes at somewhere like Three Bridges where, if the relief driver does not turn up, you can simply park the train in the depot and Finsbury Park. Or London Bridge where a train waiting at platform 4 or 5 will force subsequent trains to/from East Croydon onto the Elephant & Castle route which will immediately completely throw the timetable into disarray due to the longer journey time.

  372. I received an email from South Western Railway confirming no timetable changes in December:

    Update on timetable changes for December 2018

    Since before we started the South Western Railway franchise, we have been preparing for a major timetable change in December 2018 to provide customers with access to additional services and extra capacity throughout the day.

    We are therefore disappointed that we will not be implementing any changes to the December 2018 timetable and instead rolling over the May 2018 timetable. Preparations to deliver the extra services, capacity improvements and reduced journey times started well before we took over the SWR franchise and will continue as we are determined to deliver what our customers and stakeholders expect.

    We are mindful of the disruption to customers that happened with other major timetable changes elsewhere in May 2018 and despite SWR’s desire to deliver the increased capacity and extra services as soon as possible to customers, it has been decided at a national level that a period of stability is needed.

  373. PoP and Timbeau. Drivers always start and finish at their booking on point, though they do not always start or finish driving there.

    Ideally the changeover is made at a terminus with available platform capacity or in a depot. However we do see unsuitable (and unwise) places such as East Croydon or Selhurst used, where a missing driver causes real problems.

    One of the modern forms of cost reduction is to reduce the number of routes a driver signs, which makes rostering easier, and negates the need to remove him from normal duties to refresh routes. I suspect this is an unintended consequence of using route knowledge maintenance norms these days eg a high risk route must be driven at least every three months, a low risk route every six months and so on. Easier just to remove those routes a driver is less likely to drive altogether. Problem is then of course, driver flexibility is massively reduced during times of disruption. You would logically assume all London depots at least would sign all diversions between the Croydons and London Bridge and Victoria as well as Selhurst, Streatham Hill and Stewart’s Lane depots, but this is not the case. In the specific example PoP gives, there is certainly no guarantee that a driver stuck at Three Bridges could dump the train anywhere, unfortunately.

  374. Re: 130, Timbeau and others.

    The best comment i’ve read regarding this (and I can’t remember who made it but Malcolm had a hand in it…) is that we (as a company) seem to think because we got through London Bridge, the 700 shortages and other various debacles that we can get through this one.

    It’s plain to see we can’t. There is just too great a backlog. You could paraphrase it maybe as closing the door after the horse has bolted. There are around 240 ‘drivers’ within the company at different levels of training but prior to becoming qualified, none of which are productive. Most, although not all of these, are waiting for a driver instructor. This problem is simply not going to go away. More ‘trainee drivers’ are being recruited every month but without the driver instructors the problem will persist and the bottle neck remains. Some driver instructors have been borrowed to aid training trains and route learning but then this causes further delays in the system. They have now been sent back to try and cover jobs resulting in qualified, usually productive drivers unable to take a route assessment because there are no managers/driver instructors to assess them.

    Some 30+ recent trainees were fully trained by South Eastern and came over to GTR as planned to improve the roll out of qualified staff. However, they too are struggling to get the support to learn their routes. A recent group of trainees have been sent the other way after waiting more than a year(!) for a driver instructor. That’s 12 months stood still doing nothing only to now be sent off to SE to learn Networkers and 375s, do their handling then back to GTR for another 700 course and….here comes the issue…learning TL routes again. For those that SE can’t train on our behalf – they can do some route learning but they will still have to do their handling hours so it will not speed the process up because they’re still waiting for DI’s. The frustrating thing is that the driver instructor shortages were highlighted by outside consultants three years ago but were either ignored or it was put in the too hard to deal with pile.

    Then you have to add that if all the trainers and driver managers are out handling/piloting/assessing there becomes a back log for ETCS/ATO and 717s (neither of which have started). I’m sure you will know the intricacies of when ATO is required for the 24tph better than me though I was always led to believe it was December 2018 (hence my rather tongue in cheek comment ‘roll on December…’)

    The word on the street is that you’ll see a 717 by the time you should but it may just end up being a sole unit in a ‘committed franchise’ gesture. My job role is a little broader than ‘driver’ nowadays and I am literally staggered at what I am seeing. There will be no quick fix.

  375. When I made the comment about “having enough drivers” I was not offering a personal view. I was repeating what Charles Horton told the media. As PoP says, and was confirmed by Gibb and Green today, that number proved illusory at the last minute. I don’t propose to say any more about driver numbers as it’s been done to death and I don’t want more speculation about what I write. [Makes note to be more precise in future].

    Having watched the Transport Select Cttee (TSC) with Chris Gibb and Chris Green I was not terribly impressed. I am not doubting their many, many years of railway experience. It just seems as if everyone has agreed this useless party line of “the industry must take the blame” and no one daring to mention the DfT for fear of being spiked by a poisoned umbrella or similar. Some of the MPs were not exactly brilliant either – they clearly just expected to be given their desired answers on a plate but Mr Gibb was not playing ball. He stuck very rigidly to his role as Chair of the Industry Readiness Board (IRB).

    The striking thing that kept re-emerging was the “can do” attitude and “we must deliver this project for the passengers”. As the chair of the TSC remarked “Did no one stop to think and actually say “no”?” It looks to me that everyone was so blinded / overly enthused with “we must deliver” that any shreds of rational thought and hesitancy went out the window. Far too many comments of “with the benefit of hindsight” and “we must not break the industry timescales”. This coming from Mr Gibb who admitted that his Board had agreed to break those self same timescales and processes. It was mentioned in passing that the railway “doesn’t like to say no” to stakeholder requests. It is clear that people were, and still are, tinkering with the spec for services and the timetable. The poor souls charged with trying to deliver workable timetables and associated rosters don’t stand a chance in this ludicrously unstable environment. Someone needs to “get a grip”.

  376. It will be interesting to understand the commercial impact of the decision to roll over the May timetable beyond December. Many of the quoted franchises were reported to be performing worse than their plan. Will because let them off the hook?

  377. Re Ian J and Kit,

    That will save SWR’s bacon without embarrassment then as the rolling stock refurbishment programme is running very behind schedule and they would have had to cancel December for those reasons but GTR have provided an excuse.

    The 444/450 refresh and internal reorganisation (reducing first class, eliminating guards compartments etc…) is very behind and the 442 refresh is going well but the new traction and braking systems are a disaster with both electrical safety* and EMC issues (not enough of the original 442 electronics binned (binning the late ’60s stuff was not enough some of the ’80’s pre EMC era stuff should have gone too)).

    *3x retractioned 455s BBQs with the same equipment to be used with bigger motors in the 442s…

  378. Probably sensible to hold off any major changes this time round, but sooner or later someone will have to bite the bullet and update their timetable, unless we are to be stuck with the present one in perpetuity. (Imagine if no timetable changes had been made since nationalisation in 1948……………….)

  379. WW
    re-quoting: we must not break the industry timescales”
    Except that is exactly what has been done with the almost-complete abandonment of any significant Dec 2018 tt change. [ see note..]
    You say “someone needs to get a grip” – but whom, because at present we simply seem to have circular blame-game in progress.( Loved the bit about a poisoned DfT umberella-tip, btw 😁 )

    [Note: Example – Cornwall … the signalling has been done, the new/refurbed units are/will be available, but W of the Tamar there will still only be an approximateky-hourly service plus gaps.
    Will those units now stand idle? ]

  380. Re TL Driver,

    As a GTR outsider I’ve never understood for the last 2+ years how the comparative lack of training paths and DIs on Thameslink would allow a sensible / the required level of driver training to take place as I just couldn’t get the numbers to add up (with MEng & PhD) but put it down to missing something without the full internal knowledge, it appears GTR were missing something.

    What I really didn’t understand is how GTR through they could make moving from an optimised efficiency rostering on SN + GN to a more inefficient one where some GN and SN branches now shared with TL (e.g. East Grinstead, Peterborough, Cambridge, Littlehampton) now with much higher overall driver requirements and less flexibility.

    The only real solution is having a timemachine and going back 5-6 years so the more drivers get trained up as DIs (with recruitment to back fill)

  381. Walthamstow Writer,

    Yes, sitting through the entire proceedings online there were one or two strange bits.

    Chris Gibb went on about not training all the drivers for all the route in advance as it would be uneconomical and logistically difficult yet sitting next to him, silently, was Chris Green who I believe did just that when Thameslink originally opened. Shame that Chris Green wasn’t asked if that was what was done originally on Thameslink.

    Chris Gibb made out that the reversion to London Bridge in January had been brought forward to assist driver training yet, as far as the public was concerned, this always was the plan. We had been promised for years that Thameslink trains would be calling again at London Bridge in January 2018.

    Gibb repeated the point that training can’t happen more than six months in advance because of the need to retrain but, as I have said time and time again, there is no reason why it can’t start more than six months in advance. You just don’t want the driver signing off too soon but he has to go over the same track repeatedly in different conditions to really feel confident.

    Chris Gibb then further muddied the waters by stating that drivers needed to have been using complicated sections of track in the previous three months if they were deemed as critical. All the more reason to get other stuff out of the way first.

    Most important of all, Chris Gibb and other earlier witnesses keep emphasising that that training can’t commence more than six months in advance of being used on a regular basis but, even if true, GTR could not even manage that.

    I also noted that the committee asked if [reliance on] Rest Day Working impacted on driver training and the answer was just ‘no’ and it was left at that. I suspect untrue but, given that the effect is insidious, not immediately apparent. I noticed that just last Sunday there were a lot of cancellations by Southern on the West London Line due to a shortage of drivers so strongly suspect this is not entirely true.

  382. ngh,

    What I really didn’t understand is how GTR through they could make moving from an optimised efficiency rostering on SN + GN to a more inefficient one where some GN and SN branches …

    Yes, strange how this lesson gets lost time and time again. One of the more valid reasons for not letting TfL run Southeastern metro was the loss of efficiency caused in train use and driver efficiency once you have to separate the TOC into two separate entities. Although, to be more accurate, this accounts for less nowadays and is offset by the need for greater route knowledge. The SE division of Southern region in British Rail days were absolute masters of this though it did mean once the service was screwed up it was screwed up for everyone (sounds familiar?)

    There is also a clear trend to allow more recovery time on some lines. One reason that the service on the Tattenham Corner branch has been unbelievably good recently is that trains have up to a 25 minute layover at Tattenham Corner. This is very good for reliability but comes at the price of efficient use of drivers.

    As a contrast, in the other direction, when Chiltern took over the line out of Marylebone, they pretty much doubled the service using the same number of drivers and rolling stock. The solution – rewrite the timetables and rosters so that drivers were driving an average of around 6 hours per day instead of around 3 hours per day.

  383. Re PoP @ 0847

    “Gibb repeated the point that training can’t happen more than six months in advance because of the need to retrain but, …”

    Complete and utter b******* The elephant in the room is Crossrail who have been doing some training years ahead, they already have drivers trained to Maidenhead and are busy training more everyday, yet they won’t be running trains there in service for another 18 months. Crossrail /MTR are just picking up the cost and effort of retaining knowledge and high driver headcount very early.
    Crossrail has shown it can be done and this needs to be pointed out to TSC/ ATC / Glaister and Gibb.
    [The 1st, 2nd and 4th have been know to read LR at least occasionally]

    Indeed if the DI headcount is limited you have to start longer than 6 months in advance as there is no other realistic choice.

  384. re Greg and WW
    re-quoting: we must not break the industry timescales”

    The reference to Greater Anglia in December (18) in the RDG release is interesting as this date is not a contractural milestone in their Franchise Agreement, whereas May 2019 (TSR-2) and May 2020 (TSR-3) are? I’m not aware of any major changes planned for this December other than the normal tidying up and amendement of times and diagrams, (is it Crossrail related even though they won’t yet be running through?) My understanding is that they are in no fit state to advance anything and will have few if any new trains available for service by then?

    Deferring May 2019, (and this has been confirmed in correspendence by the TOC to a friend – that there will be limited changes at this time), one assumes will then mean that the following won’t happen until December 2019;

    3 tph to Norwich
    2 tpd Norwich in 90!
    No through services off of the East Suffolk to London
    Norwich – Cambridge not extended to Stansted
    No increase in off peak services to Southend Vic (4tph) and Hertford East (3 tph)
    No STAR enhancement

    Mix fortures for the TOC though, lower cost as fewer train miles operated, more time to commission the new train fleets and find a location for the new depot to service many of them, (as Brantham is dead in the water), but delayed uplift in revenue from more frequent and speedier journeys. Anone for franchise renogotiation/recallibration?

  385. The freeze on timetable changes also presumably means some of the infrastructure work (or at least the work that has been/is still on schedule) will now lie idle. Notably the Ordsall and Halton Curves on Northern. And where does this leave the STAR project and the enhanced service to Meridian Water?

  386. @ngh
    “That will save SWR’s bacon without embarrassment then as the rolling stock refurbishment programme is running very behind schedule and they would have had to cancel December for those reasons but GTR have provided an excuse.”

    I must admit, the cynic in me had the exact same thought…

  387. @ PoP – You’ve picked up more detail than I did from the Gibb and Green session. The fact you’ve highlighted more areas which could readily be challenged just confirms (to me) the “pre-agreed line” which everyone has adopted. I still find it breathtaking that they had 20 reps from various bodies in the Readiness Board and more people in the Risk Assurance process and they all missed the risks that actually materialised in May and subsequent to the timetable starting. It doesn’t feel credible to me. Someone knew but felt they couldn’t speak out or that they would not be listened to. Notable that no Trade Union reps appear to have been involved in any of these bodies – seems to have been wholly populated by management types.

  388. @ Alfie1014 – I think you are spot on with the franchise impact point. Delaying major timetable changes (assuming the TOCs and NR were actually ready for the change) just disrupts the basis on which franchises are bid and financed and delays passenger benefits. If a TOC is NOT ready or there are huge risks incapable of mitigation then waiting makes sense. A blanket decision to “do nothing” looks to me to be politically driven rather than anything else and is therefore likely to be a mistake. I wonder how much this is going to cost taxpayers as we end up with assets sitting around doing nothing, less revenue coming in and franchise premium payments being delayed / rephased. The lawyers will be happy – lots of legal work re franchise renegotiation and commercial claims. I also wonder whether TfL and the Mayor have signed off on the “no change” to London Overground timetables or if a claim is being send to the DfT as I write this? Overground were, I believe, supposed to moving to the x6 peak headway on the North London Line in December with x12 on the WLL / Richmond branches (this is mentioned in a live TfL bus consultation document re level crossing capacity at Bollo Lane).

    Artificially creating a “bow wave” of accumulated timetable changes is storing up problems for the future and almost certainly creates new risks and interdependencies that were not there before. I wonder if anyone has bothered to tell Failing Grayling that? The network can’t be frozen forever and the more you delay changes on Greater Anglia and GWR the more risk you create that the major “linking in” phases of Crossrail will get caught up in the crossfire.

    I suspect any impacts on Greater Anglia for Dec 2018 were small scale to work around any pathing issues for Crossrail ECS runs into the tunnel for the core service. It is perhaps not surprising that MTR Crossrail is not on the “no changes” list for December.

    @ Timbeau – I believe the introduction of STAR has been delayed to at least May 2019. There’s no way it is going to be ready for December given the delayed start on site and initial slow progress on getting the alignment ready. While I haven’t been to Tottenham Hale recently there needs (IMO) to be a fair bit more progress on the station rebuild (a LU project) to allow the STAR platform to be brought into use in a safe and effective manner. Ideally it would be sensible to get the foundations for the new lift tower, escalators and overbridge in place before introducing STAR. In an ideal world it would be even better to get the new footbridge swung into position but I can’t see that happening by May next year. It’s just too busy a location to be able to progress big works during the week – they’re very reliant on weekend possessions but clearly the station rebuild and STAR works have to fit around each other.

    Assuming Greater Anglia (GA) have 1 or 2 EMUs that can be deployed on STAR services I doubt the impacts are that big. GA just have to decide how the service will be worked – standalone shuttle or interworked with the Stratford – Hertford East / Cambridge stoppers. Obviously if it’s interworked then that may affect the WAML timetable and thus Overground (and possibly, in extremis, GTR at Cambridge). My strong suspicion, though, is that STAR will, in the short term, simply be slotted around the existing timetable with as small an impact as can be achieved.

    I believe later phases of the GA timetable step up have a bigger impact on the WAML and that will trigger a big rewrite. Ngh has already shared concerns about the Stadler trains’ dwell times at T Hale for the Stansted Express and the new Aventras will, of course, have an enhanced performance profile plus there’s supposed to be some element of frequency uplift on some routes. I confess I am not up to date on the current state of play with GA matters.

  389. As there clearly aren’t enough DIs, when did someone realise this? And did they take any action to increase them?

    Regarding Finsbury Park – there were already driver changeovers there on GN, because it’s a common point on both KX and Moorgate services; whether that was still a good idea on TL services is debatable. London Bridge is a new location and I would have thought possibly the absolute worst from a performance standpoint – but I can see the attraction in terms of efficient diagrams.

    What I’d really like to know is where the 55 extra drivers that they “suddenly” discovered they needed are based and the exact reason they got the number so wrong. While 55 out of 900 might not seem that much to many, to me it sounds like a significant cock-up. I know that bidders frequently get their driver numbers wrong by similar margins, but this should never happen ‘in franchise’, with time and resource to get it right.

    There’s lies, damn lies, statistics and GTR driver numbers.

  390. WW et al……..I listened though all of it, and I felt that in Messrs Gibb and Green were honest and comparatively open. I believe the issues of “group think” and “normalisation of deviance” were a problem for both committees, and it was likely that the GTR folk were absolutely convinced that their estimates were correct.

    I do not think they could have pointed at the root cause as they were part of the process and were also not in charge. That begs the question “who was in charge” as the person/body in charge isn’t the one that says “yes”, it’s the one that listens carefully to all the arguments and says “no”. I don’t believe there was anyone with enough knowledge and authority to say no. The DfT and SoS might have had the authority but not the knowledge, and vice versa for the industry!

    Just like the previous TSC meeting, fairly late on it was identified that the last chance to stop this was in October/November 2017 when DfT agreed to this plan which was reduced from the original. Trouble is, if they had called “stop” at that time, I doubt there was a contingency plan.

    Summary – failure of the Readiness and Assurance boards to recommend a halt is probably an immediate cause – in accident investigation terms – but the root/basic cause has yet to be identified.

    My personal suspicion is that the scale of the whole national timetable change, plus the comparative inexperience of the timetable team in NR plus insufficient resources, followed by a significant re-plan because of late infrastructure, trains or DfT decisions took everything outside anyone’s prior experience

  391. 100andthirty,

    A pretty fair summary. I don’t think either person was being dishonest but I am at a loss to understand why Chris Gibb thought that route training couldn’t start earlier. As ngh says, Crossrail is the counter-example.

    I presume he was either confused when he thought that restoration of services through London Bridge had been brought forward – that or he wasn’t aware that the public thought that this was what was going to happen from the outset.

    Quite importantly, when Chris Gibb was asked what they could have done in November if they had realised that the plan wouldn’t have worked, he was quite specific – put in a revised timetable such as the one intended for July 15th with a reduced off-peak service.

    I would imagine an advantage with this contingency plan would have been that it would not require any further changes to the working timetable as planned – you simply didn’t run some of the off-peak trains.

    Something also overlooked a bit but ngh has mentioned it before. There was a way to respect the timetable process and avoid the rewrite and late finalisation which was to close the railway in the North-West for five weeks and catch up with the electrification delays as Network Rail had suggested. This was rejected as ‘too disruptive’ but, in hindsight, it would have probably been less disruptive to the North-West let alone London if that had gone ahead and enabled the final nationwide timetable to be produced much earlier thus giving a GTR a chance to both have time to appreciate the problem better and have more time to provide mitigation.

  392. @HH 16:13
    55 drivers actually doesn’t sound that much when you consider the driver changeovers.
    If GTR has assumed that a driver from inbound train A could cross platforms and drive train B outbound a few minutes later. And then NR change the timings such that train A actually arrives after train B is due to leave. Then quite clearly you have a problem.

    You only need this to happen a handful of times before the knock-on effect leaves you very short indeed. A single driver missing their connection could have repercussions for the rest of that drivers shift.

    So the question therefore becomes – just how different was the final timetable from the one GTR put forward to NR. And how much slack did they allow between the driver arriving at a changeover point and taking the next train out. I suspect (hope!) it would be more than a few minutes, but probably not bundles.

    Given that someone (I forget who) has already mentioned on this thread that some services which should have 15 min intervals instead have 10/20 min gaps (I imagine the Catford Loop services fall into this bracket?) this would imply that some times were changed by at least 5 minutes.

  393. HH,

    I don’t think there are any lies. 55 drivers extra out of 900 is only about 6%. This must be well within any variance expected and it is just extraordinary that GTR did not allow for a decent contingency.

    The final timetable really can make a crucial difference. Network Rail may adjust services by a few minutes which can make a difference to which train a driver takes over and whether working hours are exceeded.

    Furthermore, as Chris Gibb explained (and Charles Horton on a previous occasion), your first iteration of rostering is bound to be inefficient. According to Chris Gibb this then needs manual tweaking. Stage three is removing any remaining violations of train planning rules not previously picked up or recently introduced and stage four is a further manual optimisation. The problem was that they had simply run out of time to do stages 2, 3 and 4 which would have helped cut down driver numbers needed.

  394. @ 100&30 – nice use of accident investigation methodology there.

    I am not convinced that any Thameslink project infrastructure was late (except the TMS stuff for the signalling). It *is* wholly relevant to the Northern debacle but not Thameslink. Has any of the core / London Bridge infrastructure been responsible for huge issues in June or July? Don’t think so – plenty of issues elsewhere but the new build stuff seems to be holding up OK. (Happy to be corrected). I believe the bi-directional capability in the core was recently deployed to allow GN bound TL trains to “overtake” MML trains that were stuck because of an incident. This was aided by the lack of s/b trains at the time but still shows what can be done *and* it worked!

    I do think the massive loss of timetabling expertise / experience caused by NR’s consolidation at Milton Keynes will be seen to be a significant issue. I agree with your last sentence re “beyond anyone’s prior experience”. However I would still come back to the point about where was the person who said “hang on a minute, we’ve never done this before, shouldn’t we take pause to properly consider this before committing ourselves?”. Perhaps I’m too logical, too cynical or just have the benefit of hindsight but I still struggle with this insane lemming like behaviour. Has no one in the TOCs or Network Rail every considered their team structures and the personality types within them? If they haven’t then they really need to do so to make sure they have the right set of skills and temperaments and thought processes.

    I absolutely take your point about there not being a sufficiently skilled and knowledgeable person who is genuninely “in charge” and has the authority to say “no”. Chris Gibb said as much when he remarked that “the DfT leave the railway stuff to the industry, they have their own issues to look after” when asked about the competence of the DfT’s people to take the relevant decisions. Looks to me as if we have a real structural problem in the UK’s railway industry in that no one is in charge of most of it. I expect there will be zero political appetite to actually fix that problem.

  395. WW
    Tottenham Hale is in a mess …..
    And, prefectly on-target – you simply cannot “freeze” things – or the syatem will sieze up, for other reasons, which should be obvious (to us, at least )

    130
    You are asking “who if anyone was actually in charge” – which brings us full-circle to my original comment about a “Controlling Mind” or lack of one.
    Now what?

  396. WW….

    One point of detail….whilst the infrastructure wasn’t late, the “the rolling infrastructure” was; this did affect various types of driver training as was covered in the main article.

    On a wider point, I am reminded of Eurotunnel and the consortium of contractors what won the concession to build it. They had to invent a client organisation to bring discipline to the whole thing, West Coast Route Modernisation where Railtrack tried to satisfy everyone’s requirements, and the original DLR upgrade/Bank extension where they brought in a “main contractor” to take overall responsibility for getting it all working. They all thought they had properly identified everyone’s roles and that the agreed process would be used to resolve the problems. They were wrong, and they resolved it all by “putting someone in charge”.

    The RDG could do this if only NR and the owning groups allowed it to do so. However I can’t see it happening unless there was a much better alignment of the commercial objectives of all parties.

    However, let’s assume that this has been done. That, for example, all parties have agreed that the route Boards should be “in charge” rather than advisory. Would the people on those boards behave differently if they were part of an executive rather than advisory board, recognising that those people would probably be much the same people as today?

  397. Re WW @1658

    As previously mentioned – ORR required NR to reduce expenditure on timetabling in CP5 as it believed NR should be getting more efficient (Mc Nulty Report et al.).
    Unfortunately complexity (i.e. workload) involved with timetabling as the network utilisation has increased as has the workload due to all the infrastructure upgrades and extra rolling stock for additional services.
    In reality ORR should have been telling NR to increase expenditure on Timetabling activities as Grayling has now done.

    ORR’s actions look like a traditional regulatory top down efficiency factor squeeze (RPI-X, RIIO) without looking at the bottom up workload and how that change. I wonder how ORR will assess their own actions as part of the Glaister report?

