With the current three week blockade at Waterloo to lengthen platforms 1-4 coming to a close, we take a look at works, and at how the detail doesn’t necessarily always match the headlines.
The rebuild is part of the Waterloo and South West upgrade plan, with the aim of increasing peak time capacity into Waterloo by 30%. The three week blockade was marketed as bringing “more platforms, longer trains and better journeys down the line”. There is far more to the works, however, than just that. Indeed, Londoners with long memories will remember those platforms used to be 10-car once upon a time.
The blockade also marks the end of an era, with a change of South West Franchisee from Stagecoach (who have run it for the last 21 years) to a First /MTR joint venture who took over at 02:00 on Sunday 20th August.
A short international diversion – for a limited time only
The blockade sees the completion of the first stage of returning Waterloo International to regular intensive passenger use, albeit for a short time only. Initially, this is to reduce the impact of the works during the three week blockade at the other side of Waterloo station, then for a fourth week to reduce the impact of the nine day blockade at London Bridge – with a limited number of SouthEastern services on the working days (the nearest stop on the services being Sevenoaks).
The five platforms (20 – 24) in the International terminus were originally designed to accommodate 387m Eurostar trains operating at six trains per hour (tph), with long dwell times in curved platforms. Passengers passed through a long convoluted route through passport control and security, with indirect connections to the London Underground stations below ground.
Eurostar’s use of a station named after one of Britain’s most famous victories over the French was thankfully (at least from a Foreign Office perspective) only ever intended to be temporary. Eurostar’s departure to St Pancras in November 2007 thus left five platforms that would, superficially, appear to be very useful to Network Rail and the Train Operating Company (SWT). In theory, they should have allowed both to deal with rising passengers numbers at Waterloo, which have doubled in the 20 years since privatisation. In reality, though, the platforms were completely unsuited to commuter rail use and required an extensive rebuild to make them fit for purpose.
This wasn’t the only problem. To make things more complicated, the Waterloo International terminus belongs to British Rail Residuary (via London and Continental Railways) not Network Rail. As a result, the chances of anything happening quickly were always slim, due to the added complications and costs this inevitably brought with it.
Nonetheless, in 2014 platform 20 became available for use after some quick and inexpensive works. Openings in the wall between platforms 19 and 20 were created, which opened up access. Stairs and ramps were also added to address a height gap, as the International station platforms are all higher above the ground level than the domestic ones. Platforms 21 and 22 were also available for more limited use after the construction of a temporary scaffold access bridge over the former Eurostar ‘orchestra pit’.
The first phase of the International works has now been on-going for 15 months whilst the second phase will be complete in another 16 months. The current work is intended to provide a more optimal, longer-term solution for using the International platforms. The primary aim is to allow the majority of the South West Franchise’s Windsor line services (those serving Putney, Richmond, Twickenham, Hounslow, Feltham, Kingston loop, Windsor and Reading) to move into the International Terminal. This will then open up more platforms at Waterloo for all service groups, albeit after some alterations to the station throat.
The first stage at International
The main task in phase one has been rebuilding the track in the station throat to allow an increase to the number of trains that can pass through into the ex-International platforms without disrupting traffic elsewhere. To put some context on the scale of changes required – only 6tph were timetabled into the platforms during the days of Eurostar. The aim now is 18tph, based on 12-car, 240m trains (though at the moment the maximum train length on the Windsor lines is 10-car).
As one might imagine, this has required some serious work. Not least, is shortening the platforms at the country end and infilling bridge decking in the areas formerly covered by the platforms over Westminster Bridge Road. This enabled a new track layout capable of handling more train movements (especially more parallel moves). Just as importantly, it enabled the moves to take place far closer to the starting signal at the new platform end, which then improves train throughput in the throat.
This work also had the useful side effect of removing some of the most curved parts of the platform – which are at the country end. This will improve sight lines for train dispatch – especially for drivers of trains of fewer than 12 cars, who can now see the signals at the platform ends. It also means fewer platform staff required for dispatch. Shortening the platforms at the concourse end (the other area of high curvature) has also helped with this, whilst also helpfully creating a new concourse for Windsor line services at the same level as the International platforms. This should allow it to cope well with the higher volumes of commuters now passing through Waterloo and also provide a much more direct route to the platforms.
We hope to cover the other part of the Waterloo and South West Route Upgrade in a future article.
Ultimately, the reduction in platform length is equivalent to seven cars. The works are virtually complete at platform level and the platforms are now being used during the blockade for all the Windsor line services (albeit at a reduced service level).
The new International track plan.
The next phase at International will involve completing the works to cope better with passengers below platform level, with the addition of access from platform to Tube without needing to going via the main concourse (a feature of many Waterloo platforms). It will also involve the creation of a second Windsor line concourse in the ‘orchestra pit’ that was the entrance to the former International Terminal at near-street level. This second stage is due to complete in late 2018, with the first trains running after the December 2018 timetable change. The total cost of the International rebuild is around £400m, half of the current total capacity scheme.
Lengthening the suburban platforms
The purpose of the works during the current, disruptive three week blockade is to enable the South West Main Line (SWML) suburban routes (via Wimbledon) to operate with all 10-car services, rather than just the small number currently able to do so (thanks to platform lengthening works at other stations over the last four years). Before the works, most SWML suburban trains used platforms 1 to 4. These were only eight cars long and optimally connected to the SWML slow lines with some shared use of the longer platforms 5 to 7 (platform 5 being 10-car and platforms 6 and 7 being 11-car). This brought with it the added problem that platforms 5 to 7 were less optimally connected to the slow lines, adding plenty of operational difficulties to running even the small number of 10-car suburban services that the available stock would allow. As a case in point, SWT leasing and refurbishing the 24×2-car Class 456 EMUs to enable 10 car services by extending doubled-up 4-car 455s would theoretically allow just over half the services to run at 10-car lengths; however, the operational issues at Waterloo limited them to less than half the theoretical level.
Pre-Works Track plan, slow lines
Those with longer memories will probably question the use of the term ‘lengthening’ to describe the works being done at platforms 1 to 4. Indeed perhaps the term “re-lengthening” is actually far more correct.
The present format of the domestic platforms and the concourse at Waterloo date from the early 20th century rebuild between 1903 and 1925 (the official opening was actually in 1922, pre-completion). This was carried out by London and South Western Railway and later Southern Railway, initially under the direction of Chief Engineer J.W. Jacomb-Hood. Jacomb-Hood had travelled extensively to America and Europe in an effort to understand what constituted best practice, which he then incorporated in the rebuild. The SWML suburban platforms were designed to take eight cars with a steam locomotive at either end – equivalent in length to a modern 10-car EMU.
Like much of that Waterloo rebuild, the suburban platforms required extensive use of non-standard (often unique) switches and crossings in order to maximise the number and length of platforms. This was almost entirely due to the unusually narrow station throat, which is still a major issue today.
These non-standard switches and crossings proved consistently difficult to maintain over the following nearly 80 years. The suburban platforms were electrified in 1916, two years after Jacomb-Hood’s death, but they retained their 10-car equivalent length even after resignalling to 4-aspect colour light signalling, whilst more switch and crossing complexity was added in 1936.
Changes in the eighties
With the 1936 vintage signalling along the SWML and Windsor Lines becoming increasingly unreliable and dangerous, in the early 1980s the decision was taken to resignal the many existing signal boxes along the southwestern routes in Greater London and replace them by two new main signalling centres at Wimbledon and Feltham as part of the Waterloo Area Resignalling Scheme (WARS). As part of WARS, the decision was also taken to rationalise and standardise switches and crossings where possible, the goal being to improve reliability and reduce maintenance requirements. As part of this work, platforms 1 to 4 were shortened to eight-car length in 1984. This deliberate reduction of terminus capacity may seem perverse now, but it should be remembered that 1982 was the low point in passenger numbers (and railway finances) after a decline over the preceding 25 years. To a certain extent, this made the decision sensible at the time it was taken.
Spectacular growth
Fast-forward 35 years – from that low point to the present day – and one finds spectacular growth rather than continued decline. This is especially true since privatisation, with passenger numbers at Waterloo alone increasing by an incredible 69% during that period, and by 116% franchise-wide in the same time.
On the SWML suburban side, increasing capacity isn’t just about moving to an all 10-car operation by increasing train length and hence passenger capacity. It’s also about increasing the number of trains that can potentially run on the SWML slow lines in the future. With the current signalling, track layout and rolling stock dwell times, the maximum number of trains on the SWML slow lines is limited in practice to about 18/19tph by several pinch points – with platform dwell time at Vauxhall in the peak flow direction usually being the ultimate limiting factor. With all 10-car operation, new rolling stock with wider and quicker opening doors, larger vestibule areas, more metro style seating layouts, and walk-through gangways and better acceleration/deceleration, the possibility of increasing the train frequency is worth factoring into the overall picture.
This is why a less publicised part of the blockade works involves taking the opportunity afforded by the work to add an extra (third) staircase to the slow line platform island (platforms 7 and 8) at Vauxhall. This is a classic example of how making non-obvious changes at one station can help speed up services across the whole line. This extra staircase, positioned at the country (Clapham Junction) end, should encourage passengers to distribute themselves more evenly along the trains (especially as they get longer). The more evenly distributed the pattern of boarding and alighting becomes, the more the required dwell time at Vauxhall drops.
Resignalling… and shortening
This leaves a final limitation on maximising slow line train frequency – signalling. It is understood that resignalling with a modern, more advanced signalling system such as ETCS (European Train Control System) could allow an increase in frequency to 22tph (allowing for all the other possible limitations on the slow lines). This explains the specification, when designing the current platform lengthening on the suburban platforms at Waterloo, that the throat layout and number of platforms should be able to cope with 22tph and 10-car train lengths. Hence, after rebuild the suburban services will operate from platforms 1 to 6 with a more uniform platform use, as platforms 5 and 6 will be more accessible – especially as regards parallel moves of services into and out of platforms.
Somewhat counter-intuitively to achieve this, given all the other limitations, platforms 5 and 6 are actually being shortened to 10-car length and the ends of platforms 5 to 7 are being realigned too. The Underground station’s access has always been a bit poor for platforms 1 to 4 compared with many of the other SWML platforms, so the work to improve the access with additional stairs will also be completed during the blockade.
Starting work on the hole for the new stairs to the Underground (Christmas 2016)
Post Works Track plan, slow lines
The impact of the works
The works were originally envisaged as requiring the closure of platforms 1 to 9, as the track the end of platforms 7 and 8 would also need to be altered. This would also require the closure of platform 9, and much of the publicity material still advises that platforms 1 to 9 would be closed. In the end, however, the additional closure of platform 10 was required, due to the need for a barrier train at the end of platform 10 and across the Up Main Fast. This extra requirement was always going to make operating the reduced service during the blockade even harder, especially as there was no longer room to allow for anything to go wrong.
The reduction in the available approach tracks, however, and the available ways of getting to them from the normal tracks used by the services further out actually has ultimately had a bigger impact on the number of trains that could be run. The scale of the likely disruption, the lack of a margin for error and previous negative experience at London Bridge is likely why SWT and Network Rail embarked on a 14-month publicity programme, which included encouraging passengers to avoid using Waterloo during this blockade altogether.
The new signalling gantry (for P1-8) across the end at the new ends of P1-6 which happens to be directly above the old water pipe network used to refill the steam locomotives before electrification just over a century ago.
Disruption
The lack of resilience available turned out (unsurprisingly) not to be good for Network Rail, SWT or passengers. There were seven points or signalling failures in the first two weeks of the blockade, causing significant disruption. There was also a well-publicised incident in which an operational train departing platform 11 hit the barrier train. This caused major disruption, with just five platforms and two approach tracks available at one point.
Many of the failures occurred at sets of points operating in very different ways to their normal usage pattern, a lot of which could not be effectively simulated beforehand. It is not particularly surprising therefore that, despite extensive pre-blockade maintenance, some of those points did not take the change well. Indeed Network Rail had spent a lot of weekends in winter 2016 and early spring 2017 replacing the points in the Waterloo throat ahead of the works to either help reduce the scope of the works or to improve resilience during them but this hasn’t always helped.
In the end, SWT decided to declare the ten working weekdays of the blockade (before the end of the franchise) as void days for season ticket holders – essentially ‘free’ days where they are eligible for refunds or extensions. Positive as this is for travellers, it shouldn’t be seen as an entirely magnanimous gesture – it also puts pressure on the incoming franchisee to be similarly ‘generous’ despite the delay/cancellation/disruption repay regime being completely different in the new franchise. Most (or possibly all) of SWT’s generosity will also be recouped from Network Rail.
It’s not over until the fat controller sings
The disruption for passengers, new TOC and Network Rail isn’t necessarily over when the blockade finishes, as the train drivers’ union ASLEF is unhappy with the way platforms 7 and 8 have been resignalled. The main signals for those platforms are on the new gantry (see above photo) at the 10-car mark, but those platforms are actually 12-car length. As a result there are small co-acting signals (effectively repeaters for the main signals) to enable 12-car trains to use the platforms, but most peak time trains will be longer than 10-car so those services will represent the rule here, not the exception. ASLEF have already balloted in favour of action, so life post-blockade may not immediately be so smooth as hoped.
There are also no significant services changes due yet, so commuters would do well to moderate their expectations. The first real changes will come with the December 2017 timetable change. To a certain extent, this work thus doesn’t so much represent an early Christmas present for travellers. More a present for Christmas yet-to-come.
We hope to cover the other part of the Waterloo and South West Route Upgrade in a future article.
What purpose did the “barrier train” serve, and why was the need for it not apparent from the start?
I do not believe that Waterloo was seen as a temporary thing when it was planned back in the ’80s; plans for anything else – Stratford, KX/TLK – were vague in the extreme (and neither was what was ultimately chosen).
You should check who actually owns WIT now – BRB Residual was one of those quangos culled in the early days of the Cameron government. I believe all BRBR’s assets and liabilities were then vested in the Secretary of State but there was a clear effort to find other homes for them immediately afterwards (as with StP).
@Dave
It creates physical segregation between track workers and operational services, providing for enhanced safety. As we saw on the 11th, it also provided a degree of protection in the event of an “operational incident” (which, to my untrained eyes, appeared to be a misrouting on a set of points)
Re Graham H,
The dangers of editing – The temporary bit was added and the current LCR via BRB ownership (London and Continental Railway) was lost. It was still BRB owned when all the planning for this started.
Re Mark,
But mainly in this case protecting in service trains from errant excavator arms and crane booms etc.
This all sounds more sensible than the idea (suggested at one point) of sticking together pairs of 8 car trains and running them into the Eurostar platforms as 16 car trains.
One question – what exactly is ASLEF’s objection to the repeater signal? Based on what’s written here, I don’t see why the repeater is inherently less safe than seeing the ‘real’ signal. (I’m not taking sides here; I just don’t understand the issue and am interested to learn more about signalling)
Re Leon,
The (small) size and (poor) location of the CAs increasing SPAD risk.
Is there a good reason why it wasn’t possible to have a sensible adult conversation about the correct size and location of the CAs?
[Hi Leon, there wasn’t a good reason, it seems your original comment was deleted by mistake. It’s been restored. Our apologies. LBM]
Pre-works a talk given by SWT stated that changes would be made at Wimbledon to split panel 1 into two – 1 and 1a so that platforms 1 – 9 could be closed. This work did not take place. The answer I suspect was that it was determined that it was less expensive to utilise a barrier train in platform 10 rather than make the changes at Wimbledon (which would have been expensive and complex). However the need to locate the barrier train was not taken into account until about June this year when a decision was taken to add 10 to the closed platforms. This was long after someone canned the decision to change Wimbledon signals.
So somewhere along the line the planning for these changes was not done properly. The barrier train proved its worth and was no doubt the right decision – but the need for it (and not some simpler fencing) was determined at a pretty late date.
The problem of shorter than desirable platforms at Waterloo is nothing new. In his classic book “London’s Termini” Alan A Jackson is writing about the start of the 20th century where he states
The LSWR’s 8 carriage trains would have been made up of 57 footers, giving a length of 456 feet. Suburban locos at the time of the rebuilding would typically have been an M7 – Wikipedia says just under 35 feet long – so overall platform length would need to have been no more than around 540 feet.
That only accommodates 8.5 cars of 63′ length, so the LSWR’s original specification must have been rather more generous than 2 locos and 8 carriages.
And they were. Alan A Jackson gives the following lengths (on p226 of “London’s terminals”) for platforms 1 to 6 – 696, 695, 683, 685, 720 and 723 feet respectively.
