On Friday, 13 October 2017 TfL officially announced a ‘pause’ to its Jubilee and Northern lines World Class Capacity programme. This harked back to a similar statement made by Patrick McLoughlin, then Transport Minister, about rail electrification – a project later restarted (albeit with omissions). The case here is rather different. This is a cancellation with a brave face put upon it.
‘Pause’ – as in ‘cancellation’
In fact, TfL’s formal announcement of the pause was rather belated. The writing had been on the wall since the previous Tuesday, when a verbal statement was made by David Hughes, Director Of Major Programme Sponsorship at London Underground.
Those who had been following the current Northern line upgrade (often abbreviated to NLU2), in particular, knew immediately that, when it came to Northern line trains, there could be no such thing as a pause. Here it was a case of if it got delayed, it got cancelled. Whilst the Jubilee line situation is slightly different, few commentators or informed sources believe that this is an electrification-style pause there either.
If NLU2 were delayed, then it may be a better strategy to abort this project and consider other strategic options for delivering additional capacity.
Quote from Finance and Policy Committee paper March 2016
In one sense, we should not be surprised. It has been known for some time that money is short at TfL. This doesn’t, however, paint the whole picture. TfL have repeatedly said that the capacity work on the Jubilee line represents good value for money and that it was a project that should go ahead in preference to others. Meanwhile, a lot of other projects, both within and without London Underground that seemed likelier to be cancelled, delayed, pruned or not envisaged in the current financial climate have gone ahead.
So whilst money is almost certainly at the heart of this matter, it is not simply a case of the project being too expensive.
To get some understanding of what probably went on, we need to return to the recently explored (in an Overground context) topic: the economics of ordering trains. In particular, the economics of ordering Underground trains.
The need for a production line
Ever since the days of Henry Ford, it has been the ideal of most manufacturers to have a high-volume production line as it dramatically lowers costs. Nowadays, manufacturers go a step further and look towards achieving as much automation as possible on that production line. To this day, the epitome of a company that is centred around the production line is the car manufacturer.
Lagging behind the car and other motor vehicle manufacturers are the train (‘rolling stock’) and plane manufacturers. They may be unable to attract the orders for large numbers of vehicles on the scale of car manufacturers, but they can still make their products cheaper if they can get a production line going. Also the bigger the order, the smaller the proportion of cost spent on development and testing.
Standardised yet flexible
In recent years there has been a strong trend amongst rolling stock manufacturers to have one flexible model that can be configured to the customer’s needs. This is not so different from BMW having an assembly line for Minis, yet giving the customer the ability to specify many options – from left- or right-hand drive to the choice of entertainment system installed.
As well as enabling the production line principle, a flexible train model means that development costs incurred upfront are not repeated on a large scale. It also significantly reduces acceptance costs. After all, a train horn is a train horn and you don’t need to get it separately approved each time it is incorporated into a variation of a common design. Finally, flexible off-the-shelf designs mean that manufacturers can respond quickly to demand should that be necessary.
Tube trains – non-standardised and inflexible
Small Tube trains on standard-gauge track can be found in London, but demand for such new trains with these specifications is probably unique. The idea of taking a readily-available type of train and tailoring it to fit the requirements of London Underground’s deep tubes is pretty much a non-starter.
For London’s deep tube trains, a train manufacturer pretty much has to start from scratch. This means that all the development costs have to come out of that individual train order. The best a manufacturer can thus hope for is a relatively large order, so as to minimise both development and startup costs as a portion of the total. A relatively large order also ensures that some economies of scale can be achieved during production.
The proposed trains for the Glasgow Underground – radically different from anything else
As a train manufacturer, what you really don’t want to bother with is a small order for tube trains with a unique profile – unless the customer is prepared to pay considerably above and beyond the normally expected price in order to get them. It is notable that a recent contract for replacing all the rolling stock on the Glasgow Underground went to Stadler – a company better known for its tram manufacture. As a manufacturer of trams, Stadler is used to adapting to be flexible and it is also used to accepting small bespoke orders.
Bigger (orders) is better
In recent years, when it comes to rolling stock procurement, London Underground has started to shift its strategy. This started in a big way with a single order for all of the Sub-Surface Railway consisting of only two variant types – the S7 and the S8. The number represents the number of carriages. There is some variation on seating pattern but apart from that the S8 is essentially the same train as the S7, but with an additional carriage added.
S8 stock at Amersham
This policy was then taken even further, with a single order planned for the rolling stock for the Piccadilly, Waterloo & City, Bakerloo and Central lines (the ‘New Tube for London’ project or NTfL). As on the Sub-Surface Railway, there will be variants for each line and these will primarily relate to the length of the train. It would not be surprising if the eventual replacement for the Northern line was either a follow-on from the lines previously mentioned or the forerunner of new stock intended for the Northern, Jubilee and Victoria lines. Either way, the long-term outlook could well involve just three types of rolling stock for the entire London Underground.
Image of proposed train for Deep Tube Upgrade
DLR almost follows the same practice
In a similar way, the DLR has now decided to go for replacement of all but its newest trains as one big order. The remaining trains are relatively new, as they were only ordered for the Olympics in 2012.
Recent DLR stock remains but most are to be replaced – Wikipedia photo in the public domain
Overground not so constrained
In contrast to London Underground and the DLR, London Overground is in a better position as it can utilise off-the-shelf trains built to their requirements as regard to elements such as seating layout and walk-through gangways. Nevertheless, when possible, they too seem to be going for fewer, bigger orders with options for additional trains. Crossrail too will get all its rolling stock from one order, with options exercised when additional trains are needed. Although Crossrail stock was originally ‘one of a kind’, it formed the basis for Bombardier’s new base model. Hence the similarity between Crossrail’s Class 345 and London Overground’s new Class 710 – also from Bombardier.
Image of Class 710 stock built for London Overground – remarkably similar to Crossrail stock
The cause of the pause
Back to the paused order. The order for the Jubilee and Northern Line Additional Trains (JNAT) – those needed for current, short-to-mid term capacity improvements – was tiny in relation to other orders for Tube trains in the past 25 years. Many options were considered at an early stage, but the numbers got whittled down to 10 x 7-car trains for the Jubilee line and 17 x 6-car trains for the Northern line. So that is just 172 carriages. By way of comparison, the original S Stock order (which excludes the extra train for the Croxley Rail Link) consisted of 1,387 carriages.
To make it worse, not only was the order relatively small, but the trains also had to be functionally similar to existing ones on the Northern and Jubilee lines – and the trains on these two lines are not actually identical. So, for example, they would have to feel the same to drive as existing stock on occasions when the train operator was driving it. Ultimately, even the 27 trains in the intended order could not be fully considered to be part of the same fleet, although there would have been a lot of commonalities.
Timing is everything
It probably is no coincidence that the JNAT programme was cancelled during the phase when London Underground was evaluating tenders for the additional trains. This suggests that it was the trains themselves – rather than the considerable amount of associated infrastructure work – that led to the cancellation. The appendix of the latest TfL investment programme report suggests that the JNAT contract award was made on 2nd October 2017. Much more likely, that was the date when they decided not to award it. Slightly worryingly the same document states that:
We have… also placed contracts for radio and CCTV equipment for the additional trains
which really does suggest that the cost of the trains came as an unexpected and unwelcome shock.
World Class Capacity paused
It is important to emphasise that without the new trains the outstanding part of TfL’s World Class Capacity programme to improve frequency on the Northern and Jubilee lines makes little sense. Most, but not all, of the work in that programme was about providing the infrastructure necessary to enable those trains to operate. This is likely why the formal pause announcement makes it clear that it relates to the entire World Class Capacity programme.
At this point, it is pertinent to compare the current situation on the Northern and Jubilee lines with the successful ‘World Class Capacity’ upgrade of the Victoria line. This increased the frequency during peak hours from 33tph to 36tph. The Victoria line upgrade (known as VLU2) had one very big thing going for it, however: it did not require extra trains.
Doomed from the outset?
If the reason for the for cancellation of the World Class Capacity programme was the unexpectedly high cost of the small number of additional trains then, unknowingly, London Underground probably doomed the project several years ago. The moment they decided, quite late on in planning phase, to go for the minimum number of trains consistent with getting the necessary additional capacity was probably the moment things would turn out to be untenable.