    Re PoP,

    With training levels so low and the need for resilience i can’t see how there can be an efficient roster at the moment, we are stuck at step 1 till there are lots more trained drivers. The key at Finsbury is drivers trained on 700s. Given the number of drivers that are barely usable as they have so little of the required training, the real disparity in drivers if far far higher than the headline numbers reported by GTR to the ATC.

  398. Re DJL @ 16:50

    55 drivers actually doesn’t sound that much when you consider the driver changeovers.
    If GTR has assumed that a driver from inbound train A could cross platforms and drive train B outbound a few minutes later. And then NR change the timings such that train A actually arrives after train B is due to leave. Then quite clearly you have a problem.

    You only need this to happen a handful of times before the knock-on effect leaves you very short indeed. A single driver missing their connection could have repercussions for the rest of that drivers shift.

    Looks like no / little thinking about perturbation analysis was done given the NR Sussex Sub-Routes infamous tendency to create reactionary delay this was probably a bad idea.

    So the question therefore becomes – just how different was the final timetable from the one GTR put forward to NR. And how much slack did they allow between the driver arriving at a changeover point and taking the next train out. I suspect (hope!) it would be more than a few minutes, but probably not bundles.

    The end state (for 24tph) timetable was submitted last August and it was expected that there would be about 800-900 changes to that in the end there ended up being 4,500 changes, many were of course due to the change from 2 phases to 4 phases and dealing with the interim arrangement where services terminate instead of going through the core.

    Another of the elephants in the room is that GTR did NOT attempt to roster the final draft timetable they submitted to NR they were waiting to get the final approved one back from NR. If they had attempted to roster the final draft last August then they would have found out about a big the gap in drivers vs requirements 9 months ago not just 18 days before hand (x15 in time scale), of course the shortfall would have been different and probably smaller than the final approved timetable but it still would have highlighted many issues. So why didn’t GTR attempt to roster it?

  399. re: ngh & PoP

    “What I really didn’t understand is how GTR through they could make moving from an optimised efficiency rostering on SN + GN to a more inefficient one where some GN and SN branches …”

    It’s often said by driver colleagues that TL diagrams are (or were) some of tyhe most intensive driver diagrams out there. I could only speak for TL & GN but having loosely compared the two TL diagrams were on the whole far more intensive than GN ones at least.

    Roll on the TT change and suddenly they have become far less intensive. Lots of ‘passing’ from one location to another where we didn’t before and fewer return trips per diagram than we had.

    The route knowledge point is actually a bit of a misnomer as drivers on the whole are seeing their route card reduced as they are going to a ‘route specific’ format though obviously they need to actually learn this route before.

    There is absolutely no reason whatsoever that the route learning could not have been started far earlier. All it takes is a route refresh day thrown in here and there to keep routes competent. I am of the opinion it simply wasn’t organised earlier due to other distractions/poor planning. Even now, drivers don’t know the full details of routes they will be signing and are just learning bits here and there to try and get through the more short term issues of covering jobs.

    Re: HH
    “As there clearly aren’t enough DIs, when did someone realise this? And did they take any action to increase them?”

    The company were aware at least 3 years ago. Action was taken to try and coax or cajole more drivers in to the role. However, you get to a point where you can’t get any more because they don’t want to do it or they’re not appropriate for the role.

  400. DJL “If GTR has assumed that a driver from inbound train A could cross platforms and drive train B outbound a few minutes later. And then NR change the timings such that train A actually arrives after train B is due to leave. Then quite clearly you have a problem.

    You only need this to happen a handful of times before the knock-on effect leaves you very short indeed.”

    This looks like a great explanation for what happened, but unfortunately this is simply not the case. In practice many diagrams would change and the net result would not be a lot.

    So, could the TT have been so out of kilter that it required so many extra drivers? When TOCs try to increase efficiency they have struggled to get even a 1% improvement, so I doubt very much that an inefficient TT could make over a 6% difference.

    @POP 6% (actually 6.5%) is way out of any variance expected. That’s a 6.5% drop in productivity across every driver. It’s unheard of, which is why I don’t believe it. Maybe someone did a back of fag packet calculation, but if they did, they made some poor assumptions. As I said before, I suspect that they were relying on new software to make savings, which never materialised. Classic optimism bias.

    @NGH “Another of the elephants in the room is that GTR did NOT attempt to roster the final draft timetable they submitted to NR they were waiting to get the final approved one back from NR.”

    Whatever the reason they did not, it’s quite damning IMO. Even if they were under the cosh internally, they could have hired external help – it wouldn’t have cost a fortune. Possibly this is a side effect of them not being on revenue risk and therefore cutting cost to the bone?

    @ TL Driver “..you get to a point where you can’t get any more because they don’t want to do it or they’re not appropriate for the role”

    Other TOCs have a higher %. Maybe rather less wanted to do it due to GTR’s abysmal IR, or do they not pay enough extra?

  401. Re HH, PoP, TL driver,

    Going back to my notes of the Assembly Transport Committee:

    For May 2018 TT

    Expected Driver Diagrams 854
    Actual Driver Diagrams 930
    Difference 76 or 8.8%

    For the 854 driver diagrams they were expecting to need 889 drivers and had 898 after some later transfers from SE and SN.

    930 diagrams would suggest about 968 drivers.

    968 – 898 = 70,
    70 – GBRf pilots =50->55 which is where the 50-55 number came from.

    So the miscalculation to explain is 76 or 8.8%

    Crazy thought – annual leave will be about 9%…

  402. Short piece on “all of this” on “Today” at about 07.20 just now …
    Apparently Arnitt has gone public on the system no longer being fit for purpose, & the interviewee carefully pointing out (as we know) just how much of this is already “nationalised” in practice, & that some constructive change is needed.
    My own impression reminds me of the implosion of confidence when railtrack collapsed …
    it’s a corporate ( & governmental? ) nervous breakdown.

    Going back to 130’s analogy of an accident-investigation, I think we can probably point the immediate proximate cause to NR’s shall-we-say “questionable” decision to move all tt-planning to Milton Keynes. But, as almost-always with accidents, there are lots of other causes in the final mix that has led us to this place.

  403. I’d assumed that there had been lots of changes to the timetable that were significant to rostering from the draft 24 tph timetable and the ‘final’ May 2018 one. I had kept a copy of the ‘mainline’ version so I had a look at the differences. Whilst there are a large number of changes, most of these are only of 1-3 minutes or changes to intermediate stopping patterns.
    Almost all the other changes were to be expected once the phasing had been announced and the decision to introduce the “Thameslink Express” to compensate for the removal of the East Midlands stops. Those “Thameslink Express” changes don’t change things from a rostering point of view at all – they still run to/from the same destinations are originally planned and arrive earlier or depart later. The biggest knock on effect is that one of the normal Bedford trains arrives 6 minutes later than originally timetabled but that just reduces the turnaround time a bit. There’s also the 18:55 (at St Pancras) to East Grinstead that starts 10 minutes earlier from Bedford. On the GN side, the Cambridge semi-fasts do arrive later than in the original timetable with 7 minutes at most later.

    The only trains that go to/from the “mainline” destinations that didn’t appear on the original Dec 2018 mainline timetable are the 06:01, 06:31 Bedford to Rainham – I assume these original started from Luton but would have run empty from Bedford anyway and some later evening trains from Sutton which run through to Bedford.

    So unless there are huge changes on the metro Thameslink (which I’m pretty sure they weren’t), then this “late changes to the timetable” doesn’t seem right and it must have been bad estimation without doing a full roster as NGH says

  404. Re Daven,

    Agreed on fairly minimal level of metro change vs draft (note some reasonable changes vs previous TT though).

    It is worth pointing out that as as somethings took 10 iterations to get right, that is 10 changes…

  405. This particular subject has been the most fascinating to follow over the last six weeks and i thank all contributors for providing so much insightful information. However, i find any defense of the IRB and Assurance group as difficult to accept. The whole point of these groups was to prevent the situation we now find ourselves in and there sorry excuses are just those they’ve honed in running our railways where most apologies are hollow.

    This is a systemic failure not a few cancellations at the margins. The service uploaded into journey planners for May had circa 540 9xxx movements through the core mon-fri. This was then reduced down to 440-460 9xxx movements and most days only 70-75% of this service runs. That said yesterday they achieved 84% but being at week 8 surely they must have got a few more drivers trained up. The interim TT has c455 9xxx movements showing and no information being revealed as to whether they intend to restore the original planned May TT. This just shows the scale of the deficit on readiness .

    The fact that Gibb was so evasive about releasing the IRB meeting notes and supporting information speaks volumes about the failure of both these groups whose remit was to prevent the fiasco we’ve ended up. Ultimately im sure the dead hand of DoT is in the mix somewhere but i have to standby Grayling assessment that it was these groups that have failed the travelling public. Hopefully the TSC will get some teeth after the summer recess and get the DoT apparatchiks in as Glaister report will be sold as a lessons learnt not an analysis in failure.

  406. Earlswood, a very succinct summary of the issue, thank you. This is truly a failure on a monumental scale and as you say there is no indication as to when we may get the service to anything like the level we were promised. Likewise I endorse your praise of the article and the thread beneath. All fascinating.
    Not wishing to reduce trains operated any further I nonetheless can’t help thinking a trick has been missed to speed up training. The interim timetable starts the very week the schools start breaking up for summer holidays. Peak traffic, especially morning peak, drops significantly in London at this time. Couldn’t a few more trains have been taken out of the service to facilitate more training?

  407. re GREG TINGEY I agree that the move to Milton Keynes was viewed by many in the industry, (myself included at the time), as very brave and risked de-skilling a specialism that was already struggling to retain and recruit staff. There was a naive assumption that technology could replace experience and location was to some extent irrelevant. The consequence was some staff simply retired, moved to TOCs and FOCs or found work elsewhere. Train planning is frequently viewed in some parts as a dark art, it’s not but some of the best train planners I’ve had the pleasure of working with over the years had a passion for what they were doing and were able to look outside the box. I found that some within Railtrack and subsequently NR had lost the ability to see the whole picture of how all, (the sometimes desperate), parts of the industry and its proccesses fitted together.

    re DAVEN On the face of it odd minutes here and there seem immaterial. However they can and do matter. Busting driver’s breaks for example, with the allocated time becoming too short to be legitimate, can start a cascade of consequences that can begin to unravel the diagram base a bit like un-picking a jumper. However under normal circumstances there would be time to work through these issues and to optimise the overall plan. Once the ability to iterate to any great extent is lost the delivery of an efficient plan becomes so much more difficult in the time available.

  408. This has continued to be a fascinating thread and I would like to add my thanks to all contributors (whether I agree with them or not). Having spent 25+ years delivering projects, though I admit not on this scale, I am left with the residual feeling that no-one was either aware enough (doubtful) or brave enough (very likely) to put their hand up and say “from where we are today, this will not deliver, we must replan and rethink”. I know it is often politically unacceptable, career suicide, or simply not allowed to say “No” – that is a sadness that has crept in to all aspects of project management in the last two decades – nothing succeeds like success, and walking away from a go live date to try again and then get it right is no longer held as valuable.
    I think it likely that a number of things came together to create the almost-perfect storm: the history of GTR’s industry and staff relationships, particularly on Southern, NR’s inability to deliver key things on time whether it be LBG, Canal Tunnels in useful use, Traffic Management System, ARS at 3BR – take your pick, GTR not recognising they were firstly short of drivers and then dreadfully short of drivers trained on both stock and routes, and sundry other causes that sit in the shadows. BUT – behind all this is the hand of the DfT who took GTR’s money for “delays in advance” and effectively burnt the performance regime contract, who specified and wrecked the 700’s and their delivery (with a little help from Siemens and – hey – who would have guessed – software is complicated!!) and most seriously – seem to have created an environment where one of the three parties (DfT, GTR, NR) cannot be held to blame in any way.

    This does not bode well for the future of rail in the UK.

  409. Oh and I meant to include under NR’s list the centralisation of timetable planning – and the resultant loss and erosion of these key skills – now, too late, NR knows the value of the resources they threw away in this move. Despite 40 years in IT, or perhaps because of it, I am acutely aware that is rarely, if ever, the solution to anything. It is an enabler of solutions but only if skilled people, at whatever level necessary, can use the technology to deliver.

    Belated rant over

  410. The trains are needed in service to train drivers on routes Mike C

  411. Anon, yes I see your logic. Perhaps it’s more the case that we had been hearing that trainers were being pulled off classroom work to run trains, annual leave was deferred to run trains and rest day working was being worked to death to run trains all of which will build up issues for the future. On the GN 10 tph arrive at KX or StP between 7-8 and 13 between 8-9. From next week those trains will be much lighter loaded than usual until the first week of September. Still I’m sure they know what they are doing!

  412. Re: MikeC – also bear in mind that the 700s are 8- and 12-car units. You can’t shorten trains to free up units and still operate a given frequency service, as you could with trains made up of multiple 4-car units.

  413. @ Mike C 1235 – Obviously we shall what actually runs but I have read far too ominous posts and tweets to believe it will all work come Monday. TSSA are already predicting 200 cancellations on Sunday. OK that’s not a normal working day given the reliance on rest day working / overtime but it bodes very badly. On other forums there has been regular commentary about the daily woes – largely on Great Northern – and that has been only a tiny incremental improvement in what actually runs consistently day by day. You might have expected, given the furore over the mess, that GTR could have achieved something better in 8 weeks but seemingly not. Day to day service management also seems to be erratic even when there are no infrastructure issues.

    There will obviously be a massive media focus come Monday and I expect Grayling to be demanding multiple “heads on platters” if it all goes pear shaped. The departure of Mr Horton is beginning to look like a wise move (for him anyway) as his head has already been served up. If Nick Brown is still due to go in September then he just has to wait things out while maintaining the appropriate level of effort / disappointment depending on what audience he faces. I assume Network Rail will be required to offer up a resignation or two to satisfy the Failing’s craving for blood to be spilt.

  414. @ 100&30 – I tend not to consider rolling stock as infrastructure. Yes there were difficulties with the fleet and that rests with GTR/DfT/Siemens. As I have remarked before I am fed up with the constant attempt to “blame” Network Rail when they have delivered an enormous and complex project to the required project timetable and pretty much to spec in terms of the Thameslink core and London Bridge plus approaches.

    As Ngh has reminded me (so hard to keep track of all of the factors) NR were told to reduce expenditure on timetabling by ORR. Ngh has similarly remarked that GTR’s timetable submissions were not exactly wonderful and needed a great deal of work to get them to an acceptable state. The decision to rephase the T/Link service build up was also months late in being confirmed. In short Network Rail were put in an unenviable position by others rather late in the day. I accept there are some NR shortcomings and with the benefit of hindsight some possibly dubious decisions about centralising the timetabling resources but I really dislike disproportionate blame being handed round and, worse, the NR reps sitting there in “grovelling apology” mode when GTR fail to admit the totality of their failures and NO ONE directs any blame at DfT. It just stinks.

  415. @ Reggie
    Sounds like somebody needs to go on a Public Relations course…

  416. @ALFIE1014, I appreciate that a few minutes here or there would make a difference if you are optimising the timetable when running a reliable service. But when one of the objectives is to produce a more reliable timetable you wouldn’t want to be pushing things to the limits anyway ?

  417. @ Reggie / Anonmouse – I’ve read a number of conflicting remarks and comments about that social media coverage of the senior GTR official on the train. I’m not sure anyone really knows the truth here nor that any of the people involved come out of it well (assuming what I’ve read is true and I can’t prove that). The perils of jumping on the social media commenting “bandwagon”.

  418. @ WW: Agreed – the true story of who did or said what is probably hopelessly obscured. It did feel like an example of tone-deafness however: even if said Director was actually unfailingly polite in pointing out the restrictions of First Class seating, he should not have put himself in a position where he could be photographed taking up two seats in a section of the train that was clearly standing room only. It just lends itself to negative interpretations, and in public relations, once a negative story is out there, it takes a lot of effort to counter it.

    I really hope that someone senior to him in GTR has pointed out that a picture like that is not good publicity. In a world of social media, “how could this be misinterpreted?” is an increasingly important consideration for companies.

    Incidentally the article that I linked also got half a page in the print version (with half of that being the photo), and that is distributed free to rail stations and bus services across London. I think that underlines how careful senior officers of transport companies need to be. My concern would be that he didn’t appear to be careful enough negotiating the minefield of public interaction.

  419. Notices posted on Thameslink stations today state that relaxation of First Class rules (apparently this was peak hour only) are reverting to normal from 15th July. Not sure where this leaves the long standing belief, never publicly acknowledged, that the rear 1st Class section of Class 700s is always declassified.

  420. John P: rear declassification of first class on the Clas 700s is regularly acknowledged by GTRs twitter team, and by any ticket inspectors on board.

  421. This is a first class example of the shambles of the current situation (pause for polite applause).

    When is a seat classified or declassified? Do GTR really think, given the nightmare of wondering whether your train or any of the subsequent services are actually going to turn up, one is really then going to be exercised over whether it’s peak or off-peak and whether these particular seats are still first, never were first class, or were de-classified but are now back to being first.

    The manager in question needs to understand the impact of his actions. If he cannot recognise that impact he needs to leave his role and move to something non-controversial – therefore probably outside the rail industry.

  422. @NGH “For the 854 driver diagrams they were expecting to need 889 drivers ”

    I’m trying to understand this and failing.

    If the 854 diagrams were referring to per day, then 889 drivers would be nowhere near enough (there being 6 days in the working week and drivers only working 4 of them, plus leave, etc.).

    However if it were 854 diagrams per week, then you wouldn’t need anywhere near 889 drivers.

    Is this comparing apples and pears, e.g. is the diagram number all diagrams (including SN), while the drivers are only TL?

    Can anyone shed any light?

  423. If there are 889 drivers and they have five holiday weeks a year then an average of 88 drivers will be on leave every day. Throw in a handful of sick leaves and the result is about 790 drivers available.

    So nowhere near enough for 854 diagrams.

  424. My quick, back of proverbial fag packet, calculation is that each daily driving diagram requires between 1.5 and 2 drivers ‘on the payroll’, based on what assumptions you make as to diagrams being every day or not, and how many days a driver is available to drive/working but not available (training, etc)/off – as Kit and others have said, these last two soon mount up.

  425. @ Reggie – I understand your points but there is a myriad of counter information about this incident “out there” which, depending on your own prejudices, only makes this better or worse for GTR / the individual involved. I could list them but I’d be indulging in the same horrible tactic that started all of this. It also wouldn’t get us any closer to the truth.

    I am afraid that what this incident highlights for me is one of the nastiest sides of social media – people leaping into mass condemnation and indignant remarks when they are not in the possession of the facts. I am not innocent of this myself but I am trying to not do it. If I was still a senior manager I’d be tempted to do no work on the train and to not show any name badge so as to be as anonymous as possible. Not the right attitude I know but why run the risk of being plastered across the world on social media, dumped in the news media and abused and accused with zero ability to defend myself without triggering more abuse and coverage? It’s vile, even in the context of GTR’s shambolic performance. You couldn’t pay me enough to put up with that as a non public figure which, to be fair, is the status of 99.9% of employees in any large business. Only a tiny fraction are chosen to appear in front of the media or be quoted publicly and they are given training on how to handle that. No one’s given training on how to handle social media fall out. How soon before train drivers and platform staff are regularly lampooned on social media by angry passengers? No wonder they disappear from view.

  426. Found this on the Thameslink site albeit dated 30 March 18 but has some background info on the driver position then

    https://www.thameslinkrailway.com/-/media/goahead/gtr-all-shared-pdfs-and-documents/joint-performance-improvement-plan-updates/joint-performance-improvement-update—30-march-2018.pdf?la=en

    [Note: Although the link should work, it appears not to do so. If necessary go to
    https://www.thameslinkrailway.com/about-us/how-were-performing/performance-improvement-plan and click the last line of text
    . PoP]

  427. Bad publicity arising from splendid insulation in First Class long predates social media: there is a sub plot in the Crossman Diaries about the whole compartment reserved for him to work on red boxes and the discomfiture it caused him.

  428. I see the new timetable has abandoned the Thameslink to Orpington service off-peak, but the Southeastern service has not been extended back to Orpington, so the latter only has 2tph towards Victoria. Is it generally the case that Thameslink’s retrenchement has not been matched with other operators picking up the slack?

  429. @ John B

    It’s an extra 20 minutes at least to do Bromley South-Orpington and return, so would almost certainly need an extra train and driver(s) to do it. Do Southeastern have the spare stock and drivers available? It wouldn’t make economic sense to keep assets spare in case other operators’ services collapse so I would guess not

  430. On another issue, the proposed nine day closure south of Haywards Heath in October has been deferred/cancelled. This is apparently a further consequence of the Thameslink timetable hubris.

    This is just the sort of thing I feared. If the work was deemed necessary and fairly urgent then why is it not so now? It appears that it is unfair to subject passengers to more disruption but at least it was planned disruption. Chris Gibb in his evidence to the Transport Select Committee re-iterated his concern about asset condition and originally thought this was far more of a risk that timetabling problems.

    In the worst case scenario, the work just does not get done. Unless they magically find a better way of doing it, all that happens is it is delayed until an unspecified date with the assets in poor condition and causing delays until then.

    As usual, the announcement is half-baked. Whilst the Network Rail media site has the news, the dedicated website for the changes hasn’t been updated. [Site now updated PoP]

    Whilst a lot of commuters may be relieved, those who had already booked that week off as a consequence of the original announcement are going to be less than happy.

  431. @JOHN B

    I would be shocked to find that another operator had changed their service. It would be more-or-less impossible for them to “pick up the slack”, for the same reasons that caused the problem in the first place: drivers, diagrams, rostas, train paths and … trains.

  432. @130 “Does rest day work in square the circle?”

    The opposite, it actually means that out of the 790 drivers “available” 263 (one third) will be on a rest day, leaving only 527.

    Jeremy is about right, but 1.5 is too low. On TL I would expect slightly over 2 drivers per weekday diagram. 6 days divided by 4 days rostered = 1.5; then there is roughly a 50% uplift to accommodate leave, sickness, training, etc.:

    1.5 x 150% = 2.25

    So for 854 diagrams around 1,922 drivers. Which looks possible as a total GTR number (and as Southern would have a lower multiplier, probably a bit high), but not TL only.

    Note that TL requires slightly more drivers per diagram than most TOCs; their circadian rostering means that they have exactly the same number of drivers rostered on a Saturday as a weekday (not normally the case). It’s also likely that they have a lower utilisation than some, due to the nature of the work (training, route refreshing, etc.).

  433. @WW: I agree with all of your statements. Were I in such an exalted position I would be completely anonymous and a passive observer. My thinking would be that the uniformed staff are trained in customer relations and applying rules, and have a practical experience that I’d never get near: the best way I could add value would be to silently observe and use that to generate discussion later as to whether the right objectives were being identified and achieved – which is not intended as criticism of those objectives, I have too litle experience to offer an opinion that has any value there.

  434. re: Pedantic @ 09:27

    I am also slightly puzzled by the decision to postpone the engineering works.
    On the one hand it could be seen as softening the blow of the terrible service of late.

    But, on the other hand it gives GTR an opportunity to either a) give some drivers some time off, (meaning more drivers are available on other days) or, more likely, b) get those same drivers into training (as either trainee or trainer) – both without it being GTR’s fault.

    I am assuming, of course, that during engineering workings the “spare” drivers aren’t simply put behind the wheel of a bus instead?

  435. DJL: tongue clearly in cheek, as few or no licenced train drivers would also have a PSV licence. But providing a bus replacement does actually require staff other than bus drivers (*), to marshal the passengers on and off the buses, occasionally check their tickets, and marshal the actual buses. Doubtful if that would be a good use of skilled train drivers though, even if they were willing to do it.

    (*) Buses are hired in complete with drivers anyway.

  436. HH: Some of the confusion here may be about the definition of “a diagram”. Some correspondents seem to use the term assuming that a weekly diagram contains the amount of work that one driver might do in a normal week – that is to say that it includes the appropriate number of rest days. Others are referring to daily diagrams, each containing the amount of work which a driver (who is not having a rest day) might do between one daily rest period and the next. (Not necessarily all in the same calendar day, as many work over midnight, of course).

    As has been made clear, the exact conversion factor between daily diagrams and weekly diagrams is tricky to evaluate, as is the conversion factor between weekly diagrams and drivers available.

    The complicating factors do include leave, sickness and training (giving or getting). But they must also include “spare” (being available to replace unexpectedly missing drivers) and also “waste” (sitting around nominally spare because no work for which they are trained exists, or because they are in the wrong place due to other things going wrong), and “on the cushions” (travelling between where they are and where they are needed, or where they finish and where they are booked off).

  437. BML closure:

    The original plan was for:

    2x 9day Half Term closures (October 2018 and Feb 2019)

    and

    15x Weekend closures (September 2018 – May 2019, 45% of weekends in the time period excluding blocks)

    The reason for the 2x 9 day blocks was:
    a) logistics of engineering train movements around and in/out of the possession area
    b) getting enough equipment to do it all in one block

    The new plan is to get vast majority of the work planned for the two block done in one block in Feb instead and more weekends to be announced later…

    So the team have got their mitts on more equipment but are having to wait longer…

  438. @ Malcolm. Those in the industry who work in the area only use diagram to mean one thing – it’s one day’s work for one driver. When quoting diagram numbers it’s either the number on a Wednesday (usually, as Wed is the day with least changes from the base) or the total for Monday-Friday, i.e. the total weekday number. SO & SU are usually quoted separately. For TL the SO number doesn’t actually matter as the T&Cs dictate that there will be as many drivers available as on Weekdays and SU is covered by overtime, so is irrelevant in determining driver numbers.