Regarding the barrier train,
I really don’t buy into the idea that this was necessary. It was probably expedient given that, as it turned out, the space for it was available anyway. There would have been other ways of carrying out the same safety function either physical with some kind of narrow but strong temporary fixed barrier or, alternatively, a virtual barrier.
At London Bridge when rebuilding the worksite was right next to the live tracks with nothing physical more than a wooden hoarding separating it. Despite this heavy plant was operating. This was permitted because there was a virtual box and any attempt to operate the plant (or any part of the plant) outside the virtual box would cause the plant in question to stop.
Modern Railways gives a more plausible explanation for the need to close platform 10:
Even so, I am led to believe that this is not the full story.
Man of Kent,
I am only quoting. But Alan A. Jackson does talk about twelve coach trains. The point that struck me on reading this was that this was the one opportunity to get it right and, for whatever reason, they didn’t. It is the sort of decision you know is going to cause problems a century later. We need to bear in mind that, ideally, there would have been more space for longer platforms. Even if not used as platforms they would have enabled more installation and operational flexibility when it comes to locating points and crossings.
KRW,
Unfortunately I had started writing before being aware of your comment. Yes, I suspect that there does seem to be some level of indecision or lack of communication. I do have some sympathy though. You probably have only one time of the year you can do the work and you really do not want to do it too close to when it will be needed due to both follow up work and the fear that some unknown unknown will force a further year’s delay to the rescheduled works. Once you have decided on a date, the clock is ticking and any unexpected problems just have to be dealt with.
Regarding the P7/P8 starting signals, the very end of that platform structure has been remodelled slightly width wise, to deal with the change of the platform 7 route, but I do not see why they cannot still have a similar position gantry as before, (possibly connected to that for P9/P10 for greater structural strength?).
If the ‘end of platform’ signals then cannot be easily seen from the cab of a short train (say 4 or 8 cars) in P7/P8, then why not provide banner repeaters for each cab position – this was done at the opposite end of the line at Portsmouth Harbour?
I think there’s a link missing in the “after” diagram for platforms 1-4. As shown, it’s not possible to make a simultaneous move into and out of e.g. 1 and 2, or 2 and 3 – which I found surprising so I thought I’d investigate.
I can’t find any diagrams of the new layout elsewhere online, but I did find an overhead photo of the test-assembly of the new junction. I’ve highlighted the link that I think is missing from the diagram in green.
http://imgur.com/a/OydLY
[Thanks for pointing this out. Now corrected. PoP]
Andy,
You are quite correct, that link is there on the ground.
Behind the 4th wagon in the guard train is the “missing link”.
http://www.papaspoof.org/IMG_7040.JPG
From speaking to a colleague, who happens to know a SWML train driver, the whole project relies on passenger numbers being half of normal levels.
If they weren’t at the start, then I’m sure the derailment and other problems last week would have helped achieve that. 😉 He ended up on a train one day from Alton to Waterloo where he was only person in the front coach, having gotten on at Ash Vale!
You will also see barrier trains on the Great Western when electrification work is underway. As the saga of the High Output System electrification train showed, the ORR is very keen on physical protection
The key question on the collision is why the points weren’t clamped.
@Captain Deltic: I wondered about that too… Even if the points were needed overnight at any stage then they surely could be unclamped as and when required?
Am I right in thinking that the tph figures in the article are “one way” – so the throat trackwork & signalling actually has to cope with double the number of trains?
Mark,
But will this be advertised? It is almost certainly to pick up or set down what used to confusingly be known as a “conductor” – a route trained driver who will assist the incumbent driver over the route he is unfamiliar with. Does beg the question of who trains the conductors but I suspect they have special trips for familiarisation.
I very much doubt the passenger doors will be opened.
@PoP
You are (as always) correct. It seems as though the stop is shown in the WTT, but not the GBTT
@Mark: Searching in reverse doesn’t seem to turn up anything.
I searched for 29/8/17, 1600-2359, from WIT calling at Sevenoaks, but nothing comes up.
Am I right in thinking this is in the morning only?
@SOUTHERN HEIGHTS (LIGHT RAILWAY)
These are all there. Both ways.
http://www.realtimetrains.co.uk/search/advanced/WAT/2017/08/29/0000-2359?stp=WVS&show=all&order=wtt&toc=SE
P of P @ 12:39
Southeastern route training (presumably just for the intended conductor drivers to/from Denmark Hill) was taking place fairly frequently throughout most of July.
Re SHLR,
WAT not WIT now as all the platforms in WIT were transferred over in the information systems about 4 weeks ago.
There is only 1 Waterloo again now.
Re clamping the incident points above, didn’t the incident involve a double slip crossover with two routes of the four live? So maybe (depending on the detail of how the individual switches are moved to provide the two necessary routes) it isn’t possible to clamp the otherwise unused routes.
Just a thought, I expect someone here will know for sure.
Interesting article. Thanks NGH.
It’s disappointing a signal sighting issue has become the subject of an industrial dispute. The procedures are supposed to avoid such a fall-out by having a driver representative on the cross disciplinary sighting committee that decides these details. You describe the main signals W13/15 on the large new gantry at the 10 car mark, with co-acting heads at the 12 car position at the far end of usable platform. I cannot see how this is acceptable when Rail Industry Standard RIS-0737-CCS states:
“4.4.5 The longitudinal separation of the primary and co-acting equipment shall not exceed 2 m.
Rationale
The 2 m longitudinal separation is intended to help the driver associate the primary and co-acting part of the same asset.
Guidance
Since the position of a stop aspect defines the limit of MA, there is a need to maintain a clear point beyond which a SPAD can be said to have occurred. It is therefore preferable to keep the pair of assets as close as practicable, longitudinally.”
https://www.rssb.co.uk/rgs/standards/RIS-0737-CCS%20Iss%201.pdf
Looking for more information on the rssb site I found nothing specific about these signals in any applications or certificates, so I assume that no non-compliance or deviation was envisaged from the usual standards in respect of signalling. This temporary deviation certificate, for a separate platform 7/8 clearance issue, was informative about the design of the gantry however, and includes layout drawings of the initial and revised proposals:
https://www.rssb.co.uk/rgs/deviations/16-108-dev.pdf
From the revised drawing, it appears that W15 (platfrom #8) is to be mounted on a separate left hand structure at the 12-car mark, while W13 (#7) is shown suspended from the large gantry at the 10-car mark. As shown that would limit #7 permanently to 10 cars, although #8, with its separate signal would be ok for 12. I speculate that since the date of the certificate W13 may have morphed through the design process to become a right hand signal bracketed from the same structure supporting W15 at the platform extremity, in order to support 12-car capacity for both (surely a key project output?). Right hand signals can be more difficult to view from the driving position, especially at constrained terminal sites where the cabs of full length trains reversing from buffer stops are often extremely close to the departure signals, These then become likely candidates for co-acting heads (full size or miniature within 2m longitudinally and usually on the left hand side) to improve their visibility. The initial superseded design showed W13 in a conventional elevated position to the left on a more substantial new bracket structure built out over track #7 at the 12-car position.
It can be seen from the Transfer Scheme relating to abolition of BRB (Residuary) Limited at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/248774/transfer-scheme-brb.pdf that ownership of Waterloo International vested in the Secretary of State for Transport and that the contracts necessary for its management vested in London & Continental Railways.
Looking at http://www.papaspoof.org/IMG_7040.JPG
both w13 and w15 are definitely suspended from the main new gantry, with a very small separate structure visible at the extremity, presumably carrying the co-actors at the 12 car position. The ramp at that point is extremely narrow and might not be able to accommodate a more substantial structural upright for a bracket/cantilever capable of carrying elevated full size signals, so I can see this is a very complicated engineering issue.
I can sort of see why a signalling engineer might think co-acting signals are sensible at this location but can see the downside – especially if it violates standards.. I can’t understand why they are smaller.
Imagine they installed signal A at the 10-car mark and signal B at the 12-car mark and they were not co-acting. There would be a huge risk that a driver of a 10-car train looked only at signal A and saw it was a single yellow then, forgetting that there was a further hard-to-spot signal just two coach lengths further on, looked out for the next signal beyond the platform – which may not be for him. This would all be so much worse with DOO/DCO as the driver will be looking down the platform as the train pulled out.
No doubt eventually a low-speed collision would occur and RAIB would recommend that signal A should not clear until signal B clears which would be common sense really.. To all this the signal engineer may conclude that you might as well have co-acting signals as signal A and signal B would almost be operating as if they were.
I would argue that this situation is not the same as a co-acting signal. If the driver passed signal A at danger he would be immediately stopped by TPWS – almost certainly before he got to the end of the platform. This wouldn’t be the case with co-acting signals. I don’t know it if it is legitimate to have two signals so close together in such circumstances but it makes sense to me – providing signal A does not clear until signal B does.
There are two signals (not co acting) on platforms 18 and 19 at Vic, most of the time it isn’t a problem, but sometimes sighting from the front of a 12 car of the first signal and the RA indicator is not the best.
If I’ve understood correctly, there will be a starter signal at the 10 car mark and a co acting signal linked to it at the 12 car mark? I can understand why ASLEF are unhappy. I wouldn’t be happy routinely starting trains behind the signal like this. It was my understanding co actors were for starters being close to the cab and more easily missed by drivers – such as at the rebuilt London Bridge platforms 10-15.
Mark Townend 14:20,
Maybe the problem is that the cross disciplinary sighting committee is just that – a sighting committee. It sounds like ASLEF are not objecting to the sighting (or siting) of the signals but the manner in which they are used.
Paul S @ 14.04
Yes, you are, unfortunately, correct.
There is reason to believe that wiring alterations should have been made to ensure that switching away from those two permitted routes did not occur … but it obviously did.
Draw your own conclusions.
It is interesting to note how many platforms NR require for a 22TPH service and then compare that with the 16TPH per platform achived by London Underground at Brixton and Wathamstow.
The LU result shows what a combination of good initial design ( having platform overun tunnels, good ATO / ATP, good Rolling Stock and good operating practice can acheive.
Of course with almost zero layover time it is almost impossible to recover any late running but then it is a Metro System the customers do not care about late ( or early running) just service intervals and capacity.
Can those of slightly less knowledgeable about about obscure signalling have an explanation please about these signals?
So far it sounds like an advance signal (10 coaches) is down the line from the main signal (8 coaches)! Which seems a bit cart & horse…
Reading the comments about the L&SWR’s rebuilding of makes me wonder about how much foresight they should have – and how much we should have now.
Let’s not forget that the reconstruction was authorized (including land acquisition powers) in 1899, when the LSW’s latest coaching stock for suburban workings was block sets of 14 6-wheelers, 31-34 feet over body, so perhaps 480 feet over set, with a 415 class 4-4-2T (a bit under 40 foot) each end makes 560 feet – the 680+ feet quoted for platforms 1-6 sounds fairly generous; and at that time main line coaches (bogie) were 48-50 feet over body, less than 55 over buffers – with main line locos about the same length. Mr Bulleid’s 70 foot Pacifics, and 66 foot coaches were a long way in the future….
Yes, we are now hitting the limit given by what was done a century ago – but I doubt they saw it as something that would hit the way it has, or if they did, could have justified spending even more to avoid it.
I wonder how much foresight today’s railway will be criticized for not having, in not biting the bullet to go for twelve (or more) coach trains and some more approach tracks in another century’s time.
I’m sure that if the will was there, a rebuilding as big as that of the early 20th century could be done – it’s just that we don’t have the minds to do so
@Jeremy – there’s also the small matter of money, not to mention the difficulty of providing a robust business case based on future speculation.
SHLR @ 1916
Main signals for P7/P8 are at the 10 car (10 x 20m) position, aligned with, and on the same gantry as P1-P6 – these platforms are all now 10 car length. But P7/P8 are long enough for ’12 car’ (i.e. 12 x 20m or 10 x 23m) and have additional signals right at the country end as well as those on the gantry.
Web cams suggest the farthest signal for P8 is now in position, and it is a low level but normal sized single head signal (it’s a 3 aspect area in the throat), with a separate theatre box in front, which will appear below the signal to a driver.
Re Paul S,
And a lamp post 5m in front may not be well positioned for 10x23m…
P6&7 signals used to be on a gantry that used to cantilever to the left of the P7&8 island and P8 signal used to be on short gantry beyond the end of P7&8 which is now under where the new points are.
Graham: Sometimes “business cases” and rules like “there is no magic money tree” go out of the window when someone with power wants to do something. I think that “not having the mind to do so” refers to the (probable) fact that such rule-defenstration is unlikely here.
@Malcolm -of course – I have seen more attempts by my political masters to discard rulebooks than you have had hot meals; that doesn’t make them right – it is, literally, robbery, You know the old joke about all forecasting being difficult, especially where it concerns the future.
Regarding platform 24, the track appears to extend down the side of the new concourse, rather than stopping level with 19-23. Is this a temporary arrangement or has it been done with a specific purpose in mind for the future? It looks like another 2 cars worth.
@Graham, @Malcolm
Quite. If the will was there to justify it, the money would be found (rightly or wrongly, whatever that may mean)
The LSWR, and other railways of the period had that will, the money was found, and together they produced – substantially – the railway system we have today (and a lot we no longer have). To what extent that investment was justified by ‘robust business cases based on future speculation’ is difficult for us to know: but I have the impression that a lot of investment was made on the basis of hope, guess work, optimism, and a feeling that ‘it ought to be done’.
Thank you @Ngh for an interesting and informative article. It has nicely explained the project and how it fits into a broader programme of extra capacity at Waterloo. I’ve certainly learnt several things such as the extra low level access being added on P1-4. I note that your article has received some positive remarks on social media too.
Jeremy,
If Alan A Jackson was correct, and I have not known him to be wrong, then we are not talking about future business cases but about operating problems that would have existed on rebuilding in the early 20th century.
It may be an instance not of lacking a business case but of lacking the money. If you are a private company you can have what you think is a fantastic business case but if the banks or shareholders won’t stump up the money that counts for nothing.
PoP & others
Re: Plannning for reconstruction & development …
After consulting both H Ellis’ & O S Nock’s books on the LSWR, plus a quick look into G T Moody’s “Southern
ElasticElectric” … the following appears to be the case:The LSWR obtained Parliamentary powers for the Waterloo rebuild in 1899, so planning must have started at least in the previous year, & they would have started to raise the money, then.
Whilst the Waterloo rebuild was still in progress, & therefore absorbing large numbers of £££’s, it was decided, very shortly after Herbert Walker became General Manager in 1912, that suburban electrification was essential, & work proceeded apace, even after the outbreak of WWI.
That’s an awful lot of money, raised by a (admittedly very large & profitable) railway company … note also that the electrification programme included running in to a Waterloo that was still being rebuilt at the time (!)
Re Jeremy @ 19.18
The LSWR shouldn’t be criticised for their design of the new Waterloo station. At the time of its design the need to plan for a busy electrified suburban service could not have been foreseen. Prior to the LSWR electrification scheme in 1916 the low number platforms were not restricted to the suburban trains, and there was no operational reason to do so. The original length of platforms 1 – 6 of 680 feet would have allowed for ten coaches of typically then 50 feet length plus a loco at each end. Photos of the 1900’s period show that this was sufficient for most main line trains. A photo taken at Waterloo in May 1912 (included in the book Southern Reflections by R C Riley and Nigel Harris) shows five trains in platforms 1 – 5, then the only platforms in use in the reconstructed part of Waterloo. Only two of the locos at the buffer stops are tank engines on suburban trains – the other three locos are tender engines on longer distance trains. At this period the main and local lines were paired by direction all the way to Waterloo, and there was no advantage to be gained by keeping suburban services via Wimbledon in the low number platforms. From 1916 the electric suburban trains were restricted to platforms 1 – 6 (and also platforms 16 – 21 on the Windsor side) as these were the only platforms with a third rail. The main line platforms (7 to 15) did not have a third rail until the Portsmouth line was electrified in 1937. The construction of the Durnsford Road flyover in 1936 allowed the current ‘paired by use’ track arrangement into Waterloo and the effective segregation of the inner suburban trains from the main line services.
@Jeremy – actually,it is often the case that someone wishes to invest but there is no money, in business as in the public sector. The Treasury applies three tests to any public sector investment – is there a business case? Is there a financial case? Are funds available? The last of that trio is just as much a killer as the first two. The private sector firms for which I have worked apply similar tests.