London Underground’s approach to the size of the proposed order was understandable. It was they themselves who emphasised the issue of the trains only being in service for less than half of their potential working life as they would almost certainly be scrapped when the remainder of the respective fleets were scrapped sometime after 2040.
Think of the money saved
The cancellation of the Jubilee and Northern lines upgrade is not just a matter of cancelling the order for a few trains. There was a large infrastructure programme planned to support their introduction. In fact, the cost of these works was far larger than the cost of the trains. That there would also be saving on infrastructure costs if the trains were cancelled may well have swayed minds and made the decision to cancel easier to make.
According to latest Investment Programme Report the World Class Capacity Upgrade – excluding trains – was a programme with an estimated final cost of £528 million. Currently, £74m has been spent. Most of that spending will have been on the Victoria line, which would have been by far the cheapest of the three lines to upgrade. So it is understandable why there may be a desire to cancel a programme that, when looking at the bigger picture, does not achieve that much yet will cost a further £454m.
The cancellation of the trains raises a number of issues. Some centre around what the current situation is and what can be done to make the best of it. We hope to look at that in a later article. For the moment we concentrate on a single question.
Why did this happen?
Much has already been written concerning the reason for this cancellation. It undoubtedly boils down to money – but, as we have already highlighted, that is not the full answer. The Mayor’s fares freeze cannot have helped but its contribution to this should not be overstated. The loss in government support in funding TfL’s capital programme is far more significant. But this loss of funding was already known at the time when TfL were still actively pursuing both the JNAT programme for the purchase of additional trains and the World Class Capacity programme which provided the enhancements to the infrastructure on which the JNAT project depended. Consequently, it doesn’t explain why the cancellation has happened now – as opposed to a year ago, for example.
Unexpectedly high Inflation (especially with a fares freeze) and uncertainty of future passenger numbers in the aftermath of Brexit must also be factors though to what extent is hard to tell. We suggest that, apart from the cost of the trains themselves, four things came together to produce a climate which rendered JNAT untenable. These are:
- A change of Mayoral Policy
- Unbudgeted Items
- Cost of maintaining older Tube stock
- The need to protect more important programmes
A change in Mayoral Policy
Probably more significant than anything else as a cause is the fact that the current Mayor has identified different priorities within his transport plan. Strictly speaking, this is perhaps better thought of as a change of emphasis and priority, rather than policy, but the consequence is the same.
In crude terms, the previous two mayors had a primary policy of keeping London moving. It was roughly the same policy, though the individual mayors in question sought to achieve their objectives by different means. For both of them, making the most of the existing Tube network was absolutely fundamental to their plan.
What we have seen from Sadiq Khan, the current Mayor, has been a change of emphasis. Whether he is right to do this largely irrelevant. The policies he is pursuing were in his manifesto, he was voted Mayor of London and TfL’s primary duty is to implement the Mayoral policy – providing it is legal.
New plans for old
As a consequence of this change of emphasis, we are now seeing quite expensive programmes being implemented that were never budgeted for in TfL’s long-term plans. So, for example, we are seeing a retrofitting of catalytic converters to buses in order to improve air quality at a cost approaching £100 million. The Rotherhithe – Canary Wharf crossing (expected to be a pedestrian and cycle bridge) is now also part of the plan at £65 million. The Mayor has also placed great emphasis in having accessible Underground stations. Consequently, the expensive programme to increase the number of Underground stations that are disabled-accessible has been enhanced and accelerated. This is in contrast to the previous mayor who cut back on this somewhat financially-crippling item.
The Mayor’s ‘change of direction’, if it could be called that, was probably making it very difficult to implement the JNAT programme but, on its own, it was probably not fatal.
Unbudgeted Items
The second of the four devastating blows at least has some sort of silver lining when it comes to enhancing London’s rail service. It concerns the number of unbudgeted items that have been getting approved recently. There is a good reason for these items to appear but, until recently, it was rare to see items on a TfL Committee agenda which asked for approval of significant expenditure that weren’t already in TfL’s budget.
One of the recent notable unbudgeted items put forward for approval was for four extra Crossrail trains for the enhanced service now planned west of Paddington. Details are commercially confidential but it is inconceivable that the trains will cost less than £40m. Indeed £50m would seem more plausible. The commercial case for ordering them is probably very good, as indicated by the benefit-cost ratio (BCR). This does not help the fact that, with TfL approaching the limit of what it can prudently borrow, cash up front has to be produced – however good the case is. What is more, that cash is something that hasn’t been previously earmarked for this purchase – and TfL does not have a large piggy bank of unallocated money.
More recently, on the same day that the press release was issued about the pause, we saw the Programmes and Investment Committee approve a further sum for more London Overground trains. The amount was commercially confidential but the cost of these trains is also unlikely to be less than £40m. In reality, this purchase is probably far better value for money than going through the expensive business of procuring Underground trains together with all the costly complexities of upgrading infrastructure in order to run a more intensive service on a Tube line.
Sometimes the requirement for money is not for an unbudgeted opportunity but for an unforeseen urgent need. Thus it was that TfL’s Head of Crossrail 2, Michèle Dix, had to ask for an additional £13m to keep work on Crossrail 2 going up to the point of presenting a hybrid bill to Parliament. Dix made it quite clear that the only reason the money was needed was to cover the cost of delays caused by the unexpected general election that took place earlier in the year. It is an unfortunate fact that the election and campaign may have only been around six weeks long and have seen the same party returned to government, yet the disruption caused to presenting a Crossrail 2 bill to Parliament has probably put the project back by a full year.
Unbudgeted items so far do not appear to add up to a substantial amount of money when compared with the total transport budget. Nevertheless, for those controlling the purse strings, it is probably a worrying trend. Possibly more worrying still is that the Mayor’s Transport Policy is only currently available in draft form. There may be future items of policy that lead to more unbudgeted expenditure. It is not so much a case of ‘how much unbudgeted money has been spent?’ as ‘how much do we have to allow for future unbudgeted items?’
Cost of maintaining older Tube stock
The third reason that we would suggest led to the decision to cancel the planned extra trains for the Jubilee and Northern lines is the need to hold back money to ensure that the existing (older) fleets can keep running on the Piccadilly, Bakerloo, Central, and Waterloo & City lines. In one sense this is just a specific example of unbudgeted items, but in this case, there is unlikely ever to be much choice as to whether to spend the money or not.
London Underground’s long-term deep-level Tube train replacement programme has been fairly disastrous. To replace trains on the four previously mentioned lines and to bring the service on those lines up to a modern, 21st century standard is an enormous – and very costly – undertaking. Indeed if inflation rises above its historical low then it may turn out that the final cost of doing so will have been as much as £15bn – comparable with the cost of Crossrail. Of course, much of the cost could be regarded as ongoing replacement and renewal that takes place as part of the normal asset cycle, rather than a capital investment. It is also slightly unfair to compare outturn costs of one project with the outturn costs of another project when there is approximately a difference of around 15 years between their completion dates. Nonetheless, it does give some idea as to the scale of the programme so far.
Despite the expense of the Deep Tube Upgrade programme, formerly known as New Tube for London, it was seen as both necessary and cost-effective as it would come at a time when rolling stock on the lines affected would be due for renewal anyway. Unfortunately, a failed resignalling contract for the Sub-surface Railway (Metropolitan, District, Circle and Hammersmith & City lines), which had to be retendered, meant that a significant amount of extra expenditure would be incurred on the replacement contract until around 2022. The fiscal implications of this delay must have impacted on the Deep Tube Programme.
It has never officially been stated that huge cost of resignalling and providing automatic train operation on the Sub-Surface Railway has delayed funding of the Deep Tube Upgrade programme. However, it is hard not to believe that the years of resignalling delay has done exactly that.
Meanwhile, the existing trains on the lines involved in the Deep Tube Upgrade programme haven’t been getting any younger and need more maintenance. More than that, they need a lot of tender loving care and wholesale replacement of some of the equipment on them which is outdated. Although every effort is made to predict the cost of this work, it is inevitable that it is only once the work gets underway that an accurate assessment is made of the true cost.
Clearly, ensuring one has the money available so that the existing fleets of Tube trains can remain in service is a higher priority than spending on new additional trains on lines which have a more modern stock anyway.