    854 diagrams is clearly too few for a full week, even if they mean Weekdays, as 854/5 = 171. TL had more than that under FCC, so there would be a lot more than that now, with additional routes and an increased frequency. But they wouldn’t have as many as 854 (or more, as this was the original estimate). It is in the right ballpark for the whole of GTR, based on the fact that there just over 1600 drivers across FCC & Southern in 2013.

    I’m fully aware of the factors. I used 150% (cover ratio) to represent these, a number based on years of experience. I know TOCs that use 140% (or 1.4), TOCs that use 160% (1.6) and some (like VT) use an even higher multiplier. It all depends on how they assess the non-working amounts and how much spare they want to carry. It’s not going to make a huge difference if the diagram to driver multiplier is 2.1 or 2.4, from the 2.25 I used.

    Spares take place in the Roster and in TL’s case will probably be 99% used to cover leave, sickness, etc. Any waste will be self-caused, i.e. too many drivers who don’t have requisite route/traction knowledge, which is not a good basis for calculating numbers for the long term. Drivers travelling on the cushions is in the diagrams already, so is NOT a factor in determining driver numbers.

    Often there are “cover diagrams” at key locations, which means that a few drivers are sitting around in case there is perturbation. I don’t know about GTR, but Southeastern definitely have these. Sometimes these are included in the diagram numbers, sometimes not, but the numbers are small (SE have 24 a day IIRC), so won’t affect the calculation greatly. Other than that, when there are problems on the day trains get cancelled and drivers get moved around, so it doesn’t impact directly on driver number calculations. Cover diagrams are a better way to handle this than a shotgun increase of the cover ratio.

  439. @DJL/Malcolm – rail replacement buses are never (I think) provided by the rail operator directly but are invariably wet leases from a bus operator. This means that no rail operator would have any opportunity to train train drivers on buses, because they don’t own any, and bus companies have no interest in dry vehicle leases, when they make their turn on a complete hire. Whether this *should* be so, is another matter.

    @HH Exactly; I suspect those who talk about weekly diagrams also assume that the crew do the same thing every day during that week – also not true.

  440. @ Graham H. Yes, it might be an idea for me to explain Rosters a bit.

    Depots have what are called ‘links’ of drivers. At smaller depots there may be only one main link (there are sometimes special links, e.g. for restricted or part time drivers). At larger depots there can be numerous links. Bedford has a large number for example.

    Each link gets a roster with a number of duty lines and the drivers cycle through those lines in order, so if Driver Bill works line 5 this week, he will work line 6 next and so on until he gets around to 5 again.

    The lines show ‘turns’ for each day, which include working diagrams, rest days, spares and other duties, depending on the depot. So Driver Bill’s line 5 might read:

    Monday: Diagram A
    Tuesday: Diagram B
    Wednesday: Rest Day
    Thursday: Rest Day
    Friday: Diagram M
    Saturday: Spare
    Sunday: Diagram Z (although this is not part of his core week)

    Turns marked Spare are likely to be used to cover other drivers who are on leave, or just possibly, those who are sick or delayed in some way.

    I hope that makes things clearer.

  441. HH
    Just to emphasise the point you didn’t quite make …
    That Rostering is quite possibly even more difficult than writing the timetable in the first place…………………….

  442. Greg Tingey,

    They are very different types of problems so not really comparable.

    For a timetable you have various requirements and the challenge is to produce a timetable that works. In practice, you have to make compromises and the further challenge is to provide a ‘best’ solution.

    Given an infinite number of drivers, it is easy to produce a roster that works. The challenge is to produce an efficient roster. When you bear in mind how much it costs to employ a driver (not just wages but depot accommodation, overheads and training as well) it is really desirable to get the rosters to be as efficient as you can make it. A fundamental problem is that you can never be quite sure when to stop as it is very unlikely that you can be certain that you have produced the most efficient roster.

  443. It appears from reading these comments that Sunday is still covered by overtime. Which I find amazing, given we’ve had 22 years for the thrusting, innovative, buccaneering privately owned franchisees to change to a fully flexible 7 day rostering cycle. Such an arrangement reduces risk to service from short term lack of driver interest in Sunday work and allows much needed increase in Sunday service for reasonable marginal cost uplift. London Underground managed this in 1992 then as now socially owned. What’s the problem?

  444. MikeC said “Which I find amazing, given we’ve had 22 years for the thrusting, innovative, buccaneering privately owned franchisees to change to a fully flexible 7 day rostering cycle. ”

    The overwhelming majority of those buccaneers have had contracts with DfT that gave them no protection, e.g. force majeure, if they wanted to go head to head with the unions over the 7-day roster.they need that protection as, generally, they can’t afford strikes.

  445. Sunday this week was World Cup final. Drivers give 7+ days notice if not ‘volunteering’ for overtime before England’s KO. Problem is paying market rates, if you negotiate a built in rate with Sunday closures wages could be higher.

  446. Fact is that a lot of drivers don’t want to work Sundays. So even though ASLEF support having it in the working week, lots of drivers don’t. I recall doing an analysis of drivers at one TOC and came to the conclusion that around 45% of drivers wanted to work as little as possible over the base hours and refused almost all rest day working (including Sundays) that they could.

  447. @ Mike C – the issue is money. You need a bigger workforce with all the attendant costs that go alongside. LU operates a much “flatter” service with less variation across service days. It is also able to justify extra service levels using social benefits whereas the DfT and TOCs do not do this. There is also a far wider differentiation in service levels although that has started to narrow in recent years on some London area TOCs as they have faced growing weekend demand and the DfT has eventually realised it needs to step up weekend service levels. It also beginning to realise this on other TOCs serving urban areas.

    I agree with 100&30 that the other issue is industrial relations related. Existing staff don’t want to lose the ability to earn overtime nor do some of them want to lose beneficial terms and conditions they may have retained across multiple changes of TOC ownership. TOCs have little to no appetite for industrial relations problems because they need to run trains to get revenue to cover their costs. It is only the GTR situation where DfT is taking revenue risk and reimbursing costs and not penalising for poor performance that allows a potential adjustment of working practices (e.g. guards dispute). In essence the taxpayer has funded the strike (from the TOC’s viewpoint) and passengers have borne the brunt of the disruption.

  448. It might be worth mentioning that there is more to industrial relations than just strikes. A strike only occurs when other less disruptive means of “adjusting working practices” have failed. Yes, some union leaders, and some managers facing unions, may be “strike happy”. But the far less newsworthy approach of productive engagement does succeed more often than is realised. It just does not make the headlines.

  449. ASLEF wants Sundays in the working week; the TOCs as a rule, do not. This would alter the dynamics of the length of the working week (eg where I work balanced out at 36 hour weeks across the whole year) and thus require more drivers with the attendant recruitment, training, a comodation, NI, pension costs etc. Note that drivers are divided on the issue – Sundays are often the only normal day they can guarantee with their families – mid week days off being rather lonely affairs; but as they are overtime, they are not pensionable and also not as well remunerated as rest day work. Sunday working is also not voluntary. I have contracted Sundays and the only way to get them off is to find someone else to do them, who then receives the overtime instead. If they were part of the working week I could book leave which would make the likes of wedding weekends much easier to manage. Please do not assume that this is a battle the TOCs do not want because of industrial strife – this is a cost issue that they are happy to fudge until they are unable to resist any more. Remember that it is very useful for the industry to blame the unions as a diversionary tactic – in which they are willingly aided by the mostly right wing press.

  450. Also I presume the phrase, “thrusting, innovative, buccaneering,” is ironic?

    And we’ve been flexible since 1982 I believe. We work 363 days a year, round the clock, varying lengths of turn, start and finish times, breaks at irregular intervals in various places (no fixed lunchtime with a fridge for our salad) Sundays, Bank Hols, spare turns which allow a fair bit of movement to suit the operator etc. Holidays are rostered or limited to a specific number off per shift. Even where agreements are in place to give us a more reasonable work life balance, drivers are often asked to help out regardless and usually agree.

  451. @ Anonymous, TOCs actually differ on this, and so do the T&Cs (which is probably why). I don’t think Sundays are obligatory on TL (I know they’re not on GN and T&Cs were largely harmonised at FCC). At TOCs with no obligation, you can get “BBQ Sundays” and they definitely don’t like those.

    It does require more drivers, which is why it’s favoured by ASLEF, but not necessarily more cost (it very much depends on the specifics of the agreement). Govia have put it in at Southeastern, during the current franchise. But it would only have exacerbated things at GTR, with yet more drivers needing training!

  452. Re HH and others,

    The new Thameslink / GN drivers recruited by GTR now have 12 Sundays a year written into their contracts and the existing drivers I think went up to 8 (from 0?) as part of the recent new pay deal.

    This will of course have made rostering more complicated especially form the new Temp TT focusing on Peak reliabilty…

    Weren’t the Sunday conditions at GN a result of an “oops” moment from an early FCC GN manager who didn’t last long?

  453. Perhaps my observations about management/unions relates to large employer and one of the railway unions where both seemed to want to “have their cake and eat it”.

  454. I have had a look at Realtime Trains for this morning for a few locations on Thameslink and it all seems to be working quite well, trains a few minutes late or on time. Are things improving with the new timetable, and (presumably) more trained drivers available?

  455. @NGH You may have been right. I know that the first Ops Director (who came from and went back to LU) had several “difficult” negotiations (putting it politely), so that may well have been the case. Then there was the next OD, who moved afterwards to HX; he’s the one who stopped hiring trainees. And so on.

    FCC had a succession of poor Ops Directors, probably because their MD (Elaine Holt at the time) didn’t understand Train Operations at all and therefore was unable to challenge them.

  456. @ Herned Yes, things are running more smoothly, but I understand no drivers are being route trained, so when they’ll be able to make the next step (to the original May TT) is possibly some way off.

  457. “their MD (Elaine Holt at the time) didn’t understand Train Operations”

    The same Elaine Holt who axed franchise-specified services when running East Coast on the pretext the cuts were necessary to make the operation break even (in fact the savings were minimal compared to the surplus DOR made). That was in 2010 – the services have still not been restored as the trains which would have operated them were snapped up by Open Access operators on other routes.

    [ Quote from cited article snipped, as it could be misconstrued as a personal attack, even though probably not so intended. Malcolm]

    http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/article-1359961/THE-CITY-INTERVIEW-Holt-keeps-East-Coast-rail-route-track.html

  458. Re: HH

    The Sunday working thing seems to be a bit of a grey area at the moment. Yes Sundays were brought in as ‘rostered overtime’ at TL. The most recent pay deal involved existing TL drivers taking 8 Sundays a year with the newbies doing 12. However, i’m not sure that has quite yet come in to play but will be doing so imminently. This is already the case on Southern but I believe on GN Sundays can still be chucked in.

    The talk is that they’ll be looking at adding Sundays inside the working week post 2021 (or that being the idea) but this will obviously require more drivers. Of course this may all just be talk!

  459. Yes TL DRIVER, there’s nothing the railway likes more than a rumour!

    It seems that Govia have been sold on the idea of Sundays in the working week, but will they still be there in 2022?

  460. Hi anonymous, my comment on 17/7 was more snarky I’m afraid than ironic. I know that in reality the franchisees on the the privatised railway were always constrained but that wasn’t the vision we were sold. Roger Freeman made all sorts of claims about the marvellous new services to be introduced and the new owners made no effort to disabuse us the duped. In the meantime we’ve had 20 years of not much progression in working practices. On the Underground overtime is forbidden for drivers so rosters have to be staffed up to cover the work. No rest day working at any time let alone Sunday. Overtime is bad for the company because they can be held to ransom – remember London Midland not so long ago. And its bad for the drivers too. Some get over reliant on it and then it disappears.

  461. MikeC, dare I say there appear to be plenty of Sir Humphreys working for TOCs and unions as well as the DfT. There doesn’t seem to be much of an appetite for any change if it costs money or alters cosy arrangements, and we all lose out because of it – the staff and the public. There are plenty of union members and TOC managers who would like a more collaborative and innovative approach but they tend to be ground down by events. The DfT certainly hasn’t helped with its attempts to force change through in recent years in the form of a “war on the unions”.

  462. I believe there was a civil servant who declared war on the unions of Southern Railway. Huge mistake. Union members are partners in the railway. A strong union and a strong management will come to an agreement after robust argument which meets the aims required and shares the benefits. Intensive face to face engagement of the workforce by management is an essential precondition to achieving this. Not a theory, I’ve done it.

  463. While looking for something else I found the transcript of the oral question session at the last Mayor’s Question Time. Inevitably concerns over GTR’s performance were raised. This little snippet from the discussion may mildly amuse readers.

    The Mayor said this.

    [The Rt. Hon] Chris Grayling [MP, Secretary of State for Transport] and I have had our run-ins and disagreements. It escaped his attention that when services are run nearer to those who receive the services they must be better than services run from command and control in Whitehall. The way that DfT, Network Rail and GTR have behaved in the last few weeks and months makes the case far better than I could ever do of why devolution is the smart thing to do. We will still carry on working with the Government to try to progress the stuff they have offered but really the objective must be devolving commuter trains to TfL.

    “Run-ins and disagreements” eh Mr Mayor? 😉

    The rest of the transcript touches on the publicly stated potential devolution of GN Inners and some WLL services. It’s pretty clear that the Mayor and TfL are taking things gently and trying not to destroy what little goodwill appears to have established since the DfT “dangled the carrot” of some more devolution.

  464. I am not accustomed to seeing the same people on the Programme Board, the Industry Readiness Board AND the INDEPENDENT Assurance Panel. Surely there was a conflict of interest? I reckon that there were only three or four people on each panel competent to judge the goodness of the timetables/rosters, and some of these were marking their own organisation’s homework.

    I have mentioned ‘group think’ before, and this document reinforces that view.

  465. 100&30 – I know Thameslink is a complex multi faceted project but that relationships diagram is nightmarish. It’s a wonder anything ever got done if there were regular meetings of all of those bodies and then Thameslink specific meetings overlaid. It doesn’t look a particularly appropriate structure to me but it’s easy to comment from an armchair.

    I share your observation about duplication of names across the various boards. I note one name in particular but out of kindness I shall say no more having had direct “experience” of said individual.

  466. In response to a question above the July 15th timetable is more reliable than the service we had since May. My morning train has twice turned up two minutes early this week. It’s not perfect but I’ve not claimed Delay Repay this week (yet). I’ve claimed more Delay Repay since May than I have in the last two years put together.

    The Rail User Groups of Letchworth/Royston/Ashwell had a public meeting with Govia last week. Summary: They are going to gradually increase the service from now til November to try and reach the May timetable levels, they have submitted one potential change for the December timetable (that impacts us) – hopefully we might get the evening fast trains to Cambridge to stop at our stations again, but this requires a slight retiming on the ECML (I think). Any changes to the semi-fast will probably have to wait until next May as the deadline for timetable change requests is in a few weeks time.

  467. I have to agree that since the interim timetable the service has been a lot more reliable. Certainly on the Bromley South lines it makes sense to ensure that the peak service is running at the new timetable levels, prior to the 15th you had the bizarre situation that at midday they were running 4tph (sometimes) and then in the evening peak they were only running 2 tph (between 5 and 6pm). The new timetable runs the Blackfriars- Sevenoaks service runs all times supplemented with the Orpington – Luton Service only running during the peaks.

    It does now means that changing at Blackfriars is the norm even during the week day. I do wonder whether the extension of the Sevenoaks service to Welwyn will happen next May now or not with the hiatus in the December timetable, would be curious as to whether anyone has insight on that. Whilst changing trains is easy at Blackfriars I imagine it will be a cold 5 minute layover in the winter…

  468. “It does now means that changing at Blackfriars is the norm even during the week day.”

    …..unless you are from Wimbledon, of course!

  469. “…..unless you are from Wimbledon, of course!” ha! yes that old wound…

  470. @SE5Traveller

    “whilst changing at Blackfriars is easy….”

    While it should be possible to have a cross-platform change northbound those travelling southbound do not have it so easy. This is especially the case for those who do not have a pass or Travelcard to get them through the gates at the north end of the station. They need to walk across to the south bank of the Thames, cross under the subway and then walk back over the river again to get their train.

  471. “This is especially the case for those who do not have a pass or Travelcard to get them through the gates at the north end of the station. ”

    Admittedly not as easy southbound, but regulars will know to be at the south end of the train. Others will be able to change trains by passing through the barriers at the north end, just as they can do at Victoria, Waterloo and many other places.

  472. @ James B – checking the TfL list of OSIs (on their website) shows that there is an “internal” OSI for the separate gatelines at the north end of Blackfriars NR. The time to change is 10 minutes. Therefore the only people who are potentially disadvantaged are those on magnetic tickets who will need to be let through the gates manually. PAYG and Contactless users will incur zero fare penalty provided they get between gatelines in 10 mins.

  473. WW: (or those who do not know this rule, and who go the other way “just in case”. Or is there some signage making this clear?).

  474. WW & Malcom
    Just checked that OSI list – it comes up on my screen as an only-just readable excel spreadsheet (!)
    Interestingly, what happens, if you are a PAYG user & simply “walk through” Blackfriars station ( i.e. use it as a footbridge? )
    Are you charged, or not?
    And what does “Magnetic & PAYG” mean?
    Does that refer to Season-Ticket users, perhaps?

  475. @ Greg – the list comes up fine for me. As it loads to Excel it is up to the user to enlarge the page if they need to.

    I assume that the usual rules apply at Blackfriars as for same station entry and exits – depending on the time taken there are different charges levied. It certainly isn’t free on PAYG. Info on the charges is on the TfL website.

    “Magnetic and PAYG” refers to those locations, such as Hammersmith D&P and Hammersmith H&C, where a magnetic single or return ticket is returned on exit and valid on next entry in case the passenger wishes to interchange to the neighbouring station. There is a system constraint on the total number of magnetic OSIs but the system handles many more PAYG only OSIs. I don’t know what the system limit is for PAYG / Contactless OSIs. Note that One Day or Weekly / Period Travelcards issued on magnetic stock are not affected by OSIs because the zonal validity will override the OSI.

    Magnetic OSIs were part of the original design for the Underground Ticketing System to cater for those locations where there were / are long standing interchange flows between physically separate stations like the old design of Kings Cross and Hammersmith. It also caters for places Tower Hill / Tower Gateway. It also applies at Marylebone because the LU farescale applies to Chiltern services to Amersham via Harrow. Ditto for Tower Hill / Fenchurch St where LU fares are interavailable as far as Upminster on C2C. The greater sophistication of the PAYG OSI functionality is very useful and especially given the growth in TfL’s rail network plus the extension of PAYG to NR services where interchange between nearby stations may also be a longstanding facility.

  476. I feel it sometimes needs to be rembered that those who read and contribute to LR are not “your average passenger”. An ordinary passenger arriving at Blackfriars would follow the signage and be unaware of such things as OSIs, as Malcolm suggests above.

  477. @ Malcolm / James B – I provided some extra pertinent detail about Blackfriars which is all in the public domain. I am not responsible for decisions relating to station / street wayfinding or its adequacy (or otherwise).

  478. WW: Of course. Sorry if there seemed to be any suggestion that any deficiencies were your fault. Of course they are not. And I’m not even sure that there are deficiencies. I was just supplementing your mention of those who might be inconvenienced (you mentioned magnetic ticket holders) by mentioning those who might not know about the gateline option.

    Although OSIs in general might appear to be something only known to cognoscenti, in most cases that does not matter. People using the journey planner (or signage, or knowledge from way back) typically trust the system to charge them the right fare. If the obvious route passes though a gateline, they march through with (typically) no hesitation.

    What seems to be a bit different about Blackfriars, though, is that there are two different routes to get between platforms, and for many people the gateline route is easier.

  479. One of the longest-standing magnetic OSIs is between Waterloo Main and Waterloo East. Tickets are always returned at both barrier lines.

  480. Timbeau: except (I presume) tickets which have an explicit destination of Waterloo. (Or is there no such thing: are they all “London Terminals”?).

  481. @WW

    I would like to emphasise that my comment above was not directed at anyone in particular. I was trying to convey that there are many people who use the railways who are not transport savvy and may not be making a particular journey on a regular basis. You will have had experience of this from your LU time helping people on strike days. I feel that it is important that we remember this when discussing workarounds to journeys. To them following signage is the most natural thing to do as they may well not be familiar with any particular station. We know what questions to ask because we know the answers, an advantage that many members of the travelling public do not have.

  482. Piece on this AM’s “Today” programme on the similar failings at “Northern”
    Link to programme here – start at about 1h 12 in – interview with Andy Burnham ( G-Manchester’s Mayor ).
    Points of similarity to London “are to be observed & noted” as they say.

  483. Greg Tingey,

    On the other hand, the BBC had Andy Burnham on BBC Breakfast about an hour later and much was made of the fact that really it was not similar at all to the situation down south.

    ‘Up Norf’ the issues were delayed electrification and other infrastructure schemes that had been cancelled leading to doubts that the situation would really improve much in future. Drivers not trained for routes or stock is/was an issue but only because of the delayed electrification.

    In the south it is more about delays getting new trains in service and insufficient route-trained and class 700 trained drivers.

    In the BBC article the delayed Network Rail timetable (the only source of commonality) did not get a mention.

    So not similar at all.

  484. @ PoP – haven’t see the mentioned articles / interviews but what is interesting is that the North / North West has the potential to become Thameslink Part 2. There is a lot of new rolling stock due into service and new infrastructure still to come into service. Northern and Trans Pennine have a pretty huge task on their hands to get several new fleets into service effectively. I assume Network Rail have associated tasks in getting infrastructure cleared / changed for new stock plus all the usual stuff in terms of proving runs, paths for mileage accumulation / driver training. Lots of potential for delayed rolling stock, delayed NR works and knock on consequences for driver training and delayed timetable / new service introduction. Oh and reliability problems with new stock and demands for franchise renegotiation. Let’s hope it doesn’t happen but the potential is there.

  485. There are already delays in the rolling stock for Northern – the “319-Flex” units (ex-Thameslink!) were supposed to be in service by now. And the delays in electrifying the route through Bolton has resulted in a shortage of diesel trains, as the units working that line were to have been cascaded elsewhere.

    TransPennine were to have introduced a couple of loco-hauled services using Mark 3s in advance of delivery of the Mark 5s, but changed their mind.

  486. @Timbeau

    The Mark 3 loco-hauled proposal was abandoned because of furious protest by disability rights groups at the idea that some trains would be operated by stock that was completely inaccessible to wheelchair users.

  487. Re Phil E and Timbeau,

    So other TPE services are then short formed and so rammed you can’t get a wheelchair on as there are already 10 people standing in the wheelchair space and 30 people standing between the space and the doors…
    The additional crowding means trains run late and then start their next journey late as the May TT removed some of the padding at the end of the journeys.

    Re PoP, WW and Greg.

    Plenty of driver training issues in the Northwest so plenty of commonality.
    See the Cicadas article…

    Northern have been & are struggling to “train” drivers and it isn’t going to get better as the 769s (319 conversions), 170s ex Scotrail, new CAF EMU and DMUs as well as existing drivers and guards on existing stock that is being shuffled around as well as new routes.

    Infrastructure delays are part of the Northern problems but Driver training is the elephant in the room.

    Part of the Northern’s May problem were joining up terminating routes into thorough routes and reshuffling halves of thorough routes in Manchester a la Thameslink in May.
    With identical levels of driver training issues.

    Northern were very poor on rostering pre Blackpool blockade so a slight delay in completion meant most of their Blackpool drivers timed out on route knowledge.
    Virgin on the other hand made sure none of their Blackpool trained drivers timed out.

    The NorthWestern Electrification Programme Phases 1-3 & 5 have been invaluable to the British Geological Survey in locating early mines that weren’t mapped.

  488. Re: Phil E – It ishowever only fair to point out that TPE claimed the accessibility downgrade was only one of several factors mitigating against the use of the Mark 3s for passenger use. Not sure what the other ones might have been as they got no media coverage.

  489. @Phil E

    “protest by disability rights groups at the idea that some trains would be operated by stock that was completely inaccessible to wheelchair users.”

    And running no train at all is better than running a train that can be used by (only) 95% of people because……?

    If the Mark 3s were the only stock available, it made no difference to the wheelchair user whether it ran or not.

    Had alternative, accessible, stock been available then of course it should have been used first. (Just as it is very annoying in the current weather and SWT strikes, when only about 50% of trains are running, to be sitting (or more likely standing) in a sweltering non-airconditioned train and see the a/c stock sitting in the sidings doing nothing)

  490. There is a reason why running a train which is inaccessible to wheelchair users might be argued to be worse than running no train at all. The analogy would be to say that providing a public swimming pool open only to white-skinned people is worse than providing no swimming pool at all, because such provision legitimises discrimination.

    Of course the analogy is imperfect, as some discrimination against wheelchair users on physical/practical grounds is still accepted by most people as unavoidable, whereas there are really no such grounds in the case of colour bars. But that still leaves the disability argument available as one factor in any decision about loco-hauled stopgaps.