The interesting question from your post is, however, what business cases of long ago actually looked like. Very few have survived in enough detail to be sure although there are some indicators. Accounting procedures were very much simpler a hundred years ago – no discounting, asset replacement, or inflation accounting; very limited risk analysis; no IRR; only the crudest of market analysis; no modelling; and so on. a century before that, at the dawn of the railway age, business cases were even more simplistic -counts of stagecoaches and head of cattle, estimates of road tolls, an engineer’s cost estimate (if you were lucky), divide one by the other and – lo! – a rate of return/dividend.
Another indicator is the extent to which railways actually used their assets (and raised their revenue) once bought – many locomotives (a major capital element) were allocated to specific low mileage diagrams, probably with equally low revenues; much new infrastructure saw few trains pass – for example, the whole of the Scottish Borders network built in the last third of the C19 raised no more than a few thousand in cash revenue over its 80 year existence. What sort of business case,one wonders underpinned that?
@Martin
Platform 24 remains full length for structural reasons, related to bracing the roof.
Re. nineteenth century business cases. At this time no one was expecting competition from road transport. There would have been memories of the fortunes made by canal companies earlier in the century before the railways came, and the expectation that building railways would, like building canals, generate increasing traffic. If the Scottish Borders rail network carried all the agricultural produce from the area it would still be viable.
@Roger B – I fear the figures and history don’t bear out your assertions. Many canal companies went bust in the C18/pre-railway era, and most if not all country branch lines went bust too, even tho’ they had a monopoly of the local carrying trade. The reason for this was that the assets’ replacements and renewals were not properly financed and – at least until the late C19 – profits could be – and were – paid out of capital to boost prospects. It’s not just the history of such basket cases as the Talyllyn or the late Col Stephens’ railway “empire” but also the multitude of privately-owned branches which were “saved” for 25 years by being cross-subsidised from the coal trade and express passenger services after 1923.
My comments about the LSWR were not intended as a criticism, rather a response to an earlier comment which did appear to me as an unjustified criticism. It’s always an issue as to whether an organisation should plan its developments on a 10, 50, 100, 200 or longer time span; but always unfair to blame it its development is inadequate after twice that time.
As to the for money to be available, yes, of course, it is always the case that if it can’t be found, the project won’t come to fruition – and that is a symptom of inadequate collective will. But I feel that these days too often there is an assumption of ‘no money’ right at the start, ruling out what might be otherwise potentially justifiable projects.
In this case, I wonder how much (if any) consideration was made of ‘future proofing’ by providing for twelve car trains all round, or for even longer trains – in whole or part. And how long before future generations criticise this one for not doing so.
A 30% increase in passenger flows at Waterloo will mean shovelling even more passengers down into the Northern line, which will also have to cope with increased loadings from both the Battersea extension and from Crossrail. A good reason for reviving the cross-river tram proposal.
“that is a symptom of inadequate collective will”- no,it’s a symptom of the fact that there may actually be no money. (We really must get away from this notion that the money can *always* be found if only someone “wills” it; sometimes the folding sort just isn’t there).
@GrahamH – at the risk of going a bit off piste, yes, of course after WWI rural branch lines were a lost cause because of road competition. However, when these lines were built this was limited to horses and carts over short distances. I think it was quite reasonable then to believe that a thriving agricultural economy and the import of house coal and other commodities would provide an adequate revenue to sustain a rural branch.
.. actually … no money.
A person, or a company, that for some reason is unable to borrow, may indeed be unable to do something if they do not have enough folding stuff. And of course, they may be able to borrow, but only at exorbitant rates which scupper the plan. But apart from these cases, money could always be found, so the cry of “no money” can often be interpreted as “we do not want to do this”.
Concrete bases are now going in at the position expected for the low level 12 car position starting signal and route indicator for P7, i.e. between the approach tracks to P6 and P7, this looks to be very slightly (a few feet) beyond the low level 12 car position starter for P8.
Jeremy: the assumption of “no money” at the start may also be a prudent saving of speculative expenditure on planning a project, based on previous failure (for whatever reason) to find money for some similar recent project.
@David H
Crossrail 2 would provide far greater capacity relief than the Cross River Tram ever would
@Rogerb – perhaps you would care to name such a branch. (I won’t bore the commentariat with the long list of branches which were financial failures – the backlist of Oakwood Press and Wild Swan Publications would do as a proxy.) Put very simply, the only UK railways which performed as well as the UK stock market were the Big Four; very few railways indeed were “5%” lines and those almost exclusively engaged as coal conveyers from S Wales mines to S Wales ports. Most country railways paid no dividend whatsoever, even under the lax terms of Victorian accounting and despite having a monopoly; I challenge you to find more than, say, three which paid more than the return on gilts.
@Malcolm – indeed! Human thought has so far only devised four ways of running an economy:
– slavery (the collective or personal will is the only determinant of what is done,and the only limitation is the availability of slaves)
-centrally planned and controlled economies such as GosPlan
– monetary aggregates and borrowing (what we do now)
– on the basis of GVA or similar social benefits (actually no one has yet tried this yet)
@Mark – whilst that is true, the two modes would serve very different markets.
@POP 22 August 2017 at 15:07
That’s easily solved. Just make A 2 aspect R/G and only allow it to clear if B is showing a proceed aspect
@Fred, what happens if B shows yellow? If A then clears to green, there would seem to be a significant risk that someday a driver will manage to overlook B completely, and forget that a green from A does not promise as much as the six other signals on the same gantry.
Graham H: While tiss true that rural branch lines failed to provide a return even in Victorian times, this may not necessarily have been anticipated when these lines where actually built.
Aneconspeaks: The unprofitabilty obviously was not fully anticipated, else they would not have been built (except perhaps as a philanthropic gesture). But for all but the first few branch lines, the evidence (of the first ones) was there. Though presumably misunderstood.
To answer some queries:
The barrier train was not the reason for the additional platform and lines in the blockade. It was always planned and was just moved along one platform. The reason for the additional lines in the blockade was to significantly reduce the intrusive changeovers of signalling wiring taking place in night time white periods, something which now looks to have been an excellent decision.
The co acting signals at the ends of platforms 7 and 8 are both full size apertures of the same size and type as those on the gantry. They are just in smaller steel housings. RSSB derogation has been granted for the unusual separation of 30m compared to the standard 2m maximum.
P24 remained as long as it originally was due to it being on a curve. Derogation was granted for 20-23 as if a train hit the buffers, the platform walk would contain the train within the track bed. On P24, the train was at risk of going out of the side of the roof!
Also, RE co-actors, the science proves the new arrangement is safer. The extra TPWS provided by the signal on the gantry means the number of trains which can reach the conflict point is very significantly reduced. Both signals on each platform will show the same indication.
For those discussing the availability of money for projects then it’s worth just noting a couple of things. There are always more transport projects wanting funding these days than is available in the budget. Therefore someone will always lose out. Having read the coverage of the spectacular “moan-a-thon” that was the Transport Summit held in the North of England today I just wondered whether any of the participants were living in the real world. The anti London and South East rhetoric (no facts allowed) was astounding as was the complete non disclosure of all the road spending, new bus stations, tram networks (in Manchester and Nottingham) and bus priority schemes that have been funded (Tees Valley, Bristol, Leigh) away from London. Also, whether it fits the “hard done by” rhetoric or not, lots of nice high spec buses have been put into service by private bus companies.
The second point is that circumstances can and do change overnight. I recall a week in LU where we thought our capital spend and project portfolio was going nicely. By the end of the week we had no money for anything new, had reduced scope on most projects and stopped work entirely / cancelled contrats on others. Apart from handling the financial fallout we literally had nothing to do. It was far, far worse in some other areas with big projects / high spend. This was all down to some accounting problems where Sir Wilfred Newton (then LT Chairman) famously said of the Finance Director “his cash management skills left something to be desired” (or words to that effect). I get a distinct feeling that something similar (not necessarily cash mismanagement) has been going on between Network Rail and the DfT for many months hence the escalating scale of crisis as work is stopped, schemes cancelled and whole programmes wiped from existence. Clearly some stuff (London Bridge, Manchester, Waterloo and others) have to carry on because they’re too far advanced but I suspect an awful lot of other spend is in a state of crisis because of cost overruns, poor budgeting, cost escalation, scope creep, whatever. The lack of a proper HLOS and SOFA (High Level Output Spec / Statement of Funds Available) from the DfT, a “new” way of handling capital projects and non delivery of expected cost efficiencies are other warning signs. We have yet to have the inevitable collapse in operational performance but I dare say that will emerge in the next couple of years as postponed / cancelled spend has an impact.
Blockader,
First, thanks to your insight.
I am presuming that what you are saying is that both signals will have TPWS. So if a 10-car train is in the platform and it starts off when the 10-car signal is red, it spads the first signal, signal A, because the train detector (don’t know official term) associated with that signal tells the train to apply brakes. Similarly, if a train (of any length) attempts to pass the signal at the end of the platform. signal B, at danger then it too will trigger a train detector and the train will come to a halt.
If I understand correctly then I think this is a neat solution and one that could have use elsewhere. I do have concerns though. I suspect that the reasoning behind this hasn’t been clearly conveyed to ASLEF whereas plain simple courtesy means that it should have been discussed with them to explain the situation. My other concern is that this should not be a derogation.
Derogations, in the main, should be used to cater for situations where, for historical, reasons, modern standards cannot be applied. I can understand a derogation to permit the curved platform, for example. I would have thought that such a signalling arrangement should not have been a derogation but that the signalling rules amended to permit this on curved platforms. After all, if it is a good idea, it should be acceptable anywhere appropriate and one should not have to apply for a derogation to achieve this.
Walthamstow Writer,
I remember being told of a situation many years ago where the government had authorised a five-year plan for major track replacement on London Underground. It started off well then the government realised it was short of money and so pulled much of the funding. Most of what was left was needed to pay contractors for losses caused by breach of contract on work that wasn’t yet done.
I believe, in the light of the reality of the removal of funding decision, that some compromise was made to enable some track renewal to re-commence. Nevertheless, it shows the danger of spending money you do not yet have.
@aneconspeaks/Malcolm – I’ve not seen any analysis of the prospectuses for railways in the early C19, but the general impression from numerous detailed histories is that the “offer” didn’t change much over time, despite the obvious lessons of the railway mania of the 1840s, which suggests that “ordinary” investors such as farmers and small businessmen had other objectives including “putting their town on the map”.
It’s more difficult to understand the behaviour of investors in the generation before WW1, however, even though they were banker-led and you might think bankers would know better – the competing Speyer and Yerkes tube consortia are good examples. In the event, none of the tubes as built were money spinners. Possibly, Yerkes alleged famous remarks about buying junk, fixing it up and selling it on, are the clue. If so, little attention was was paid to business cases and more to marketing and the “thundering herd”.
Standing back from the detail, the underlying issue seems to be periods of great liquidity occurring at times when there were insufficient good schemes to mop up the cash. And here we are perhaps close to WW’s point about northern investment. Certainly, in my time in Whitehall (and it still seems to be the case now), ministers were actually quite keen to spend money in the regions, but there is a persisting dearth of worthwhile cases, certainly large projects a la Crossrail.
The diversion of the Ramsgate / Dover trains to Waterloo for four days (2908 – 0109) gives a chance to travel over the Waterloo Curve for anybody wishing to do so.
The Waterloo Curve, specifically built for Eurostar trains (then named Eurostar Curve), connects between the lines from Victoria and the lines from Waterloo and is not normally used for passenger services.
The diversion runs between Waterloo and Courthill Loop South Junction and would have been the path that Eurostar took on its way to Folkestone
http://carto.metro.free.fr/cartes/metro-tram-london/index.php?gpslat=51.473957&gpslon=-0.077489&zoom=2
RTT shows the path as passing Parks Bridge Junction, However, this is the normal route towards London Bridge and so I assume that the Parks Bridge entry is an error.
http://www.realtimetrains.co.uk/train/J01302/2017/08/29/advanced
And the signals now make sense to me as well!
Thanks….
@Aneconspeaks, Malcolm: I suspect an awful lot of pre WW1 (and later) railway investment was done primarily on the basis that it needed to be done to handle traffic, or ought to be done as a public good, rather than on any financial consideration.
On the issue of money availability and withdrawal of promised funding: part of this seems to be down to entering into long term contracts and the balance of power and responsibility over long term financial commitments, vs the principle of paying as you go (it would perhaps be interesting to look at the LSWR’s Waterloo rebuilding and its stages in the light of this)
Graham H 24 August 2017 at 10:03
“And here we are perhaps close to WW’s point about northern investment. Certainly, in my time in Whitehall (and it still seems to be the case now), ministers were actually quite keen to spend money in the regions, but there is a persisting dearth of worthwhile cases, certainly large projects a la Crossrail.”
Still wondering why the Secretary of State is casting doubts on TransPennine North electrification. It offers quicker journeys between the big cities and major towns without expensive tunnelling.
Also the opportunity to replace a lot of those diesel trains between York and Newcastle with electric trains.
Chris Grayling has a big decision to make when Network Rail report to him about it this autumn
Re: Alan Griffiths – presumably because no electrification costs are now trusted and the fear is that anyone who signs up to an electrification project will find him/herself staring over the edge of a big and very deep financial hole. I know there is a tendency to view electrification as an unqualified good thing, but that does *not* apply at amy cost and, let’s face it, we *have* reached the point where it is simply not possible to say that it is good value for money.
Regarding the signalling set up, perhaps there’s a case that this type of installation is defined completely separately to normal ‘co-actors’.
From what has been described above, the situation is here is that both signals have their own TPWS set up. I’d suggest a new name for this method is needed, though am unqualified to suggest one.
As soon as terms such as derogation or dispensation come in people go on the back foot, whatever the detail 2m and 30m are a long way apart, and even a perfectly well explained derogation is going to be pretty worthless if the TU refuses to accept it…
ANECONSPEAKS at 21:57 yesterday, and others:
Lots of parallels in the industry I write about, telecoms, and not just in the 19th century. In the 1980s and 1990s dozens of cable TV projects across the UK were licensed by the government and funded by investors (including North American cable companies, telecoms operators, and banks). I sat in many conference presentations where analysts talked of the unrealistic expectations of take-up on which the business plans were built. And so, companies merged (leaving the industry with incompatible standards), went bankrupt, thereby dumping all the investors. Virgin Media, which now owns all or most, does well because it paid little or none of the original civil engineering costs.
And then, in the 1990s, the dotcom boom led to yet more investment, in fibre optic cabling across the Atlantic and between cities in Europe and North America. Again companies went bust. Business plans were unrealistic — and it’s only now, 20 years later, that the capacity built then is being used, because of the huge explosion in data that we all use (by sites such as this, for example).
The only sector I can think of that has made real money is the mobile industry — and few expected that. Vodafone got going in the UK in the 1980s on the expectation of a few hundred thousand customers.
Trust me, investors know nothing.
Don’t forget that some lines were built strategically to prevent incursions by others into “their” territory or to deliberately attempt to pinch some traffic (e.g. The Bromley North branch).
@Jeremy/SHLR – I am sure you are right that some projects were built because the traffic was there and then infrastructure wasn’t adequate or for defensive purposes (one might draw attention to the plethora of twigs added by the LBSC to protect the BML) but to what extent such things were appraised in they way we would now expect is far from clear. What is almost certainly missing before the later C20 is any sort of quantifiable forecasting. (Even at LT – there is the famous story of LT agents wandering the streets of Bexleyheath and noting a large factory site in the course of construction which they were sure would generate traffic – it turned out to be the future Bexleyheath trolleybus depot…)
(With apologies for a double post) … and well into the ’50s, Southdown’s boast was that they never refused a hire, with the inevitable consequence that the least used vehicle in their coaching fleet turned a huge 15 km a year. No sign of business analysis there, you might think.
ROGMI @ 1004
The normal Eurostar route to/from Waterloo was not via Courthill Loop South Jn. It was via Herne Hill and Kent House. Pre-CTRL phase 1, trains continued via Orpington/Tonbridge, and post CTRL phase 1 trains continued via Swanley to Fawkham Jn.
Also, the timing point at Parks Bridge Jn is inclusive of Courthills Loop South Jn. The two junctions are too close to make splitting them out meaningful – a long train waiting for a path at one will stand foul of the other.
Jeremy
or ought to be done as a public good, rather than on any financial consideration.
No
I’ve just been re-readin Wrottesley (sp?) on the history of the GNR.
Believe me, the ONLY consideration was: “Would there be a worhwhile profit in it?”