It is not just the trains either. With resignalling on the line years away, London Underground has recently spent around £40 million on a new Piccadilly line signalling control system which was developed in-house in order to reduce delays due to equipment failure. As with other items, this is probably extremely good value for money and prudent use of funds but, almost certainly, it is also something that wasn’t originally budgeted for.
The need to protect more important programmes
Important though the Jubilee and Northern Line World Class Capacity programme was seen to be, it really is not in the same category as some very expensive upcoming programmes for the Tube. As well as the need to update and upgrade what we already have in London, there is seen to be a vital need to get on with Crossrail 2, which is the only programme around likely to have a genuine, game-changing impact on London’s transport and housing issues.
Currently London Underground is well into the signalling upgrade of the Sub-Surface Railway. Over £1bn has been spent on this so far and it is estimated that at least another £1bn is needed to complete the job. The signalling needs to be replaced so, even if some savings can be identified, this is a sum of money that just has to be available. It is budgeted for, but with the uncertainty current in Britain and passenger numbers appearing to stagnate – so budgeted income figures are not being met – it is only prudent not to spend wildly on other things until one is absolutely confident about being able to fund such projects.
The Deep Tube Upgrade is mainly in the design phase at the moment which at least means costs are only measured in the millions not billions. Nevertheless, the rolling of the full project has had some eye-watering figures identified with it. As a long-term, value-for-money essential project it is vital it gets protected in preference to a relatively short-term fix for the Northern and Jubilee lines. The long-term solution can be looked at again for the Northern and Jubilee lines once the Deep Tube Upgrade programme is complete.
Finally, it is important not to forget about Crossrail 2 and keep the wheels turning on that project. The Northern line upgrade would have done very little for the problems on the Kennington – Morden section of the Northern line, which really need Crossrail 2 for a suitable bold solution. Crossrail 2 might be incredibly pricey, but it does comprehensively tackle issues that other schemes only tinker with.
One does wish, however, that sometimes TfL would just call a spade a spade, rather than a ‘temporary soil relocation device’. The cancellation of the World Class Capacity programme probably did not come as a surprise to some people. Arguably, it is also a prudent measure given the circumstances. Nevertheless, to claim (at least in part) that the work is no longer as necessary is more than a little misleading. Many of the issues that this project was designed to address still remain.
In another article, we hope to look at those issues in a bit more detail and see what options remain to deal with them.
Cover (and S8 stock) photo: mattbuck
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Excellent article as always. Minor comment: the sub-surface resignalling was retendered twice. The original contract was with Westinghouse/Invensys, now Siemens Automation.
Great read, and puts my mind to rest that this was the fault of the fares reduction (freeze less inflation effects). Seems to me that in this respect, as in many others, London is the victim of its own success of being the ‘first mover’ in tube railways, with nearly every line having different specifications – dimensions, swept volume, train length. We’d be able to have larger orders if every line was built to the same spec as the same vehicles could run on every line.
Such a pity that reboring them all to the largest standard (JLE?) is a complete non-starter. It would make life _so_ much easier and cheaper… 🙁
Re AlisonW,
I think the worse problem out there on the deep level network are the different length and capacity of stations, rather than running tunnels. (After all, tunnels aren’t that hard to re-drill in London. The Northern Line itself was once “re-born” in 1924, even in attempt to keep service running until accident struck)
New Tube for London is listed as being for the Jubilee line – I think that should be Piccadilly!
[Corrected. Thanks. PoP]
@Patrickov – ” (After all, tunnels aren’t that hard to re-drill in London. The Northern Line itself was once “re-born” in 1924, even in attempt to keep service running until accident struck)”. Goodness knows what the cost would be now to rebore every deep tube line to SSL standards – probably not far removed from the cost of building new. The cost of having and maintaining two different profiles of stock is undoubtedly small by comparison.
After all, Berlin has two profiles for its U-Bahn stock ….
Standard tube stock, and most subsequent types up to the 1972 stock, seemed to be capable of operation on all deep tube lines. What has changed?
And is London paying the full cost of the extra West of Paddington Crossrail units? Only seven of the 15 stations served are within Greater London.
The abstract answer is that standardization costs. By taking advantage of slightly less restrictive constraints on certain lines (e.g. greater tunnel diameter on the Victoria line), trains slightly too big for the most tightly restricted lines can have a bit more capacity. Also, it is no longer considered necessary for all trains to be able to get to Acton (or any other single site) for major overhaul. Signalling and train operation has got more complex since 1972, and it is not considered desirable to restrict all lines to the technology operated on the least sophisticated line.
(Engineering trains can still, I think, go everywhere, but not generally in public open hours).
All this leads to a question ( Which might be answered in subsequent parts, I admit ) ….
So, we are losing all the “serious”upgrades & fixes & small-orders of infill for deep-level tube stock, right?
But, sooner or later, all of this stuff will wear out – what’s the (new?) putative timetable for actual new stock, in an also-probably cheaper-per-train being ordered/showing up?
Greg Tingey,
Well, we will lose the small orders for rolling stock. I think TfL has long got wise to the fact that they really must include options for additional purchases but there is a limit to how long you can keep these options open – no rolling stock supplier would want to be saddled with that for an excessively long period.
There are some things you can do to utilise better the trains that you have got and we hope to look at that.
But, yes, eventually you have to bit the bullet and put in an order for as many trains as you can possibly justify.
All this assumes we are correct in believing it is the quoted cost of the trains themselves that sunk the World Class Capacity upgrade.
As to when, you can maintain trains almost indefinitely – at a cost. I could cobble together a timetable for stock replacement for the Underground but it seems to change on a regular basis so it wouldn’t be much use. Not helped by inconsistency within TfL documents. So, for example, there are documents that talk about Northern line trains being replaced by 2040 and others that talk of replacing the fleet some time in the 2040s. I have never seen a date given for the Jubilee line stock. I have long lost the desire to try and keep up with the dates of the stock for the Deep Tube Upgrade. I have almost lost any motivation to keep up-to-date with the order in which lines will be upgraded – that seems to endlessly change with the only consistency being that the Piccadilly really, really must be done first – for a number of reasons.
Off-topic observation on aircraft manufacture: there is a great deal of production line automation in the manufacture of the most popular aircraft these days. Boeing turns out 47 737s a month and may hike this to 57; Airbus is increasing its rate to 60 A320s a month. Production lines are able to handle different variants at the same time (different lengths, and now different exit door arrangements for the same model).
So (London Underground) trains may be the only remaining relatively bespoke transport manufacturing operation.
Simple question that no doubt has complicated reasons why impossible: can this be resolved by cascading the Jubilee and Northern line fleets to the Bakerloo and Piccadilly lines respectively, and the J and N getting the new tube stock instead?
Looks like any extra trains – come the time – will be part of the Deep Tube Upgrade programme. A big question in my mind is whether a single stock will be sustained through the the expected duration of the programme. Even at a time of slower technological change, the jump from 1938/49 stock to 56/62 on trains with an almost identical carriage architecture resulted in fundamentally different trains. Then the mind goes back to the 1986 experimental train that was supposed to set a way for the future, however the resulting 1992 stock ended up being something of a dead end, with no discernibly common elements following through to the ’95/’96.
Much as a ‘Son of Standard Stock’ seems most desirable, the time factor involved makes this a big ask. There could be a danger that locking 3 or 4 lines into an extended order renders the latter tranches being unable make use of developing technology, ideas, or regulatory environment, unless the same production line sees a similar jump between the ’38/’49 – ’56/’62 during the process.
@Malcolm – You seem to suggest that the Victoria Line trains, or at least the original 1967 Stock, couldn’t run on other lines because of a greater envelope (ignoring the ATO aspect). In fact, they have regularly been through the Piccadilly Line tunnels to reach Acton Works and the Central Line tunnels to reach the Woodford – Hainault loop, whilst one unit is said to be at London Road depot (near Elephant & Castle) on the Bakerloo and others are in store at Eastleigh for possible use on the Bakerloo. See Wiki:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/London_Underground_1967_Stock
If they can run on that lot, then they could have run on the rest.