  491. And West Coast Railways are happily running some Mk2s on a Windermere Shuttle
    but the protesters haven’t caught up with them yet (substituting for Northern with lack of drivers and stock who weren’t able to run their timetabled services).

    Virgin West Coast were perfectly able to run the very same Mk3 carriages as TPE hired in on their Friday night extra train for years on end until they got the extra 390s and extra 390 cars for some existing units.

    I suspect one of the TPE justifications was the bad dwell times with just end doors that need manual closing.

  492. Timbeau ( & NGH )
    And running no train at all is better than running a train that can be used by (only) 95% of people because……?
    Ah, but you musn’t expect the people whom messrs Ford & Walmsley call “The disability Taliban” to be reasonable, do you?
    I think the railtour operators cope with this problem by simply getting their staff to physically pick up the “less able” ( & their wheelchairs etc ) in getting on & off …..
    Which indicates that either on-train &/or on-platform staff solves the problem?

  493. Greg: Those who speak up for people with disabilities frequently get the demand “just be reasonable”, and on many occasions they do so. But that does not, and should not, stop them putting their case.

    Of course expedients like manual lifting of wheelchairs, and “permitting” their users to ride in the guard’s compartment, do exist, and may well be welcomed when there is no alternative. But the point here is that there is an alternative – provide properly equipped trains. And safely lifting an adult in a wheelchair requires at least two people, so the extra staff requirement is significant.

  494. Greg Tingey,

    There is the small detail that what the railway does must be lawful. You might disagree with the law but, given that it is there, the railway is obliged to observe it (whether or not any campaign group pounces on them).

    Whether or not the law should be so drastic or accommodating is a different point and not one for discussion on this website.

  495. @Malcolm

    “But the point here is that there is an alternative – provide properly equipped trains.”

    Indeed, and the properly-equipped trains are being built. But, until those trains are available, isn’t it better to provide a substitute that some can use, rather than deprive those who could make use of the service, just in order to provide “equality of misery” with those who can’t?

    That is the logic which says a train should be taken out of service because the toilet doesn’t work, even if no replacement train is available. Better to run it and give people the choice (of being on time and crosslegged, or late and relieved).

    On a recently well-publicised incident, no-one thought of the obvious answer – a loo break at a suitably equipped station – better a delayed train than a cancelled one.

    The analogy of segregation by race isn’t the same, because there is no physical reason for it. (Should you close a swimming pool because non-swimmers can’t use it?)

  496. timbeau,

    In British Rail days these issues were a judgement call. So it is a cold day and the heating doesn’t work on the train and it is not yet in service. What do you do?

    The answer used to be that if it was a commuter service or suburban off-peak (infrequent) service then you let the train run in service but if Inter City (which meant some passengers could be on the train for hours) you made sure you had a substitute even if the train left late. In those days finding a substitute was generally a bit easier.

    I am sure any relevant legislation only requires reasonable efforts on the day to provide provision so, usually, a train without a functioning disabled toilet is better than no train. But common sense suggests this should be clear to passengers before they board. After all, cancelling the train isn’t doing anyone any favours if it means that the following train is too crowded for a wheelchair-user to get to the toilet.

    And one can always extrapolate and wonder what if a toilet, or the heating, or the air-conditioning fails in service. Is it different if it is the last train of the day? Does one take into account how far from the terminus? Do you permit return workings?

    You can get the slight anomaly where a Luton – Wimbledon loop train develops a non-critical fault in service. Arrangements are made for it to be replaced as soon as practicable which will be on its return to Luton. If a similar fault develops between Luton and Rainham then it may get taken out of service at Rainham, possibly with the return working cancelled.

  497. timbeau: as Pedantic points out, there is a law in force concerning disability provision. While passing reference to apparently awkward consequences of that law may be acceptable here, extended discussion around issues of either flouting or changing that law would be off topic.

  498. @PoP
    This reminds me of the days when plain blue or blue and grey slam door stock tended to be randomly plastered with BR’s OUT OF ORDER gummed labels. No apologies, no explanations and no alternatives. Just OUT OF ORDER.
    Doors, windows, seats, heater controls, toilets – they were everywhere.
    None of them bore the double arrow or transport font. Presumably the rolls of perforated labels were printed by the million many years before the British Rail corporate identity was dreamed of.
    Sometimes they were left in situ long after the fault had been fixed.

  499. @Timbeau: “equality of misery”, actually cancelling the train would not result in that. Merely a “heightening of misery” as two train loads try to pile onto the one train, usually leaving the disabled passenger on the platform. 🙁

  500. @PoP

    Pedant mode on.
    Wimbledon loop trains start/finish at St Albans rather than Luton now.
    Pedant mode off.

  501. One possibly interesting factor in the accessibility debate is, of course” that not all the legislation is currently in place, as the “PRM deadline” (see note) has not yet passed.
    Note: this is the deadline (applied by UK lawmakers to the UK only) for what is usually called compliance with the Technical Standard for Interoperability for Persons with Reduced Mobility, but which is in fact a judgement call by the DfT based on practicability (“targeted compliance”), is 31st December 2019, or rather that all heavy rail vehicles in service on 1st January 2020 must satisfy targeted compliance.

  502. Re TPE and the MkIIIs

    The reality as is so often the case is more complicated. The ‘Pretendalino’ set used by Virgin WC and Greater Anglia was a full 9 coach train and had just 1 wheelchair accessible vehicle.

    TPE were going to use the set split to form 2 four car trains. However with only one accessible vehicle one set wouldn’t by default contain one. Where TPE didn’t help themselves was by putting out some less than helpful guidance for staff on how to deal with passengers if the train they wanted to use wasn’t accessible for them. In simple terms it was; if you can’t board two trains in succession then we’ll provide a taxi for you. Not surprisingly this was deemed to be discriminatory and with all of the bad press TPE decided not to use the train in passenger service. Aquiring or converting an extra vehicle was presumably deemed not practical for such a short period of use.

    The hauled sets used in Cumbria (and East Anglia ) are accessible as they have brake vans in the DBSOs.

  503. Re: Alfie1014 – As mentioned upthread, TPE itself claimed that accessibility was only one of several factors in its decision.
    Out of interest, what definition of “accessible” are you using in your claim about DBSOs? I admit it’s been a long time since I used one, but I don’t recall them having universal access toilets (without which they are discrimnatory) and if you mean a brake van as I understand it then I’m not sure I’d wish that miserable solitary-confinement-cell experience (complete with cage, bars on the windows and inability to open doors) on any actual person who uses a wheelchair.
    There are reasons why heritage railways these days offer something other than the actual heritage experience to such customers…

  504. Is Thameslink still on an interim timetable or has it now reverted to the May timetable? I note that, yesterday, they had only 1 cancellation and 3 trains running significantly late.

  505. Quinlet
    The official Thameslink web-page says that they are still using the revised t-t, not the May one.

  506. Still on the interim timetable. No announcement that I am aware of any date for the full May timetable.

  507. @Quinlet
    And on my cycle to work yesterday morning, heading towards Deptford, I saw a Thameslink train on the Greenwich line. First time ever.

  508. I’m not sure what it’s meant to be as I’ve recently moved to Deptford however I can confirm we’re getting 2tph Thameslink currently.

  509. Still Interim Timetable but performance has started to stabalise (as I predicted for August a very long time ago!)

    Somewhat a function of drivers who were already in training on a section of route eventually managing to complete training so the numbers of drivers supplied by GBRf has dropped significantly in recent weeks. The next stage is to resume driver training properly to increase driver route knowledge to more sensible levels.

  510. I note that this website/article gets a “gold star” from Capn’ Deltic in September’s “Modern Railways”

  511. @ Quinlet et al
    Sadly, back to ‘normal’ today. Looking at the 12 ‘live departures’ from 21:16 – 6 cancelled, 4 average 11 minutes late, 2 on time.
    Stabilisation of a sort I suppose.

  512. RogerB, the MML was severely disrupted this afternoon by a person being hit by a train with virtually nothing running in either direction during the evening peak; much to recover from.

    Services have otherwise been getting better. The interim timetable is interesting, as it’s still a few cogs short of having turn up and go convenience between London Bridge and the St Albans service. I gave it a try today, waiting 1/4 hour at LBG (just missed one) and then another 1/4hr at Blackfriars for the stopper, so 1/2hr to cover less than a mile. Won’t do that again until the full timetable.

  513. Thanks for all the explanations. Certainly my feeling is (pace person hit by a train today) that the service has well stabilised.

  514. @ Quinlet – my comments are “second hand” and based on reading comments elsewhere so apply the appropriate weight to them. The volume of “complaint” seems to have fallen which indicates some people are able to rely on the service for their commute. This would support the view that things are stabilising. The main note of caution is that it is still holiday season so fewer people are travelling so less “noise”. However there do still seem to be all sorts of odd things happening like trains late off depots in the morning, drivers still late / “lost” for taking over trains part way through their journey and sporadic cancellations and short forms (more on GN).

    There are also *far* too many delays due to incidents which then ripple right through the timetable. Obviously not all incidents are in the control / fault of the railway but this shows the vulnerability of the Thameslink concept and the service structure. There is not much scope to turn trains or get them “out of the way” which seems to lead to either a decision to cancel entire services or have them skip stop substantial portions of route. There was one incident last night where a Sutton loop train was turned into a fast to Wimbledon but the passengers were only informed once it had departed Blackfriars! Tweeting via social media (which I saw) seemed to work in drawing control’s attention to this but not before the train had zoomed through Tulse Hill, Herne Hill and Streatham! Seems something failed on the train’s info systems as the train was officially “rescheduled” at St Pancras. Obviously not an “incident” in the normal sense but another failing which won’t please passengers. Even in the peaks Sutton loop services are only half hourly so long gap for people at intermediate stops and potential long return journey for those trapped on the express who “missed” their stop.

    You have to hope the service really is stabilising and that GTR can start adding services back in, especially at weekends where the service offer is dire. If things worsen again come September then there will be a lot of disquiet from passengers. I am not aware of any official announcements about GTR achieving the May timetable in the foreseeable future. Perhaps they’ve gone from one extreme of confidently promising to do the impossible to not saying anything about anything for fear of being severely criticised?

    Has Charles Horton actually finished yet? I see that Steve White of LUL has been announced as Nick Brown’s replacement so the continuation of LUL senior operating manager transfers to GTR continues. I note that Mr White previously worked for Siemens and most recently has been heavily involved in the SSR resignalling works on LU. Interesting mix of (relevant and transferable) experience there.

  515. WW
    My Biggleswade (BIW) correspondent says that the thinner Thameslink/GN services can now, usually be relied upon, but that you have to consult the timetable before you make any journey, as the “clock-regularity” of some services isn’t there with this TT iteration.
    Also he &/or his missus have to change trains more often, as the semi-stoppers S of Hitchin/Stevenage are not calling at BIW under normal circumstances.

  516. ngh
    30 July 2018 at 21:51

    “The NorthWestern Electrification Programme Phases 1-3 & 5 have been invaluable to the British Geological Survey in locating early mines that weren’t mapped.”

    I expect that serious investigation of ground conditions will be expected before any electrification is approved by future Secretaries of State. Not expecting Chris Grayling to approve any, not even Manchester to Leeds & ECML.

  517. Pedantic of Purley
    30 July 2018 at 11:29

    “‘Up Norf’ the issues were delayed electrification and other infrastructure schemes that had been cancelled leading to doubts that the situation would really improve much in future.”

    Most of the “Northern Hub” projects were supposed (!) to be in use by December 2018. Some, including
    re-modelling the station at Manchester Oxford Road,
    a second pair of through platforms at Manchester Piccadilly and
    freight loops in the Hope Valley.
    are still awaiting Transport & Works Act Orders or other Ministerial approval.

  518. Well, I’ll chip in a few positive notes here: I often cycle between Parliament Hill and Brixton Hill. It used to be the quickest way, but since the automation of the Northern line and re-fit of the Victoria, the Tube is quicker, even allowing for getting from Parliament Hill to Kentish Town. Since the introduction of the 700’s and more Suttons from Kentish Town in the evenings, it’s become very easy to take the bike on the train to Loughborough Junction, and if well timed, this is now the quickest way. I did this last night -after the peak, but still busy – and during the trip noticed several people with wheelchairs and other mobility aids underway (formerly a very rare sight) a smattering of other bikes, near constant use of the toilet, and everyone who wanted a seat had one. It was a good impression of how it’s meant to be… Great when it all works.

  519. GTR are now starting to increase the service levels from the temporary timetable to the May in stages (every Monday) with 4-6 extra services per stage.

    First 3 weeks focus on Wimbledon Loop, Rainham and BML (BML – some temporary arrangements to take account of GN issues that left a missing service on the BML) with the 4th week seeing some very limited GN improvements.

  520. Is this only Monday to Friday services? Or are we going to see some weekend use of the Canal tunnels too?

  521. Based on the Thameslink website they are adding one additional 8car train diagram each week.

    From Monday 3 September 2018
    06:07 St Albans City to Sutton
    07:46 Sutton to St Albans City
    09:22 St Albans City to Sutton
    10:49 Sutton to St Albans City
    15:52 St Albans City to Sutton
    17:19 Sutton to St Albans City

    From Monday 10 September 2018
    07:01 Mill Hill Broadway to Luton
    07:46 Luton to Gillingham (Kent)
    16:00 Gillingham (Kent) to Luton

    From Monday 17 September 2018
    06:41 Three Bridges to St Albans City
    08:22 St Albans City to Sutton
    09:49 Sutton to St Albans City
    17:35 London St Pancras International to Gatwick Airport

    From Monday 24 September 2018 (Details of these services will be available in journey planners during September 2018)
    06:57 Cambridge to London King’s Cross
    08:36 London King’s Cross to Welwyn Garden City
    17:02 Welwyn Garden City to London King’s Cross
    17:51 London King’s Cross to Cambridge

  522. @ Quinlet – GTR seem to have developed an aversion to running services at weekends. I don’t know if this is because training effort is being concentrated on these days or if it is simply a recognition that employee goodwill has just about vanished thus making coverage of such services a near impossibility. GTR are only getting away with running such pitiful services, esp on the GN, because so many people have given up on the railway. If they were to return on masse the present service could not carry everybody. It astonishes me that they taken what was never a brilliant set up at weekends and made it utterly worse.

    They do appear, Network Rail asset failures and customer incidents aside, to have stabilised most of the M-F “amended timetable” service. The PPM trends are improving with Southern being the most stable but various Thameslink routes are on an improving trend albeit on a reduced timetable. It’s whether this can be sustained as services are added back in and acid test is next week with hols over and schools back.

  523. The new timetables available on the Thameslink website applying from 3 September do seem to crystallize the current weekend timetable.

    https://www.thameslinkrailway.com/travel-information/plan-your-journey/timetables

    I wouldn’t be particularly surprised if the current weekend service continues into next year.

    Apart from on the GN is there anywhere where the Thameslink Saturday service is inadequate (as opposed to inconvenient) for the numbers of people travelling?

  524. WW, employee goodwill shouldn’t make a difference on Saturdays which are just an ordinary working day. Summer is always tricky for finding rest day volunteers to cover rostered leave as people are more likely to want to spend weekends with their families which may be more of a problem but that should ease once the schools go back.

    Sundays are slightly different as whilst they are not voluntary as such, there is probably more work than rostered drivers available and less interest in volunteering all year round, but especially in Summer.

  525. @Anonymous: I wouldn’t consider a Saturday an “ordinary working day”. The last person I know who did was my grandfather and that was only a half day…

  526. SH(LR): If you work in
    * Retail
    * Health
    * Transport
    * Broadcast and Print Media
    * Emergency Services
    at al, then Saturdays – and often Sundays – are, indeed, “ordinary working days”, and rarely paid at a higher rate than Monday – Friday. Not everyone works 9-5 in an office or factory (decreasing numbers, actually)

  527. @SHLR – the civil service was one of the last major employers to abandon half day Saturdays (although it took the Drain 30 years to notice that the City was deserted on Sats) – Just for amusement, when I joined up in 1970, at least one HEO had failed to tell his wife that Saturday working had been abandoned and went to work every Saturday to meet his mistress – that continued until one day there was a domestic emergency and the wife spoke to a bemused custody guard…

  528. [HEO = Higher Executive Officer (the next-to-topmost non-graduate civil-service rung, with exceptions)].

  529. @Malcolm – I should think these days a high proportion of HEOs are graduates – even in my day, the grade below (EO) was 5% graduate. Maybe a better analogy would be to think of HEOs as the sergeant majors of the service.

  530. Graham: you’re doubtless right. I was trying to avoid the term “middle manager”, which I consider even more meaningless than the rest of management-speak. But for the purpose of your wonderful story, it doesn’t really matter: the only thing readers need to know is that the bearer of the initials was a person, and they could infer that anyway.

  531. @SHLR: I think the point was that Saturday is an ordinary working day for train drivers – ie they can be rostered to work them the same as any weekday – unlike Sundays where it depends on which agreement they are covered by (complicated by the fact that GTR’s drivers come from multiple former franchises all with different working conditions).

  532. I would think Harpenden users would regard their Saturday service as inadequate. It should be 6 tph (2 x Bedford -Brighton, 2 x Bedford-Gatwick , 2 x Luton- Rainham). All they are getting are the 2 Bedford – Brightons. The same could be said for Luton Airport punters, although they are helped by EMT fasts from StP. The Wimbledon Loop stoppers do not go north of St Albans.

  533. Purley is supposed to have services to Gatwick Saturday and Sunday. They have been cancelled for months. As the Horsham trains no longer stop here we have been left without this connection. On Sundays we are left without two thirds of our fast trains to London and 40% of the service to East Croydon.

  534. @Alison W: and, for completeness, industrial and logistics activities which operate around the clock – sometimes for “continuous process” reasons. The working year at my last employer was 24 hours a day for 357 days a year. And, as you suggest, the pay rates were uniform on the basis that in a year everyone would work the same number of Sunday nights, Wednesday mornings and so on. Coming from that background it’s difficult to understand these arrangements where some shifts are “voluntary”.

  535. There may be some difficulty in understanding, but if it happens to suit the employer and the employees to make some shifts voluntary, and that works effectively, then there should be no objection from outsiders.

    Of course, the problem is that the arrangement seems not to be working effectively now, although it probably has done in the past. Responding to altered real-world circumstances is always a problem for industrial relations. But any pain resulting from a need (if there is one) to withdraw the arrangement should be shared between employees and employers. Not easy though.

  536. @ Alison W – I’d also throw in the Hospitality sector (hotels, pubs / bars, restaurants etc) into the work every day of the week list. This sector is known for relatively poor pay and long hours coupled with awkward shift times.

    And the knock on consequence for all these “work all the time” sectors is the impact on transport services and vehicle use. London caters for some of this with its night time plus early and late bus and tube services. Obviously many places do not have such provision so I assume people have to drive, walk, taxi or cycle depending on the distance involved. In rare cases there are employer provided shuttles such as the growing network of works services to get people to the Amazon logistics depot in Tilbury that are run by Ensignbus.

  537. Jim R & WW: Indeed, which is why the ‘et al’ was there! Especially in the major conurbations like London, B’ham, and Manchester the need for 24/7/365+ services is clearly there, but like the announcement that Manchester Fire Service are closing their central fire station overnight due to cuts the country is not funding what it needs to.

    This, naturally, feeds into the argument over how much of the cost the farebox should cover and how much should be otherwise funded on social or air quality improvement grounds.

  538. When Retail working was extended to 7 days it was a requirement that all shifts on the Day of Rest would be voluntary.
    Since it has become the busiest trading per hour of the week it is understood that staff not volunteering may not have a future career.

  539. The inadequate Saturday services also applies to stations north of Luton on the MML – 2tph instead of the 4tph that there has been for decades. Sundays is 2tph also but that’s a formalisation of the practice for the last year before the Shambles when even though 4tph was nominally in the timetable if there were engineering works anywhere, half the Bedford to London services were cancelled.

  540. I would regard the weekend service at Purley as an inconvenience rather than real hardship – southbound Gatwick and southern destinations can be reached by cross platform connection at East Croydon quicker than a direct all stations train via Redhill and northbound a change at Redhill only requires a 12 minute wait.

    In terms of capacity the weekend service from Purley and Redhill is adequate (there will always be pressure on the four-car Reigate to Victoria service regardless of the full Thameslink service running). Given the actual level of demand from London Bridge at the weekend (relative to Victoria) and the reluctance of weekend passengers to use London Bridge rather than Victoria from Redhill, 4tph 12 car Thameslink services on the Redhill corridor would be moving a lot of fresh air.

    There seem to have been a disproportionate number of weekend engineering work closures affecting the Sutton loop since May.

  541. I’ve never understood the obsession with Victoria. I would rather have the old service of 6 trains fast to London bridge back. The only place Victoria is better for really is the museum’s around South Kensington. With Thames link they become accessible from Blackfriars anyway.

  542. @ Purley Dweller – The answer to that lies in the reality of the late 1950’s and into the 1960’s when passenger traffic to/from e.g. the Brighton line to/from the City of London was dropping significantly because many businesses were moving out of the City and transferring to the West End, which was best served by Victoria from the Brighton line. Accordingly, the train services were recast to shift the emphasis from London Bridge to Victoria.

    Incidentally, what nobody seems to have mentioned so far is that most electric suburban services when introduced used to run at 20 min. intervals, not the 30 min. ones as still common today on individual routes. I leave others to fill in the gap as to why that may be…. I’ll get told off should I attempt to go further.

  543. @ Purley Dweller – Perhaps I’d explain that better by saying that traditional City roles were being lost at the time, whilst new businesses were attracting more custom in the West End.

  544. The opening of the Victoria Line must have been a factor in the increased usefulness of Victoria station. Until 1967 it was only on the District / Circle. Hence it’s relatively generous provision for buses in the forecourt.

  545. @ ALEKS: When Sunday trading was introduced, was it not only those employed at the time who had the statutory protection of Sunday working being optional? After that, it became a contractual issue for new retail employees, so it could be imposed as a requirement, and thus probably not now ‘optional’ for many, unless they manage to negotiate an exception for themselves.

  546. Re: weekend working
    I would add to AlisonW’s and others’ lists that a legion of people work 24/7/365 to keep the power on, the gas and water flowing, the sewers emptying, the internet working, the roads and railways in good shape, the planes flying, the streets clean, the supermarket shelves stocked, the parcels arriving… there will be more… Every minute of our every day depends irrefutably on a significant array of people turning up to work and doing their jobs, often jobs which if done well are invisible, and we must never forget it.

  547. The area around Victoria is now a pretty major employment hub, with lots of new development completed or planned.

    For a start (and keeping to the civil service theme) there are two big MOJ buildings within walking distance.

    My own employer moved to the area because it was a more convenient station for the CFO than our previous location.

  548. @Twopenny Tube: Workers can still opt out of Sunday working giving 3 months’ notice, unless the only day they’re contracted to work is Sunday. As you mentioned, those employed before the law came in are not required to opt in to Sunday working.

  549. @Moogal @Twopenny
    Just to be clear that all this only applies to “shop and betting shop” workers (some definitions of “retail” are broader than that). The official gov details are here. So the vast majority of Sunday workers have no such protections.

  550. I think what is missing from the discussion on Sunday working is the consequence for the railway. If Sunday working was compulsory in theory we would have a wealth of Sunday services but the drivers are limited to a set number of hours per week. If seven day working was the norm you would need additional drivers to cover all the diagrams occurring in a week. The train operating companies would have increased employment costs which they wish to avoid hence the reliance on voluntary overtime.

  551. RichardB. I think you are conflating two different questions here. Any increased employment costs incurred by enhancements to Sunday services would be a result of the decision to enhance the services, not incurred because of switching from voluntary to compulsory Sunday rostering. If such a switch was made with no service enhancement (quite possible in theory), then costs would be unchanged.

  552. @ Malcolm I still do not see how you can increase the hours on Sunday services without robbing the weekly service unless you hire additional drivers or you require them to work additional hours which will incur extra costs. The issue is that most of the TOCs are manned to provide drivers for the weekly service and rely on volunteers on overtime to cover the extra.

  553. RICHARDB
    5sep19:38 you state that there would be much greater Sunday services if Sunday working was compulsory when in fact the correct word is could. If the TOC s decided demand was there it would mean that it would be easier to increase Sunday services. What Malcolm has quite correctly said is that changing the Sunday work from voluntary to compulsory would not change the costs of such services in itself, however increasing rosters/workings will indeed increase costs either by more driver’s overtime or increased number of drivers required as you said.

  554. I thought it was generally accepted that bringing Sunday ‘inside the week’ would increase costs – because if it’s not overtime, the driver establishment has to increase to absorb the hours.

  555. Industry Readiness Board Papers now uploaded to DoT website.

    Only sampled a couple but plenty of info available to review and looking at April 18s board meeting how they didn’t deduce it was doomed then is beyond me (slide 21 onwards shows where they were with driver route knowledge by each service group). May 18 further recognises need for workarounds and the risks and the need to reduce the timetable. DfT has reps on IRB so they knew where it was headed so id say the select committee needs to review whats been released and call in the mandarins.

    https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/thameslink-industry-readiness-board-meeting-papers

  556. So looking at the May 2018 documents I notice that:

    1) They bundle three documents together as PDFs within a zip file rather than giving us direct access to the PDFs (which can be linked to). In other words they don’t make it easy to reference documents.