@WW, PoP
It’s not just the Government that has withdrawn early and unilaterally from long term ‘fixed’ deals. Indeed, TfL is guilty of the same offence in about 2010, having agreed a five year deal with London Councils for the cost of the Freedom Pass it then decided it had given too cheap a price for future years and just reneged on the deal
@Greg Tingey – Sir Richard Moon, the LNW Chairman between 1861 and 1891 is supposed to have had a cardboard sign with a large S thereon,kept on his desk to remind him that the sole criteria for action was whether it would benefit the shareholders.
Alan Griffiths 11:14 re. Grayling’s decision: He appears to have already decided a day or two ago: to pass this buck to the local authorities along the HS3 route. Strangely, I think he has something of a point, in that CR1 depended on a massive consensus among authorities along the route, which included arranging the business rates surcharge on top of TfL and NR’s public funding components. My reading of the situation is that he’s challenged those on the Liverpool-Hull axis to get together and work out a similarly compelling formula before he’ll even think about considering it against other possible schemes that would attract serious central government budget. I assume this to be much more of a challenge, due to the more disparate authorities and more dispersed (and smaller) population centres involved.
@POP 24/8 0928
That is indeed correct, the TPWS at the gantry will stop the trains where the driver can see that signal. There is also another TPWS loop installed further j to each platform which will stop the very short trains (2 or 4 car).
RE derogation, this was the only option to allow safe running of 12 car in platform 8 and 10 car diesels in platform 7.
Finally, regarding informing the unions, contrary their view, they are not the owner of the railway. The TOC and FOCs were all consulted via the formal network change process and signed up to the scheme. That the TOC did not inform or discuss with staff fully is not the fault of NR
Going back to historical comparisons, LSWR expenditure, & “Forethought & planning” …
I’m going to quote from a respected academic source, Dr David Turner of York Uni:
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
,….. the electrification was not the largest, nor the most important financial investment, costing £1,186,963 between 1913 and 1916 (of course we have to keep in mind though that costs rose because of war shortages, so the expenditure is not directly comparable with what follows). The major projects that consumed capital were as follows:-
• When the Southern closed the Waterloo rebuilding account in 1923 it came to £2,269,354. Between 1903 and 1911 the expenditure was £502,418.
• By far the biggest project of the earlier period, and evidencing the company’s focus on capacity, was the expansion of the company’s running lines, which between 1897 and 1905 – when it finished – consumed £2,180,881.
• The building of the Eastleigh Locomotive works also cost £393,717.
• The company also was expanding the Southampton Docks which cost between 1899 and 1904 £991,990, and between 1907 and 1911 £726,294 (for some reason my thesis did not give the overall total form 1899-1911, but my estimate is it would be around £1,850,000.
• The capital spent on all projects between 1898 and 1911 amounted to £8,042,753, the total outlay alone between 1898 and 1904 being £5,685,041.
• The LSWR also bought the Waterloo and City £627,340 in 1906
The W&CR purchase particularly highlights the conservatism and lack of effective strategic thinking of the LSWR before 1912. Jacomb-Hood’s electrification plan was to estimated cost only £630,000, so not much compared with other projects (if inflation adjusted this figure is just short of the actual expenditure on the LSWR’s suburban electrification between 1913 and 1916). The Waterloo and City was returning good money to the LSWR and did not need to be bought, yet it did so, rather than spend the same amount of capital on electrification which by 1906 was proven to be technologically sound, given the District’s electrification.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Make of that what you will.
@Ianno Thanks for the info.. Since it was about 10 years since I travelled on Eurostar from Waterloo, my memory had faded 🙂
Blockader,
Thank you for the further information.
To be fair, I did not specifically state that Network Rail should have liaised with the Unions. I merely stated that it should have been done to explain what was happening and why.
Whether railway drivers are unionised or not, or believe they own the railway or not is not relevant. The point is they are affected by it and need to understand the reasoning behind it. A soldier is subject to orders but still expects to be properly briefed.
Finally, I go along entirely with Paul S. It would be far better if a new name was invented for this type of signal and that they were not described as co-acting signals. Theoretically, it seems that one could potentially have multiple occurrences of these strung along the platform. There appears to be no ‘main’ signal. All are equal. So my suggestion is Terminal Starting Signal.
@ROGMI: It’s almost 10 years since anyone used the Eurostar from Waterloo! 😉
14th of November 2007 was the start date for services from St. Pancras.
@Alan Burkitt-Gray yesterday. Interesting. There was an article in The Oldie recently explaining the reason we have poor high speed broadband via BT lines. When they invented the technology they offered to equip the whole Country but were told not to by the then government as it would have wiped out the fledgling cable companies. Is this true?
@Greg T – thank you very much for forwarding those figures. It is, as you imply, difficult not to draw the conclusion that the LSW business policy was driven either by responding to capacity questions or “prestige” projects such as the W&C, whereas a more rigorous approach might have focussed on electrification (which, as said, was relatively cheap but which could yield quick dividends in terms of fuel and staff costs). The investment in the docks is also somewhat offbeam by today’s standards: the passenger traffic was, proportionately, neglible if prestigious, and freight was not a major LSW market – perhaps that, too, was a response to capacity issues (larger ships drawing more water?)
ROGERB at 11:07 “There was an article in The Oldie …. Is this true?”
Haven’t seen the Oldie, but it sounds 100% accurate. (And I’m aware that we’re taking this off topic — apologies, and I’ll be brief.) As I remember, BT had a fully costed plan to replace its copper local lines with fibre, to generate an income delivering cable TV channels (the internet wasn’t a thing then, in the mid 1980s). The Thatcher government wanted a competitive telecoms market (and in that, at least, it was right), and licensed cable TV operators, and at the same time banned BT from offering TV services. End of fibre plan.
(Now, let’s get back to the topic.)
Graham H
Except that the LSW, certainly after Urie took over at Eastleigh, was the only SR constituent to build serious freight & mixed-traffic locos ( The first Maunsell mogul didn’t appear until 1917 ) – classes H15 & S15, both of which were fairly meaty 4-6-0’s. And they were extensively used on the Soton docks traffic, which built up nicely.
Alan B-G: Actually that’s not a million miles from telling the BBC not to make such popular programs or interfering with an improved Thameslink/Wimbledon loop service (by terminating the latter at Blackfriars).
See how I got us back on topic again? Or at least within a mile so from Waterloo… 😉
Missed copying this bit: A publicly owned company is not allowed to be too competitive…
Whilst work on the additional stairs on P1-4 will indeed continue during the current , they will not be finished by the end of the blockade as the article implies
As the blockade nears its end, has anyone seen any news on how well the work has gone?
Based on Network Rail’s recent history with major projects (with a lot of cynicism thrown in), are we going to find out next week that there have been some design problems or late arrival of equipment and so another blockade will be needed before the work can be finished?
Greg Tingley/Graham H
But much bigger things were at stake at Soton Dock, which is why the issues mentioned occurred. Around the time of the previous major Waterloo rebuilding, Soton Docks was in a huge battle with Liverpool Docks over the lucrative North Atlantic passenger and freight business. A vast amount of money had been spent enlarging, dredging and building new facilities at Soton Dock to take the largest ships then on the North Atlantic and for the future (as they saw it). But none of this could have happened without the full support of the L&SWR. Having a new Docks infrastructure doesn’t work if you cannot move people and goods out quickly and efficiently. Was there a financial incentive from the Docks to improve L&SWR freight facilites; hence the new Urie locomotives, Greg mentions? Or were members of the L&SWR Board involved with Soton Docks financially? What is certain is the L&SWR did not attempt to match the special and exclusive trains provided for “American Tourists” by the London & North Western Railway to London directly from Liverpool Docks. So perhaps the L&SWR Board had some financial common sense. Especially if someone (i.e.Soton Dock) was making a contribution to L&SWR coffers to improve services at the Docks.
Just looking at what railways ‘improve’ and spend money on neglects wider issues. On a smaller scale but much more recent, I am reminded of the opening of Ramsgate Harbour to cross channel shipping. The inadequate road system in Kent could simply not deal with the huge heavy lorries that suddenly appeared on local roads. So eventually the M2 was extended almost to Ramsgate to cope with this demand. A kind of chicken and egg situation. It highlights the almost farcical transport planning system in this country, that public funds (extending the M2) were put into making a private business venture (Ramsgate Harbour) a success. But the general point is that railway developments should be looked at broadly. And L&SWR actions as regards freight and track widening at this time almost certainly were because Soton Dock was expanding rapidly and attracting much more business than previously.
Michael: I think your points about Ramsgate Harbour are subject to small corrections, but they are probably only detail and may not affect the general sweep of your argument. Ramsgate Harbour is now run by the local authority, and has been for some time, though it may have been private at some point – and of course the ferry services always have been private. The M2 was extended towards Ramsgate – in 1965, two years after the first section was built, but that eastmost part also serves Canterbury and Dover. The Thanet Way, A299, which connects the M2 to Ramsgate is not a motorway, but has been substantially upgraded, mostly in the 1990s, though the last part was done during 2009-2012, just in time to provide good access to the Pfizer complex, Manston Airport, and Ramsgate ferries (all subsequently closed – which may well make your “farcial” point).
But comparing Ramsgate Harbour with Southampton Docks rather a strange thing to do, as they are on completely different scales – like contrasting Broad Street station with Waterloo.
Malcolm,
What a strange statement concerning Broad Street and Waterloo. I think you need to add a period in history. Which is the big one and which is the minnow? Broad Street was once very busy indeed. If Wikipedia is to believed, and I am sure I have read this in a multiple number of books as well, Broad Street was busier than Waterloo. Somehow, I don’t think this is what you intended to convey to us.
PoP: Indeed it is not what I intended. I was thinking of Broad Street it its final years. A non-transport comparison would have been better – indeed the minnow you mention would have served better, alongside some suitable large aquatic creature.
@Michael Easton – I think one needs to get the scale of the thing in perspective. However bitter the battle between Liverpool and Soton as ports for the prestigious liner trade, in terms of impacts on the railway, neither justified more than one or two trains a day, compared with the many hundreds on the rest of the LSW system (or, if you prefer, the dozens of other long distance services operated by the LSW); as a slice of the LSW income it will have been small. [It is, of course, a well-known – almost Parkinsonian – tendency for firms to concentrate effort on high profile but non-core projects…]
On the question of highway planning, one issue until very recent decades has been the lack of any suitable planning tools. The basic framework of the motorway system, for example, was developed on the highly formulaic basis that it should connect London to the north and to the ports, and that there should be an onion ring of circles around London; other motorways were added on the basis of observed traffic. Even now, the modelling of traffic flows tends to relate to the volumes expected at a particular point or on a particular stretch of road, rather than as the aggregation of flows between O/D pairs. The words soggy and trench spring to mind.
Micheal Easton
Or were members of the L&SWR Board involved with Soton Docks financially?
[Patronising tone removed. LBM]
The LSWR owned Soton docks, outright.
Quoting from O. S. Nock:
” Charles Scotter … [ Gen Manager LSWR } & on his recommendation, an arrangement was made in 1892, for the LSWR to purchase the entire estate of the Southampton Dock Company.”
You have to remember, that, up until 1948 many railways outright-owned docks, as well as shipping lines. And even with nationalisaton, the continuity of interest & service was maintained until it was deliberately smashed-up for personal gain by a later government, under the guise of “increased competition”
Graham H, Micheal E & others
Never mind the three boat-trains put on for a single ship ( Either of the !Queens” in later years ) the real profit in Soton was freight, vast quantities of freight, which then encouraged further development of Soton Docks & the dredging of that estuary.
The LSWR & the SR & BR did very well out of the Soton Docks, until they were taken away from them – so nothing at all like a “high profile but non-core project” I’m afraid.
Whereas, at Liverpool, the docks were their own masters, the LNW/L&Y/CLC had to run thier trains to the docks’ boundary & then usually let others take the working over for the last few half-mile or so ( Though there was some interworking )
At Southampton, for passengers, the trains came to the docksdie, as at Dover Marine. The nearest one could get in Liverpool was Livp. Coprorations/Dock Coy’s “Riverside” station. A delightful place, but still not quite as close to the ships as either Southampton or the admirable Parkeston Quay.
For comparison, both Manchester & London (PLA) had their own extensive railway systems, with their own locomotives, which – as in Liverpool – handled & forwarded traffic from the main-line railways.
@Michael, Malcolm
SR150 (David St John Thomas) states that the LSWR took over Southampton Docks in 1892.
Alan A Jackson gives traffic figures for various periods; in 1903, 322 trains arrived daily at Broad Street, against 303 at Waterloo; the positions were reversed for passenger journeys, Waterloo dealing with 31.0 million and Broad Street 26.7 million.
Dear all,
Have been watching this conversation since Greg contacted me, and there are a couple of things to note.
The LSWR had more than a stake in the Southampton Docks, they bought the failing Southampton Dock Company in 1892 at a cost of £1,177,086 and so had complete control over operations and investment.
The principal reason for this move was that the docks was a major source of freight traffic for the LSWR. If the Dock Company had failed, the consequences for the railway’s financial performance would have been serious. Thereafter, the LSWR set about expanding the docks massively, growing its trade accordingly. According to one director, Portal, in 1897 95% of all goods passing through the docks went via the LSWR. So using this and the various surviving statistics I have estimated the contribution of the docks to the tonnage of freight hauled by the LSWR
YR est. in/out (95%) Total LSWR est. docks %
1892 400,530 1,778,944 22.52%
1897 718,552 2,274,047 31.60%
1908 1,057,495 2,505,040 42.21%
Here are the figures for coal, and ‘Total LSWR’ denotes the company’s total mineral trade,
YR est. in/out (95%) Total LSWR est. docks %
1892 170,544 2,736,806 6.23%
1897 369,871 3,135,521 11.80%
1908 568,195 4,119,279 13.79%
I realise these figures are imperfect given the data that has survived, but they prove that the freight passing through the docks became an increasingly important part of the LSWR’s business.
On the passenger front, between 1896 and 1908 the number of passengers embarking and disembarking at Southampton increased from 214,400 to 268,549, or by 25.26%,
To demonstrates how the LSWR set about growing the passenger business through the docks in the latter part of the Edwardian period, I will just quote my thesis directly (because it is easier).
“Towards the end of the period, further decisions to enlarge the Southampton Docks were not simply driven by the need to accommodate traffic growth and increasing vessel sizes, but by a renewed drive to significantly develop the business. Lord Pirrie joined the LSWR board in June 1907. He was chairman of Harland and Wolff, the Belfast shipbuilder, and a director of the White Star Line (WSL). Pirrie’s appointment to the LSWR board was a reflection of the stronger links that had been established between the railway and these companies at that time; Harland and Wolff had established a repair station at the Southampton Docks in April 1907, while the WSL had started sailing from them in June. Once Pirrie became director he was appointed to the Docks and Marine Committee, so his experience and knowledge could be utilised to maximum effect by the company. From here he helped to direct investment in the docks towards facilities for his companies; in October 1907 the LSWR began work on ‘White Star’ dock to accommodate the WSL’s new ships (constructed by Harland and Wolff), “Titanic” and “Olympic.” Between then and the June half-year 1911 the LSWR expended £726,294 on docks improvements, or 6.29 percent of the company’s capital expenditure during Owens’ General Managership (1898-1911). This investment was a rare example of practical decision-making on the LSWR’s part in the period. The relationship with Pirrie anticipated long-term growth in the WSL’s business from Southampton. However, throughout the first decade of the twentieth century the WSL was not the only the company to use Southampton. By 1909 21 steamship lines sailed from the docks . Pirrie, along with Sir Owen Phillips (another L&SWR/WSL director) who also had positions in shipping, would have brought to the railway considerable experience and insight that probably helped it attract shipping lines to Southampton and better manage the business there. ”
Overall, I cannot tell you what proportion of total company’s income was derived from the traffic passing through the docks, the detailed figures have not survived. An estimate I made was that in 1908 the freight contributed £1,008,398 (gross) to the company’s coffers, or 18.24% of its overall revenue. My overall conclusion, therefore, is that the development of the docks helped stave off a crises for the L&SWR, as it off-set losses from tram and latterly bus competition in its profitable suburban districts.
I hope that is useful/interesting.
I noted the critical figures in the centre of my comment have not come out clearly, so here they are again, but with dividers popped in. First general merchandise.