@ PoP – interesting article. I have one quibble and that’s with the use of the term “unbudgeted”. While I understand the point you are making about revised Mayoral priorities if we take TfL and Val Shawcross at their (public) word then the Budget was completely rebuilt and restructured last year. I would expect TfL to have been more than aware of what it reasonably hoped to do with respect to Crossrail services and Overground enhancements. We know for a fact that the trains for the Barking Riverside extension were budgeted. It was pretty rare, even in my old days as a client, for major programmes to be unbudgeted. The process these days is far more involved and has far more challenge and rigour applied so I would be surprised if there is really as much “unbudgeted” spend as you suggest. Authority papers usually state very clearly if unbudgeted funds are being sought and that term is not evident in the recent paper for extra Overground trains but, of course, we don’t get to see the full financial detail. The other aspect, and pardon the cynicism, with the Crossrail and Overground fleet orders is that the improved services are likely to be in place during the current Mayoral term so can be touted as a “success”. The Riverside extension won’t be finished but it will be in build so that can be also hailed as another positive initiative.
I do think your points about weak patronage / revenue numbers, “softening” economic prospects and inflation are much more the story alongside the fares freeze. You know my views on this so won’t repeat them again. I do wonder if the procurement process for the Deep Tube Upgrade rolling stock has resulted in a lot of “teeth sucking” from suppliers over the scope that LU want. That may also have caused some jitters around the budgeted numbers for the Picc Line upgrade and LU may have decided they need some more financial headroom to cope with possible new train costs.
Graham F: Yes, my comment was general, and I only brought in the Victoria line as an example of developments since destandardisation. I was insufficiently precise in quoting the example, as I was actually thinking of the 2009 stock, which is famously boxed-in to the Vic line.
Concord…..there are lots of railways around the world that need special trains, usually dictated by one or more of these features: structure gauge, track gauge, curvature, electrical power supply, gradient and weather. (I am sure I have missed something!)
The great thing about planes is that the infrastructure tends to be designed around the aircraft. This is not always true on railways, especially metros, hence Heinz 57 sizes of train!
Graham Feakins, Malcolm,
I don’t think there is any doubt that 67 stock could get to Acton Works. It was a fundamental part of the design philosophy of the Victoria line that they could. As a result the tube was built needlessly small (at 12′ only very slightly bigger than the standard size of 11′ 8¾”). I think it was one of the few big design errors of the Victoria line that thinking centred around getting these trains back to these works. The tunnels could have been two feet wider otherwise and could still have taken exactly the same route. Any bigger and it would have to be deeper to be able to serve Oxford Circus and King’s Cross. All made clear in ‘The Story of the Victoria Line’ by John Day.
Equally, the new trains definitely cannot go on the Piccadilly line. It was intended to deliver them this way – at very slow speed – but even this turned out to be impossible. A combination of extra width and/or extra length compared to the original prevented that.
Walthamstow Writer,
We know for a fact that the trains for the Barking Riverside extension were budgeted.
I am pretty sure not. At least not in the sense of budgeted for the 2017-2018 budget. Why would they be when building the extension has hardly commenced and is not due for completion until 2021? The paper to the Finance and Investment Committee suggests that they weren’t currently budgeted for and the part of the discussion that was in public strongly suggested this was all unbudgeted – like a statement from a board member saying “This is entirely unbudgeted”.
It might have been budgeted for some future year but accountancy doesn’t work on that basis. A lesson my brother learnt at a young age when he tried to get an advance on his pocket money. I suppose in some sense it was budgeted for. On the same basis you could argue a payday loan is budgeted for.
Walky,
I don’t really know where to start but here are a few openers:
1. See this excellent comment by 100andthirty on District Dave’s forum.
2. The problem with the Jubilee line is that the Platform Edge Doors are incompatible with future Deep Tube upgrade stock. This is a big issue.
3. Something needs to be done about the Piccadilly line as soon as possible. This is because of both the age of the trains and the demand level. Any scheme which involves a two stage process is bound to slow that down and introduces additional risk. In comparison a bit of a shortfall in rolling stock on the Northern line is insignificant
What is the £40m for Piccadilly line signalling control system being spent on exactly? Is this new workstations in the box? £40m doesn’t usually buy one very much in signalling terms…
“So, for example, they [the new trains] would have to feel the same to drive as existing stock on occasions when the train operator was driving it. ”
This comment doesn’t make sense to me, given that the Jubillee and Northern lines are now fully ATO
@ PoP – OK, you were in the meeting and I wasn’t. I still find it extraordinary that the BRE trains weren’t budgeted given all the statements to the public enquiry and elsewhere that the project was fully funded and budgeted. Assuming TfL still set their capital budgets on the basis of Value of Work Done (VOWD) with cash out of the door handled separately then the VOWD of extra class 710s is likely to be negligible in the current financial year given we are in October. There is, of course, the more interesting matter as to whether any capex is incurred at all given the LO trains are being funded by a leasing company who (I assume) will own the trains and it is actually the TOC who pays them when the stock comes into service and TfL will adjust the Concession fee to reflect this at the due time. I can see that if extra sidings are needed in a depot or the ELL signalling works proceed then that is capex funded and that might be unbudgetted in the current year. I can’t remember whether TfL ever put a leasing deal in place for the Crossrail 345s or if they are a directly owned asset. I know the original plan for a PFI funding deal was killed off at TfL’s insistence given worries over the IEP and Class 700 deals.
TfL were recently challenged by the Assembly as to why there was no capital funding for the Silvertown Tunnel. The answer that came was that the scheme was expected to be funded via a PPP contract and thus would not be capitalised because it’d be funded via revenue from tolling the Blackwall and Silvertown crossings. If that argument applies for the tunnel then why wouldn’t it apply to leasing more trains – it’s the same issue isn’t it?
Finally TfL traditionally “overprogramme” their capital budget in the expectation that some works will not proceed as per schedule meaning funding is “spare” in the current year. Other work is therefore programmed that can use any released funding. Stuart Harvey of TfL recently stated that several tens of millions of pounds had been released back to TfL from Major Projects that were now expected to come in under budget. Some of that could, for example, have funded any marginal VOWD impacts in 2017/18 from the extra LO trains.
Anyway, just let me sit here in astonishment about TfL’s budgetting process. No wonder the London Assembly are bamboozled by TfL’s number crunching.
James……Drivers are, on occasion required to drive ATO trains manually. They need to “feel” more or less the same. Believe it or not, the same is true for the ATO controller. Although it’s a closed loop controller and can compensate for some deviations, it has to be tuned to the characteristic of the trains if it is to control trains to stop routinely within plus or minus 300mm or so of the stopping point. This is entirely possible, but would require the ATO controllers to be bespoke to the small fleet with means to ensure they don’t get mixed up with the existing ones – all entirely do-able – but easier to match the new trains performance to the old ones.
Anonymous 11:05,
Try looking at page 33 of this Investment Programme Update or search for ‘Piccadilly line interim upgrade’ within it for details.
Walthamstow Writer,
I too wonder how the TfL Board follow the number crunching. Also how they follow details of a project. It would be nice if every time TfL officers produced a paper they referenced the previous paper on the subject so we could follow what has progressed since the subject last came up. None of this helped by renaming projects as they go along or sometimes concatenating projects and sometimes not. So they seem to try and bury Four Lines Modernisation resignalling within the total project when it suits them and sometimes not. Dates are another complete mystery because projects miraculously become ‘on time’ because the end date has been re-specified. Or alternatively is slightly late but it is explained to board members that this is against their aggressive internal schedule and in fact the project is running early when compared with the official completion date.
Then there are the projects that just seem to be airbrushed out of any report e.g. Metropolitan line extension. And items that you would think would logically come under one project but, in fact, are part of a completely different nebulous project. So new air shafts for the Jubilee line didn’t come under Jubilee line upgrade and Holborn Station upgrade not being part of the Deep Tube upgrade despite being dependent on it (but you could argue that the station upgrade is not dependent on the Deep Tube).
I think the issue that you had really highlighted this. Of course trains for Barking Riverside extension have been factored in for future budgets – but not for the current one. And then it gets buried in a proposal for other new London Overground trains so you can’t untangle it – not that it matters because the figures are confidential anyway.
If there is anything good about this, the current TfL Board do seem to be more probing that previous ones and don’t just rubber stamp stuff.
So with the cancellation of the upgrade programme, what did we lose in proposed capacity increases?
1) Where will the Battersea Extension (NLE) obtain its stock?