    2) The slides of Industry Readiness are in image format which means they are not searchable. This may be a genuine error or oversight but is typically done as a shabby trick to prevent a search of the document and also prevent copying parts of it.

    I note on page 28 one of the risks on GTR was “Dependency of RDW”. Yet at one of the select committee meetings Chris Gibb flatly denied that Rest Day Working was an issue. Admittedly, this was in response to a question about driver training not implementing the live timetable (as in the Industry Readiness slide) but it is hard to imagine that it is an issue for the live timetable but not an issue for driver route learning in advance of it. It is possible the answer he gave was true but misleading but I personally conclude that it wasn’t true.

  557. Verulamius
    You said: ie no one in overall project/programme management charge. referring to the OOR report.

    And the very first comment on this thread (from me!) said: The overall impression is a total absence of a “Guiding Mind” – no-one was in overall control or appearing to even attempt to co-ordinate matters.
    So, ORR have come to the same conclusion as the “L-R” coprorate mind, after several months deliberation …..
    [ Do we get a sausage voucher? ]

  558. From the quickest of skims it seems that not surprisingly there is a lot of agreement but:

    He seems to be only considering immediate causes not longer term issues that had consequences. So late delivery of trains and problems with the awarding of the franchise don’t get a mention – so that gets the DfT off a major hook.

    He states categorically that Traffic Management Systems (TMS) weren’t an issue as they weren’t needed for 18tph and the timetable could work without it. No-one has ever claimed otherwise. However, no consideration is made of the fact that if a decent TMS was working the chaos could have been mitigated.

    He pooh-poohs the delay of the opening of Canal Tunnels noting that it was planned to open early on 19th February to passenger trains but opened a week late on the 26th which he considers insignificant. But if the plan for Canal Tunnels was open to open much earlier (it wasn’t) then maybe it would have been in use earlier still which would have reduced the risk of the May timetable. It is extraordinary that this was originally built as part of HS1 yet was so late to come into full service. We now know from the report this was because it didn’t have functioning radio reception which you have to have if running DOO with passengers.

    As far as I can immediately tell, he doesn’t directly comment on the last-minute near-bonkers plan to rely on day 1 not only of drivers only operating part of the route but also of pilot drivers to accompany drivers over sections for which they do not have route knowledge. If this is the case, I think it is because he already considers them to be over the tipping point by then so wasn’t a cause but a consequence.

  559. Does the apparent absence of a “Guiding Mind” not indicate an abrogation of his responsibilities by the SoS?

  560. I would like to contrast the Network Rail infrastructure works around London Bridge, which had a clear DfT lead project sponsor and separate mechanisms outwith ORR monitoring with the wider Thameslink Programme which was left to normal rail industry mechanisms.

  561. Re: Nameless at 12.41 – that depends on whether you believe that the Secretary of State for Transport should automatically be the railway system’s guiding mind. Are you sure that’s what you believe?

  562. Balthazar
    Well, re-listening to “John Bull” on R4 ( see other thread for link) he said …
    “A transport minister who multiple times has said “I don’t run the railway” so you have a body (DfT) wich should be in charge but doesn’t think it’s in charge, then you are clearly going to have a problem.”
    To which, may I add, having been reminded of such by my signal-engineer freind in the pub last night, that GoViaThamselink ( & “Southern” ) are presently, supposedly, directly under the Dft’s direct control & orders, with a certain transport minister at the head of that body,
    So if not “Mr G”, then whom?

  563. Greg T……Remember Yes Minister……..who was in charge of the Ministry of Administrative Affairs – Hacker or Sir Humprey? And who had the competence to be in charge of the matters that DAA managed? Arguably neither.

    DfT have no business being in charge of integrating the various railway activities. They need an executive arm to implement policy. It worked for BR, and it works for TfL. Of course they have political place-people on the boards, but in each case, the “integrated whole” was managed in an integrated way by reasonably competent people with reasonable freedom to act. That’s what’s been missing here; despite all the parties being ultimately responsible to the DfT (owned in the case of NR or contracted to, in the case of the TOCs) all of them felt unable to act other than in their own self interest.

    In practice all these things happen because each organisation is held to account based on its contract or regulatory scorecard and they’re not joined up.

  564. Ideally you probably need two kinds of guiding mind: someone who sets overall principles and strategy, and then someone* with operational responsibility. That is the way it is in most public companies: a chair and board set the strategy, the chief executive is responsible for implementing that and reporting back to the board. Or like the relationship between the Mayor and TfL Commissioner. Democratic accountability comes through the elected representative, but they in turn hand operational responsibility to a single point of control.

    * Not necessarily an individual, perhaps a board, but with clearly defined responsibility and someone to coordinate them.

  565. 130
    Your comment rests on an assumption: That I have a TV & watch it …..
    ( I gave up on TV about 1974/5 & don’t have one)
    Though I agree wholeheartedly about your “DfT have no business…” point, but it was probably inevitable given the complete dogs-breakfast “model” that the UK’s rail privatisation followed.

    PoP/Ian J/Graham H
    It’s certain that we need a coherent, properly-desined “command structure” with clear lines of responsibility.
    Now then, what’s the likelihood of actually getting it, given the doctrinaire leanings of both the major political parties?

  566. @GT
    I wholeheartedly recommend the following texts for background study:

    The Complete Yes Minister ISBN 0-563-20665-9
    The Complete Yes, Prime Minister ISBN 0-563-20773-6

    They do not require the use of a television set.

  567. Perhaps it is time to bring back the British Transport Commission and have a bit of strategic direction and some accountability all round. And for those who do not wish to get involved with television sets or television shows, but would like to see the interaction between elected representatives and the civil service, try the (Richard) Crossman Diaries, particularly Vol. 1 when he was Minister of Housing, or the “A View from the Foothills” by Chris Mullin, which includes a period as a junior minister.

  568. Civil Servants & ministers
    There’s the contra tale of course of the late-lamented Roy Jenkins, becoming Home Secretary & demanding papers for the posthumous acquittal/pardon of Timothy Evans, followed by months of foot-dragging. [ The Home Office would have to admit they were WRONG ] IIRC, in the end, after several rounds of this, he actually had to threaten senior CS’ with dismissal, before they did the honourable thing ….

  569. @Twopenny Tube. The trouble with the BTC was that it didn’t provide any strategic direction , apart from the outset when it tinkered about with some area coordination schemes for buses in Shropshire; otherwise, it left its subsidiaries to get on with it – and indeed, in the case of BR, they then left the regions to get on with it. Hence the very differing outcomes for the diesel modernisation programmes. It’s far from clear what the BTC was actually for, except to save the government having to “waste” time looking into the affairs of each industry/subsidiary. In that sense, it was about as useful as the late and unlamented National Bus Co – who screwed up their subsidiaries’ procurement programmes, defrauded the taxpayer when the finances got difficult, and ran away when rumbled.

    @Hugh.S – many dispassionate observers still believe that OfQ was about as good an organisational structure as you could get in a complex. multidimensional industry Whether it would have provided that guiding mind is something I was never allowed to put to the test: much depended on the willingness of the CEO and the business MDs to face down the barons in the subsidiaries – that was certainly the issue with IC and, to a lesser extent, with NSE. The RR and Freight barons were much more docile. Unfortunately, privatisation appeared before those relationships could be stress tested in the way intended.

    What was clear was what the components of such a directing mind might look like – strategic planning, control over investment and pricing, control over strategic negotiations with the unions, control over the commercial distribution system. Industry standards and commercial interfaces with other large operators (eg LT) were also a central function.

    @Greg T – it was no coincidence that the army had a long tradition of supplying senior railway managers. Although there is always the risk of over control, the basic feature of the rail industry is that it is highly complex industry with large numbers of junior staff spread over the entire face of the country, all engaged in parts of a single task. Privatisation effectively gave these staff multiple objectives.

  570. @Graham.H
    Many thanks for this. I was a very junior employee of BR in the 1980’s for a few years but left to join the travel trade as an agent. I have always wondered how things would have turned out if OfQ had been allowed to continue and become something like the BBC commissioning others to run things.

    This is what happens in Germany where I have just been staying for a few days. Deutsche Bahn still runs the InterCity services and its DB Regio subsidiary runs some others in competition with all the usual suspects like Govia, Abellio and many others. There seems to be a lot more local involvement but we are catching up now with local devolution in Wales and Scotland and some of the English regions too.

  571. @Graham.H

    We must remember that until 1988 the Inspecorate of Railways at the Board of Trade comprised Officers of the Royal Engineers. It was obviously sensible to recruit

  572. @St Andrean – We didn’t. I do not know of any Railway Inspector who moved into railway management. A near majority of the senior Inspectors were, in fact, ex-Indian Army, having stayed on to train the new Indian army. A substantial number were – to put it politely – eccentric. [For a small fee, I could write about their attempts to deal with luggage trolleys which culminated in closing to the public a bank of escalators at Waterloo down which different types of barrow were thenpropelled . ]

  573. @Hugh.S – It’s one of life’s minor ironies that the final step in completing the undoing of the region/engineering matrix, which involved the devolution of the management of the infrastructure to the subsectors, was achieved just one week before Railtrack was created. [The process had started back well before the privatisation legislation and, because of the process of consultation and agreements with the unions, became difficult to stop instantly].

    That final step was key as it presented subsector managers (indeed anyone) for the first time with the requirement to trade off the different factors of production between themselves and with the different commercial outcomes. I had just begun to put together a road show for the NSE subsectors and begun to consider what admin infrastructure was needed to progress this, when privatisation (and the resulting lack of any investment) effectively put an end to all that.

  574. @10 July

    “The freeze on timetable changes also presumably means some of the infrastructure work (or at least the work that has been/is still on schedule) will now lie idle. Notably the Ordsall and Halton Curves on Northern. ”

    My crystal ball seems to be malfunctioning. The Halton Curve services are indeed in the timetable (the 12 week window now extending past the timetable change).
    Curiously it is shown as being run by “Other operator” rather than “Arriva Trains Wales” (as other services are – although that is itself of course wrong for any service after October 13th).

    However, despite this, it has been announced that because of late delivery of rolling stock (presumably the Class 769s) the service will not actually run until May.

    http://www.railtechnologymagazine.com/rail-news/1875m-halton-curve-project-delayed-a-further-six-months

    Thus it is added to the sorry catalogue of projects due for completion or major stages in 2018.

    In service late: Canal Tunnels, Full Thameslink 2000(!) service, Class 385 (windscreens), Class 802 (albeit only by a few weeks).

    Supposed to have been be in service by now, but still waiting:
    Classes 230, 710, 717, 769, Mark 5 Sleepers (due February, now scheduled for October), Sheffield-Rotherham Tram-Train, Bloomberg entrance at Bank

    Scheduled for last quarter of 2018:
    Mark 5 (Transpennine), Classes 195, 331, 801
    – we may see bi-mode 800s in service on the ECML in December, as planned, but given the recent signal immunisation issues on the East Coast Main Line I doubt that the straight-electric 801s will be cleared for operation by the New Year

    Definitely off until next year: Halton Curve, Crossrail Core

  575. Re Timbeau,

    Do keep up a the back 😉 The first 717 in service ran this morning and second will run this afternoon.

    This is enough for everyone to tick the box (by the end of September) and then wait another while to sort out lots of issues before proper service starts:
    – More than 1 unit with the new tripcock design that is more than coke can’s distance away from the 3rd rail! but still uses the shoe mounting point on the bogie.
    – A large number of trained drivers
    – A third of the fleet accepted

    769 diesel testing started at the beginning of the week

  576. Re Timbeau,

    Halton curve etc. – the Welsh Assembly put their fingers in their ears for years everytime anyone (paging Captain Deltic and 3 ROSCO CEOs in one committee hearing alone) said “TSI-PRM mods before 31/12/2019 you need to start doing something now” and decided to leave it to the new franchisee who will have even fewer trains soon while everything goes in for mods in very short period of time.

    Luckily Northern and Porterbrook / Angel will be helping ATW successors out with their fleet of Pacers being diverted from the scrap yards to Wales to manage this crisis.
    Hence a strong possibility that Halton will start in December but Northern providing and maintaining the pacers.

    Transport for Wales make DfT look perfect!

    Worth booking the popcorn deliveries for all the bad publicity when the Northern pacers start arriving in Wales (not one of TfW’s promises for the new franchise).

    It will also soon be entertaining to watch Northern’s excuses when NR have delivered all the infrastructure improvements and Northern still can’t run what they promised, one wonders if Grayling will change his tune of blame NR?

  577. @NGH
    That’s annoying – I’m just back from a trip on the Northern City – because I can!

    If I’d known, I’d have looked out for the 717.

    When is the afternoon run?

  578. Re NEW OVER-60’S PASSHOLDER,

    Afternoon 717 run now Cancelled (was 2G96 1435 Moorgate – 1509 Gordon Hill )

  579. NGH

    “Transport for Wales make DfT look perfect!”

    Does that make Transport Scotland into a Super Hero?

  580. Re: NGH – I might well be wrong about this, but wouldn’t the Welsh Government have needed (a) powers and (b) money – neither of which they had until too recently – actually to do anything about the PRM-TSI deadline as you suggest they are remiss for not doing?

    And in any case, they *can* blame KeolisAmey because the public announcements on award were exactly that clever juggling of incoming 230s, 769s, 170s, 153s and Mark 4s with resulting cascades of 150s *would* avoid the problem. There ia a fabulous graph of the rolling stock fleet floating around that shows just that.

    Anyway, does it matter? Does anyone really believe that trains on Wales & Borders or East Midlands* won’t run on 1st January 2020 because of non-compliant rolling stock**?

    *And to be honest it’s quite impressive that only two operators ended up seriously affected, although late deliveries of new and refurbished stock may strike others.

    **As opposed to the effects of stock undergoing modification rather than being available for service.

  581. Re Balthazar,

    a) powers devolved by DfT, this was meant to be their first proper (and easy) test pre franchise/concession tendering (need less to say DfT didn’t tell them it was a test and they didn’t realise or chose not to realise!)

    b) paid for by the ROSCOs

    As some of the existing non compliant stock is staying till 2022-23 under the plan it will be going in for mods soon with lots of units at the same time so short forms galore (or worse). The 5x 769s were a knee jerk sticking plaster when “X” told them they were already well past kicking the can down the road, had been set up by DfT and had to start before the new franchisee took over as DfT would probably take great pleasure in not signing off derogations as it would highlight devolved incompetency …

    Expect EMT to pull the rabbit out of the hat for their successors on most / all of their stock possibly exc 153s.

  582. Re: NGH – thank you for the response. I’m afraid they generate more questions!

    a) Genuine question: did WG actually have the power to increase the costs of the Arriva Trains Wales franchise which was (and indeed still is) a contract with DfT, not WG?

    b) Under a current franchise, RoSCos will not invest like that without certainty that the stock is required for at least the payback period – certainty that they could not have had until confirmation of KeolisAmey’s fleet plans (the rules change when the franchise does, since the new lease arrangements can take account of upgrade works with short lives).

    c) You’re confident about a solution for EMT’s HSTs, then…

  583. Re Balthazar,

    a) limited subject to final nod from DfT (who were slightly surprised they were never asked)

    b) it just needs some (not all) stock to start going away earlier and some ROSCOs were willing to take the risk. Does anyone think those 158s won’t be going to a good home after they leave? Existing lease changes can easily be agreed during franchise as they have been done virtually everywhere else (subject to DfT nod)

    c) Modified HST power cars + MK4s + lots of new platform edge stones / angle grinder for the short term and the new bimode fleet for the long term to replace the meridians too which EMT are leading for the successors at DfT’s behest (First unit delivery by end 2021)

  584. Re: NGH – many thanks again.

    a) Interesting.

    b) Albeit the important question was how to replace the Valleys Pacers which (I like to think) nobody was considering as having much life left. (As far as I can see the KeolisAmey calculaton is that 2 x 2-car 14X is replaced in service by 2-car 150 + 153 with approx. same capacity pending delivery of the tram-trains.)

    c) But does it make sense to anyone to embark on such a costly short term measure? I’m still not quite convinced – especially if the time available to create the HST+Mk4 solution extends past 31/12/19 – in which case the derogation is needed anyway and the time before the bi-modes arrive gets ever shorter.

  585. re 28 September 12:38

    ..and the sorry catalogue of delays into service continues

    https://www.railmagazine.com/news/network/caledonian-sleeper-s-mk-5s-delayed-until-spring-2019

    The 717 has so far run one service (out of two scheduled – not auspicious)

    Meanwhile, Psalm 121 v1 seems appropriate for any prospect of more new rolling stock this year.

    And although it seems from others’ comments that we may yet see the Halton Curve in service in December, that depends on Northern getting some new dmus.

  586. FYI
    Ps121 v1 – modern translation:
    I lift up my eyes to the mountains — where does my help come from?

  587. I was thinking of the (trans)Pennine hills, as Nova 3 seems to be the only new rolling stock still likely to appear in 2018.

  588. Book of Common Prayer version – “I will lift up mine eyes unto the hills, from whence cometh my help.”

    I was thinking of the (trans)Pennine hills, as Nova 3 seems to be the only new rolling stock still likely to appear in 2018.

  589. @GT/timbeau – isn’t that interesting: the latest version replaces a positive statement – “whence” with a question – “where … from”? [Moderators, my apologies, this is about TLK and not about versions of the Bible].

  590. “From whence” could be a question, but there is no question mark in either the BCP or the King James Bible – and they do use question marks elsewhere – compare Ps22.

    Back to Thameslink.

  591. A question would make sense, as v2 supplies the answer — “My help cometh even from the Lord”

  592. The Crystal Ball strikes again

    (sitrep on 28 September)

    “the sorry catalogue of projects due for completion or major stages in 2018″.

    In service late: Canal Tunnels, Full Thameslink 2000(!) service, Class 385 (windscreens), Class 802 (albeit only by a few weeks).

    Supposed to have been be in service by now, but still waiting:
    Classes 230, 710, 717, 769, Mark 5 Sleepers (due February, now scheduled for October), Sheffield-Rotherham Tram-Train, Bloomberg entrance at Bank

    Scheduled for last quarter of 2018:
    Mark 5 (Transpennine), Classes 195, 331, 800 (ECML) and 801
    – we may see bi-mode 800s in service on the ECML in December, as planned, but given the recent signal immunisation issues on the East Coast Main Line I doubt that the straight-electric 801s will be cleared for operation by the New Year

    Definitely off until next year: Halton Curve, Crossrail Core”

    Updates: 230, 710, 717 and 769 all now testing but still not in public service (except for one box-ticking run by a 717)
    Tram-Train now scheduled for Oct 24th.

    … but now this
    https://www.railnews.co.uk/news/2018/10/10-december-launch-for-ecml-azumas.html

    and this
    https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-45764238

  593. @Timbeau: Those class 385 trains remind me of the tanks the Navigators travel in, in the ’80’s classic “Dune”!

  594. @Aleks

    Quite so – and better forward visibility too. But are they as reliable?

    The Class 458s had something similar in “as built” condition, and were, so I understand, problematic.

    Before rebuilding
    https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Rail_Class_458#/media/File:8030_at_London_Waterloo.JPG

    In use
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Rail_Class_458#/media/File:Reading_railway_station_MMB_33_458007_458023.jpg

    after rebuilding
    https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b6/458_526_leaving_Waterloo.jpg

  595. @Aleks: The Dutch NS IC III, had them too (these are also known as “Koplopers”).

    They have all been disabled as the maintenance costs escalated over time…

  596. The only Dutch train I have been on was a Koploper. The name means “Frontrunner” or “Head-walker” – because you can walk through the “head” of the train. The Dutch go in for interesting nicknames though – they also had the “hondekop” (dog head” and the original “Sprinter”)

  597. Retractables – I Imagine that the Japanese would value the aesthetics and make it work.

    In service performance is not worth any avoidable disruption.

    It’s ironic that developments in design and engineering with potential to enhance our daily lives end up delivering ever lower costs.

    [This coupler digression has run its course. Further comments may be deleted without warning. LBM]

  598. Timbeau. Your sit rep already out of date. Introduction of sleepers now delayed until 2019, allegedly due to brakes coming on uncommanded.

  599. @Island Dweller

    Oops – yes, I had picked that up earlier – see my post of Oct 2nd. I missed that (second) delay to the sleepers in my update

  600. On the subject of the other Scottish braking problems:

    The 385 brake failure (2nd of 2 units in a train) last week was due to the brake electronics getting fried due to a power spike* as it went though a neutral section. This suggests the transformer output and rectification (inverter based for regen.) might be a bit more agricultural that intended, which is interesting as IEP signalling interference problems are all down to that inverter unit too, apparently. This was the second time a brake controller has got fried on a 385 in the same way.

    *(sudden contact wire voltage rise after the first unit disappears into the neutral section and the load reduces? or attempting regenerative braking through the neutral section? )

  601. @Timbeau: Just about every Dutch train unit in days gone by had a nickname from Blue Angel, to Red Devil, passing Buffel (Buffalo) and Wadloper (Waddenzee walker) and the boring “Benelux trein” along the way.

    I don’t know if this still happens…

  602. SHLR……….I saw the Koplopers when they were being built and the supplier demonstrated the over complex coupling arrangement. It must have seemed like a good idea at the time and it was no surprise that they were all sealed when I went back in 2014

  603. I was at London Bridge last night at 545ish, not something I do often, thankfully. On the slow grind in from Greenwich, stopping at every signal (which incidentally I thought was supposed to be a thing of the past), three southbound Thameslink trains went past, none of which seemed very busy. There were a few people standing but that was it.

    So have the new trains got enough space now that they are no longer crush-loaded, and there are enough now running? Or have numbers travelling declined? Or a combination of the two?

  604. @100andthirty: The space left by the retractable connector is now used to house the computer for the passenger information displays on the train. A very useful feature too, except when it fails and only displays a picture of a train in a field of tulips. Refurbishing an old train offers a lot of possibilities if you’re able to think out-of-the-box!

    @Southern Heights, not really the case anymore. Various nicknames have been proposed for VIRM stock but none has stuck, neither does SLT have a nickname (besides an all too obvious four-letter one which is typically against the rules on web sites like this one. Some people hate the trains so much that this word has to be explicitly listed as forbidden in forum rules of Dutch railway forums.)

  605. @Albert JP
    Is the computer used on the train really that big? These days I would expect it to be so small as to fit inside someone’s pocket.

  606. Well, the refurbishment of these trains started over 10 years ago so it’s probably not the pocket computer but more of a normal desktop one, plus a mobile broadband receiver for the on-train wifi, and probably a ton of cables to connect all screens and wifi access points on the train. But I don’t know exactly how big things are, haven’t had a look inside.

    In newer trains (DDZ I believe), the computer for the same passenger information system fits in the filled-in space under two seats.

  607. Re Quinlet et al.,

    The associated cabling and relays etc. were traditionally much bigger than the actual computers hence the recent changes to network controlled equipment remote from the computer(s) to reduce space, complexity, weight and cost. The down side is they take some adaptation getting used to (different faults and fixes). The data networks also need very good EMC protection (see Hitachi issues in Scotland in the last few weeks).

  608. Is there going to be a part 3 to this excellent article? Or maybe an update about where we are on services?

  609. Simon,

    Unlikely now, although that was the original plan, unless there is something dramatic to report that isn’t generally in the public domain. Personally, the very limited time I have for articles at the moment has other topics as higher priorities. Also we try not to let one topic dominate and there will be plenty of other things to report on in the next few weeks.

  610. Quick Update:

    Aim for December Timetable is to run the full May Thameslink timetable Monday to Friday so about 80tpd extra through the core in each direction above the stable emergency timetable.

    Some services have already got reinstated in September at 4 or 6 tpd extra every week but this has now plateaued again.

    Due to the huge amount of engineering work on the BML (Three Bridges – Brigton) to till next April the weekend improvements will be deferred till next May (2/3rds of weekends will have an engineering works timetable any way…). But better duct tape solution for weekends in general especially GN.

    A big focus on sorting out GN issues:
    Driver training (700s and new routes)
    Introducing the 717s to Moorgate services with 313 withdrawal before the May TT change.

    Training levels outside GN looking much more sensible.

    Performance:
    Outside GN area and TL Rainham services everything has settled down and is performing at equal or better than historic level except TL Bedford services (On time down from ~85% to ~80%) and GatEx (Brighton extensions) due to added stops (making up for missing TL services).

    The extra capacity and reduced dwell times with the 717s will help GN Moorgate performance improve outside to TL related GN issues. 717 won’t be seen in proper service till they have about 10 OK units and a very high level of driver training completed.

  611. NGH….I understand that ATO is currently not currently being used. Is it intended to introduce it in December?

  612. @NGH
    I beg to differ that service is equal or better than historic levels. On the Wimbledon loop, we have lost a lot of the ‘fill-in’ London Bridge services, and there are some weird 40 min gaps in the service from Wimbledon, especially in the evening. It’s pretty rubbish.

  613. @CHRISMITCH,

    When railway people talk about performance levels, they mean against the current timetable. Flitwick, Leagrave and Harpenden have much worse services too…

  614. Re Dave N,

    Exactly hence the use of “performance” against timetable i.e. on time / late / cancelled or very late. Nothing about whether the service is adequate!