YR – est. in/out (95%) – Total LSWR – est. docks %
1892 – 400,530 – 1,778,944 – 22.52%
1897 – 718,552 – 2,274,047 – 31.60%
1908 – 1,057,495 – 2,505,040 – 42.21%
Coal.
YR – est. in/out (95%) – Total LSWR – est. docks %
1892 – 170,544 – 2,736,806 – 6.23%
1897 – 369,871 – 3,135,521 – 11.80%
1908 – 568,195 – 4,119,279 – 13.79%
Blockader, please could we leave facetious comments about the unions “thinking they own the railway” out? It’s not unreasonable for drivers and their representatives to want to be comfortable with the tools they are expected to use for the job. I can assure you from my own experiences, contrary to popular belief, drivers compromise all the time on all sorts of issues to keep the wheels moving, but there are fundamentals where compromise must be limited. Believe me, given the chance the powers that be would allow drivers to take risks – if they know it’s the driver that will take the flak.
Graham H. writes: when considering funding 19C. branch lines “investors such as small businessmen had other objectives including “putting their town on the map”.
This raises an interesting point. The businesses in these branch line communities might have benefited from building the line, even if the line itself was not profitable. What mattered to them is whether their overall profits increased rather than whether the railway itself was profitable. These local businessmen may have been happy to make this cross-subsidy: at least this was the calculation that they were often making.
Re Jimbo @ 15:57
Civils, Track and Signalling + Telecom installation all completed (to schedule).
However testing the signalling was 1 to 2 days behind at the start of this week (some what as result of the mis-routing and derailment the previous Wednesday so no surprises more than day has been lost as a result), hence the early closures of P11-14 in the evening after 2230 earlier this week (Monday – Wednesday) and the additional closure of P11-14 all day Thursday to catch up (P11-14 in addition to P1-10 closures for this Friday, Saturday, Sunday and Monday were part of the original plan).
The plant has virtually all gone with lots of the plant making its way round to London Bridge for the 9 days there starting tonight and there is just some site clearance left to do apart from testing.
So good chance with 3+ days to go (Handback is scheduled for 0400 Tuesday).
@ngh: The plant has virtually all gone with lots of the plant making its way round to London Bridge for the 9 days there starting tonight
I was wondering why I could see little plant around during the week on the approaches to London Bridge… Normally there is much more of it in the build up to a large blockade.
Your comment also invoked an image of a line of diggers driving along the tracks from Waterloo East to London Bridge!
“What is certain is the L&SWR did not attempt to match the special and exclusive trains provided for “American Tourists” by the London & North Western Railway to London directly from Liverpool Docks.”
Following is from ‘L.S.W.R. Carriages Vol. 1, Weddell’
“… L.S.W.R. was finally enabled to buy the docks in November 1892. One of the first moves to attract more business was to improve the boat train services. […] the Locomotive and stores committee, on 9th November 1892, approved the construction of ten saloon carriages for the America Line boat trains.”
“this was a high priority scheme is clear [..]. the first pair of vehicles were ready within three months, with the rest following at the rate of two each month. They cost £1,190 each […] were most luxuriously fitted out.”
“second batch of ten […] built in 1894 […] cost £1,159 each […] completed between January and May”
After 1901 they also ran to Plymouth as the America line ships began to stop there with the interesting competition with the GWR. they seem to have been taken out of boat train traffic around 1906 /07.
@David Turner – itis very kind of you to share these figures here. The key ratio wold seem to be the proportion of dock freight to the total LSW in come – at its peak,if i have understood your figures correctly, Soton freight was about 42% of 18% – about 8-9%of all revenue to compare with the 1911 figure of the docks consuming about 6% of capex (not clear, of course,whether this level of investment was sustained long term). In those terms, Soton investment was better than most LSW investments. Whether that also extended to the docks passenger business is unclear. Still less clear as to whether LSW made this sort of calculation.
Turning to TJ’s costings for coaching stock, the implication is that a typical train (loco and ten coaches) would cost around £14k – say £3500 pa at typical Edwardian dividend levels – twice that including depreciation. Running costs? Say £200 for a round trip = £60k pa . Roughly £50-60k to run a daily boat train for, say 500 passengers @£2 a pop – revenue of £300k pa. A good contribution to servicing the capital costs of the infrastructure, although the same calculation could be made and scaled up for the Solents /BOMOs /WC services. [There’s a further implication that some other activity was diluting the total business performance but I can’t see what that was from the available figures here – suburban, wagonload???]
Although these broad brush conclusions suggest that the boat trains were worthwhile in themselves, it still seems to be an open question as to whether investment in the docks as opposed to the other IC routes wasn’t something of a distraction. (EG LSW could have run the boat trains without the dock investment).
@ Malcolm
Re Ramsgate, you did not mention the very substantial Royal Harbour Approach built by Kent CC in about 1999 to support what was then a privately owned Ramsgate Harbour (it became the property of Thanet DC when the private company had had enough of losses). This road, about 2 miles long including a half mile long bored tunnel only provides access to the port and is, now, wholly useless as the port has closed – at least to commercial shipping. Just another example of the taxpayer supporting a private sector project without sufficient consideration.
The busiest part of the Surburban lines in the morning from my experiance is the part from Clapham Junction to Vauxhall. A lot of passengers get off at Vauxhall probably most head for the Victoria Line. A good Underground connection to Clapham junction would solve a lot of the overcrowding problems and could even remove the requirement for 10 car trains on the suburban services.
A substantial increase in capacity on the suberbal lines could be acheived by getting rid of the intermediate cabs and going for an articulated train as used on London Overground / S Stock & Thameslink amongst others.
quinlet: All very true and good points. Only a small niggle, I don’t think the port has actually legally closed to commercial shipping, but it is currently being used for little or none. For instance the council claimed, quite recently, that they were legally obliged to admit the ship which takes the live animal exports (provided it followed the rules), even though they (and the numerous protestors) disapproved. But whatever, the so-called Royal Harbour Approach is indeed part of the expensive apparent over-provision of public infrastructure in the area. Whether it competes in scale with the Humber Bridge and M180 is left as an exercise for the reader.
JohnM: Although most readers probably know what you mean, strictly the sort of train with full width gangways between carriages (and no intermediate cabs) is not necessarily “articulated”, as that word should probably only be used if adjacent carriages share bogies (and sharing or not-sharing bogies is largely irrelevant to capacity).
As a regular user of what is now SWR, I found this article very interesting.
One thing that initially confused me about the special works timetable was the fact that trains from Portsmouth were making an additional stop at Staines at the weekends (and during yesterday and today). I have now found out the reason why they are going that way. The reason is that, in addition to the closure of the up/down Main Slows from Queenstown Road inwards, the up/down Main Fasts are also blocked at weekends from there. Now it is possible to switch from the Windsor lines to the Main lines after Queenstown Road, however, the crossover is only a single lead which limits capacity. As a result, it has been necessary to divert (in the up direction only) both the Portsmouth and Weymouth trains off at Byfleet to join the Reading line and avoid the pinch point.
Another interesting bit of operation that happens at the weekends is the fact the Cobham line trains are curtailed at Surbiton, turning around in the up Fast platform! Of course, they can do this because the only trains running through Surbiton that would normally use the up Fast line are the hourly Exeter trains.
@JohnM
“A substantial increase in capacity on the suberbal [sic] lines could be acheived by getting rid of the intermediate cabs and going for a
n articulatedfull width gangwayed train as used on London Overground / S Stock & Thameslink amongst others.”…which is precisely what SWR are planning on doing by 2020.
@NGH – Thanks for the feedback – that is very good to hear. It also explains the sudden changes at the end of last week. If it does finish on time, it will be really good to see a Network Rail major project completed properly
Re Anon E. Mouse,
“…which is precisely what SWR are planning on doing by 2020”
Which was covered but got edited out to shorten the article…
And everything will be 5/ 10 car (60x 10 car units and 30x 5 car units) with walk through (wide gangway) design. However First in their infinite wisdom have decided to fit toilets* to the units which will reduce the capacity gain (roughly equivalent to intermediate cab removal).
* which will probably be used as a first class compartment by users unless there is cooperation which see the space taken over as additional standing space for circa 10 people which is what happens on other busy trains in other parts of the country!
Re Jimbo,
Waterloo is far lower risk and impact than London Bridge as at Waterloo the option exists to keep running Windsor line services into the former international and then use as much as they can of the rest depending on what is or isn’t complete as regards testing sign off.
London Bridge non-completion has a much higher impact and knock on effects for the next stages.
Agree that NR needs plenty of completed on time on everything that is happening in the next few weeks/months as the scale of the works across the UK is massive (Liverpool Lime Street and Glasgow Queen Street (phase 2) are both at the start of massive rebuilds bigger than the Waterloo works) along with key Thameslink, Crossrail, electrification works and the start of HS2 modifications to the existing network
NGH
Contrariwise…
Waterloo was, effectively a “Big Bang” with some extra work added on …
LBG is a whole ongoing set of large “Chunks” all of which need to be done, in order, on time, to make the whole vast project work at all.
My sig-engineer friend ( who is probably at LBG right now ) reminded me of this on Wednesday, whilt repeating that he was glad he was not involved at WAT ( after the derailment … )
I’m having difficulty in reading the comments on this, and the Southeastern article.
Whichever way I turn my phone, (LG G5) Landscape or Portrait, they are positioned too far to the right. Meaning that only approximately half of each line of the comment, is actually visible.
The articles themselves, are displayed just fine.
Still unable to get my head around how an operational train is signalled into another train on a closed track. That would seem to me to be as most accidents are due to a series of errors in planning and operation.
1. The driver should not have accepted a route onto a closed track.
2. The signaller should not have set a route onto a closed track.
However 1 and 2 shouldn’t have been possible because the barrier train should surely have given an occupied track circuit making it impossible for 2. to occur, therefore the signalling equipment is faulty, which is far more of a concern. Anyway surely the points should have been locked away (scotch and clipped) from the occupied route.
Either way it is clear there is a serious failure here somewhere, maybe multiple ones and it needs resolving before people are actually injured because of it.
@LUTimetabler – I recall reading somewhere that there was a fault with the track to cause the derailment, as in spread point blades or the like. If so, that could possibly exclude either of your suggested options. Presumably, the RAIB will report in due course.
LUT
1) No – he had a clear “green” – which means he had ( Or so he was lead to believe ) a clear, safe route
2) He probably didn’t, so not that either.
But, if you look further back up in the comments, is is probable that the cause was either, as GF has just said – a specific fault in the physical pointwork, leading to a wrong-route, or a mis-wiring of the point-systems, which should have had to have been so altered, as to prevent a “left” switch at that slip. The latter being exactly analagous to Clapham Jn, of course, which was a wiring fault.
Again, we don’t yet know, but RAIB will tell us.
Graham Feakins, Greg Tingey,
I wonder if Graham has confused the derailment at Waterloo with the one at Paddington. The one at Paddington involved the rear HST power car as the train was leaving the station. and happened close to the buffer stops. I know we discourage speculation but, given the circumstances, it is hard to imagine this is anything other than a track fault or at least a situation where the condition of the track is a least part of the cause.
Again, not wishing to encourage speculation too much but, the thing that is probably significant about the Waterloo derailment is that it was the first train of the day. So an obvious question to as is: “what happened overnight such that the situation was different to the previous day?”.
Greg Tingey,
Contrariwise…
Waterloo was, effectively a “Big Bang” with some extra work added on … LBG is a whole ongoing set of large “Chunks” all of which need to be done, in order, on time, to make the whole vast project work at all.
I don’t want to get over-semantic about this but the “chunks” themselves are pretty massive and some are getting on for the same sort of scale as Waterloo. There is a period of eight days of work going on in the London Bridge area at the moment including various junction changes and bringing new track and a new platform into use.. The signalling changes are over a much wider area than Waterloo.
Also, Waterloo has been able to continue to function throughout the disruptive period. Incredibly, the news items emphasised disruption at Waterloo over the Bank Holiday but most totally failed to mention the closure of Charing Cross for eight days. Presumably as no significant engineering work was taking place at that station it didn’t get included.
Furthermore if you look at the service from Waterloo today you have around 18tph departing. At London Bridge that is just 4tph. That is 2tph to East Croydon via Norbury and 2tph all-stations to Tattenham Corner via a roundabout route – so what is on offer isn’t much use to most regular users.
@ Alan G 1114 24/8 – in terms of the equivocating over Trans Pennine electrification I wonder whether the Government is still nervous over what its so called “Northern Powerhouse” will deliver for rail. Note that a certain newspaper editor and former Chancellor is happily throwing rocks at the government when he sees due opportunity. He has recently thrown a volley in respect of what sort of rail scheme should be provided over the Pennines. I have not followed the debate in detail but we seem to have three variants – “bog standard” electrification, a Crossrail of the North and HS3. I do wonder if the first variant is now deemed “too boring” and not “glitzy” enough to give due uplift to the Government’s “commitment” to the North. The dangers with variants 2 and 3 is that no one seems to know in detail what they mean apart from being more snazzy and high profile sounding (and thus more expensive).
I think it is interesting that Mr Grayling appears to have partly handed the baton to Northern politicians to get them to decide what they want and think they can fund. Whether there is any real appetite for a glitzy scheme and to largely pay for it is unknown. On that basis it is quite clever for the DfT to offer the North a “noose” to see if they will put their head in it or not. If they have any sense they won’t do that and will keep the pressure on to get electrification done as quickly as is feasible but done in a way that does not scupper additional tracks or platforms later if a more “Crossrail-esque” service is deemed viable. That does imply someone getting their requirements and upgrade path sorted very quickly so Network Rail can select a suitable design for electrification works and not stymie themselves for possible later works.
If I were to believe what I’ve read elsewhere NR have allegedly got contractors lined up, possibly on an “early engagement basis”, for two large parts of TP electrification. The works at Leeds don’t have anyone in place yet. If this is true it makes the “baton handing” by DfT all the more curious as it potentially adds more uncertainty and delay which is the last thing you would want if you wished to show commitment to the North.
While I understand the concerns of the costs of electrification schemes I find it deeply ironic that as NR get through a horrible phase of “learning” and build expertise and knowledge government then stop all the future schemes. If the knowledge is lost then we can guarantee that future works will have scoping and delivery problems. It strikes me as barmy to cancel MML and some other infill schemes (Birmingham – Bristol) and to threaten TP electrification. Clearly you have to get stability but it should be possible to phase these works sensibly and provide us with a secure long term infrastructure. Bi-mode trains gorging on diesel fuel is not a secure future.
WW
This happened before.
There was a definite attempt, about 1962-3 to stop the Manchester/Liverpool/Brum/Euston electrification, because it was costing too much.
( And – Marples was on the loose )
Then, sensible heads prevailed, said “let’s learn from this” & carried on.
[Rest snipped! LBM]
Walthamstow Writer 28 August 2017 at 01:37
“I think it is interesting that Mr Grayling appears to have partly handed the baton to Northern politicians to get them to decide what they want and think they can fund.”
Patrick McLoughlin was fine with Northern and Midland councils working out what they wanted from the new TransPennine and Northern franchises. Some quite clever things were worked out that deliver a lot for not all that many more trains and drivers.
That was all led from Manchester. Chief Executive Sir Howard Bernstein has since retired. However, I think the will to get results that can be delivered is still widely shared.
Re WW and Greg,
I suspect Grayling just wants to delay it enough so it lands in his successors in tray, I think DfT probably anticipates the North presenting a united front rather than infighting and getting back rather quicker than Grayling anticipates…
Part of the problem with the original announcement of TPE electrification was that it ignored all the other issues on the route that also need dealing with in order to run better services (i.e. more, longer, faster). So like many of the other electrification schemes (GW being the biggest and most prominent example) what BR called a “total route modernisation” would be required instead of just electrification. Note that GW Electrification is now GW Route Modernisation…
Hence TP electrification is now an 8 year route modernisation programme with track layout/alignment, signalling (including semaphore replacement in places), platform lengths, passing loops all getting sorted before electrification. Note the similar time scale to sorting out the GWML from the start of Reading rebuild to the non-paused electrification work being completed as well as Filton bank requadrification etc. For example track realignment to increase speeds through Ashton (under Lyne) will produce about a third of the total time saving of electrification between Manchester and Leeds but with far higher BCR hence sorting out the PSRs that see a drop from in line speed 75mph to 20mph (already partially done this year) first then electrify later, but electrifying later then become harder to justify unless the there is high tph as the B element of the BCR has been undermined by track realignment.