2) For the Northern line the real game changer will be Camden Town Capacity Improvement (2025?). Then the line can be separated into two. Once that happens more stock would be required. Depending on the Deep Tube roll out dates one separated line potentially could jump the queue and receive new stock (After Picc). With existing stock focused on the other line. (NB Bakerloo Extension will also need new trains so unless you truncate northern end, at say Wembley, complete stock change likely to be needed at a similar time). However unpleasant another decade and a bit.
3) Jubilee line – if new stock to current characteristics can’t be provided at a sensible price I can’t see higher frequencies. Crossrail, District signalling, LO-ELL extra trains/ signalling may in combination provide sufficient alternatives for a brief period.
@walky
I believe the extra throwover of the longer carriages of 1995/96 stock (and 1973 stock) preclude their use on the Bakerloo because of some tight curves on that line.)
130 – many manufacturers are now building trains for a variety of customers and applications based on common design parameters, such as Hitachi’s A-train, which is the basis for a wide variety of trains on the Japanese narrow gauge system as well as British trains as different as the IEP, Javelins, and the class 385s currently being built for Scotrail local services – and even a couple of monorail systems in the Far East!
But it would take a lot of redesign to adapt the A-train layout down to tube size.
BRE is Barking Riverside extension. LBM
To operate the Battersea extension will only need a handful of additional trains, some judicious short-turning of trains at Golders Green / East Finchley / Finchley Central should be able to achieve that.
When the Piccadilly receives its new trains, I would speculate that two batches will be needed – an initial batch that will replace the 1973 stock on a 1:1 basis and continue to operate under traditional signals, then a second batch to significantly increase the service when it is resignalled. Get that second batch delivered concurrently and send them to the Northern on an interim basis – Wikipedia says that 1973 stock and 1995 stock trains are the same length.
The stumbling block for additional train on the Jubilee is having a door layout that is compatible with the PEDs. So send 10 x 1995 stock trains from the Northern to the Jubilee. As these will each be a car short, disband an additional 5 x 1995 stock trains to provide the necessary 10 trailers. This would leave the Northern short of 15 trains, plus the 17 additional trains that were wanted, so it would want up to 32 of the new Piccadilly trains on loan, which might match quite nicely with the quantity of additional trains that will be wanted for the Piccadilly when it goes ATO.
When the Piccadilly finally claims its extra trains that the Northern has “borrowed”, you build a further batch of the latest derivative of the new Deep Tube train to replace them, then at the end end of the programme you build more to fully replace the 1995 stock which will be nearing the end of its life.
The Victoria line tube trains and S stock for the Circle line etc were ordered together from Bombardier. They are both part of the Movia family.
Timbeau and Taz. Don’t believe all you read in train manufacturers’ publicity regarding their “platforms”. S Stock and 2009 tube stock have much less in common than some of the “common platform” automobiles in production; for example the VW Golf and the VW Passat are based on the same MQB platform but are quite different in size. They use many common engineering parts. There are few common parts on the tube trains.
Slightly off topic, but since it is mentioned in the article, is the Rotherhithe Bridge cost of £65 million just the base cost without risk? There was a comment by a councillor last year on the wharf.dot.co.uk that the cost would be £200 million.
Re (un-)budgeted, isn’t the issue that the word means different things this/next year and future years? When I wrote the South East Wales Transport Alliance capital budgets, the internal future year outline budgets had many variations, with ceilings set at cut, standstill, low increase, high increase, and items including committed, low, medium and high priority, plus various cost confidence levels. But in the published version we only ever included committed items (multi-year projects that have started), broad categories (e.g. ‘further interchange upgrades’) and a scheme pipeline (that is, all potential schemes) with status info – plus a long-winded explanation that budgeting is difficult 😉 The pipeline was there to keep councillors happy and to lobby the Welsh Government to give us more funding. (We’re talking <£20m here.)
At draft stage board members raised their high-priority items. We did report back, though the real info was in the verbal report, not the written one (or the minutes, which were mainly actions). Luckily for us the press never attended, though Railfuture did and occasionally lobbied the members or the Assembly for this or that.
In practice most surprise/unbudgeted items (i.e. items that did not appear in the published outline budget for the next couple of years but then did appear in a budget during those years) were well taken account of in numerous future budget variations before, so inclusion was easy, and they were only unbudgeted in the sense that they did not appear as a specific headline previously. There were a few genuine surprises, i.e. projects that were previous seen as very low priority and/or very unlikely and/or unready (e.g. Pye Corner) and/or cancellations (Gabalfa junction). But as most of our schemes were co-funded with other programmes there was usually a way round. EU-funding was especially useful in this context because they have a different financial year which really provides flexibility. But as said, you wouldn't find out which were the real surprises to officers by the paper work…
@Steve L – 15x6car trains taken from the Northern would provide 10x7car trains for the Jubilee, and 5×4 car trains, which in turn could be used on the W&C (providing they fit), to free up a clutch of additional units for the Central. The other 91×6 car trains of the 1995tube stock could then go onto the Piccadilly, providing it with a slight increase in stock provision. In this scenario, the Northern would be the first recipient of the NTfL. The benefit of this would be that all transferred units stay on their line until scrap and replacement, and you don’t end up with the musical chairs of the late 70s/early 80s cascades. You would however need to rebuild/rewire the transferred stock to better match that on the line it would end up on; the W&C stock in particular would need a total redo.
Though the numbers might match, as linked to earlier 130’s post on DD’s forum was a reply to a similar suggestion I made there, and details succinctly why nothing is ever simple! The operational, equipment, and owning issues are all good reasons to make anything vaguely creative a pain in the neck, and more complex/expensive than in an ideal (non-existent) world.
My response on DD centres on the fact that the assumption is that in such a plan the Pic infrastructure would need to be adapted to match the 1995ts requirements. I wonder, though, whether the option of adapting the 95ts to match the Pics infrastructure and requirements was ever costed or explored? I would have thought recommissioning tripcocks and arranging a sighting exercise to use existing platform CCTV monitors from a 95ts cab would be cheaper than converting the Pic to the Northern’s flavour of ATO and installing beacons etc. However, administrative costs for safety cases and the sort may be totally prohibitive.
This is idle speculation as an enthusiast. More realistic solutions, creative or not, will emanate from those with actual professional expertise in such matters and programmes!
While the headline might be that the upgrade is paused if you look more carefully at David Hughes’ comments:
It is actually JNAT ( a seperate project) rather than the upgrade as whole that is paused.
The capacity upgrade has 4 elements to it at the strategy level:
a) infrastructure upgrades that allow greater frequency (sometime in central “core” sections only.
b) ainfrastructure directly related to those additional trains (i.e. JNAT project) e.g. more stabling and maintenance capacity at depots.
c) infrastructure indirectly related to but required for b) which can be done as cheap often incremental upgrades in a)
d) infrastructure indirectly related to but required for b) which are expensive and disruptive add-ons to a) & c).
It appears that just b) which is which has been paused not the others [ a), c) & d) ] which are part of JLU2/NLU2/Morden intermediate programmes.
Hence what I suspect we will see (and evidence on other decisions taken in 2017 align with this) is that a) & C) will proceed but b) and d) won’t (for the time being.)
What I suspect the VLU/VLU2 programmes (and the hard data they have generated) have shown is that it might be possible to squeeze more out of the existing stock (see TfL comments below) especially on the northern line than was though at the time the requirement for the 17 Northern and 10 Jubilee trains was created. Therefore pausing and pricing up smaller orders might be sensible – even if the per car cost goes up as the total cost could still be lower and still allowing a later positive investment case to be made for additional stock. A reduced requirement for additional stock also reduces the requirements for additional stabling and maintence facilities
TfL also make the
figleaf?case that other improvements Crossrail / Thameslink“2000”and external factors such as Brexit and reduced overseas capital inflows to the London Property market add lots of uncertainly to the demand picture.*ditto Northern line from London Bridge and Kings Cross towards Bank/Moorgate
Hence I’m not so bearish as PoP on this one.