    Flitwick etc. With the Derby rebuild complete lots of the EMT issues /constraints should be relieved. Just some restrictions north of Bedford due to re-quadrification and electrification at the moment but some of that should ease before the December TT change so there could be some improvement in December.

    Re 130,

    ATO isn’t needed for December service levels and requires extra Driver training (which hasn’t been prioritised) so (pre) May is probable

  615. Extra driver training required for ATO???
    (Helps to explain why I get this feeling things are escalating out of control)

  616. Re Roger B,

    ATO training – Probably the least problematic training requirement of the lot but not worth worrying about till most of the other issues are resolved and ATO in use is on the horizon.
    Reducing the too many foci issue.

  617. Project delay update

    RAIL now reports class 769s for Northern is service “First half of 2019” – so by July 3rd then!
    https://www.railmagazine.com/news/network/exclusive-northern-to-introduce-converted-bi-modes-next-year

    The same issue reports that on a reluctance by he Government to confirm that LNER’s Azumas will have entered service by the end of this year. This in turn must put a question mark on the new (and long-overdue) services to Harrogate, Huddersfield, Lincoln and Teesside promised for May.

    Two other ongoing projects due by the end of this year.
    Re-opening of International platforms at Waterloo: in time for the new timetable on December 9th (except that the extra services for which it is being built are not now going to happen)
    Re-opening of “Shell” (York Road) entrance to Waterloo Tube station. Closed Nov 15th 2015 – about the time the Bloomberg entrance at the other end of the Drain was supposed to open!) , due to reopen “Summer 2018”. It looks slightly more ready than the Bloomberg entrance, so it will be interesting to see which actually opens first

  618. timbeau,

    except that the extra services for which it is being built are not now going to happen

    Yes they are – in 2020. Apparently the electrical supply problems mean it will take that long for 4tph to Reading from Waterloo. December 2018 sees minor tweaks then it is a gradual phased-in introduction for various facets of the December 2018 timetable plan after that.

  619. @PoP

    “the extra services for which it is being built are not now going to happen – Yes they are – in 2020.”

    Indeed, but not in 2018 or even 2019, so of no use to me.

    Delaying the introduction of the extra 2tph (each way) by a year means, assuming an 18 hour traffic day, effectively cancelling 365x18x2x2=26280 trains that the franchisee promised. Likewise the eight-year hiatus in running ECML services to the destinations promised in the Eureka timetable is essentially over 34,000 cancelled services. (Even assuming they do actually start next May)

  620. timbeau,

    Ah, but…

    The franchisee didn’t really promise travellers that there would be extra services. This promise, or commitment, was made to the DfT. And effectively it is the DfT who, for good reason, has postponed them. So the franchisee hasn’t really reneged on their promise.

    I take your point though that this is a lot of trains that won’t now run. And the line out to Reading really does deserve better with a lot of commuting to both Reading and Bracknell (and a surprising amount between the two in both directions).

  621. Just looking through this piece again, I am struck by just how good the graphics are.

  622. Time for a sitrep

    In service late:
    – Canal Tunnels,
    – Full Thameslink 2000(!) service,
    – Class 385 (windscreens),
    – Class 802 (albeit only by a few weeks),
    – Sheffield-Rotherham Tram-Train.

    Still on schedule for last quarter of 2018 as far as is known:
    – Former International Platforms at Waterloo,
    – Mark 5 (Transpennine),
    – Class 195
    – Class 331

    Supposed to have been be in service by now, but still waiting:
    – Class 710
    – Class 717 (bar one run)
    – Bloomberg entrance at Bank,
    – reopened Shell Tube entrance at Waterloo

    Definitely off until next year:
    – Halton Curve,
    – Crossrail Core,
    – Mark 5 Sleepers
    – Class 230 – recent news https://www.railwaygazette.com/news/traction-rolling-stock/single-view/view/vivarail-class-230-dmu-entry-into-service-delayed.html
    – Class 769 – https://www.railmagazine.com/news/network/exclusive-northern-to-introduce-converted-bi-modes-next-year
    Classes 800 and 801 (ECML) – more news just in https://www.railnews.co.uk/news/2018/10/26-december-launch-of-east-coast.html

  623. @Timbeau: I saw yesterday that the ticket machines have been switched on. The orange was very visible despite the plastic that is meant to be hiding it….

  624. Re Timbeau,

    The Glaister (ORR Chair) Review decided that Canal Tunnels were in service exactly as planned so NR shouldn’t be blamed for that, Grayling has been blaming NR a bit less recently.

  625. ngh,

    Well he said Canal Tunnels were open to passenger service a week later than GTR said they needed but that was not a factor, Yes, technically Network Rail (NR) did what they originally planned and said they would do and better though why they did not appreciate that they were needed earlier is a bit of a mystery. Unless NR obsessives with ‘just in time’ to minimise spending. The review makes clear that the only outstanding issue was continuous radio coverage if trains are carrying passengers. So, presumably, they could have been used for driver training. And why NR didn’t arrange radio coverage earlier anyway is one of those unanswered questions.

    timbeau,

    I believe only platforms 21 and 22 are opening this December at Waterloo. Platform 20 is already available as all they had to do was knock a hole into the wall and build a ramp up. However, platform 20 will be more conveniently accessible from December.

  626. SHLR
    Given that Mithraic Temples were partly or wholly underground & must have been noisy, crowded & hot, it seems highly appropriate ….

  627. Look, I told you ages ago that the story’s not over until Thameslink reaches Maidstone. Well, there’s news. According to “Wealden Times”, Mr Grayling has turned up somewhere in Maidstone (how?) and announced that the last two paths through the Thameslink core will be used by the Maidstone East – Cambridge service, as announced in olden times. But it will be in December 2020.

    Note to self – try to survive a bit longer.

  628. Re Maidstone Jotter,

    I’m looking forward to the first training showing on the boards as delayed by 527,040 minutes 😉

  629. @NGH

    The first morning train from Kings Cross to Lincoln is already nearly 4 million minutes late, and currently expected to be 4.2 million by the time it arrives. (assuming LNER actually get their “Azumas” into service in time)

  630. Re Timbeau,

    As DfT has finally acquired a backbone again the LNER ones are going to be delayed as they are going to be modified to reduce their huge EMI output so for the time being just deliveries and in selected places a bit of testing and driver training.

    Given the issues, the Lincoln service might actually be the best place for them to start given IETs won’t be able to fill in for HST or 91s/Mk4s on any of the other services at the moment!

  631. @NGH

    as electrodiesels, they could even be routed via Spalding if any electrical problems exist on the “Towns Line” via Stoke Summit

  632. @NGH – Assuming IETs can be modified to reduce EMI sufficiently, that seems the best solution if it avoids all or even most of the signalling module upgrades and other work that might otherwise be required. Much easier to bring each train in for a depot or factory mod than to work in perhaps many tens (even hundreds?) of small trackside locations.

  633. Sorry, it wasn’t the “Wealden Times”, it was the “Downs Mail” that quoted from a letter sent to the Kent County Council by transport secretary Chris Grayling, confirming that “from December 2019, new Thameslink services between Maidstone East and Cambridge will also provide an extra two trains per hour in each direction all day.”

    I don’t think he meant to include Sundays, but hey ho. Perhaps they will now do something about the Big Dipper ride near Kemsing.

  634. @Maidstone Jotter

    The draft National Rail Timetable for December 2018 had all of the Cambridge/Maidstone timings included in Table 196, operated by TOC YY. These have now been taken out again and replaced by a box at the foot of each page with the legend “Maidstone to Cambridge Service will be introduced in December 2019”.

  635. “I love deadlines. I love the whooshing noise they make as they go by.”
    Douglas Adams

    More whooshing in November – it’s time for another sitrep

    Time for a sitrep
    In service in 2018, but late:
    – Class 385
    – Class 802
    – Sheffield-Rotherham Tram-Train.
    – Canal Tunnels,
    – Full Thameslink 2000(!) service – barring some later enhancements which were always planned to be added later,
    – Walbrook entrance at Bank (squeaked in to November, with less than 14 hours to spare)

    Still on schedule for last quarter of 2018 as far as is known:
    – Former International Platforms at Waterloo,
    – Class 195*

    Supposed to have been be in service by now, but still waiting:
    – Class 710
    – Class 717 (bar one run, nine weeks ago)
    – reopened Shell Tube entrance at Waterloo

    Definitely off until next year:
    – Halton Curve,
    – Crossrail Core,
    – Mark 5 Sleepers
    – Mark 5a (Transpennine),
    – Class 230
    – Class 331*
    – Class 769
    – Classes 800 and 801 (ECML)

    *We are told only that “the first of Northern’s new trains will enter service in December”, but not which class. I have assumed that, as the 331s need more testing for signal immunisation etc, the 195s will be first.

  636. Re Timbeau,

    From what I’ve been hearing there are big big issues with testing the new CAF stock for Northern, TPE (both MK5s and EMUs) and Caledonian sleeper.

    e.g.
    a) not designed for a UK testing regime (or Germany etc either) requiring highest levels of safety while testing. (e.g. everything NOT being individually isolate-able so impossible to turn X off without also turning A,B, C, D, … off too.)
    This will also be entertaining when dealing with faults in service and multiplying delay minutes. Value engineering the price down in this way might have been counter productive…

    b) software not UK orientated *apparently* “rail head leaf mulch” doesn’t translate into euskara so the WSP can’t deal with a UK autumn!

    c) everything being cannibalised on arrival to keep initial test stock going e.g wheelsets as WSP isn’t working.

  637. @ Ngh – oh dear what a mess with those Northern trains. If what you say is correct, and I’m not doubting you, then someone somewhere has some very difficult questions to answer. How on earth do you get a train designed that isn’t aligned with delay / fault attribution knowledge (given it should be derived from well established engineering knowledge / root causes and diagnosis) and without wheelslip protecton? I assume no trees grow anywhere near railway lines in Spain.

    Surely some serious questions now need to be asked about train specification, procurement, design, testing, commissioning and introduction to service processes? Back to the issues around “informed clients” and “effective project / risk management” yet again. They surely haven’t lost the ability to buy new trains in the North of England or have they?

  638. Re WW,

    They do have WSP just it isn’t working with some of the extras the UK throws up. E.g. WSP software rewrite time. So in some ways similar to early BR WSP that was often problematic.

    The warmer dryer conditions in Spain mean it is presumably less of an issue in general and most of the handful of species that are the most problematic on producing the tough low friction paste aren’t found in Spain. (e.g. London Planes).

    CAF now has the oldest on-train software of vendors selling in Europe.

    The reduced ability to isolate functionality will potentially have made thinks more reliable as there are less things to fail but higher impact when they do. It will also have helped keep the purchase price low which has been causing some “how do they for that price” type head scratching at competitors, the answer is becoming clearer…

    Eversholt as a ROSCO was originally electric stock only so might not have been so astute on DMUs ?

    Agree on the questions!

  639. Thameslink are one of the few operators being permitted a December timetable change effective Monday

    https://www.thameslinkrailway.com/timetables

    On the TL Metro inners I’ve picked up the hourly Rainham terminating at Gillingham becomes half hourly Dartford. Also the hourly night service is restored.

    The Canal Tunnels get weekday half-hourlies from Cambridge to Brighton and Peterborough to Horsham.

  640. Aleks,

    Is that actually true ? Most of what is being added is actually stuff that was in the May timetable but had to be withdrawn. So, as far as Network Rail is concerned, it has been validated and it works so it is not a potential new issue.

    You could argue that Cambridge to Brighton service has been augmented but it was already half-hourly and the second slot was per hour was there ready and waiting. If it works for 1 tph on a timetable that generally repeats itself every half an hour it will work for 2tph. So no great risk there.

    Off topic, I see from the details of Gospel Oak – Barking minutes (TfL and Gobrug) posted elsewhere that London Overground can’t even get all its trains on the North London Line that currently turn short at South Acton into Richmond. They have eliminated most but three short workings remain (so six truncated services).

  641. Re PoP,

    No it isn’t, the key qualifying word “major” is missing and they weren’t permitted major changes.
    The GTR changes are minor and effectively implementing the May changes + some easy extras (Core to 19tph, yes an odd number!)

    All TOCs have at least some minor changes.

    The timetable change actually happens Sunday…

  642. “the hourly Rainham terminating at Gillingham becomes half hourly Dartford”

    I don’t understand. The timetable shows the Thameslink services will go to Rainham, as they do at present – not Dartford or Gillingham. There will be more of them though.

  643. And unless I have missed something, Cambridge to Brighton will only be hourly rather than half hourly even from next week, and even during the peak. But at least the Thameslink semi-fasts from the Great Northern line will be the same 3 trains each hour all day rather than a random selection of 2 or 3 out of the planned 4 each hour.

  644. @PoP – The May timetable was effectively withdrawn. GTR have issued a couple of timetables since. I don’t know that they are the full May, I doubt it based on weekends.
    It was the other way round, RDGs list only allowed them to restore not change.

    @Timbeau – The trains from Rainham became hourly and were shown returning to Gillingham ? on travel info.
    The Dartford timetable 2x/hr is here
    https://www.thameslinkrailway.com/-/media/goahead/gtr-all-timetables/tl-timetables—9-dec-2018—18-may-2019/gtr1812ptt03.pdf

  645. Can we say.
    As far as rail industry insiders are concerned, the GoVia Thameslink changes are not a timetable change per se – from Monday they’re running services that should have run from May but (due to the debacle) got pulled.
    As far as Joe Public is concerned, standing on the platform at Greenwich, this is a change. There will be six trains per hour rather than five.
    Also – the timetable freeze rule is an English thing. Quite a lot of timetable change in Scotland.

  646. @Aleks
    Timetable No. 6 shows the full half-hourly service to and from Rainham – though it’s still hourly at weekends.

  647. @Man of Kent – wonder why they don’t disclose the service destination to the Men of Herts?

  648. Nevermind – I found the small print in the Notes. It also still shows services running to or from Gillingham which must be for stabling. Now at the ends of the day but previously occurring at odd times throughout the pattern.

  649. Re PoP,

    PoP – “Is that actually true ? ”
    NGH – “No it isn’t”

    I was agreeing with you!

    Re Island Dweller,

    A good summary of the situation. As I said in the first timetable article (cicadas pre go-live, the issues isn’t about the timetable but the operators ability to run trains as the TSC concluded this week)
    About 2/3rd of the TOCs are doing no major change e.g. Frozen with a mix of medium and big (Scotrail) at the rest. Even Scotrails is mix of previously deferred and planned for December with some deferred till May

  650. Not a great start to the ‘new’ timetable on the Catford Loop line, where they were only able to run 1 tph rather than the already pitiful 2 tph.

    Doesn’t bode well for their commitment to keep passengers better informed either. there was nothing on the website to say this was going to the be the case and they removed all of the trains from the journey planners entirely. The only way you could tell that they ever existed at all was on real time trains where every other train was flagged as cancelled by operator…

  651. @SE5Traveller
    Closer inspection of Real Time Trains appears to show that while two trains an hour were scheduled from Victoria to Sevenoaks (one of which was then cancelled) there was only a path booked for one train an hour from Sevenoaks to Victoria – the second train each hour apparently having been overlooked.
    Difficult to tell whether it was a Thameslink or a Network Rail error. If it was TL’s, NR surely shouldn’t have accepted it anyway.

  652. I had wondered about provision for the Luton to Rainham trains when the direct line via Greenwich is closed. Today gives the answer, they are running via Bexleyheath as Dartford to North Kent East via Woolwich and Greenwich is closed. Mostly they seem to be running from Rainham to Blackfriars.

  653. With hindsight, Thameslink seems to have been one of the more successful projects due to be completed in 2018

    In service in 2018, but late:
    – Canal Tunnels, London Bridge rebuilding, Thameslink full timetable (more or less)
    – Class 385 (Scotrail)
    – Class 802 (GWR)
    – Sheffield-Rotherham Tram-Train (Rolling stock has been in tram service since 2016)
    – Canal Tunnels,
    – Walbrook entrance at Bank
    – Former International Platforms 21 & 22 at Waterloo,

    Supposed to have been be in service by now, but still waiting:

    Spring 2018 – Class 403 (5BEL) restoration to main line use: now expected August 2019

    May 2018 – Class 769 (Class 319 Flex) for Northern ), now May 2019. No date given for TfW and GWR examples

    Summer 2018 – Mark 5 (Caledonian Sleeper ), now “Spring” 2019

    September – Class 717 (Gt Northern) now “early” 2019
    – Shell Centre entrance at Waterloo. No new date announced

    Autumn 2018 – Mark 5a (Transpennine) now expected Jan 2019

    November – Class 710 (Overground) ), now “early” 2019

    December– Crossrail Core, now ?2020?
    – Halton Curve (ready, but service postponed until May 2019 awaiting new rolling stock delivery)
    – new Woolwich ferry (no new date set: website still says “late December”)
    – Class 195 (Northern), now “early” 2019
    – Class 230 (London Midland), now “early” 2019. TfW examples “mid 2019”
    – Class 331 (Northern), now “early” 2019
    – Class 442 return to service (SWR) (January 2019?)
    – Classes 800 and 801 (LNER) now expected Feb 2019

    Other things expected in 2019

    Greater Anglia Classes 720 (March), 745 (April) and 755 (May)

    Transpennine Class 397 (Nova 2) (Spring)

    Transpennine and Hull Trains Class 802 (mid 2019)

    SWR Class 701 (Mid 2019)

  654. Re: timbeau – not sure how tongue-in-cheek your inclusion of the Brighton Belle was, but – noting the accepted use of the term “Hornbyism” to refer to over-ambition in relation to rolling stock – it gives me an excuse to quote from the Hornby catalogue which introduced the model version:
    “Their goal is to have the train ready and in service by the London 2012 Olympics, a goal which is well within their grasp.”

  655. @Balthazar:
    Indeed, the Brighton Belle’s restoration has been “in service next year” for a very long time – partly a “red queen’s race” of trying to keep up with modern standards and expectations – I understand the latest delay is to install air-cooling – although natural ventilation will be adequate when the train is moving, the train could get unbearably hot sitting in a siding whilst its well-heeled passengers go off visiting cathedrals etc *. It wasn’t a problem on the original service as both termini had all-over roofs.

    *there are four near “London SR” termini, and eight others in Southern Electric territory.

    An article from 2012 suggesting it would be ready “in a few years time” http://www.rail.co.uk/rail-news/2012/the-brighton-belle/

    The 5BEL Trust was founded ten years ago this month!

  656. Re TIMBEAU 1 Jan. at 13:17
    Rail Engineer have a recent article on 769 Flex :-
    https://www.railengineer.uk/2018/12/20/class-769-flex-in-action/
    in which it is said “In discussion, Jonathan Wragg, Porterbrook’s Flex programme director, outlined the production programme. The first unit for Arriva Trains North is due for delivery in January 2019, for Transport for Wales in spring 2019 and deliveries to GWR should start in summer 2019 and be completed in early 2020.”
    This first delivery seems to fit in with a May TT introduction.

  657. Re TIMBEAU 1 Jan at 13:17
    ‘In service in 2018, but late
    Thameslink full timetable (more or less)’
    Hang on, I’ll just pop down to Maidstone East Station and join the queue…
    It’s less.

  658. @Maidstone Jotter: He said “more successful”, not a runaway success… Admittedly the bar has been set low this year.

    I wonder how the six fifteen from Horsham is doing?

  659. A good experience on Thameslink this week. The overnight buses were replaced with trains operating half hourly to Luton and Gatwick. The challenge is to recover some passenger confidence to reliably meet check-in times.

    London TravelWatch report that airline passengers are more likely to travel by car or taxi to catch flights from Heathrow, Gatwick and Luton than they were 7 years ago, in a trend they say is “concerning”.

    http://www.airportwatch.org.uk/2019/01/new-study-by-london-travel-watch-shows-more-airline-passengers-using-cars-or-cabs-to-get-to-heathrow-gatwick-and-luton/

  660. Another update:

    Finally in service four months late – albeit just three one-way workings a day – Class 717

    Supposed to have been be in service by now, but still waiting:

    May 2018 – Class 769 (Class 319 Flex) for Northern ), now May 2019. No date given for TfW and GWR examples

    Summer 2018 – Mark 5 (Caledonian Sleeper ), now slipped again from “Spring” 2019 to June

    Autumn 2018 – Mark 5a (Transpennine) now expected “early” 2019 rather than January

    November – Class 710 (Overground) ), now “early” 2019

    December– Crossrail Core, now ?2020?
    – Halton Curve (ready, but service postponed until May 2019 awaiting new rolling stock delivery)
    – new Woolwich ferry (no new date set)
    – Classes 195 and 331 (Northern), now “early” 2019
    – Class 230 (London Midland), now “early” 2019. TfW examples “mid 2019”
    – Class 442 return to service (SWR) (now February 2019)
    – Classes 800 and 801 (LNER) slipped again, now expected April 2019

    A consequence of this last one is that the direct services to Harrogate and Lincoln (originally promised in 2011) have slipped from the May timetable to December, thus losing a ninth tourist season.

    Other things expected in 2019

    Greater Anglia Classes 720 (March), 745 (originally April) and 755 (originally May) – now reported in “RAIL” as slipped to March, May and July respectively, with the 720s very doubtful for March as their Class 710 cousins are not yet in service

    Transpennine Class 397 (Nova 2) (Spring)

    SWR Class 701 (still forecast for mid-2019) – but see Class 710 and 720 above

    Transpennine and Hull Trains Class 802 – now December (slipped from mid- 2019)

  661. @Timbeau TfL are still showing the revised opening date of February from December

    https://tfl.gov.uk/modes/river/woolwich-ferry

    David Fisher, head of London river services at TfL, apologised for the delay, saying: “We are undertaking extensive trials of the newer and less polluting ferries and docks to ensure they are ready for service and this has taken longer than anticipated. We will launch the new ferries in February subject to the completion of these trials.”

  662. @TIMBEAU

    “November – Class 710 (Overground) ), now “early” 2019”

    What was the “black and orange” Overground train I got on at Wednesday, 19 December 2018, 12:45 at Surrey Quays Platform 1?

    I managed to take a couple of photos of the inside but I didn’t spot what the ID of the train was but it was externally like an Overground train, but the “white” bit of the exterior was “black”, like the sign.

    https://ukfree.tv/styles/images/2018/on_board_sign.jpg

    I only noticed that it was unusual when I got on because it was so clean! Arriva Rail London don’t clean the Overground trains the way that LOROL did. Here’s the moquette from the train

    https://ukfree.tv/styles/images/2018/seat_cover.jpg

  663. @130 Not shortened, surely? The only shortened (4-car) unit is on the Goblin, and has only had relatively minor work done to it.

    The fully refurbished units (four to date I think) are all 5-car DC-only units working on the East London Line

  664. Brian was on one of the the refurbed 378s. The refrubishment programme has been halted as that generates an extra unit to help run services on Goblin.

  665. @me: yesterday 1351

    Correction – Greater Anglia Class 755 still expected in May – I misread the article in RAIL.

  666. Timbeau – your Update 13.51 on 30 Jan. There is another one to add to the list.

    Electrification to Newbury went live on 2 Jan, with 4-car Class 387 operating the Reading-Newbury shuttle (although there was a 2-car 165 in the Bay at Newbury this morning). The Paddington-Bedwyn service *should* have been operated with 5-car 800/802s from the same date. However, on 4 Dec 18 GWR announced that the introduction of the bi-modes would be ‘delayed until further notice’ because it had been realised that CCTV fitment was needed before they could operate to the unstaffed stations on the Berks and Hants. So 3-car 165s are still operating the service with no indication of how long for.

    Apart from the obvious question of how did we get to within a month of the planned bi-mode introduction before this was realised, GWR clearly will now be short of stock, partly because they cannot cascade the 165s and partly because bi-modes will be undergoing CCTV fitment. Does anyone know if the 800s/802s have passive provision for CCTV fitment or will it have to be designed-in from scratch? Also, I assume the bare minimum number of units for service and a few spares will be fitted, so will this introduce a new sub-class?

    Meanwhile, 3-car 165s continue to provide a non-stop service on the fast lines between Reading and Paddington

  667. I have seen GWR class 80X with CCTV housings on the exterior and have seen the cab simulator with the CCTV screens with the simulation showing exterior images, so the intent is there even if the CCTV isn’t original equipment.

  668. Littlejohn

    First electric passenger trains between Reading and Newbury ran on 31 December.

  669. Re Little John and 130,

    The issues is more to do with which former TOC the driver is from and DOO agreements that are in place (or NOT…).

    The former NSE / Thames Trains drivers are fine with DOO but it is a sore point with the former “intercity” drivers on the 80x currently who are used to Guard/Train Manager etc.. First want to avoid kicking off another DOO battle.

    The original plan was that 387s with “former Thames Trains contract ” drivers would operate the Newburys but the plan was changed to some 80x operation without realising that would then entail additional driver training on 80x to avoid DOO battles.

    Re Londoner in Scotland,

    Agree it happened quietly on the 31st.

