On 24th March 2015 there was a surprise announcement from the Mayor and TfL about the re-signalling of the Subsurface Railway (SSR). It is largely a re-announcement of what has already been announced numerous times, and it is far from free of doublespeak, but it does also contain some genuinely new information. Unfortunately, despite appearances, most of that information is not really good news for the travelling public of London.
The difficulties of resignalling
Resignalling tends to be a fraught process. It is generally a lot simpler to start from scratch. In London we have the problem of not building sufficient numbers of new railway lines and a rapidly expanding population. Improving capacity therefore leaves only a few options – increase train capacity, increase train frequency or both.
When it comes to London Underground, there are severe limits as to how train capacity can be increased and unfortunately most of the existing options have already been taken up. That really only leaves increasing frequency and to do that one needs to push to the limit of, or even beyond, current signalling technology. Consequently from the building of the Victoria Line onward it has generally been a real challenge to provide a signalling system that is truly fit for purpose in London. The exception is stage 1 of the Jubilee Line, where signal engineers had the rare luxury of being able to install tried-and-tested state-of-the-art equipment and being very confident it would work and provide the necessary capacity.
20th century resignalling
When opened the Victoria Line was supposed to be able to handle 30tph but at best managed 27tph on a good day until it was resignalled in the 21st century – and this for a line that could hardly be simpler to operate. The Jubilee Line Extension, meanwhile, was supposed to have a signalling system capable of running 36tph on opening. Not only did that prove impossible, but the intended system had to be ripped out and conventional 24tph signalling installed in order to beat the December 31st 1999 deadline for the full opening of the extension. Whilst past results are never a reliable indicator of future performance, the late 20th century omens for reliable 21st century developments in signalling were not good.
21st century resignalling
As one century moved into another, the Central Line automatic train resignalling was completed as the final part of a package to replace trains, signals and power supplies. The combination of the three meant many years before the system really settled down and worked properly. Meanwhile the second generation of automatic signalling on the DLR initially fared little better.
Having moved fully into the 21st century, we finally saw a resignalling that was reasonably successful – that of the Victoria Line – although at roughly the same time Thales were struggling to get their implementation working on a resignalled (again!) Jubilee Line. This was the era of the Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), described with considerable justification as “one of the scandals of the decade”, and as such Thales had little incentive to develop the system properly off-line. Instead the Jubilee Line was effectively used as a test bed to develop their new signalling system – good for Thales, but extremely bad for Londoners as this was the primary reason for its frequent closure on weekends. This experience led to London Underground making noises at the time about never again buying a signalling system that hadn’t been properly tested before being installed.
Thales – bad boy made good
The surprising thing for those who despaired about the Jubilee Line is that once Thales did get their system working it actually worked quite well. Indeed, when they installed it on the much more complex Northern Line, installation and commissioning went better than anyone had dared hope.
To cancel one signalling contract …
It is fair to say that so far the story on the Sub-surface Railway – the District, Metropolitan, Hammersmith & City and Circle – has been more tortuous. Originally the work was to be carried out through the PPP mechanism. When that collapsed TfL took the opportunity to cancel the signalling contract entirely. They had long felt it contained some serious weaknesses but under the PPP regime they had not had the power to intervene.
The contract was re-tendered and won by Bombardier. The system proposed appeared to be well-established and TfL must have thought they were taking the safe option. Issues, however, soon emerged. One problem, not picked up at the time, was that the metro systems on which it had already been successfully installed weren’t actually that complex. TfL also later claimed that Bombardier had overstated what it could do – claims they had felt at the time that, given Bombardier’s status as a well-established train manufacturer, they could rely on.
We have reported at length on the fracas that led to the decision to pull the Bombardier contract. As the sadly now-dormant Railway Eye website put it at the time:
To lose one signalling supplier, Mr. Brown, may be regarded as a misfortune; to lose two looks like carelessness.
With hindsight, it is hard to criticise the decision to cancel the Bombardier contract as, once work had begun, it did look hopelessly optimistic as to what could be achieved. The project failed to meet the most basic of predetermined milestones in the early stages of implementation, which was always going to cause considerable alarm in an organisation still bearing the battle-scars of the Jubilee Line. That said, the decision to award it in the first place is something that, in retrospect, did seem to involve a level of naivety and misguided trust.