The infrastructure costs for Sub-schemes are as follows:
JLU2 £78m – All approved long ago – A mix of a), b) and c)
Morden intermediate £17m – Final tranch approved in June allows 32tph on the Morden branch in peaks from Easter 2019 with existing stock. – All a)
NLU2 £392m – of which £79m approved so far – a mixture of a), b), c) & d) so expect to see some reductions here especially in b) & d)
JLU2 scope:
The scope comprised:
(1) power strengthening works at six substations;
(2) four cooling ventilation fan upgrades;
(3) train depot enabling works at Stratford Market Depot and Neasden Depot;
(4) renewal and upgrade of tracks at West Hampstead;
(5) modifications to signalling systems, including automation options;
(6) minor modifications to existing trains; and
(7) maintenance and operating changes.
Most of which apart from (3) would be useful for a) [e.g. better using exiting trains]
Morden Intermediate Scope:
The scope comprised:
It is proposed to continue with the full project scope as follows:
(1) track works to accommodate higher train speeds;
(2) braking improvements;
(3) signaling system modifications to support higher capacity service at
pinchpoints; and
(4) power works to support higher capacity service
Most of which apart from (3) would be useful for a) [e.g. better using exiting trains]. with a bit of c) [doing at the same time as a) works as the incremental cost is low.]
NLU2 scope:
The scope comprised:
(1) provision of five additional train stabling spaces at Morden Depot;
(2) provision of a new train depot at Highgate;
(3) track upgrade at East Finchley;
(4) modifications to signalling systems;
(5) power strengthening works at 22 substations and power cable upgrades;
(6) minor modifications to existing trains; and
(7) maintenance and operating changes.
Without additional trains 1 & 2, which are very expensive aren’t required.
3-7 are need for for a) [e.g. better using exiting trains] or c) doing at the same time as a) works as the incremental cost is low.
In the NLU2 scope at a more detailed level I suspect the following will still largely survive as they are needed for a) and have a very good BCR:
(101) power upgrades (22 substation upgrades, new feeder cable at 14 sites, increased regenerative braking);
(102) low loss composite conductor rail, fan renewal and two cooling schemes;
(103) upgrades to track including development of new track layouts for service pattern and stabling;
(104) signalling pinchpoint improvements (to support throughput);
(105) signalling software – coasting changes (for energy efficiency);
(106) depot signalling at Morden; (based on the recent VLU/VLU2 work at Northhumberland Park)
(107) signalling modification to support new track layouts (e.g East Finchley turnback).
Putting my cynical hat on for a moment. If we all agree that TfL are dead set on securing funding and authority for Crossrail 2 as a top priority, is it not in their interest to suppress capacity on the Northern line for the time being? Any uplift in Northern line capacity will surely dampen the benefit-cost ratio for the Crossrail 2 business case. It would be interesting to know what Northern line frequency the Crossrail 2 have been assuming in their business case, or whether they have even made any assumption at all on this yet…
Another potential reason for pause on the additional rolling stock (JNAT) at a comparatively late moment is that the bodyshells for the existing stock were built in Alstom’s Madrid factory which is very much at risk as part for the Siemens-Alsthom merger. It is also probable that Alstom existing variable frequency /voltage 3 phase drive technology will largely get discontinued as Siemen’s VFD division turnover is ~50% of the total Alstom turnover (and the Alstom turnover includes lots of 3rd party work as part of turn key projects they lead so the picture is even worse in the detail).
Hence the bidder may have made a request for a pause while they reassess their bid in the light of changes at their end.
ngh 09:21,
Well, that is basically the follow-on article exactly although there will be a bit more in it. The good thing for me is that now I don’t have to dig out the references to some of the stuff.
The only thing different is that you say NLU2 and JLU2 will continue. I believe they are cancelled and that any benefits (such as those you have mentioned that have a good case) will be represented as a separate project or separate mini-projects. But that is almost splitting hairs.
The information I have (forwarded to me so no quite sure of exact original provenance) states:
Re PoP,
References – I have loads more and some thinking on how much you can achieve with the existing fleet.
NLU2/JLU2 continuing – I meant in some reduced form minus JNAT requirements and probably under a new project name as per Tfl tradition. Much work has already taken place and some of the other is either financially positive (aka infinite BCR) or could be regards as largely renewal work (e.g. at least 5 of the 22 Northern substations fall into this category as life expired).
Strip out the depot costs and it all looks much more sensible for both lines.
Anonymous 09:25,
Undoubtedly a thought that many have had.
In fact, as we shall see in the follow-on article, the planned upgrade on the Morden branch from 30tph to 32tph will go ahead as, technically, it is not part of NLU2. More to the point, unlike NLU2, most of the critical work is complete or close to completion. And it doesn’t involve buying more trains.
ngh 09:34,
I suspect the strict rules of contract tender would prevent one party unilaterally having a request for a pause accepted. However, if Siemens-Alstom felt unable to bid that may well have made the remaining options very limited and untenable.
Re Alstom/Siemens………..all the signals so far suggest that it will be some years – and certainly beyond any likely JNAT timescale – before Alstom and Siemens start rationalising their product lines, although I agree with the likely outcome that NGH suggests. By the way it was in Alstom’s Barcelona factory that the existing trains’ bodyshells (whole cars for the 2005 additional Jubilee stock) were manufactured.
Very much opinion, but I strongly suspect that the opening of Crossrail 1 will bring more overall traffic onto the tubes, whilst temporarily relieving the loads in some limited parts of the system ( Notably Jubilee Line Stratford – Waterloo & Central Bond St – Stratford )
It’s going to be very interesting to see how much suppressed demand there is on the ex-GW lines, once electric services Didcot-Paddington start at either the next tt change, or in May ’18 – because a very large part of that load will then go straight on to CR1, the moment the last phase opens in ’19.
Yes, Greg but …
All this would have been known years ago. It is not exactly as if building Crossrail were a secret. Statements given explain that Crossrail and Thameslink will mean that there will be some easing of demand on the Northern and Jubilee lines.
What we would really like to know is not how they think Crossrail (and Thameslink) may make the Northern and Jubilee line upgrades less necessary, which is what is implied, but why they think this has changed from any previous analysis.
None of this helped by a lack of an official press release on the TfL website. All we have is comments from David Hughes and we don’t know how ‘off the cuff’ they were. Certainly, without any explanation of what has changed, they just seem meaningless and prompt the desire for more questions.
Re PoP @ 1008,
But if a pause is mutually acceptable to both parties…
Re 130,
Oops I should have checked rather than relying on memory…
Re PoP / GT,
I suspect new data might also have lead to the models being refreshed, perhaps post wifi tracking experiment?
ngh,
I was thinking in terms of other bidders. TfL might be happy to pause the bid other companies bidding will probably genuinely not be pleased. Not to mention that if they realise the reason behind it they will do their utmost to ensure it doesn’t get stalled so that they can eliminate some of the competition.
Obviously, if all parties involved agree then there isn’t a problem.
@anonymous
“authority for Crossrail 2 as a top priority, is it not in their interest to suppress capacity on the Northern line for the time being? Any uplift in Northern line capacity will surely dampen the benefit-cost ratio for the Crossrail 2 business case. ”
I am still not convinced that Crossrail 2 will relieve the Tooting – Kennington section of the Northern Line. Surely the number of people from Morden, Colliers Wood etc, changing to XR2 will be heavily outnumbered by the hordes of Surreyites interchanging the other way to get to the City?
(Especially as there are alternative, and probably easier, interchanges for those Mordeners to get to most XR2 destinations by staying on the Northern Line and changing across the platform at Stockwell or Kennington, or staying on the train to Kings Cross)
timbeau,
And I am not convinced that my response would be different.
As we have discussed this a number of times I think this will have to be out-of-bounds here.
As Elvis sang “It’s Now or Never”……… if the trains had been ordered now, they wouldn’t be in service before 2020. By then 1995 stock (NL) would be an average of 20 years older and 1996 stock (JL) slightly older (ignoring the 2005 vehicles). Based on a usual fleet life of 40 years, The longer the delay the worse the bargain to buy new trains with an intentional life of <20 years. Come 2040, LU can buy more Deep Tube Upgrade trains for the Northern. Because of the PEDs, the Jubilee is very different challenge, but fortunately no one needs to worry about that for another 10 years!
100andthirty,
Worse than that actually, The figure of 2021 was generally quoted for the Jubilee line because not all the necessary JLU2 work would have been be complete before then – though there would have been some interim improvements not requiring new trains.