  670. Londoner in Scotland (with Pop’s indulgence). No doubt – I was in Auchterarder that week! – although all the local publicity and conversations with Newbury station staff referred to 2 Jan. However, my comments were more to do with one more (apparent) last minute screw up with the bi-mode introduction being pulled at almost the last moment.

  671. NGH – noted. My last post was drafted before yours but for some reason didn’t make it to LR

  672. @PoP

    “This thread seems to be drifting to include any piece of news regardless of relevance to original topic”

    Probably my fault, starting a hare by comparing Thameslink’s delays with other projects. I will find a more appropriate thread for any future updates.

  673. NGH I thought the issue was that the CCTV picture wasn’t good enough to dispatch safely. The drivers drive DOO to Oxford but use platform dispatch at Paddington, Reading and other stations on that route. Beyond Newbury there are no staff for that.

  674. CCTV & dispatch
    I’ve just heard the head of West Midlands Trains & LNW talking on this very subject ….
    Do you try to staff all your stations, thus enabling dispatch, with the trains being DOO, or do you have a “Second Man” – not necessarily a “guard” on all the trains, especially to assist for PRM passengers – who can also help with dispatch if necessary & do without staff on some of the outer, more thinly-used/populated areas?
    He didn’t have a single answer to that set of conundrums, I may add, but it does require careful thought.
    [ PRM = Persons of Restricted Mobility ]

  675. I wonder if someone could help me with a quesiton (if known)?

    With the new Cambridge to Maidstone East line, will there be a slow and fast operating? I can’t seem to make head nor tale of the proposal by Thameslink. I’m sure i read that there will be a fast train from Maidstone Eeast that’ll call at Swanley and then London Bridge and so on.

    Can anyone shed some light on this, as i’m thinking of buying a property in Maidstone and this hangs on my final decision…. Thanks!

  676. This article suggests it will serve intermediate stations between Maidstone and Otford.
    https://www.kentonline.co.uk/maidstone/news/government-commits-to-key-rail-route-191861/ (health warning for the picture illustrating the article)

    THis one too
    https://www.homesandproperty.co.uk/property-news/maidstone-to-be-revived-as-a-city-commuter-favourite-with-new-sub-60-minute-trains-to-london-bridge-a117936.html

    The diagram here also indicates that https://i0.wp.com/www.fromthemurkydepths.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Thameslink-map.jpg

    Neither is clear as to the stopping pattern after Otford.

    This article suggesting a 55 minute journey time to London Bridge would seem to corroborate that
    http://www.maidstone.gov.uk/home/news-and-events/delays-to-thameslink-unacceptable

    The fastest train to Blackfriars in the current timetable (not via London Bridge) calls at all stations except Shoreham, Eynsford and Bickley to Bromley South, then non-stop to Elephant & Castle) and takes 68 minutes.

    Maidstone has had fast trains to London Bridge before – they didn’t last
    https://www.theyworkforyou.com/whall/?id=2010-01-06b.92.0

  677. @GT

    “The service would see trains also stopping at West Malling, Borough Green, Wrotham and Otford before travelling to popular City stations London Bridge, Blackfriars and St Pancras.”

    This PDF shows the current routes, and shows the Maidstone East and the words “Thameslink services on this route will operate from December 2019”.

    https://www.thameslinkrailway.com/-/media/goahead/gtr-all-shared-pdfs-and-documents/gtr-all-brands-route-map.pdf?la=en

    “I’m sure i read that there will be a fast train from Maidstone East that’ll call at Swanley and then London Bridge and so on.”

    The current Swanley to London Bridge services are all-stops. There a twice-hour service and takes 60 mins to get from Otford to London Bridge.

    Don’t get your hopes up for a new express services: there are only double-tracks between the four stops between Swanley and Shortlands, there is nowhere for “express Thameslink” services to go, unlike the Brighton Thames trains that can skip East Croydon to London Bridge due to there being a “fast line”.

    Also, you might like to remember that when railway people say “fast”, they mean “non-stopping”.

  678. Thanks Timbeau.

    It’s a shame if this is the case. I don’t exactly call 52 minutes ‘fast’!

  679. @GT

    52 minutes not “fast”

    Comparable with other stations 40 miles from London though:

    Rainham (Kent) 56 Minutes from Victoria, 50 minutes from St Pancras
    Tunbridge Wells 53 minutes
    Haywards Heath 45 minutes
    Horsham 51 minutes
    Haselmere 53 minutes
    Basingstoke 42 minutes
    Theale 42 minutes
    Haddenham & Thame Parkway 37 minutes
    Aylesbury 63 minutes
    Leighton Buzzard 42 minutes
    Biggleswade 44 minutes
    Stansted Airport 50 minutes
    Witham 45 minutes
    Southend (Central) 54 minutes

  680. @GT

    And, just looking again at the PDF link I posted, I note that “Thameslink services on this route
    will operate from December 2019” is in fact using the route via Chislehurst, Elmstead Woods, Grove Park, Hitcher Green, New Cross to London Bridge.

    Interesting, the stopping trains on these route on Southeastern take only 26 minutes from Chislehurst to London Bridge. So, it’s currently 35 mins from Maidstone East to Swanley, a similar distance to Chislehurst.

    This *could* mean 61 minutes for the Maidstone East to London Bridge. Getting it down more is a problem of line capacity, rather than train speed.

  681. @BB/GT
    To get to London Bridge they would indeed have to take the Chislehurst route, but the diagram suggests they will run fast between London Bridge and (at least) St Mary Cray.

  682. Tonneau, for info

    London to Leighton Buzzard fast is 28 or 29 minutes.

    Slower trains are available

  683. Re Timbeau et al.

    The new TL service is the replacement for the Cannon Street ones that ceased in 2009.

    The normal pattern will be for it to run non stop on the fasts on the SEML from Chislehurst to Parks Bridge (near Lewisham) before swapping to the Cannon Street tracks (parallel move of a stopping service going via Lewisham) and southbound to run non stop on the Cannon Street / Slow lines till Chislehurst so there aren’t any conflicting moves at Chislehurst.

    Re GT.

    “Fast” in SE land means fast till “x” then all stops

  684. The originally published draft Thameslink timetable had a 55 minute morning peak time Maidstone East to London Bridge and a 52 minute evening peak return time.

    When the decision was made to add additional phasing to the introduction of services, these would have been added in December 2019.

    But.. we are currently 6/12 months behind in the introduction of those timetables. e.g. the additional fast Cambridge -> Brighton trains are now due May 2019 instead of Dec 2018 but the Littlehampton services that were due to happen in Dec 2018 aren’t shown as happening in May 2019.

    Also there might be a problem of not enough rolling stock ? As I understand it, the plan was that the Bedford services would be all 12 car but because of lack of stabling facilities some 8 cars are in use instead, so there might not be enough for the Maidstone services.

  685. @ Daven – not enough trains for the planned Thameslink service pattern? Oh dear, you couldn’t make this up.

  686. @Brian Butterworth
    Trains also sometimes use the Up Chatham Loop ( from S0110/011 #11 to SO130/013 #5), which you didn’t indicate with a purple line.
    I think such moves are rare, with the Reversible Chatham loop used more often. (Though I could be wrong on this frequency difference).

    Interestingly the diagram you posted is in contradiction to both traksy and carto metro, which both suggest that it is possible to get from the Up Chatham Loop to the Up Slow at Chislehurst Junction.
    I’m more inclined to believe your diagram, given its source, however I thought I had seen such a connection previously (though it has been quite a while since I was on the SEML)

    Maybe this connection was removed?

    Also I was previously under the assumption that the Up Chatham Loop could be used in both directions. Obviously if the relevant crossover(s) are missing then I must be in error here!

  687. There were some changes to the points south of Chislehurst recently(2018?), however the ability remains to go from the down slow to the up slow just NW of Chislehurst. The down slow is bidirectional in the station.

    They also added the ability to go from the up fast to the up slow. Why they didn’t add the ability to go down slow to down fast, I don’t know….

  688. The original draft for Table 196 of the current National Rail Timetable showed the Thameslink (TL) services planned from Cambridge to Maidstone East (and Ashford) with a note that they would not commence until December 2019. Services were for off-peak only, with SE Trains operating their existing peak services from Blackfriars but via Bromley South rather than London Bridge. Operation was to be Monday to Friday and all day Saturday. No service on Sunday.

    Timings from London Bridge for the TL services were:

    London Bridge 0 mins
    Swanley 24 mins
    Otford 33 mins
    Borough Green 40 mins
    West Malling 46 mins
    Maidstone East 54 mins

    The timings were all removed before publication but the box announcing the start of services 12 months ahead remained as did the stations listed within the table.

  689. SH(LR)
    The connections to the Chatham Loops at Chislehurst and the associated crossovers were remodelled in 2016, with the opportunity taken to increase the line speed for the turnouts and one of the crossovers.
    The old layout had turnout connections from the Down Slow to the Reversible Chatham Loop and the Up Chatham Loop to the Up Fast, with three-line crossovers enabling movements from the Down Fast to Down Slow and the Up Fast to Up Slow (note that this functionality is not new), all at 20mph, except the Up Chatham Loop to Up Fast turnout, which was 30mph. All the above junctionwork was located at the southern (Country) end of the station.
    The two three-line crossovers ‘overlapped’ between the two inner tracks of the four track main line, due to spatial constraints, making a less than desirable track layout to maintain.
    The new layout retains a similar footprint for access from both Down lines to the Reversible Chatham Loop, retaining a 20mph three-line crossover from DF to DS (space prevented a higher speed), but provided a speed improvement to 40mph on the turnout from the DS to the RCL.
    In the Up direction, the previous three-line crossover was replaced by a pair of crossovers (40mph) located north (London end) of the station and a turnout (40mph) from the UCL to the UF.
    Removing the Up direction three-line crossover removed the undesirable diamond crossing between the inner tracks at the Country end of the station and enabled the crossover to be relocated in a position where a higher speed could be provided. These alterations were operational by July 2016, according to the current Sectional Appendix.
    The Slow line crossover (40mph) at the London end of the station that enables the Up direction connection from the RCL was not affected by these works.
    The result of these works is that all routes from the Charing Cross – Tonbridge lines to the Chatham Loops are now 40mph, except the DF to RCL route, whcih remains at 20mph over the Down three-line crossover. The Loops themselves are now 40mph throughout.
    A DS to DF three-line crossover (50mph) is located in the second signal section towards Orpington.
    The track arrangement and signals are shown in the Grove Park – Hildenborough OpenTimeTrains diagram, but note that the now removed Up direction three-line crossover has been incorrectly retained in this diagram.

  690. RJBI’s helpful information about the 2016 junction upgrades at Chisehurst misses the main benefit.
    Eliminating the diamond crossing on the down fast has eliminated the 60 mph PSR just south of the down fast platform.
    All down fast trains now continue through at 70 mph, saving energy wasted in braking, & saving time.
    This benefits at least 6 down trains an hour, many of 12 coaches.

    ( but not Thameslink trains which all stop at Chislehurst).

  691. JE
    The current Sectional Appendix pages (last revised in 2016) shows 70 mph on all four tracks between Hither Green and Petts Wood (approx).
    Previously there was a 60mph section over a 10 chain length about Chislehurst Jcn on the UF, and Slow lines, with the DF reducing to 50mph over this section (as shown in the Jan 2015 dated page).
    So there is, as you say, a line speed improvement benefit on the fast and slow lines through Chislehurst as a result of the 2016 junction remodelling
    Thameslink trains do not currently serve Chislehurst; all services on this route, fast or stopping are operated by SE.

  692. @GT

    There are various summaries on that page that describe the stopping patterns. The most comprehensive is in the fourth paragraph:
    “As well as Maidstone East, the new Thameslink service will call at West Malling (for Kings Hill), Borough Green & Wrotham, Otford and Swanley before running non-stop to London Bridge, thus providing a valuable new rail service to the City and beyond for a wide area of mid-Kent.”
    So no one-intermediate-stop-only service between London and Maidstone. (The omission of West Malling being especially unlikely, while line speeds at Otford are so slow, a station stop probably costs only one minute than the usual two).

  693. @RJB1: Thanks for reminding me of when it happened! Doesn’t time fly…

    The 60 mile an hour limit had been there since I first moved out that way in ‘05, however just before the remodelling it had a 50mph temporary speed restriction slapped on it on the DF. Very noticeable if the train was late!

  694. James Bunting etc
    As a comparison
    Times in 1961, starting from Victoria – a longer route.
    Swanley 25/ 28 min ( Train splits with Gillingham portion )
    Otford 38 min
    Boro’ Grn 48 min
    W Malling 55 min
    Miadstone E 65 min
    Given today’s timings are only fractionally faster, with a shorter route, no split/divide, & the acceleration/braking characteristics of today’s trains will be considerably better … it’s pathetic, isn’t it?

  695. @GREG TINGEY

    Of course, it’s 38 minutes from St Pancras to Ashford International, which is 92km…

  696. Greg Tingey,

    I have lost count of the number of times you bring up the topic of slower trains. As always, you are unimpressed when people point our some services are quicker.

    Bearing in mind:

    1) for the most part the routes are the same as before
    2) modern electric units are limited in acceleration and braking in what the human body finds comfortable – and that hasn’t changed
    3) dwell times are longer. This is partly because more people use the railway, partly because of the disappearance of slam door stock and partly because “platform interface” injuries are no longer tolerated
    4) the modern regime incentivises trains not to be late – even if that means they take longer
    5) the network is much more crowded.

    So, get over it! Train times won’t improve. Any further comments about trains being slower now or in the future will be deleted. You have given this topic quite enough airing over the years.

  697. Re PoP,

    2) modern electric units are limited in acceleration and braking in what the human body finds comfortable – and that hasn’t changed

    Not quite – it is actually the rate of change of acceleration (units of ms^-3) that is usually known as “jerk” in rolling stock contracts that limits performance.

    This only matters in the first few seconds of acceleration or last few seconds of braking and can easily be optimised to avoid discomfort in real use / time (e.g. railhead conditions) on the latest trains / software. Expect the new Aventras appearing on the Goblin and with the final software in the Crossrail core to push the limits compared to current stock. Also expect the software to transition the power application on and off far more smoothly including the frequency hops to avoid signalling interference.

  698. @ngh: it’s interesting to think how much automation is changing things without getting much attention – in the past it would have been largely down to the skill of the driver to minimise jerk, now the driver’s inputs to the controls are more and more mediated through software. Same thing in planes and cars too. But hence rigorously testing the software becomes very important, to detect unwanted effects, and that has taken more time than the manufacturers expected.

  699. Re Ian J,

    Agreed, the attempts have been going on long time though. The piece of the puzzle are all starting to fall into place in big way finally.

    A well known UK oil company has been doing similarly to its fuel tankers for over 15 years, they behave exactly the same way for the driver whatever fuel load and distribution in the tanker trailer. The result was a lower accident rate.

    Later this year will see the 30th anniversary of what is now Bombardier Transportation Berlin decide days after the Wall came down that the future of winningrolling stock orders (post reunification) lay in software (and a technology partnership with ABB), initially locomotives and remote unpowered driving cars , followed 3-4 years later by EMUs/ DMUs and coaches. Their main (electric) locomotive building competition the Tank builders Kraus-Maffei turned to Siemens and the rest is history…

    The key reason for the turning point now is this is the first generation of stock with all the hardware being reliably network addressable has opened the doors combined with the ability to throw sufficient on-board computing power at implementation as well as the ease of desktop computer design modelling to incredible levels of detail to simulate everything before hand.

  700. NGH……….I get your comment re software, but it has to work. I didn’t sense any cynicism or irony in your post, but the people trying to get class 710 into service might reasonably wonder what went wrong.

  701. Re 130,

    Agreed it has to work, and there in lies some bad assumptions in not realising there was a once in generation big step re software to be taken.

    The simple solution is that you build a prototype unit or two a year or 2 ahead of the rest of production and then test it to oblivion* in the same way BR used to prototype and similar to what happened with the ’09 Stock for the Victoria line where the original first 2 units end up being replaced with production spec ones as so much had changed (and LU in general have done have frequently done over the years as regards prototyping but mainly for hardware reasons as you are well aware.

    *You still won’t find everything but most problems being found earlier would help.

    It isn’t just the UK have issues the Swiss are having similar software issues with new stock currently.

  702. Currently the SEML Fasts at Chiselhurst have 6tph off-peak (2 Ashford/Dover, 2 Tunbridge, 2 Hastings). If they introduce 2 tph Maidstone and 2 tph Ashford (needed to give Orpington 4tph once the Hastings trains run fast from Tonbridge), it will need to handle 10tph. It that likely to stress the line, or is that just equivalent to the peak service already?

    I’ve very suspicious of Thameslink/Southeastern interactions, as Orpington lost 2 tph to Victoria in May, and Thameslink still haven’t run their Saturday replacements 9 months later.

  703. John B
    Looking at the appropriate timetables for the evening peak ( 17.15 – 18.15 LBG departure times ) 5 or 6 to T-Wells or beyond, 6 to Ashford ( *note*)
    Making 11 or 12 down fasts in the PM peak, so 10 ought to do-able.
    (*note* Table 207 has an anomaly – two trains dissapearing at London Bridge & reappearing at Dover Priory or Margate .. 16.35 & 17.14 off LBG, arriving @ 18.43 & 18.56 respectively … now they can’t get on to the “HS2” line from there, so are they actually running non-stop, or is it a printing glitch, or what? A quick, but not complete check of the “WTT” says that the Margate certainly has not come from St Pancras, as there is another train arriving at 18.57 – 17.25 off St Pancras. Um.

  704. Greg,
    Real time trains has these trains. The 1635 ex LB (1G85) travels to Dover Priory via Medway, Faversham and Canterbury East, and the 1714 is 1G87 to Margate again via the Medway route.

  705. Greg: Or they both travel via Faversham (intermediate stations not in Table 207). Only a few peak direction trains from Margate or Dover via Faversham go through London Bridge (instead of to Victoria), most of which are shown in Table 207.

  706. Is anyone able to shed light on the work currently going on beside Cambridge station? I assume this is Thameslink related – but would have thought it was an inconvenient place for further stabling, since trains would have to reverse to get from there to the station itself.

  707. So at rush hour we have 12 tph running at 60mph through Chislehurst, 5 min slots. I guess the Thameslink trains will occupy 2 slots, as they’ll be joining at much reduced speed, so it will be like rush hour all day long.

    With the ITT requiring a fast Hastings from Tonbridge, and a new Ashford stopping train to compensate we might have countrybound

    A half-hour pattern TW-DO-HA-AF-MA*2 will give 15 minute spacing for Orpington stops, and the Hastings train 20 minutes to run down the Tunbridge Wells train. But the Dover train will catch the Ashford one.

    TW-MA*2-AF-HA-DO spaces the Ashford trains better, but the Hastings train will catch the Tunbridge Wells one

    TW-DO-HA-MA*2-AF spaces the Ashford and Hastings trains, but gives a 5/25 split at Orpington, which would be very unpopular there

    TW-AF-HA-DO-MA*2 spaces the Ashford and Hastings trains well, and gives 15 minute spacing at Orpington if the Dover train stops, not the the Ashford one.

    Londonbound TW-AF-HA-DO-MA*2 is likely with the Hastings and Dover trains running faster. Again, the Dover needs to stop at Orpington.

  708. Re Anonymous,

    Cambridge works – yes they are Thameslink related.

    The stabling is being rejigged so it is 12 car capable, the bit you are thinking about will include the new carriage washer hence less of an issue for direct access to the station but easy access to the sidings is useful so units can be rotated through the washer easily overnight

  709. Build it and they will come –

    I had occasion to use Thameslink between London Bridge and Blackfriars this morning – a section of line which had no service a year ago. My train, a Horsham (?) to Peterborough service, was crush loaded. It occurred to me to wonder where all those people had come from – what was their commuting pattern this time last year?

    A bit of a hiatus at London Bridge though, as the barriers wouldn’t let me through with my over-60 pass, and the lady on the barrier didn’t seem to be aware that they are valid before 0930 between there and West Hampstead.

  710. Re Timbeau,

    Indeed that isn’t the only TL service like that.
    The Northern Line has been a bit more pleasant lately! Tube transfer volumes at LBG appears to be down and northern transfers seem like the main transfer to reduce. Also a some changes as regards other NR “terminals” e.g. Blackfriars instead of Cannon Street or Charing Cross.

  711. timbeau,

    That has been my experience too. Indeed I wrote about that exact same subject to a few people a few weeks ago. Yes, less than a year ago. I was observing it after nine months. Indeed the only previous peak service (apart from the notional 1 train an hour) was over a century ago I believe. If not then almost a century.

    For all that gets slated about Thameslink I think it is wonderful. Now largely sorted out, it has transformed my journeys. When going to Central London I often just use Thameslink and walk the rest. If crossing London to Marylebone I now just change at Farringdon (extremely busy on all platforms at times) and walk from Baker Street. The services to and from are more frequent than I have even known them.

    When writing this article, someone (who will remain nameless to save embarrassment) urged me to compare the shambles at Thameslink with how well and organised things were going at Crossrail. I am pleased I didn’t take that advice. Thameslink might have been a bit shambolic at times but the structures were built to schedule (pretty much so). In retrospect the introduction of trains is no worse than any other recent new rolling stock – and better than some. Having said that, from what I hear, I believe there are still potential problems in that we either might not get all the extra trains due in May or there might initially be some cancellations.

    I believe all this is reflected in official ridership numbers. It is noticeable how few moans there are about Thameslink nowadays even if some of the trains are a bit late.

  712. timbeau,

    There are a few stations where Oystercards are valid but because the numbers are relatively small and there is a lot of opportunity for fraud/misunderstanding your Oystercard with free TfL travel may not work. I know Clapham Junction and Shenfield are like that. I suspect it is the case at New Cross but do not know for certain.

    In such situations it is deliberate but the staff should let you through without question. Indeed the better staff anticipate the problem and approach you to help as soon as they see your card rejected and the surprise on your face. It is regrettable that the lady did not appear to know the rules. As one railway manager said ‘if the passengers know the rules better than the staff, we have a problem’.

  713. Re PoP,

    Yes – who knew decent modelling could be accurate!
    It also shows why TL at 24tph is very useful to enable the Northern line Bank works.
    And none of the morning P6 carnage on the new P8/9 either.

    I’d expect SE to have have take a revenue hit given the barriers will show the London Terminal exits as Blackfriars rather than CST/CHX (and no direct SE services in many cases). Ditto TfL on the Northern Line obviously!

  714. To be fair to the lady on the barrier the conversation went like this:

    Barrier: “seek assistance”
    me “Excuse me”
    Her: “what sort of Oyster have you there?”
    Me: “Over 60”
    Her: “that’s not valid until 0930″ (could be implied to the uninitiated that this is universal)
    Me: ” it’s valid to Blackfriars now”
    Her: (opens barrier without further comment)

    @NGH
    To judge by the numbers alighting at Blackfriars, and the direction most of them seemed to be walking, neither Cannon Street, Charing Cross, or the Northern Line would have been very convenient to them before. (Maybe the 17 and 521 buses took the brunt)

  715. I’m a case in point, as a commuter from Blackheath to the Fleet Street area. Until last summer I got a train to Waterloo East or Cannon Street and then a bus or the District line.

    It took me some time to become confident, but now my regular route is to change at London Bridge, where there’s a northbound Thameslink train every few minutes. They are overloaded, but enough get out to make room for the next lot. Crush loaded before, crush loaded after, but a different group of people.

    Would be a similar story to get further north — Farringdon or St Pancras — and the change is so much better than that long dispiriting trudge to London Bridge Underground, in spite of all the shiny shops.

  716. @ALANBG: The trudge to London Bridge Underground via the vaults (or Western Arcade) is nothing when compare to exiting the station to head to London Bridge (Bridge). Both the walk up Duke Street Hill or using the overpass and along Colechurch House (London Bridge Walk) are truly horrible…

    It’s a pity the City of London (Who own Colechurch House) didn’t get in on the redevelopment to make the whole journey a lot nicer.

  717. My commute is from Westcombe Park to Farringdon, now a direct train.
    The Greenwich line TL service has noticeably got busier since its introduction I think as people have started to adjust their journeys.

    The 8:42 Westcombe Pk to West Hampstead is now seeing many people who would have boarded the preceding train to Cannon St.

    Quite a few people who visibly board with me, or are already on the service, stay beyond Farringdon. Unfortunately the chance of getting a seat at London Bridge as hoards alight is no longer a given!

    Reliability has also much improved, with any issues mostly due to slotting into delays in the SE service.

    A query , as ticketing has already been mentioned.
    My monthly TL paper ticket Westcombe Pk to Farringdon works at the barriers at St Pancras, Waterloo East, Charing Cross – I presume I get some kind of London Terminals cover? – but bizarrely NOT at London Bridge, though staff let me through.

    PoP, in your explanation to Timbeau, could it also apply to paper tickets at stations where fraud is a potential problem? If not, any ideas? The gateline staff at LBG don’t seem to know.

    Many thanks from a first time commenter / long term reader !

  718. Mat WCB
    Wierd. Because London Bridge is on your direct route between your named terminals, so of course it’s valid for entry/exit. That is standard season-ticket rules, as I’m sure you are aware … as to why the barriers won’t accept it is another question.
    Mind you, I know someone with an annual “paper” Walthamstow-Liverpool St ticket, that always stops working after about a month – & she says its simply not worth the hassle of getting it changed for a new one another 10 or 11 times during the year ….