The main issue nationally (including Crossrail etc) is the “delivery gap” i.e. the to do but not finished list still kept getting added to faster than work on the projects was progressing combined with increased average project scope and timescales. Hence lots of benefits promised but very few yet completed with always plenty of jam tomorrow. DfT are effectively slowing down the rate at which stuff is getting added and NR have stepped up the delivery rate (hence the biggest ever August and soon Christmas – beating last year in both cases) as DfT want some jam actually delivered. Delivering jam now is far harder as most of the then remaining low hanging fruit projects were picked up and with delivery starting about a decade ago.
Re Alan Griffiths,
“That was all led from Manchester. Chief Executive Sir Howard Bernstein has since retired. However, I think the will to get results that can be delivered is still widely shared.”
As Grayling is probably going to find out before a reshuffle 🙂
There is clear consistency to the actions of Grayling (Thymallus thymallus). Although in London, he blocked decentralisation of decision and control and in the North he is promoting it, in both cases he is making investment less likely and his own responsibility for any mishaps much less evident. Ditto the block on the various electrification schemes.
Before the election, I presumed that he was awaiting a ministerial reshuffle. Clearly I was wrong on the specifics. In a government environment in which tax revenues are falling and there is political instability, it is difficult to hold self-interested ministerial decisions to account.
Comparison between XR2 and electrification in the north or elsewhere is a little facile. XR2 is about increasing capacity. Electrification per se makes a much smaller contribution to improved capacity. Longer/more frequent trains could do more, and that option is still available in most areas outside London, where 2/3 car trains and 1 or 2 tph are the norm on most lines, even in peak times. Increased length or frequency of trains is much harder to achieve in London, where everything is already maxed out and major infrastructure projects such as at Waterloo are needed to make any improvements at all. (Remember that the Waterloo project will only benefit four platforms of the 19, and only provide a 25% improvement in capacity even to those – so increasing capacity on the SWR by about 5%. You could double the length of most trains in the North of England without any infrastructure changes at all.
Horses for courses – capacity is not, in general, what the north needs. It needs faster, more frequent services.
Re Timbeau,
Many users up North would disagree on capacity as they struggle to get on services at the moment as there was huge growth on the previous franchise let as a “no-growth” one with lots of capacity currently being added mostly by lengthening but also bottle neck removal.
4 platforms of the
1924… And then actually platforms 1-6 as 5-7 were hard to fully utilise before hand and the throat needed rebuilding to take the frequency with 100% 10 car trains.Except you get 30% increase in capacity overall as part of the programme:
100% 10 car on SWML slows up from ~25% currently
100% 10 car on SWML slows up from ~50% currently
100% full length SWML fast services
More SWML services
More Windsor line services
More standing space, less first class and less wasted space (guards offices removal and fewer cabs on new stock)
@ Greg I believe you are correct about the attempt to kill off the London Euston to Manchester electrification in the sixties. Indeed I believe Beeching thought there was only a need for one “heavy” train per day. Probably part and parcel of his belief that the future lay with a freight only railway as per the US model. I believe what sabotaged this effort was a request from London Midland Region for a huge number of new Deltic locomotives way more than what was envisaged on the East Coast line. This projected purchase was so costly that the argument against electrification faded away.
@WW, @ngh
If you subscribe to the view, as I do, that you should not overload your expert team on electrification, it’s a case of where to send them when GWR is paused and Bedford to Corby is complete on MML. For any disbelievers, look what happened when NR tried to run GOBLIN electrification alongside GWR electrification. Choices as follows:
1) GWR Filton Bank – assuming that you descope the Temple Meads station upgrade to send the wires into the old train shed, That’s a short distance to wire with your bridges already rebuilt, but also very few trains unless you change service patterns.
2) GWR Thingley Junction to Temple Meads – about 21 miles allowing between one and two tph in either direction to be electric only (some continue to Weston/Exeter). Remember that it has been suggested here that IEP might not be as fast as HST (!). Most (if not all) of the enabling work is complete but there is still the need to build the masts in Bath, which has been controversial. Again you would need to descope at Temple Meads to make this a sensible option.
3) MML Kettering to Nottingham. About 46 miles with no (or next to no) enabling work done. About 1 tph could be electric only.
4) Northern Powerhouse Manchester to Leeds. I cannot conceive how this can be cheaper with a new line, so I will assume that we are working with an upgrade. Here, as ngh has described, we are looking at remodelling at Ashton and resignalling as well as the standard bridges, pylons and wires. It is roughly 38 miles in distance, and all trains would have to be bi-mode. To create an all-electric route, the wires would have to extend to Liverpool Lime Street in the west to Colton Junction near York in the North.
Mr Grayling may well assume it is his successor’s issue, but it is challenging. To appear not to favour the North – even though, like WW, I am a Northerner and I largely support the current funding priorities – would be foolish, but it isn’t hard to see that it would be the most costly of the four schemes and create no electric-only trains. Running more than the first two in parallel would be likely to cause issues with overloaded experts, so it is probably a case of ‘either-or’, which would match the government’s policy on infrastructure spending. Maybe a compromise would be to do the enabling work but not the electrification in the North?
Re Ian S
“3) MML Kettering to Nottingham. About 46 miles with no (or next to no) enabling work done. About 1 tph could be electric only.”
Apart from the majority of bridge work already done along the route south of Trent Jn…
The electrical feed for Bedford – Corby will be on the MML north of Kettering.
The current franchisee was recently instructed to procure an all bimode fleet for Nottingham /Derby /Sheffield services for use by the next franchise holder. (Corby will be EMU within 2.5 years). Hence south of Trent Jn would be 4tph each way under the wires.
The MML equivalent of Ashton is Market Harborough and the alignment is getting straighten out (and hence speeded up) over the next 2 years which isn’t helpful as regards getting electrification actually done.
“Maybe a compromise would be to do the enabling work but not the electrification in the North?”
Doing the the enabling work in advance substantially reduces the workload for the specialist teams which is effectively what is happening with Transpennine and the extended time scales (8 years) to do the enabling works then electrify.
@ Alan G – Patrick McLoughlin is not Chris Grayling and boy can we spot the difference. While I don’t think we would have avoided all the problems I suspect that if McLoughlin had stayed we’d have had more devolution in the S East and a more pragmatic view on other issues. As a Midlands MP I couldn’t see him cancelling MML electrification for example. I suspect he’d have had to make some unpalatable decisions but we’d have been far better off with him still at DfT.
@ Ngh – thanks for the extra details. I am actually pleased that Trans Pennine looks like a full and proper modernisation – that is what the route needs to ensure what he have is properly exploited and improved. I do hope the Northern politicians don’t fall into Mr G’s trap and duly come back with a united front that keeps him under pressure. He may well be itching to get away but I don’t see any reshuffles for as long as Mrs May is PM. I also don’t see much prospect of her being replaced in the near future even if the Tory Party is tearing itself apart in private.
@ Ian S – I was reluctant to make any detail suggestions as I’m not up to date with everything that is going on. I take your point about not overstretching key resources but surely NR and its supply base must be *growing* its expertise over time and not just remaining with a critical resource risk for ever and a day. That should allow the pace to be picked up over time at an affordable cost while maintaining a sensible programme approach. Based on what has reached the public domain (not a lot) about GOBLIN electrification I am sceptical that a lack of critical resource is the main root cause. It’s a factor but I think there are others. One day we might actually find out the truth. I just hope that we get some common sense prevailing soon on rail investment but I am not holding my breath.
NR issued a statement starting with encouraging noises at 2000 this evening:
“We expect the station to be fully reopened tomorrow morning for our passengers”
but several paragraphs later less encouraging noises:
“The next few hours will be a crucial part as all the new signalling is switched on a tested. We will be keeping passengers updated through tonight and into the morning”
The planed diversions of SE services (due to London Bridge works) into P21/22 tomorrow before 1900 have been diverted to Blackfriars instead….
SWR not saying anything yet.
Re WW,
GOBLIN
“Based on what has reached the public domain (not a lot) about GOBLIN electrification I am sceptical that a lack of critical resource is the main root cause. It’s a factor but I think there are others.”
Indeed it won’t be anywhere near the top of the list.
“Issues” at a well known non-UK based component designer / supplier is fairly high on the list.
Expect to see wires going up over night starting next week at the western end, should all be virtually complete by end of Christmas block and there are some weekend road closures for Crouch Hill bridge surveys soon.
@WW, @ngh
Thank you, as ever, for your insight.
@ngh
“Issues” at a well known non-UK based component designer / supplier is fairly high on the list.,
Would the off-shore supplier have been selected if the specialist team not been focused on GWR electrification?
@WW
surely NR and its supply base must be *growing* its expertise over time and not just remaining with a critical resource risk for ever and a day
You would like to think so. But with no definite funding beyond 2019, that doesn’t attract the best engineers.
The September issue of Modern Railways has a lot to say about all of these issues, including Mr Thymallus – well worth a read, IMHO
Re Ian S,
“Would the off-shore supplier have been selected if the specialist team not been focused on GWR electrification?”
Quite probably as they have been doing similar for BR (last days) and Railtrack before NR and are doing similar at some of the more traditional type electrifications inc North West and Scotland too. One of that suppliers main (& more expensive) competitors is doing the equivalent for GWML, MML, Crossrail as well as ECML/GEML upgrade rather than a “specialist team”.
Other countries outsource similarly to the same firms as NR /Crossrail does.
Quelle surprise, the upgrade has overrun with massive disruption on SWR this morning.
SOUTHERN HEIGHTS (LIGHT RAILWAY) 22 August 2017 at 13:06
@Mark: Searching in reverse doesn’t seem to turn up anything.
I searched for 29/8/17, 1600-2359, from WIT calling at Sevenoaks, but nothing comes up.
Am I right in thinking this is in the morning only?
______________________________________________
It seems for today the services will go into/from Blackfriars except for 2357 to Dover services, Then the services run from into/from Waterloo until 2357 on Friday.
Re James,
Handed back at 0645 rather than 0400 so the morning peak is a write off unsurprisingly.
SWR visibly leaving all the trains they could be running in the Wimbledon depots instead of at least trying to run some more services in the later half of the peak for SWML slow services.
Given today is day 1 of Delay Repay on SWR they may regret the number of extra claims that come in from point to point Oyster users at the stations affected (rather than not having to give a stuff under passenger charter). They are effectively running last 3 weeks am peak timetable.
Part of the issue comes from using some of the drivers for the morning.to come in earlier to do test runs instead of driving in service trains instead of the drivers than were available for the purpose yesterday afternoon/evening but everything was behind…
Aiming to get thing back to plan for 1200.
@DEL_TIC: I noticed it this morning. The trains I had expected to say London Waterloo all said London Blackfriars….
I wonder if Blackfriars was able to cope? There doesn’t seem to be anything on SET web-site other than a note to give the change of destination…
Re Ian S,
(Goblin electrification) Just to add that the overseas supplier concerned had also taken over another BR /Railtrack era supplier when the parent company of that firm decided to exit OHLE parts so they have a moderately long history in the UK. There have also been separate different issues with the same supplier on a project in Scotland recently.
Part of the issue will be many of their designs are relatively old, tried + tested and cheap ones which then cause many issues as they increase the amount /cost of work required to get the tick the boxes with the new stricter rules hence going to their more expensive competitor(s) can actually be cheaper in total cost terms as their products tick the boxes more easily (e.g. insulators far closer to contact /catenary wires so there is less extraneous surface area of live components closer to masts / platforms etc so easier to meet stricter safe distance to live components requirements).
Re SHLR,
Blackfriars this evening will be the test…
Ian Sergeant 28 August 2017 at 14:54
“4) Northern Powerhouse Manchester to Leeds. I cannot conceive how this can be cheaper with a new line, so I will assume that we are working with an upgrade. Here, as ngh has described, we are looking at remodelling at Ashton and resignalling as well as the standard bridges, pylons and wires. It is roughly 38 miles in distance, and all trains would have to be bi-mode. To create an all-electric route, the wires would have to extend to Liverpool Lime Street in the west to Colton Junction near York in the North.”
I thank you, and all others, for contributing their knowledge on TransPennine North, but I think you’ve missed some key points.
1) Liverpool-Manchester, via Newtown-le-Willows not via Warrington and Widnes, has already been electrified as part of the NW triangle electrifications. Manchester Airport to Edinburgh & Glasgow services are now all-electric and so are some local ones.
2) Manchester-Stalybridge electrification, last I heard, has been committed as part of the NW triangle electrifications.
3) Bridge clearances between Leeds and East Coast mainline, towards both York and Selby, have continued as pre-electrification works.
4) There are currently 5 fast trains an hour between Manchester and Leeds, and slow ones too, with aspirations for a sixth and most of them via Manchester Victoria. That’s a busy railway!
5) The 5 fast trains an hour terminate at Liverpool Lime Street (2 routes), Manchester Airport and Manchester Piccadilly in the west, Newcastle (2), Middlesbrough, Scarborough and Hull in the east.
6) The Ordsall Chord opens in December this year, with significant timetable changes and a sharp reduction in trains crossing the throat of Manchester Piccadilly.
If electrifying Stalybridge-Leeds-ECML & Selby doesn’t go ahead, what will for the foreseeable future?
[There is no need to bring this Pennine digression to a drastically abrupt halt. But would contributors please just bear in mind the intended London focus of this site (the clue is in the name) and the Waterloo focus of the article under discussion. Malcolm]
Whilst there will, no doubt, be some wringing of hands that the hand-back was late by nearly 3 hours, this is still a seriously good achievement. I still remember going on a project management course where they said something to the effect that “you can be confident in your estimates (time and cost) once you’ve done the same job more than 10 times and really confident when you’ve done it 50 times. Fine for house builders (always on time?????), for folk who build trains, and for the n-th kilometre of plain track.
There are contributors who are close to this project and they might have different views, but I think this has been really successful…..planned, engineered, teamwork (SWT, SWR, NR) , and executed by all the folk at the sharp end (service and engineering).
It was also good to see the NR press desk challenge media seeking to peddle the hackneyed old “disruption on the railways” mantra.
I wonder if the bi-mode trains should cause a re-think on tactics. What, for example, would be the benefits of electrifying the South Devon banks as an isolated performance improvement?
@100andthirty – Whilst only 3 hours late on a such a project is pretty good, I was always taught that a good project manager includes contingency when there is uncertainty in the plan. Would it not have been better to plan to hand back early (say Saturday morning) but give yourself a few days to overcome unforeseen problems? These projects often seem to hand back just before one of the busiest times of day – would it not be better to plan to hand back during a quiet period giving yourself time to fix any teething problems?
@100ANDTHIRTY
That is the Crux of it – in the last fifteen to twenty years, nobody has done an alteration to a free wired relay interlocking of the scale of the one at Waterloo. So working out the possession needed in both lines required and day’s required two years before seeing detailed design was always going to be problematic! To have completed it only three hours late is a brilliant achievement. It’s no comfort to passengers who travelled this morning but they will soon hopefully see the benefit.
@jimbo
Planned completion was around 1600 monday but issues with the testing of the signalling meant that all the contingency got used up. In simple terms, every time an issue is found, the designer has to identify the problem, and produce a modification to the design – this will involve installing more wires and maybe more relays – and then it can be re-tested. Following all the testing you have to do a confidence check that there are no extra wires erroneously installed in any relays you have worked on. This all combined to eat up all the contingency
@ 100&30 – I pretty much agree with your view. We’ve had the usual media nonsense for what was a short but very inconvenient overrun on a project that has done a heck of a lot of work and coped with a derailment in the midst of it all. Clearly the decision to re-route the Dover / Ramsgate trains to Blackfriars for today was part of a pre-determined contingency plan. I’ve seen comments on social media that suggest that the basic contract / payment structure used for NR services (Sch 4 payments?) causes significant issues in preventing appropriate contingency being added to programmes. Then there is also the view as to constitutes “efficiency” from the Regulator. Therefore NR are stuffed all ways round – can’t add contingency to programees, are forced to shell out a fortune if they try and are then marked down by the Regulator if a programme is “too long” or there is an overrun. I haven’t checked what Schedule 4 is but I assume it is compensation payments to operators whose services are disrupted by planned engineering works.