Brave Face
In trying to be as positive as possible about what had happened, TfL expressed optimism that another supplier could be found and the original deadline met (or at least only narrowly missed). This was inevitably treated with much scepticism by the knowledgeable railway press, such as Roger Ford in Modern Railways or in Railway Gazette. With only one potential supplier (Thales) a serious contender it wasn’t hard to see where the balance of negotiating power really lay. Brave talk of financial penalties for failing to meet deadlines seemed a nonsense. What firm was going to sign up for that?
Disappointment
It was likely to have been the case that, privately, most people involved within London Underground were resigned to the SSR not being fully resignalled until 2019 or 2020. These were dates that seemed far more plausible and achievable. It therefore comes as quite a shock to find out that clearly Thales have played their hand rather strongly, with talk now of completion by 2022. Less surprising is that there has been an increase in costs, although the amount raises eyebrows – an almost staggering £1.3 billion, as far as one can tell all related to increased signalling costs. What would be really encouraging to learn is that the increase is partly accounted for by including major sections of the Piccadilly Line in this contract, as once envisaged. It seems highly unlikely though or it would have been mentioned as a way to sweeten the public pill.
Not definite yet
It is also slightly concerning that buried in the press release is the statement:
LU is in the final stages of negotiating a position with Thales
So a deal hasn’t actually been done yet. One hopes that there aren’t shades of the Thameslink Rolling Stock supplier (Siemens), where the announcement pre-dated the final agreement by a full two years. The SSR resignalling announcement seems to have been made when it was because:
The Mayor and London Underground (LU) today confirmed detailed plans, including timescales and budget, to ensure the delivery of the much needed modernisation of the next four of the network’s lines.
The problem they had is that we will soon enter purdah due to the general election, where such announcements are generally frowned upon as being electioneering motivated. So if an announcement were to be made it seems that it is better to do it now. This still leaves the issue of why it has been so boldly announced when, basically, it is not good news. Perhaps the goal was simply to get out in front of the inevitable story with a positive spin.
Surprised? We shouldn’t have been
In retrospect perhaps we shouldn’t have been so surprised at the announced change in completion date. Some clues were there. First of all, London Underground unexpectedly pressed ahead with improving the off-peak SSR timetable despite the fact that previous indications were that this would wait for the signalling upgrade. More recently there was the reported cost escalation of the Croxley Rail Link and the suggestion that included in the costs were the initial signalling and a subsequent resignalling as part of the SSR upgrade. With the rail link not now due to open until 2018, if it gets final approval, it would not have made sense to have to resignal it within a matter of months of opening when construction could have easily have been delayed by short period if that would have saved a lot of money.
Another clue was buried in the latest Commissioner’s Report and easily overlooked even if one does trouble to read this document in detail. In it, he refers to:
The work is also preparing the ground for a new high-speed ‘scissors’ crossover west of King’s Cross, due to be installed next year. … When complete, when we need to, we will be able to reverse more than 20 trains an hour east to west from the two King’s Cross platforms. This is more than double the capacity available today.
Like the Croxley Rail Link it would not have made much sense to go to the expense of installing and signalling this crossover next year if it were to be followed around a year later by the resignalling of that section of the SSR.
There also continues to be extreme vagueness as to when the SSR will be part of the night tube, and the February joint announcement by the Mayor and the Chancellor about extending the night tube to the East London Line and the DLR only referred to it being extended to the SSR when signalling upgrade is complete – with no hint as to when that would be. If it were good news one would have expected a tentative date.
The classic TfL Mayoral press release
The press release follows a standard formula. The SSR upgrade as a whole is discussed as if this is a promise for the future despite the fact that much of it – such as new trains, lengthened platforms and rebuilt depots have either been completed or are already close to completion. The 34tph on the Victoria Line gets its usual obligatory mention. Not only that, this is done in a very misleading way:
The plan uses an even further improved version of the system built by Thales, now successfully operating on the Jubilee and Northern lines, and also follows on from the Victoria line modernisation where, with 34 trains every hour in each direction, there now is one of the most frequent train services anywhere in Europe.