  719. Re Mat WCB,

    Thameslink Ticket barrier acceptance is also problematic due to the underlying ticketing restrictions.
    You probably have a “London Thameslink” (more expensive) rather than a “London Terminals”.
    The later only covers you from the south for terminals till Blackfriars at which point you need a “London Thameslink” for going further north. Those coming from the North do slightly better as it also includes Moorgate (Thameslink served from before the Farringdon rebuild).

    There are lots of issues around London Terminals and London Thameslink tickets and barrier operation…

    When the LBG work were completed the last of the LU ticket acceptance also did so LU remove the ticket acceptance from their barriers including Moorgate (which they shouldn’t have done and it took some constant hounding from MPs and London assembly members to get it sorted (along with lots of member of barrier staff getting reported for not following their training when the problem was recognised and a default explanatory letter was issues to those affected to present at the barriers. TfL didn’t want to have to do an unscheduled update to barrier software but they eventually did to stop the barrage of complaints.

  720. There are other instances where the National Rail and Thameslink websites still struggle with the “new” Thameslink destinations. Two examples:

    (i) the websites offer an off-peak return on the 0854 Cambridge to Brighton train if the destination is input as London Bridge or beyond, but treat it as a peak train if St Pancras, Farringdon, City Thameslink or Blackfriars is the destination;

    (ii) they allow through ticketing from Shelford (one stop south of Cambridge on the Liverpool Street line) via Cambridge to St Pancras, but not to Kings Cross: bizarre as some of the St Pancras journeys offered include alighting at Kings Cross and walking to St Pancras.

    Both these offers are not technically permitted, I believe, but it would be difficult to challenge a passenger armed with their print-out from the website showing the journey in question.

  721. Point to Point season tickets are of course valid at intermediate stations but whether or not the gates are programmed to do this is another matter.

    Singles are generally valid for a break of journey. The often do not operate the gates but the staff should let you through. Indeed many staff never query things and just let you through so long as you wave something that looks vaguely like a ticket.

    There may still be outstanding issues. As others have commented, they are reluctant to do an update just to sort out a minor problem which has a simple workaround. For at least two years Charing Cross wouldn’t accept paper tickets to get out the station for the onward journey. It was fine once they explained this to you. You made sure you went to a gate next to staff so they could quickly let you through without much disruption. However, it is fairly chaotic when some unsuspecting soul gets puzzled, tries a few more times and causes a massive bottleneck with a trainload of people behind them.

    The moral of the story is don’t just assume that because your ticket is rejected it isn’t valid. I suspect that, as others describe, there are times when tickets are accepted but probably, strictly speaking, aren’t valid.

  722. Re Greg and Mat WCB,

    I suspect it may have something to do with validity of London Thameslink tickets from the North – they may well only be valid as far South as Blackfriars hence a logical reason for a London TL ticket not working @ LBG

  723. I don’t know why that should be, because I discovered by chance that my London Terminals ticket issued south of the River do work the gates at some northern termini – specifically Baker Street – even though it very obviously wasn’t valid there. Even if a London TL ticket comes in North and South flavours, one issued at Westcombe Park should be valid at all stations to St Pancreas, including London Bridge.

  724. That is all a lot clearer. Thanks all for your feedback.

    I’ll wave my ticket more confidently next time I cross the barriers at LBG to use the loo 🙂

    I did try once buying a weekly ticket at Farringdon rather than Westcombe to see if this resolved issue at LBG, but only difference was ticket was no longer accepted by machines at any London terminal, including Farringdon, to the confusion of all the TfL staff there. Lesson learnt 🙂

  725. timbeau,

    London terminals means any of the designated London Terminals. Normally this was used for cross-London tickets which were indicated by a + after the destination station showing cross-London transfer was included. Baker Street is listed as a valid London Terminal Station as a lot of people (myself included) choose to walk to Marylebone from there. I don’t know but am virtually certain Tower Hill is included for a similar reason.

    I have forgotten the current term but there is also the Southern Terminals that consist of the stations you would expect plus Vauxhall. The zonal system means that there would appear to be no advantage in having Vauxhall included though in the past it could be useful to save money (e.g. if living in south-east London and wanting to watch Surrey at the Oval).

  726. @PoP

    Quite so, but there is no valid route from anywhere in SWT land (where my ticket was from) to any London terminal other than the former SR ones (and, if from west of Basingstoke, Paddington). And yet my Kingston – London Terminals season ticket worked the gates at Baker Street when I absent-mindedly presented it instead of my Oyster.

  727. timbeau,

    So that is either an encoding error or simply that they have to be ‘flexible’ as they can’t code the correct requirements.

    The Cross-London situation always was a bit flexible. For example, if my memory serves me correctly, on an open return ticket you could often cross London by bus and use the central cross-London rail ticket part days later between two totally different terminal stations. I am sure this wasn’t the intention but there was nothing stopping you doing it.

  728. Quite. But this re-emphasises the point that the set of stations at which a given ticket opens the barriers, and the set of stations at which that ticket ought to open the barriers (in an ideal world) are often slightly different sets, and neither is necessarily a subset of the other. The reasons for these discrepancies are numerous and complex, and perhaps in some cases not really worth pursuing.

  729. @ngh 5 March 09:42 – “You probably have a “London Thameslink” (more expensive) rather than a “London Terminals”.
    The lat[t]er only covers you from the south for terminals till Blackfriars at which point you need a “London Thameslink” for going further north.”

    Not Blackfriars but City Thameslink I think you’ll find, as a substitute for the former Holborn Viaduct station above.

  730. Graham H
    Have you looked at the little diagrams appending that ( otherwise very useful ) ticket guide?
    At least one station seems to be in the wrong place!

  731. As an aside, I’m thinking of getting a Orpington-Cambridge Off-Peak ticket, out Sat, back Sun. The obvious route across London is Northern Line or Thameslink to Kings Cross, but could I go to Charing Cross, spend 3 hours protesting outside Parliament, and then use the tube from Charing Cross to Kings Cross. I know I can break an Off-Peak journey, but can I choose my own route between London Terminals?

  732. This is probably the wrong place to post this, so please move it to the right one if possible.
    Can anyone explain how the Rail Easy Split Ticketing website can get me a cheaper ticket than that direct from LNER for an LNER journey even when there is no split ticket involved?
    What am I missing?

  733. Re RogerB,

    Several possibilities:
    1. Are you a registered LNER and predecessor customer? If so quite often they will offer a ~7% discount on the 2nd advance single. (Rail Easy may well get that discount and pass it on)

    2. LNER’s website is run by Trainline who charge a large management fee.

    3. Rail easy possibly charge less than the standard TOC ticket sale fee. (Season ticket sales are a nice earner for TOCs).

    4. It may well be some form of hidden split ticketing type activity in that they know how to game GNER and successors tiered nodal demand based fares model and segment the journey or they book you a slightly longer journey you don’t use all of.

  734. There was a debate in Westminster Hall yesterday about rail services in South East London. At the end, the rail minister Andrews Jones made this comment about future thameslink services to Maidstone.

    “We are certainly committed to improving regular services between Maidstone and the City as soon as possible, and we are working very closely with the industry to finalise plans for the remaining stages of the Thameslink timetable. That work includes future services from Maidstone East. ”

    https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2019-03-06/debates/FCBC4F34-9A83-4C48-ACEF-9A6409B2CD5F/RailServicesSouth-EastLondon

  735. ngh 5 March 2019 at 17:01

    LONDON THAMESLINK from the North is valid as far as London Bridge or Elephant & Castle

  736. @Timbeau

    Looking at all of the autumn hullabaloo about this specific quirk, London Terminals tickets on routes via Finsbury Park are still valid on LU services between Finsbury Park, Highbury & Islington, Old Street, Moorgate and Kings Cross St Pancras (but not intermediate stops).

    Unless something changed with the January fares revision?

  737. RAIB has today published its report into the door incident at Elstree on 7 September 2018.

    https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/798697/R032019_190501_Elstree___Borehamwood.pdf

    At para 53 it quotes RSSB research that for an eight-coach train the driver should allow 13.5 seconds for the task of carrying out the ‘train safety check’ in order to ensure reliability in making a full and safe inspection of CCTV images. That is time required after the doors have closed, and even longer will be needed for a twelve-coach train. Evidence at paras 54 and 55 is that drivers take much less time for this task. Average time recorded for Thameslink drivers after the incident was 3.3 seconds.

    It is possible that the RSSB conclusion is over-cautious, but what would be the impact on Thameslink operations if station dwell times were 10-15 seconds longer than at present, because drivers spend longer checking it is safe to restart the train?

  738. LiS
    They will have to (re)employ station dispatch staff, won’t they?
    An extra 10 seconds & more likely 15 – minimum per stop on a “slink” service, all-stations St Albans – Sutton of 18 stops … Maybe not such a good idea?

  739. Having dispatch staff checking for 13.5 seconds and then unambiguously communicating with the driver doesn’t sound like it is going to make things faster.

    Is every train in the world going to have this delay? Sound tiring on whoever gets the job. Without any background in this subject, it looks to me the obviously solutions to do it automatically or to send each camera feed to a separate remote panel member to okay it.

  740. How does it work on the Victoria line with 8 coach trains and rather more 50% more doors?

  741. SFD ….the CCTV system on the Victoria line is quite different from that on the overwhelming majority of National Rail OPO or DOO CCTV systems. On a class 700 with bodywork cameras, there are images from at least eight or twelve cameras to monitor. On the Victoria line there are just four, but mounted on the platform with, arguably, a better view of the platform train interface. In addition, the Victoria line has sensitive door edges that will case the train to stop in the event it sets off with something stuck in the doors that is still attached to someone on the platform.

  742. Re Tom Hawtin,

    I’d also suggest that 13.5 Seconds is a long time for further issues to arise if new customers enter the platform and approach the train during that time (as other relatively recent RAIB report also show is a risk).

    Almost a case of damned whatever you do, unless you do something similar to Vic / Crossrail.

  743. It also takes no account of how busy it is…..

  744. This 13.5 sec time from doors shut to start the train seems incredibly long.
    Just count out 13.5 secs, imagine yourself in the silence of a cab & you may agree.

    I have tried to go to the original source but cannot find out the method employed & the justification for 13.5secs. Why not 9.5 secs or 14.9 seconds?

    This afternoon the job was done safely between Kentish Town & Luton at a station average of about 3 seconds. Slightly more than the time taken by the Elstree driver.

    13.5 seconds will add more than two minutes to an all stations to Luton train.

    If universally adopted present journey times & frequencies will be thrown out of the window.

    Will the TOCs dare to question the 13.5 secs?
    Was it produced by a researcher who had never been in a driving cab or been in railway operations?

  745. Re: Jim Elson

    To get hold of the research paper to which RAIB refers you have to go to a RSSB website that can only be accessed with a user-name and password.

    I don’t know how RSSB recruits staff, but would have expected practical experience of railway operating or engineering to be an essential qualification. One could make a case for a significant proportion of its staff being people on secondment for a year or two from other railway companies.

    More concerning, if there really is evidence that people need as long as 13.5 seconds to properly view eight video images (which is less than 2 seconds per image), that implies dispatch methods based on a camera on every carriage are not fit for purpose. As NGH suggested, if the driver takes this long getting to the image from carriage number 8, the situation could have changed at carriage number 1. And, presumably, RSSB considers something like 20 seconds as necessary for a twelve-coach train.

  746. There’s no problem accessing the RSSB website – you can log on via various social media sites.

    The research was specifically looking at using 6 images on a monitor rather than 4 – ie viewing every carriage in a 12 car train on 2 monitors. It was carried out using video images including staged incidents from real train cameras. The participants were train drivers most of whom were used to DOO. The recommendations are based on their results.

    The 13.5 seconds figure comes from the following recommendation –

    “Ensure that planned station dwell times allow for sufficient time for drivers to make a full and safe inspection of the CCTV images. It is recommended that as a minimum this includes the following time allowances (based on rounded 95th percentile values) in seconds for each length of train:

    Train length 4 cars, CCTV scan time 10.5 secs
    Train length 6 cars, CCTV scan time 12.00 secs
    Train length 8 cars, CCTV scan time 13.50 secs
    Train length 12 cars, CCTV scan time 16.00 secs

    The recommended times are based on 95th percentile values for each length of train in order to provide an appropriate safety margin for the majority of trips; the mean (average) time values would provide insufficient time to make an accurate and safe assessment on at least half of all stops.

    Note that this time relates only to that period between the moment at which the doors have been successfully closed and interlock has been achieved until the train starts to move, it must be in addition to time provided for passengers to board and alight while the doors are open.”

    In other words 19 out of 20 train drivers will have fully scanned the monitors of an 8 car train in 13.5 seconds after the doors have closed and this time should be included in the calculation of the dwell time at a station.

  747. Vince
    Which is, to anyone who has travelled on any trains, at all, anywhere … utterly bonkers.
    It also implies that the operation of say the London Underground ( Or any “Metro” system anywhwere ) is fundamentally unsafe & there will be fatal/dangerous accident happening all over the place – which is patently not occurring.
    This is as unreal & counterproductive as the recommendations made after the King’s Cross fire, which, if applied, meant that the station manager(s) in articular, never got any of their normal work done at all, because they were running round following the “safety” procedures.
    This finding has, I’m sorry to say one place only – the truncated-conical “filing cabinet” by the side of your desk!

  748. The Timetable Planning Rules 2020 show a half minute dwell time for electric units at most stations on the Midland Main Line, including Elstree. This allowance also applies at many stations south of the river.

    That means if drivers are expected to take as long as 13.5 secs for checking it is safe to depart, there are only 16.5 secs for opening the doors, allowing passengers to alight and board and closing the doors, or just 14 secs in the case of a twelve-coach train.

    I can’t help feeling there must be something wrong with the RSSB research, with some factor not taken into account sufficiently or at all.

  749. Just to be clear, I’ve never driven a train. But can I offer an observation despite that.
    Most DLR trains (though referred to as three car units) are equivalent length to a six carriage train. At most times the train operator will initiate the door closure whilst standing at one of the doors – but at some times, especially when services are really busy such as on marathon Sunday, the train operator will control door closure from the front left seat (what would be generally the same position as the drivers seat in other trains) looking at either platform-end mirrors or an array of CCTV screens. As a frequent DLR user, I’d say that the 95 percentile value for the operator to scan the mirrors or CCTV is under 2 seconds.
    This paper claims that on National Rail the safe value for a six carriage train is 12 seconds. That’s a massive disparity and it makes no sense to this observer.

  750. 95th percentile means that 1 in 20 times, it will take longer than the stated figure to scan the CCTV. Whilst the figures may be skewed a little by driver training runs, the stated figures seem counter-intuitive because a single driver could do this 20 times in a single run. Unless it is a few seconds for 18 stops and then for 2 stops, it takes a couple of minutes due to problems?

    I would suggest that if the RSSB want these numbers adopted for train planning purposes, they need to publish the data the numbers are based on.

  751. Jimbo and others. The report was published in 2005. That it was referred to in the RAIB report published in 2019 implies that it’s been ignored for the last 13/14 years, probably for the same reasons outlined here. Like Jimbo, I’m not a driver, but I would suggest that a driver starts to build a picture of what he or she is looking at on the monitors long before starting the safety check. It might well be that it takes 13 seconds or so to build that picture, but that time starts before the doors are commanded to close – a task with safety implications. The research process presented images to their driver volunteers in a desktop environment on the basis that the doors had been proved closed, which was an unreal situation.

    Note RAIB didn’t recommend the adoption of the 13 second or any other timing, only that GTR review their processes.

    If it was me doing the review, I would be wanting a process something like this.

    1) Check it’s time to be departing and check there is authority to move (eg clear signal)
    2) Check that it is safe to close the doors
    3) Operate the door close controls whilst observing the platform.
    4) When the doors are proved closed carry out a final check of the platform
    5) Confirm that there is still authority to move
    6) Depart.

    If a process something had been carried out at Elstree and Borehamwood, I would have expected the driver to notice someone still trying to board, but the RAIB is silent on the subject of why the doors were closed whilst someone was still tying to get on – unless I’ve missed it!

  752. I’m just reading the full Elstree report and have to disagree with one of their conclusions, “The RAIB’s inspection of the recorded CCTV images found that the passenger was clearly visible, standing in close proximity to the train (figure 9).”

    I didn’t see the passenger concerned at all, just the person standing to the side. It was only after repeated looks of maybe 15 seconds – on a tablet such that the image I was viewing is around the actual size the driver saw – that I found her, almost invisible in the shade of the platform edge slabs.

    Much like walkers at night wearing dark clothes she didn’t stand out against the dark background. As we obviously can’t demand that pax wear bright clothing I believe there is a strong case that the area nearest the platform edge should be clearly patterned such that any “shape” is clearly deliniated.

    I still don’t see the dog,

  753. It strikes me that if trains are going to remain at standstill for up to 16 seconds (depending on train length) then drivers are frequently going to find “changed circumstances” because passengers will have arrived on the platform and will be trying to push “door open” buttons. What happens then? Drivers wait for them to step back? they re-open the doors? or do they depart the platform regardless? There has to be some sort of sensible answer to whatever the diagnosed “problem” is. I note that RAIB report places some extra monitoring obligations on GTR but does not require them to comply with the timings in the RSSB research.

    I note the RSSB research dates from 2005. I wonder if camera and screen technology, especially on new stock, has improved / changed to aid drivers in their dispatch duties? I know this is essentially an issue around the performance of humans but it’s also interraction with technology.

  754. Acording to a London Transport spokesman “the primary aim [for installing platform edge doors] was to do with ventilation, and litter and human hair – we get tonnes and tonnes of human hair down the tunnels and it can take hours and hours of cleaning time,” “But of course there is the added safety benefit that it stops people committing suicide.”

    http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/468278.stm

  755. Is there a case for AI to provide clearance, monitoring all cars at once? How do unstaffed trains achieve safe working?

  756. Anecdata from a single journey, yesterday, taken at Bromley South
    Three trains, one 4-car, two 8-car, the numbers refer to the (approx) time in seconds between stopping & door-opening, the time the doors were open & the time between door-close & departure …
    8 / 26 / 9
    4 / 24 / 5
    7 / 90 / 5 ( Train was early & waited time )

  757. I think this 13.5 sec time from “door close” to “wheel move” may become an issue.
    A friend with ASLEF contacts has told me that drivers’ internet sites associated with London area TOCS, plus an unofficial LUL drivers’ site, have published links to the Elstree report & highlighted the 13.5 second remark.

    Driver posters have had broadly the same discussion as we have, but with several saying they should use all the 13.5 seconds or more to defend themselves from prosecution.

    If every driver took that view, DOO & also guard operated trains would be unable to operate at anything like the present rush hour frequencies in the London area. The consequence would be chaos & the capital’s railways would probably be less safe.

    This should not be swept under the carpet.
    The TOCS, TfL & even the Dft should challenge this 13.5 sec time vigorously – quoting years of safe DOO 1, 2 or 3 second despatch throughout England & lowland Scotland & specially below ground in London in the toughest of platform environments.

  758. Does anyone know how many long distance operators still have a notice saying ‘doors may close up to 30 seconds before the train is due to leave to ensure prompt departure’ (or words to that effect?
    I imagine most passengers just want to get on a train and go, and not have to work out whether the doors will close 30 /13.5/0 seconds before the train will start. Some standardisation of procedures needed here please.

  759. J Elson
    I have just done a quickish return trip to a just-in-London terminus, operated by “Overground”
    Maximum time from door-closing “bleep-&-shut” to movement of 3 seconds & on one occasion, one second.
    Strongly second your motion that affected parties should challenge this … shall we say “dubious” finding & recommendation from RSSB?

  760. This should not affect guard-operated trains, ones where platform staff give the right away, nor ones where the driver observes a small number of monitors on the platform (likely to give a better view than images from train-mounted cameras).

    The 13.5/16 seconds relates to the time supposedly required for the driver to check multiple small images on screens within the cab.

  761. I wonder if a slight change to door opening policy would make things safer, without compromising speed.

    Doors open on request (as now upon arrival, or with “door ordering” shortly before arrival).

    Doors autoclose as soon as the doorway is clear for more than a few seconds (reopening immediately if any obstruction is detected).

    At time of dispatch – all remaining doors are closed. In most cases, especially at less busy stations, all doors will have closed automatically at this point. Even if not, the driver has far fewer doors to check in detail.

    Crucially (and in contrast to the situation on the S stock) different door-closing chimes are used depending on whether the doors are closing automatically or upon command of the driver. There are also clear visual indicators on the doors from the outside that indicate their state (open, closing, closed but can be reopened, and closed for departure).

    This approach is used in many European countries – in particular in Switzerland. In that case, aside from illumination of the door buttons, the gap fillers serve as a good indicator (if the doors can be opened, they remain deployed, only retracting just before departure).

    It has its limitations – in particular for very high frequency environments like LU, but for the majority of heavy rail situations it works very well. It can also be further optimised, for example at stations where large numbers of passengers are expected to alight or board, all doors can be opened automatically (saving a few seconds if an unfamiliar traveller has not “ordered” a door.

  762. @ J Elson – if the drivers do decide to implement the RSSB research findings as a protection against prosecution then they have a very powerful weapon. As you rightly say timetables and services will fall apart and I suspect the tube will become unmanageable because of huge numbers stuck on platforms unable to travel because the throughput of trains will fall so much. So we’d have the bizarre situation of supposedly safer train dispatch at the cost of chronically overloaded stations / platforms and tens of thousands of delayed passengers. TOC and Tube management need to get a clear view about risk around the platform / train interface, train dispatch and human factors for drivers relative to the RSSB research.

  763. WW
    Precisely – but, if it comes to that, who is going to be left “holding the parcel”?
    As many have already noted, the recommendation is plainly both bonkers & non-enforcible for reasonable working in cities.
    But, who will step up & admit that RSSB had “got it round thier necks” though?

  764. I read these recent comments with a great feeling that, like me, others feel the RAIB guidance quite simply ludicrous. As someone that now directly assessess drivers I too agree with the assertion that these timings are untenable.

    As correctly pointed out there becomes a greater risk from late arrivals on the platform with the train waiting to move.

    In response to the DOO camera images on a 700 – they are superior to those of a 387 and especially the old 377/2 we had (it looks like Electrostar equipment from the 2005 RSSB report). But as we have seen from this incident they are not infallible.

  765. I hasten to add, we are awaiting a response from our safety and standards team regarding our approach forward.

  766. @ Greg – it is not a recommendation! Everyone is reacting as if it is but it isn’t. As 100&30 pointed out in an earlier post GTR were asked to review their processes. That’s a reasonable thing to ask in the circumstances. My layman’s view is that at some point the RSSB research needs revisiting given improvements in camera and screen technology plus greater understanding of the factors affecting driver performance and their interraction with technology. There could be risks with that but a review would seem pertinent.

  767. It is a recommendation in the RSSB report, but isn’t included as a recommendation in the RAIB report. The reference to the RSSB report seems out of context, as that time period is aimed at train planners using the 95th percentile values. So even in that experiment, 18 times out of 20 the participants would have been faster.

    The report was aimed at comparing times with more images present on a monitor. It looks well done for the comparative times in my opinion. Absolute times are more tricky as it’s much harder to reflect real world conditions and procedure in a simulated trial. For example checking the starting signal and taking power was replaced by reading a two digit number off a screen and then pressing ‘go’ on the keypad. The substitute process may have taken longer given lack of familiarity.

    Other recommendations in the RSSB report include considering further study of image scanning patterns and recommending drivers have a methodical scan pattern. Only 13 out of 21 drivers were categorised as having a planned strategy in the trial, those varying so much no further subdivision was possible. I’d expect the time taken to vary depending on the strategy (some were doing multiple scans of the images) so it probably doesn’t reflect current practice.

    At each train length, the slowest participant took twice as long overall as the quickest one. So a one rule fits all approach for drivers may not be wise, there wasn’t a significant correlation between time taken and error rate either. It seems a relatively inexperienced DOO cohort with the average in cab monitors experience being under a year.

    The mean (average) figure for 8-car trains was 8 seconds including time for the substitute task. The overall point in the RAIB report that 1.1 seconds is a short time to evaluate 8 separate images on a monitor, 2 liveness indicators and the starting signal seems valid. Hopefully the industry will carry out further studies if they want to find a realistic minimum time and the factors which influence it.

  768. The Thameslink Programme website has been converted into a learning legacy site. As it states:

    “Welcome to Learning Legacy, the collation of good practice, lessons learned and innovation from the £7bn Government-sponsored Thameslink Programme”

    https://www.thameslinkprogramme.co.uk/

    There are lots of interesting articles and downloads.

    What it does not appear to cover are the problems around the new timetable introduction.

  769. Processes reviewed. Advice as before. No set time limit on the train safety check after the doors have closed but a reminder to use the methodical ‘zulu’ approach to door scanning.

    Regarding the TLP site, I met a couple of chaps behind this a few weeks back and I understood that the site was to be a lessons learnt in terms of ETCS and ATO testing and implementation rather than the other issues of TLP (such as the timetable or shortage of drivers etc). The site wasn’t quite due to go live with the lessons learnt at that point but it seems like it now has.

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