As soon as the Northern Line date started slipping, I think various people must have started getting concerned for the reason you stated. Very little (as in ‘none’) of the actual boots-on-ground work (rather than shoes-on-office-carpet work) had been done for NLU2 so we were some years off anyway.
A bit of a giveaway was the lack of concern about the Battersea extension being open before the necessary extra vehicles would have been delivered.
Excuse my ignorance, but does this impact the separation of the Northern line extensions (in terms of them fulfilling their capacity potential in terms of train frequency) To my non-expert mind it seemed we were effectively getting an additional tube line at a bargain price (infrastructure changes, Camden Town redevelopment and additional trains a fraction of say CR1 or CR2).
@Greg Tingey
How will Crossrail 1 reduce loadings from Waterloo to Canary Wharf/Stratford? Crossrail doesn’t interchange with any SWML stations, so the only route involves interchanging via TCR or Bond St No argument that Central Line loadings will decrease.
I suspect that even if a pause is acceptable to all suppliers currently in the race and to the would-be purchaser, it could still be subject to challenge by another firm who might say “we would have bid if we had known that there would be extra time”. Plus the fact that a supplier would not wish it to be publicly known that they wanted a pause (unless it was already agreed), so agreement between bidders (even if they all secretly wanted it) is unlikely.
Travelers from Reading or its hinterland (particularly places where the Waterloo service is easier to get to, but the Paddington one is possible) to Canary Wharf? Or from Windsor?
@James
The reason why Crossrail could ease overcrowding on the Jubilee between Waterloo and Canary Wharf is not because it would reduce the number of people getting on at Waterloo but because fewer people would be using the Jubilee to get to the Wharf from north and west of Waterloo. For example, a commuter who arrives at Paddington and uses the Bakerloo & Jubilee lines to get to the Wharf would certainly switch to Crossrail from Dec ’18.
It makes sense to me that the opening of Crossrail 1 will remove some passengers from the Jubilee to Canary Wharf, it is safe to assume that a large proportion of passengers from the north and west of London will switch. However, every service will occasionally suffer from disruption – given the many predictions that Crossrail will be full from day one, how will the Jubilee cope if Crossrail is disrupted?
@BEN – I did consider using the remaining 1995 motor cars for W&C, but considered it a crayon too far, to only provide the Central with 2.5 extra trains.
@ 100&30 – one of the TfL papers on this topic said clearly that any slippage started to weaken the business case significantly and we’ve already had months of delay. TfL / LU can always manage to justify spend to keep trains running for an extra decade or so but it would always find it near impossible to justify buying new and then scrapping at the half life point (and rightly so).
For me the main issue here is the one PoP mentions in reply to Greg. What on earth has changed in terms of demand forecasts that suddenly allows Crossrail (full on day one!) to be the short to medium saviour of both the Northern and Jubilee Lines? Although there was never a LU line demand breakdown in past budgets and business plans the assumption was that revenue and demand kept rising across all modes except DLR in the short term. The DLR “dip” was explained clearly by TfL (diversion to Crossrail in SE London). No other dips or fluctuations were stated or explained. Maybe the next TfL Budget, due in December, will shed more light?
Re James @ 1806
There is a large significant flow from the northern end of Thameslink (MML) to Canary Wharf which current interchanges to the Jubilee at West Hampstead. In the future it is anticipated that the vast majority will stay on the Thameslink services till Farringdon and interchange to Crossrail there instead with a significant journey time reduction.
Farringdon could soon be (is expected to be by TfL and NR) very near the top of busiest interchange stations league table.
Re WW,
The key is to look at some of the short distance flows in Zone 1.
Crossrail as the savior of the Northern line – they miss out the bit about in conjunction with the Thameslink which will reduce traffic Northern between Kings Cross and London Bridge. 6tph ECML Thameslinkto Farringdon, City Thameslink, Blackfriars. 16tph from London Bridge to Blackfriars, City Thameslink, Farringdon.
Interchange to the Central at Bank will also reduce as passengers swap to Crossrail at Moorgate or Farringdon instead.
Re 130 and WW,
Slippage etc.
I suspect all of us take the talk of TfL joined up engineering teams and the promoted gains they bring with pinch /spade of salt, but I suspect it may have brought about some changes in thinking especially if the rolling stock and infrastructure sides are preparted to share the margins they have built in with other parties which could lead to a higher tph with out additional stock than was originally planned, this means less stock would be need to reach the maximum tph than originally planned thus reducing the rolling stock investment required and allowing the smaller investment to take place later in the rolling stock life cycle.
For example investment in new Northern substations to allow much greater levels of regenerative braking (currently a significant performance issue once individual station performance issues are filtered out e.g. Bank ) than it is understood from modelling based on real VLU/VLU2 data that greater timetabling /frequency improvements will be able to be made than was originally anticipated with the existing stock thus reducing the requirement for Northern Stock.
Also integration of the team may encourage some “crazy” (in old thinking) alternatives to come to the table for example on the Jubilee, replacing the existing GTO Variable Frequency Drives would improve electrical efficiency by few percentage points reducing waste heat levels and also improving the efficiency of regenerative braking potential reducing the level of investment required in substations and slightly reducing the number of additional trains required if existing train performance could be improved very slightly.
The article was good but the reference to Brexit ridiculous.
Absolutely not. Brexit has created uncertainty and I think few people (including Brexiteers) would deny it. There has also been a levelling off of public transport usage recently when it was steadily rising. It is hard to see this as a co-incidence.
As a result of Brexit TfL are less confident about either their passenger or their financial forecasts.
Nothing in the above is about whether Brexit is good or bad but to deny that it has all sorts of consequences – such as playing a bit part in the decision not to purchase of new tube trains – is simply to ignore the strong evidence in front of us.
Improvements to the reversing siding turnouts at West Hampstead so that the 6tph Wembley Park terminators can turn there would save 2 trains. Auto-reverse — which should be possible to build into the existing ATO — might save another one and obviate the need for stepping back and detrainment (if that’s a word) at West Hampstead and Willesden Green.
Victoria-style unlocking doors and opening an inch or two before the train has come to a halt saving maybe 5 seconds dwell time per station: a further 2 trains saved. NGH’s inverter upgrades to allow more aggressive acceleration/braking in the same heat/power envelope saving another 5-10s between stations: 3 trains saved. Switching from a 15-second timetable to a 5-second timetable, again comme Victoria: probably another train there, too.
There we go: 9 trains + 1 scheduled out for maintenance = 10 trains that don’t need to be ordered. I’m not saying that this would be easy or cheap — or indeed what TfL plan — but I don’t believe it’s completely in Crayola territory either. ‘Creating’ 10 trains for a 36tph service is a bit on the edge, but 7 or 8 trains to allow ~34tph with suitable upgrades to the existing fleet looks eminently plausible.
Speeding the service up instead of buying new trains brings additional benefits of not having to have any additional drivers and – naturally – the intangible benefits of shorter journey times for passengers.
Having won the Crossrail order with its new Aventra platform Bombardier has gone on to win contracts for Greater Anglia and West Midlands. When current Class 387 Electrostar delivery ends at Derby the production line will be converted to Aventra, making four production lines for the new design with an output approaching 1000 vehicles a year.
I am currently analysing demand for rolling stock when the current boom in deliveries ends in 2019-20. There is relatively little main line demand and the manufacturers are ‘whistling the happy tune’ of DTUP’s 1700 vehicles to bolster their courage . But this is a long thin pipeline starting with 640 or so vehicles between 2022 and 2027, well within the capability of a single production line. Could I tap the collective Connections knowledge base on suggestions that DTUP may be sliding to the right?
@NGH: CAF was also bidding for JNAT and both bids were considered too expensive.
Re Timbeau 31 October 2017 at 18:17
“And is London paying the full cost of the extra West of Paddington Crossrail units? Only seven of the 15 stations served are within Greater London”
That might be because it is TfL that made a ‘land grab’ for the residual GWR semi-fast services that were originally planned to be retained in the post Crossrail world (rather than GWR begging TfL to take them off their hands).
This is backed up by reports from those who actually live outside London suggesting that they would actually have preferred it if TfL had decided to save some money as it would have given them trains with trains having toilets and traditional seating arrangements inside (the class 387 Electrostars now being delivered) rather than the ‘tube experience’ TfL will be offering in its new trains.