This almost implies that the Victoria Line has a system built by Thales. In fact the exact opposite is true and the line with “one of the most frequent train services anywhere in Europe” is not using a Thales signalling system. Had this had been made clear a very obvious question could be asked about the ideal signalling system for the SSR.
As well as the Victoria Line we get the inevitable statement about the rising population of London, although the normal comment about the population of London going up by the equivalent to a tube train full of passengers every three days is, refreshingly, avoided.
Even the increase in cost gets a positive spin, being compared favourably with the cost of resignalling under PPP.
the firm expectation is that the new price will be in line with, or below, the cost per kilometre of modernising the Northern line signalling
It’s not actually a statement that reassures. Whilst costs would be expected to be high in some of the central subsurface sections, with their many complex junctions, one would not expect this to be replicated on the line on the surface out to Upminster, Uxbridge or Amersham. There are an awful lot of rural miles there that should make it easy to bring the cost per kilometre down below what it was for the Northern Line.
The good bit
Whilst, as we shall see, this press release raises an lot of issues, there are some more encouraging aspects of this apparent near-agreement. The first is that it does seem to be more realistic than anything put forward before.
The press release refers to:
additional infrastructure works and costs identified as necessary to the modernisation following the termination of the Bombardier contract
It also recognises that the existing Thales system is not adequate for the complexity of the SSR as it states:
The plan uses an even further improved version of the system built by Thales.
A lesson learnt, no doubt, from the failure of the Bombardier offering. So, hopefully, fewer nasty surprises.
This realism extends to dates and perhaps a good argument could be made that once you miss the 2018 deadline then Crossrail will be open and the pressure is off to improve SSR services. It then makes more sense to get this right and take advantage of a relative lull in SSR demand – on the northern side of the Circle if not the southern side.
The bad bits
Most telling of all in the press release is the statement that:
customers will start to see the benefits of the work on the Circle line in 2021, with customers experiencing the full benefits across all lines in 2022. Once these four lines have been completed, LU will then move on to buying new trains and control systems for the Piccadilly, Central, Bakerloo, and Waterloo & City lines.
The true ramifications of this should be plain to see. If true, this means that there will be a substantial further delay to New Tube for London (NtfL) programme with all the consequences that will bring. Currently, according to the latest published Fit for the Future plan, installation of the new Piccadilly signalling will commence in mid 2019. If TfL are only going to start buying new control systems once the SSR upgrade is complete then that looks like a three year delay, although time could be made up by the resignalling and delivery of new trains going hand in hand. Given the interfaces between the Piccadilly and the SSR it makes sense to hold off resignalling the Piccadilly until the SSR is complete. It will also make it easier for Thales to bid for the work. If nothing else, this fiasco has shown the benefit of having more than one serious contender in the bidding stakes with more than zero being an absolutely vital prerequisite.
Piccadilly Line: The old unrefurbished train for London
We have recently reported on the major work necessary to keep the Bakerloo Lines running. In a similar vein there is a two stage plan to first upgrade the Central and Waterloo & City Line trains before giving them yet a further revamp with new traction motors. What is missing is any kind of major refurbishment for the Piccadilly line trains despite, it seems now, the fact that all of them will need to remain in service for at least another seven years. It does seem surprising and slightly worrying that this has not had a mention anywhere. With seven or more years of useful life needed from the stock one would have thought some kind of refurbishment programme was highly desirable. It is notable that the District Line D78 stock got a final significant refurbishment, despite at the time only being expected to be in service for another seven years at most.
Further knock on consequences follow. The Mayoral promise to stop Piccadilly Line trains at Turnham Green throughout the day, dependent on Piccadilly Line resignalling, seems to be receding further into the future. Supporters of the Bakerloo Line to Hayes will find it increasingly difficult to plan for this being completed before 2030 and certainly not much earlier given that the replacement for the Bakerloo Line stock will follow the (seemingly further delayed) Piccadilly Line replacement stock.
As delays to the Tube programme mount up it is going to get harder and harder to mitigate against this. Of particular concern is the fact that the further delays seem to be at least partially prompted by finance and cash flow considerations. If this is the case then that further limits ones options to spend one’s way out of trouble.
The curious bits
One very strange part of the announcement was a remarkable increase in the frequency of the Circle Line. This could have been a misprint, but for it being mentioned twice.