@JOHNM
even though your post is a long way back I thought I had to just say something – the platform requirements between Waterloo NR and Walthamstow LU are totally incomparable. There are a multitude of reasons for this but I will just pick two out – One is a Metro system where all the trains do the same thing and travel over a much shorter distance – no matter if they are late or not they all follow in the same order with no junctions downstream. My other point is that the end point of LU lines tend to be in the suburbs (as is the case at Walthamstow) – at this point the trains are at their emptyest and there is little need for a long layover time. Waterloo on the other hand is the busiest point – it is not possible and even if it were it wouldn’t be safe practice for a full 10-car train to unload and people board the train within 1.5 mins, and then another full 10-car train arrive to a still full platform
@ QTR – while your main point is valid I’m afraid I will quibble about the loadings on trains at Vic Line terminals. In the AM peak there may not be huge numbers alighting at termini but there will be people waiting to board and a very high flow rate of passengers esp at Brixton. Trains leave full and standing at both ends of the line in the AM peak. Similarly very well loaded trains arrive in the PM peak and platforms and lower escalator circulating areas are not clear before the next surge of passengers arrive. Clearly, though, Waterloo NR is a much more complex operation and other LU termini meet your criteria e.g. the Met Line where trains are never full to / from Aldgate and I doubt trains are ever at capacity at Watford or Chesham.
@QTR – well, perhaps not 15 mins – there are some good examples of less around the termini but the basic point is right. Unless you practice stepping back of crew, there is a serious time difference between a driver having to walk back along 108m of train and having to walk back along 240m. Another important difference between metro operation and mainline operation at termini is that a metro usually terminates in a simple scissors 2 track stub, with only two routeing choices and a simple scissors crossing from two tracks. A mainline terminus such as Waterloo has multiple choices of platform from multiple approach and departure tracks; this complexity gives advantages in terms of capacity but also comes at a cost of more conflicting movements.
Chris Grayling is the wrong T. thymallus for the job. For an OHLE programme one obviously wants to put in place his philosopher namesake, A. C..
The RAIB have revealed that a temporary modification was incorrect, and AFAICS probably absolves driver and signaller.
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/collision-near-london-waterloo-station-15-august-2017
“The collision occurred because a set of points were misaligned and directed the passenger train away from its intended route. The misalignment was a consequence of a temporary modification to the points control system which also caused the train driver and signaller to receive indications that the points were correctly aligned.”
I can see the eventual RAIB report including an interesting description of how the component parts of double slip crossovers work – which has always intrigued me….
I was watching one of Network Rail’s excellent time lapse videos, showing the works and I started wondering whether these make the work almost seem too easy with track removed and replaced as though it came from Hornby, and signla gantries swung around as though they were knitting needle! Perhaps it might be worth quoting somd of the statistics….for example the hundreds (or is it thousands) of tonnes of materials that need to be removed from and then brought to site to replace a single plain km of track. This could then be quantified in the number of lorry movements avoided when all this comes by train.
Similarly with bridges….it’s the close ups of the huge vehicles with literally dozens of rubber tyres bogies moving structures weighing hundreds or thousands of tonnes of rigid concrete around with accuracy of a few mm is truly humbling.
I say this as an engineer who should be familiar with all this!
Hopefully this is not too much of a northern diversion, but this video, especially from about 37mins when they talk about how to increase capacity and speed, is interesting to a non rail expert like me. It turns out non electrification related interventions have a vastly greater impact than electrification.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LTGnTgdWfh4
There is a good lesson countrywide here and it’s instead of focussing on one solution, or the ‘how’ (electrification) focus on what you want to achieve and only then consider all the ways to do that.
N.B there are a few other videos from that conference that are also pretty interesting
Re Paul S,
The switch end should have been set to send the train to the right but the ends were actually mid way but the detection said they were set to go right, train derails as the front wheels don’t run along either switch rail and is then deflected to the left by the next bit of rail the (right front) wheel finds on its travels along the ballast /sleepers. Possibly no need to explain how a double slip works in full in this case unless it is required to explain the detection issue as the rest could equally have happened at simple set of points.
@ CVM – Yes and any professionally run railway would consider a range of interventions against whatever the objectives are. Unfortunately boring things like raising line speeds, reworking junctions, making it easier and faster to get on and off trains or adding signals are not “sexy”. Politicians like to open “big” things that reflect their enormous egos hence people wanting big electrification schemes, HS2, Crossrails and lots and lots of new trains. Passengers also tend to be similarly mesmerised about “more trains” and “cheaper fares” without really appreciating that it might make more sense to replace bridges, put in new drains, ballast and rails to give a faster, smoother and more reliable run time for their journeys. No one explains the boring stuff. I was fortunate enough (although it didn’t feel like it at the time!) to have to sit in a lot of asset management sessions in various engineering disciplines where I gained a lot of insight into what’s needed and when and how a lot of the choices are not that simple. I’m no engineer and never will be but it helped give me a more rounded view about the importance of proper maintenance, renewals and capital investment and a balance between these types of expenditure.
However I would still caution about not taking a system / network / route approach and delivering electrification where it makes sense. This is why I’m happy that Trans Pennine seems to be based around route modernisation. The return of the “bionic duckweed” syndrome at the DfT is concerning even if there are some advances in things like battery or hybrid power packs. Making us more and more reliant on diesel is stupid given increasing air quality concerns. Having heavier and heavier bi-mode trains is also pretty ludicrous if it means they are lugging diesel power packs for hundreds of miles under wires / lugging electrical kit under diesel power. We have no idea how much extra cost is involved in this policy decision as I suspect it will not take much change to diesel fuel prices in the future to make us wish we had persisted with electrification schemes albeit on a more sustainable cost and delivery basis.
@QTR: One is a Metro system where all the trains do the same thing and travel over a much shorter distance – no matter if they are late or not they all follow in the same order with no junctions downstream. My other point is that the end point of LU lines tend to be in the suburbs
Hence the long-term solution to congestion at Waterloo is to make more of the services metro-like frequent services on simpler routes that run through the centre on a headway basis and terminate in the suburbs – ie. Crossrail 2.
But meanwhile does Charing Cross manage faster turnarounds than Waterloo? If so, why? Is stepping back used at Charing Cross? Is platform dispatch different there?
Ian J
Look at the track-layouts of those stations & their approaches … & my & PoP’s comments @ 15.06 & 16.04 yesterday on the “C2C” thread – & why CHX manages more trains than CST, as well ….
Re Ian J,
At Charing Cross the rolling stock is much more interchangeable, any metro stock can be used on any metro route and and “long distance” stock can be used on any route.
At Waterloo you have diesels to Salisbury and beyond, 450 use to maximise seating to Portsmouth, 444 to Soton and beyond, then lots of metro stock issues e.g. 10 car now fit on the all via Wimbledons without issue but SDO stock needed on the Windsor lines and then there is the interface between the 2 on the Kingston loop.
The solution to the SWML fasts issues is more platforms to allow longer dwells without effecting performance and for everything else at Waterloo is uniform stock (new Bombardier Aventras).
WW. I agree.
I think regarding the various desired outcomes more capacity and faster speeds are rated above electric traction in the views of most, especially the customer (by which I mean the passengers and potential passengers). The problem is the implication has been you need electrification to deliver the others and clearly this far from always being the case. Hence people see electrification cut back and assume (with the encouragement of politicians looking to score points rather than deal in facts) that capacity and speed are also cut.
On top of this it seems NR are quite reasonable at delivering civils projects like those you mention and bigger ones (Reading, Norton junction) on time to budget in marked contrast to electrification. No surprise where you would concentrate your efforts then!
I think Diesel pollution is the next topic to be addressed and this, with bi-modes, could switch the focus into, for example, ensuring electrification is to the limits of any cities suburban rail network. As a very general rule of thumb local stoppers all electric, longer distance bi-mode.
Charing Cross (and Cannon Street) have no need for considerable movement between tracks. The restricted mouth then leads to 2-3 platforms at London Bridge and the junctions beyond that are either grade separated (Bermondsey) or further still (Lewisham).
Waterloo does somewhat keep the three – Windsor, Fast and Slow – apart but Fast will always have more luggage and slower dis/embarking times.
Faster turnrounds at Charing Cross is no panacea. It reduces the ability to cover from delays and, because the train goes out on another route, it means that disruption spreads very quickly.
Quicker turnarounds on South Western on their own would achieve little. If you could achieve faster turnarounds then you would have to take a holistic network-wide approach and consider all the other issues – level crossings, Worting Junction, capacity from Surbiton inwards etc.
In fact it might make more sense to look at Vauxhall than Waterloo. Eight platforms for three main routes (Windsor, main line, other suburban) is not an ideal combination. Network Rail would like a ninth platform there and continue to Waterloo with three dedicated tracks each for the three main routes.
@NGH – in practice, SWML stock allocations are not as clear cut as perhaps you imagine: 444s, for example, regularly (but not quite absolutely predictably) work the Portsmouth stoppers, even the Haslemere shorts. This would appear to have much to do with (a) the mileage terms in the leases, and (b) the interworking between routes -this used to be done by linking the the Alton and Portsmouth services, although these days it seems to be the Pomo via Eastleighs that get linked to the Directs. No doubt, all this will change again with the 442s’ Second Coming.
I’m not a great fan of the “Let’s take the recovery time at London termini” argument; in another thread, the discussion suggested that at Euston, that added a few £100m to the cost of the rebuild and screwed the use of the station during that rebuild. I understand the point that paths are in shorter supply at the London end but even so. Simpler diagrams, less top train working at WAT and keeping crew and train together would avoid massive rebuilds at the margin just to generate more platform occupation time. [Of course, in today’s anti-holistic railway, such joined up thinking is impossible… it’s all to easy to reach for the shovel].
@WW
The Trans-Pennine route is one where bi-mode would represent a significant improvement. In order to cope with the gradients on the route, the 185s were specified with an engine under each car, which slows them down East of Leeds because they have a worse route availability than the 15xs that they replaced which equates to lower permitted line speeds on the Selby line. Nonetheless the end-to-end journey times were improved by the additional power on the steep bits. A bi-mode would only need to have enough diesel power to cope with the relatively flat bits toward the coasts, so could actually be lighter than the 185s as the hilly middle would be electrified.
I can’t see sparks between (say) Micklefield Jn and Hull or York and Scarborough really ever stacking up, so a purely electric fleet isn’t particularly feasible.
Coming back to Waterloo, the West of England Main Line isn’t going to be electrified any time soon, but no sign of bi-modes in SWR’s plans, so diesels still running over the 3rd rail from Waterloo to Basingstoke…
@moosealot – and no sign at all of the necessary 3rd rail/diesel bimodes that would have been needed to make it happen.
@Graham H: Class 73?
Apart from the Exeter line from Waterloo and the Uckfield ine where else would third rail bimodes be used? Is there a large enough potential market to make it worthwhile any development time?
@CVM -presumably also Reading-Gatwick,Hastings- Ashford , and Reading-Basingstoke? Whether it would justify a special build, like you,I doubt.
@SHLR. No doubt,in times past. [One of the many discarded options for dealing with Salisbury-Exeter]
I expect cl.319 bi-mode conversions might retain DC shoes if necessary, as well as or instead of their pantographs. I don’t think their current interiors are suitable for all the way to Exeter though. Running them on DC into Waterloo would not be as easy as it would be on an AC route, as supply capacity is more limited. I expect some enhancement work for the supply is planned anyway for anticipated enhancements to other electric services in the corridor.
CvM (ex CdB) 31 August 2017 at 09:14
“I think Diesel pollution is the next topic to be addressed and this, with bi-modes, could switch the focus into, for example, ensuring electrification is to the limits of any cities suburban rail network. As a very general rule of thumb local stoppers all electric, longer distance bi-mode.”
Seems to me that the logic of your point is that electrification Stalybridge-Leeds-York & Selby should go ahead ?
Bi-modes (where are the suitable trains?) could then run via Warrington and beyond the wires to Hull, Scarborough and Middlesbrough. Each of those services is one an hour.
Anyone used to a class 159 would see a class 319 as a giant step backwards – although if it were refurbished to class 321 Renatus standard, I might take a different view. That said, the best that has been said about the 319 bi-mode performance is that it can keep up with sprinter style diesels. As electric trains, with one motor car, they are not “nippy”.
Another observation on a slightly different subject relating to submission of winning bids rather than provision of enough resource for reliable operation, I have seen some odd things in this thread, in the thread about Southern and the Gibb report, and in interviews with the new SWR MD.
The Gibb report highlighted that optimising crew schedules to deliver “lowest cost” harmed reliability;
Above we have highlighted with the comment about class 444 and lease mileage issues, implying that optimising rolling stock leases can harm sensible deployment and harm the flexibility TOCs will need,
And the SWR MD observed, in effect, that there’s not electricity in the third rail west of Bournemouth to run more trains, so those folk are losing one through train to London an hour in order to serve Portsmouth. With the £Bn being spent on trains, couldn’t a few £m have been reserved in providing a few more amps?
All these things illustrate lack of joined up thinking to improve services to the customer, boost capacity and deliver reliability and dependability.
I would observe that LU learned this whole system lesson in developing the capability to reverse 36 trains per hour through Brixton (remembering, this is quite a busy station). Everyone knows about stepping back by now (leave the train that’s just arrived and position yourself for the one after), but on Victoria line train there is double or even triple stepping back with staff facilities provided a platform level so that physical needs may be taken care of – a not inconsiderable cost of plumbing in toilets 25m or so below ground!
Rant over
Isn’t the argument for electric trains mainly to do with costs rather than speed and capacity? As a very rough “rule-of-thumb”, diesel trains cost about £1 per carriage per mile to run, while AC-electric trains are about two-thirds of that. (Ignoring crew costs etc.). Hence any intensely run line should really be electric so that the overall railway costs less. I believe this is the real scandal of the approach by Grayling.
Anecon…
the real scandal of the approach by Grayling. … is the deliberate discarding of hard re-won experience & knowledge, forcing us, when we re-start electrification to go back to the beginning & start again/again/again.
Rather than taking a real pause, to learn from mistakes, do it right next time & (IMHO the real mistake made recently) take our time, one project or at most two on the go at once, so that it is a continuous process, rather than “Boom-&-Bust”, which is never a good idea.
Greg, can you point out to us where Grayling has actually said all electrification schemes are stopped and none more will happen? Granted he hasn’t phrased it like you have which would have been more sensible but neither do I think he has said what you are saying he did
Alan Griffiths 31 August 2017 at 16:23
Quite possibly. The CLC line also has stoppers though….
ANECONSPEAKS. Maybe electric trains are cheaper than diesel, but it’s also quite simple to give electric trains excellent acceleration performance compared with a diesel of the same nominal installed power. Electric trains also redistribute energy in braking that is wasted in diesels.
Closer to today’s discussion. The 4-car class 319 is quoted on Wikipaedia as having four traction motors with a nominal rating of almost 1000kW, whereas the two proposed diesel generators have a combined power rating of 700kW from which must be deducted the power required for auxiliaries.
Re Waterloo turnaround times and comparison to Charing Cross and the Vic line.
The minimum turnaround time at Charing Cross (train arriving to departure) is 6 minutes. At Waterloo it is 6 minutes. Both are done every morning peak (in normal service). Not every train is planned to do so, obviously. Essentially this is the time it takes for door opening, train unloading, train checked clear, driver (and conductor where provided!) swap ends, train ready to start, route set, door closure procedure, wheels roll.
The difference between Charing Cross and Waterloo is, as Greg says, the track layouts on the approaches. Each pair of lines approaching Charing Cross serves three platforms, with the necessary pointwork (generally) immediately off the platform ends. At Waterloo there are many more platforms per pair of lines, necessitating much more pointwork, which stretches the ‘throat’. This significantly increases the time it takes each train to clear the ‘throat’, which increases the theoretical headway between services.
Now the Victoria line. The trains are 130m long. They have fantastic acceleration. The crossovers at Brixton and Walthamstow are immediately off the ends of the platforms – you can see the points move if you wait at the far end. The crossovers are approximately at full linespeed, and do not constrain the braking / acceleration of the trains. A Vic line train departing Brixton can be clear of the points and a conflicting route set within in 30 seconds.
Compare to Waterloo. The trains are 180-240 metres long. The clearance point is, in some cases the best part of half a mile out. All at 15mph. Hence it takes a departing or arriving train more than 2 minutes to be clear sufficient to set a conflicting route.
SFD. I recognise that the Victoria Line is not strictly comparable with the national network’s longer trains, but it does illustrate that more platforms doesn’t necessarily improve the capacity and that getting the track layout right to allow appropriate speeds is really important, as is the acceleration of the trains.
However, the comparison between Charing Cross and Waterloo does beg the question about what value is obtained by serving more than three platforms from a single pair of tracks for all the reasons you put forward.