In other words if TfL are that desperate for more train paths they need to kick the plans of others aside,then it becomes liable for the extra trains needed. Simples!
@Captain Deltic: DTUP = Deep Tube Upgrade Programme?
@Mark, PoP
Trying not to get into the politics here as it isn’t the place for it… I was once told by the driver of a car that ran me over that if the traffic light had been green, it would have been fine for her to drive through without stopping, and if I hadn’t pressed the button on the pelican crossing then the light would have been green therefore it was my fault that she hit me. The logic is in some ways compelling, but clearly flawed.
Blaming Brexit for officialdom’s less-than-stellar response to it (both before and after the referendum) falls into a similar trap. When the chancellor states that if something happens then he will put tax rates up significantly then the markets take notice, even if he ceases to be chancellor in the mean time. When the Bank of England, HM Treasury, the International Monetary Fund and all their friends loudly proclaim public predictions based on a model that was made questionable by the container ship, obsolete by the rise of the service economy and laughable by the internet, enough people will still listen to them to affect the markets.
But this isn’t a politics or economics blog where such subtleties are necessary. The result of me crossing the road was that I got walloped by a Rav-4, regardless of whose fault it was; the result of Brexit is that there was a sharp devaluation in the pound that made Spanish trains ~20% more expensive more-or-less overnight, made a GBP-denominated paycheque less desirable to the internationally mobile, and, yes, led to the formation of a government that has done little to provide any certainty about very much at all.
As long as no attempt is made to apportion blame to voters either individually or corporately for any ill effects – which PoP assiduously avoids – then ‘because of Brexit’ is a perfectly reasonable shorthand.
“Captain Deltic
“Bombardier has gone on to win contracts for Greater Anglia and West Midlands”
……not to mention the Overground, and the huge order for SWR.
If I’ve done my sums right:
LO – class 710: 180 vehicles
West Mid – class tba: 333 vehicles
Crossrail – class 345: 630 vehicles
GA – class 720: 665 vehicles
SWR – class 701: 750 vehicles
The most recent order for Siemens was the class 707 – which are already looking for a new home……………..
@MOOSEALOT
Sorry to hear about your accident. Interestingly, as I recall from being taught “road safety” at about 8 years old, GREEN doesn’t mean “go”, it means,…
“GREEN means you may go on if the way is clear”
Which I think applies to both your driver of a car and to your political metaphor.
Moosealot: Yes indeed. The policy of this site will, as always, permit reference to things that have happened in the political arena and had an impact on transport issues, as the Brexit decisions clearly have. It will, as you rightly point out, continue to discourage or prohibit straying beyond such reference to the rights and wrongs of these happenings.
Pedantically, the most recent Siemens order is for the trains to operate the deep Moorgate line from Great Northern territory
It is worth noting that Val Shawcross and TfL’s David Hughes have been summoned to appear in front of the Assembly Transport Cttee next week (8/11) on this very topic – “paused” upgrade projects. Wonder if we will get any further clarity from that session?
The Times in late August reported that the European Investment Bank had imposed a moratorium on UK loans. Somewhere else (sorry I cannot recall where) I heard that TfL was one organisation that was affected by this. Could that have had any impact on the decision not to buy trains?
Walthamstow Writer,
I hope to be there to hear what they say, The Scrutiny Manager for the Transport Committee was kind enough to alert us about this meeting.
TfL seem to have been less open about their business over the past year or more, JLU2 & NLU2 were included in the draft Mayor’s Transport Strategy of June 2017, and news of their demise appeared in the media on 10 October. TfL released an explanation to staff on 13 October. But papers for the Programmes & Investment committee meeting on 13 October, released a week earlier, gave the impression that everything was progressing as expected on these upgrades. There were no details of them included in the papers for the Customer Service & Operational Performance panel meeting on 1 November or the TfL Board meeting on 9 November, both released a week earlier.
MOOSEALOT 3 November 2017 at 10:02: Avoiding buying 10 non-standard trains also saves on-going costs of spare parts holding, and additional training of drivers & maintainers (not only initially, but with turnover).
@130
I had indeed overlooked that the 717s for the GN locals were ordered after the 707s, but the order for the class 717 going to Siemens is essentially a follow-on from the (Siemens) class 700s for the same TOC. The principal differences are emergency doors in the cab ends, and only six cars instead of eight or twelve.
Another superb article but I don’t think the problems were inevitable. Sadiq Khan boxed himself in with a clearly unaffordable ‘fares freeze’ at time when the bus network in particularly needed much more investment and prioritisation. One of the problems is that the Mayor has no real understanding of public transport and conflates ‘non-car use’ as a single policy. This means he is prioritizing cycling as a ‘quick win’ which in turn is perpetuating the negative impact upon buses because of constricted road space and delays resulting to bus services, causing more people to abandon the bus for the Tube and rail (there is no mass modal shift to cycling). Therefore buses lose money and passengers whilst Tube/Rail gets more crowded, yet buses are more congested because of the delays caused by congestion.
So the problems of the buses and the overcrowding on the Tube/Rail are inter-related. To this is the Mayor’s fares freeze that is unaffordable because capacity upgrades to the Tube and more rolling stock become stalled. Similarly there is money for TfL to procure extra rail services on lines it doesn’t have full control of (the Railways Act allows TfL to buy more services or decrement them on railways journeys operating wholly within London). On rail then the Mayor has no intermediate vision of funding more platforms at key interchanges or looking at new routes. Granted his hands are tied by the lack of full TfL control, but there is a tendency for the Mayor to allude to what he can’t do rather than use his powers more effectively. Transport is a key example: he can procure more rail services even if he doesn’t have full control. He can improve bus services by re-prioritising bus lanes and to stop narrowing roads – but chooses not to. SImilarly he can buy more trains for the Northern ahead of Battersea extension.
There is a lack of real public transport drive in the current Mayoralty (promoting cycling isn’t the same thing) that is too similar to the previous regime. I don’t see this changing unless and until there is a Mayoral figure who is unashamedly pro-public transport (as opposed to pro-cycling which is a political fashion accessory). The problem is that in terms of image, being ‘pro-bus’ is never appealing to some politicians because it is not modish particularly amongst media circle: the bus and Tube’s sheer ‘ordinariness’ reflect both their vital importance but ironically when they are not cause celebres in the way cycling has become which has more political capital despite being a resource-heavy yet capacity-light transport mode
@Taz: Are TfL less open, or is this a sign that the decision was made very recently? In the past when projects have been cancelled (eg. Crystal Palace Tramlink, DLR Dagenham Dock), I don’t recall any formal announcement – they just stopped being mentioned. If the upgrades were in the draft Transport Strategy and then board papers that suggests an intention until very recently to go ahead – otherwise they just wouldn’t have been mentioned (like the previous strategy that omitted the Croxley link).
If the cancellation wasn’t decided on until very late in the day – hence the (now wasted?) order for radios etc – this sheds light on the reason for it. It can’t be down to the fares freeze – that has been known about for more than a year – or the official explanation about Crossrail reducing tube demand – which has been known for even longer – let alone cycling policy (?!). The new piece of information in September/October that led to the cancellation, as the article points out, has to be that the total cost from the trains tender was more than TfL was willing to pay.
It’s not hard to see why CAF couldn’t have produced an affordable bid if they had to recoup the cost of developing a completely new type of train over only 27 units, with no possibility of any follow-on orders, and it’s not hard to see why Alstom, who are basically out of the UK train-building market at the moment, would rather concentrate on bigger long-term prospects like New Tube for London and HS2.
@ Nick B – a nice summary there. Pretty much sums up my views of the parlous mess we are in. If policies remain unchanged then the next Mayor has a real problem on their hands once they’ve stopped taking the credit for Crossrail’s full service opening and settling down.
@ Ian J – I take your point about the cost of trains possibly being the decisive factor but I do share Taz’s view about transparency. The information flow and depth / breadth of regular reporting is much worse now than it was. In the attempt to “streamline” information we have lost quite a lot of information that was previously made public. We have got some bits of info but it’s questionable about it adds to the public’s understanding. The fact that much less is now being done than in the past doesn’t help either as there’s less activity to report on and less is in the “planning pipeline” as there’s no funding for it.