As a follow-up to 100andthirty’s comment, could a thought-experiment be tried by planning a reduction in the number of platforms at Waterloo, redesigning the throat accordingly (shorter and faster), and using the released space to make the platforms themselves wider (and perhaps even double-sided), thus easing passenger flow. Obviously the work would be expensive (and counter-intuitive), but could it actually increase throughput? And if (as I suspect) this would not work, it would be interesting to know why.
I think the diesel / electric debate so far has missed a big point – for the customer, the comfort of the travel experience. I commute on a diesel line, and the noise and vibration that comes with sitting on top of a 200 hp diesel engine does not make for a pleasant trip (still better than controlling 90bhp of diesel in the car). The sensation in electric trains is far superior – both of comfort, and in acceleration.
I disagree that having electric trains does not necessarily provide what people want. I think reliably quick, comfortable journeys are desired – all of which are more likely with electrics. Yes, an amount of improvement can be had through route modernisation, but there is a lot that rides on the capabilities of the train, and everything I read says that electrics are better…
Having said that of course, I’d be more than happy to sit on a Pacer every morning and every evening, if that meant I got a half-hourly service (instead of an hourly off-peak service that gets less frequent in the peaks…)
130 / Malcolm. Each pair of lines into Charing Cross deals with 14trains per hour maximum. Each pair* into Waterloo deals with 18-24 tph maximum. Therefore more platforms needed per pair for the latter. Added to which, the longer distance services – of which there are many more at Waterloo than Charing Cross – need to have longer turn rounds as the probability of delay increase with longer journeys.
Also look at the aerial views of Charing Cross and Waterloo and you will see that the former has point work on nice straight track immediately off the platform ends. Speed limit is 25mph unless you are going through the points (15mph) which as they are so close to the platforms minimises the effect of the speed reduction. Waterloo has that (in)famous s-bend on the approach, which makes the pointwork more difficult, more complex, and consequently longer. Combined with signal sighting issues this pushes the first signal section further out, reducing throughput. It also makes all routes 15mph which further reduces throughput.
*counting the Windsor lines as a ‘pair’ which they effectively are for timetabling purposes.
Just saying that one of the most (arguably) successful train types in UK history – though getting long in the tooth now – is powered by diesel engines which are not under the passengers. And also, nobody has yet proved that underfloor diesels in trains have to produce perceptible unpleasant vibrations (think luxury diesel-powered road vehicles) – we just have not yet managed to suppress these effectively – perhaps for economic reasons.
Malcolm,
I remember reading a few years ago that the optimal number of platforms on LU for a terminal station at the end of a twin-track line is three. The argument was that more platforms just introduced more pointwork which actually reduced capacity.
I have to say this doesn’t fully make sense on National Rail because other factors can be involved such as re-bowsing water tanks, whether stepping back is undesirable or not due to the complications it causes and how long it takes passengers to board or alight.
Going the other way, it also seems to be a little bit illogical because in a DLR-like situation one can argue that two platforms are all that is necessary and, in fact, Bank (DLR) manages with just a single terminating siding beyond the station yet manages to cope with trains 2 minutes apart. I suspect that Tower Gateway (1 track, 2 platforms) could get near to providing a 2 minute interval service if it had to.
Nevertheless on LU, an organisation that is really hot on applying operations research to such problems, they do seem to go for a maximum of three platforms at termini – or rather three platformed tracks at termini. I have never heard it suggested that a fourth should be added to increase throughput. Furthermore, three seems to be necessary at locations where there is no overrun. Where there is a full overrun and the trains have powerful modern motors it would appear from Victoria line experience that two are sufficient (and probably all that is desirable).
There are numerous examples of termini with three platform lines on LU but probably the best are at the ends of the Jubilee line. Undoubtedly there would have been four platforms at Stratford if it would have achieved anything. At the other end, two was found to be insufficient at Stanmore and a third was added.
None of this really answers your question but does suggest that, with an 8 track approach, Waterloo needs an absolute minimum of 12 platforms. I suspect, because of other factors that have been mentioned it is a lot more than that and, perhaps, a desirable number is twice that – which just happens to be the number of platforms that Waterloo now has.
ANONYMIKE (NR) If 200hp produces too much vibration imagine what a 1000hp engine ( Hitachi bi-mode) might be like? Perhaps they have applied Mercedes style sound proofing. However, powerful cars generally ‘waft’ along producing ample performance at very low engine speed. If maximum performance is called for the noise can be quite ‘exciting’. Diesel trains use full engine revs in all sorts of places – eg leaving stations – and I am convinced they will be (using typical British understatement) quite noticeable.
See also Alfie 1014 on the C2C thread … some very relevant remarks there ….
Anonymike & Malcom
Yes
Something Mr Thymallus is ignoring, or possibly neither knows nor cares about, since all his constituency’s trains were electrified long since …. See also long-previous comments about going to Derby/Sheffield, whilst sitting on top of same loud vibrators. Whereas, in HST’s they are well-away from the passengers.
@SFD – “This significantly increases the time it takes each train to clear the ‘throat’, which increases the theoretical headway between services.” Just so and I’m not quite sure why my remark on this point was contested, although I take PoP’s point about system (especially signalling) optimisation – just another example of the step functions in costs and operations in which railways abound (to the annoyance of economists…).
Specifically on Waterloo (but perhaps also of more general application), the key to maximising throughput was thought to be getting the procession of approaching trains in the right order at Woking, not least because of the varied stopping patterns/with the implied switching between slow and fast lines.
@Malcolm – believe it or not, but there are people who actually like to sit on top of a throbbing diesel engine, although I (and many normal people) wouldn’t wish to sit next to them myself. Some of the vibration may have something to do with fuel additives intended to improve efficiency – at least that was the explanation given to me by a bus engineer when I asked why identical vehicles (in this case Mercedes Cittaros) rode roughly in the UK but smoothly in Switzerland.
Yet another Waterloo/CHX contrast might be the distance between typical destinations (and uniformity of train types). A driver and/or train expecting to finish their shift at Ramsgate can be diverted to, say, Ashford, with manageable consequences. Portsmouth/Exeter rather less so. So sending a train to the “wrong” place to get it out of the way at the London terminus would seem to be much easier at CHX. (I am ready to be corrected, however, by someone more familiar with the details here).
DC Bi-mode
AC current from OHLE and from the alternators in a diesel-electric setup is rectified to DC before being fed into the AC traction inverter because the traction package needs to vary the frequency of the AC going to the motors. Taking DC directly from a 3rd rail and feeding it to the traction inverter wouldn’t represent a significant extra design/engineering effort over an AC bi-mode unit, and should be viable even for only for a dozen sets. SWT have 10x 2-car 158s and 30x 3-car 159s
Weymouth
Basing
radstoke-Weymouth is approx. twice the distance Waterloo-Basingstoke. Upgrading a 3rd-rail power supply over that kind of distance to support an extra 1-2tph is not going to represent a good BCR. I suspect the limitation is mainly between Basingstoke and Southampton; the electric spine programme would have fixed this by upgrading to OHLE at probably a competitive cost to upgrading ~60km worth of DC supporting infrastructure, but that’s been scrapped – probably until the DC kit is life-expired.Diesel NVH
Not convinced that noise, vibration and harshness [NVH] is a function of engine power. An inline 6 shouldn’t need any balancing shafts, but that assumes that the performance of all the cylinders is equal, possibly not a terribly valid assumption for engines that could have 100,000 hours on. A diesel-electric setup as in the bi-modes should be easier to isolate from the passenger saloon because there isn’t any mechanical connection to the bogies; engine-on-raft should make life easier still, as the raft could be damped as a unit.
I wonder how much the servicing schedule — especially for older units — concerns itself with passenger experience. Example: do engine mount bushes get replaced when they lead to a level of vibration that is uncomfortable for passengers, or when they get to the point that there is a risk of damage to the engine/chassis of the train from vibrations? Similarly, is cylinder compression checked for evenness across a bank, or just that each cylinder individually is within some tolerance?
Apologies: got interrupted mid-edit.
SWR have 10x 2-car 158s and 30x 3-car 159s. If there were to be a program to replace most or all of these with bi-modes, this would almost certainly be a big enough job to be worth someone’s while.
Re: Moosealot – extending your query about whether engine maintenance is related to passenger experience, I’m sure I heard once that British track is (noticeably) rougher than on continental routes precisely because of the *successful* efforts of BR Research to understand the wheel/rail interface, i.e. whereas in mainland Europe the track was maintained traditionally to a high standard (“any deviation from perfect presents an unknown risk because we don’t know how it will deteriorate”), BR civil engineers *did* know how it would deteriorate and therefore were able to reduce maintenance levels (for which read costs, of course – this is rather the point of good engineering) as they were confident it remained safe despite the track being ostensibly in worse condition than would have been tolerated across the Channel. Not convinced the passengers came into that calculation, but it could explain why, some decades later once train supply became an internationalised activity, the use of bogies derived from continental types initially produced poor ride.
@MooseALot: 100&30 specifically mentioned “West of Bournemouth” as having the electron shortage problem….
“West of Poole” (i.e. Poole to Weymouth) is more correct. That is what the notes on power restrictions state in the current Kent/Sussex/Wessex online sectional appendix.
10 and 12 car trains do operate as far as Poole sidings, I expect that the west end of the sidings is the limit of ‘normal’ unrestricted operations.
Moosalot. Apropos NVH. As I recall, all current underfloor engine trains currently in service are 6-cylinder so should be “smooth”.
Based on my personal “subjective test apparatus”, a diesel electric Voyager engine Voyager is a less pleasant place to be than a diesel mechanical Turbostar. Best, for me is probably the diesel mechanical Siemens class 185. The Hitachi trains with their V12 engines should be “interesting”.
Once I did have a really pleasant journey from London to Derby on a Meridian (Voyagers’ younger sibling). It was only as i approached Derby that I realised why…..the engine wasn’t running!
re: Bournemouth/Basingstoke — oops, my bad.
SWR have advertised a new service from Portsmouth-Weymouth. Will this be diesel, shorter, or otherwise not taking up as much juice as a London-bound service?
re: NVH
A v12 with the “correct” firing pattern should be as smooth as an inline 6. Whether Hitachi’s turn out to be so or not is yet to be discovered… Similarly, just because it’s possible to get better isolation on a diesel-electric than with a hydraulic/mechanical transmission doesn’t mean that the manufacturer will actually do that.
I remember the Virgin Voyagers first being introduced and comparing the quality of the fit and finish unfavourably to Great Western’s then-25-year-old Mk3s, or even the odd 158 that would sometimes venture to our neck of the woods. They had a “feature” where the rheostatic braking dumped interference into the intercom, all the way down South Devon’s hills… so I would hardly like to suggest that they are the epitome of a well-done diesel-electric unit.
The 185s are seriously over-engined in order to handle the hills in the middle of the transpennine routes. Most of the time they pootle along; even pulling out of stations they rarely use full power. On the few occasions they do run up to full chat, they are comparable to — if not noisier than — a Turbostar.
According to the FMTR track access application the “new” Portsmouth to Weymouth service is a combination of:
a. the existing Portsmouth to Southampton stopper
b. the Southampton to Poole leg of the existing Poole stopper
c. the Poole to Weymouth leg of one of the existing Waterloo Weymouth trains.
To allow this to happen, the existing Poole stopper will terminate at Southampton, and one of the 2 existing Weymouth services will terminate at Poole.
The net effect on the power supply will probably be neutral.
(small electrical joke there…)
Re the 185’s. So overpowered in fact that shortly after they were introduced, they had a software mod that shutdown one (or more) of the engines when not needed to a) save fuel, and b) to keep the other engines reasonably well loaded (improves their life apparently).
Re Class 800s and how noisy they might be – I was at Bristol Temple Meads last night and two coupled units went through, admittedly very slowly. They were significantly quieter than a voyager at similar speed, and the loudest sound was the traction motor whine, which I don’t remember hearing on any other diesel-electric
Moosealot
( 1-5-3-6-2-4 – for a “six” ) Now, for a V12? Um
I wonder if you actually want a horizontally-opposed flat-12 firing as for the in-line 6 order, as above.
Herned…..if the class 800 was “giving its all”, then that’s a crumb of comfort in the bi-mode saga.
I was also going to comment that the SWR alteration to Weymouth services will almost certainly be power neutral. For one thing, there are no spare diesel sets available for the Portsmouth-Weymouth service.
Some observations from the passenger point of view concerning the Waterloo blockade.
I went through Waterloo about 8 times in that period. Admittedly, only once in the down direction during the evening peak, when potential queues and waits on the concourse were advertised. That one occasion was later in the blockade and I was not delayed at all. The peak up direction was different. I normally caught the 07.12 (non-stop to Waterloo) out of Basingstoke. As it seemed to always be in the platform for at least 5 mins before starting I assumed it started there. I normally caught that train on Fridays, and observed that the 12-coach train was only ever about 50% loaded. However, I also caught it on the last Monday of the blockade, and it was already full and standing when I arrived at the platform. Were people returning from holidays? Were/are Mondays always worse than Fridays? The poor usage of that train on Fridays did make me wonder if the operators had got the blockade planning right.
The ‘project fear’ technique where the PR depts advertise heavily and the press duly take the bait with suitable cliched horror stories, certainly seemed to work as far as leisure passengers were concerned. I normally don’t look forward to my later evening journeys on summer Fridays out of Waterloo, as the normal commuting crowd is joined by holidaymakers with unwieldy large bags. No SW trains are designed for large bags! However, in the blockade, most of those travellers disappeared, and despite fewer trains, there was no extra overcrowding after the Friday evening peak.
From at the aerial photo’ at the head of the article it looks as though considerably more capacity could have been obtained if the Eurostar platforms had been integrated into the main station. The country end of all the platforms could have been slewed northwards making it possible to extend them all to 12 cars and making more space for the throat. Obviously hugely expensive, but cheaper and quicker than CR2?
@Rogerb – a classic case of using Google earth and similar – it’s not just a matter of an aerial plan. Longer platforms as slewed would require moving the throat most of the way to Vauxhall with all the accompanying property acquisition, new viaducts and so on.
A few billions certainly, but the problem with Waterloo that CR2 is supposed to solve is the capacity sw thereof.
Re RogerB,
The international track level is also higher than the domestic side so impossible without major rebuild.
The domestic side bridge deck construction over Westminster Bridge Road is a major issue for track layout and alignment.
The capacity gains would all be far lower than for CR2.
@NGH
“Many users up North would disagree on capacity as they struggle to get on services at the moment as there was huge growth on the previous franchise ”
Indeed, but the problem there is the capacity of the trains, not the infrastructure. Many Northern train services could be twice as long (or twice as frequent) without any infrastructure changes at all.
The scaffolding was being taken down on the International side at Waterloo this morning – could this be a project that is actually going to be ready on time?
(Pity the timetable changes have been deferred though…………)
(No sign of any 442s making their promised comeback yet)
Re Timbeau,
I’d say “open” for Monday, “ready” or “complete” is another matter!
No 442s for another few months.
Most Windsor and Reading services using platforms 21 and 22 this morning. In a throwback to the old Waterloo, the departure screens over these new “Windsor Lines” platforms are only showing “Windsor Lines” services, (but including, in an unusual display of common sense over operational convenience, both directions round the Strawberry Hill loop).
(When there were the old-style “flapper” indicator boards, there were three sets – only the middle set showed all trains)
https://blackcablondon.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/the-old-pre-digital-departure-board.jpg
Arguably these were clearer, as you could see at once what the stopping pattern was)
A digression: Last night I travelled on two class 455s – both sporting in-car diagrams which not only said that you could change at Waterloo for International services (not true since 2007) but also that you could change at Richmond for North Woolwich – closed in 2006!
The new walkway over the orchestra pit is open and the hoardings substantially reduced.
All access to the lower orchestra pit level (including platform lifts and underground access) remains closed off.
And I noticed some people trying to get from platform 21 to platform 20 (which can be seen from the new concourse) are having to make a very long walk. This is awkward, as some trains to Putney, Richmond and Twickenham (all very popular stations) go from 21 and 22 and others (generally stoppers) from 19 and 20, and if you miss one you’ll have probably missd the next by the time you’ve trekked round.
Timbeau
Ah, forward planning strikes again!
Re Greg,
More a case of the hoardings still being up blocking the way because construction isn’t finished. The stairs down from the new P20 – 24 concourse to the orchestra pit are in the former track bed between 20 and 21. P19 and 20 will the closing for some works soon hence the ability to separate 20 from 21 is very useful.