The system is needed to allow more trains to run – more than double the number will run on the Circle line alone
Once completed most Circle line customers will see a train up to every 4 minutes instead of 10
This clearly suggests that the agreed plans are different to what was originally proposed. It is hard to see how the Circle Line can have such a frequency unless, with a bit of tinkering, it absorbed the Hammersmith & City Line – which would have its eastern terminus swapped with the Metropolitan Line. However, even this does not seem possible because the press release refers to the Hammersmith & City as a separate line after the upgrade, so it will presumably continue to exist.
So either there has been a complete rethink and something quite radical is proposed or someone writing a press release has got very confused as to what will happen. If the Circle Line did truly run on the south side of the Circle every 4 minutes then that would leave around only 15tph on the District Line to serve Ealing Broadway, Richmond and Wimbledon – something that just does not seem plausible.
Too many trains too soon
A further consequence of the delayed resignalling is that it would appear that there will be considerably more S Stock trains built than can initially be used – something that also happened on the Northern Line and has only very recently been rectified. This will amount to a considerable sum of money and trains will to some extent deteriorate, or at least become dated, whether used or not. No mention is made of this but one wonders if there is scope for rescheduling delivery of the final batch of trains. As well as delaying payment, not getting new trains for the signalling upgrade until they were needed would also mean that any relevant technological developments could be taken advantage of at a later time – maybe even taking advantage of early benefits of the NTfL programme.
The opportunities for delaying delivery of the last of the S Stock seem limited and yet it could work out. Currently deliveries of S7 stock have slowed to a trickle, or even a halt, as Bombardier concentrates on lengthening the class 378 stock for the London Overground. They also have the contract to build the Crossrail trains and there may well be others in the pipeline. So it could possibly suit both London Underground and Bombardier not to build the final S7 trains until the signalling is ready for it.
Of course, London Underground could take the attitude that Bombardier more than owe them a favour, especially as it was their failure to produce a workable signalling system that caused the problem in the first place – but business doesn’t work like that.
It can’t be as bad as all that – can it?
Perhaps in the very long term things are not too bad. The more the New Tube for London gets delayed, the better it should be when it finally arrives – and it does have what is currently a very challenging technical specification. And as previously discussed, the more NTfL gets delayed, the more it becomes a logical successor to Northern and Jubilee Line stock which will be at the point of being due for replacement by the current end of the NTfL programme.
If the Piccadilly Line trains survive in service until their replacement arrives and no other great disaster befalls London Underground then it could all work out very well in the long term – but it is fair to say it will be as much through luck as through forward planning.
Thanks for the quick turnaround on this article. I saw the total cost of £5bn announced and was staggered – until I realised that it includes the cost of new trains and upgraded stations as well as signalling. Even so it is a vast amount of money to spend on an upgrade to an existing railway.
The ramifications of the delay also seem worrying. The steady drumbeat of population growth must mean that these upgrades are getting more urgent, not less; and yet the delivery of them is being pushed into the future.
I am told that there are just under 30 S-Stock trains in store at the Old Dalby track.
In a parallel universe Boris Johnson would wittily demolish this case of Great Soviet Encyclopaedia air-brushing out of inconvenient historic facts in his Daily Telegraph column.
Thank you for yet another informative analysis. Given the ever-receding horizon for both NTFL and resignalling, it would be interesting to know whether the case has been considered for a more conventional stock build now (well, at least in the next three or four years) to deal with at least the Piccadilly and perhaps the Bakerloo. (The way the future is vanishing into the distance, NTFL will then be still around to replace those replacements….)
As regards the initially surplus stock:
I think they didn’t have enough stock to operate the theoretical maximum of existing services so they will be able to utilise some of the additional number of units (additional = # S Stock units – #D Stock – #C stock). Also possible short turn backs could be reduced for example Tower Hill Terminators (see PoP’s other SSR articles?)
Circle line – I wonder what the baseline for measuring this is…
If the baseline is Circle pre tea cup then it might be relatively easy especially if the off-peak service (including weekends) frequency is improved.
I wonder what the plan for numerous other SRR improvements originally aligned with the resignalling such as the Putney Bridge rationalisation now is? Is some of the extra cost now due to going ahead with the work a la Croxley and installing new “old” signalling for a few years to get some capacity improvement in the interim. If so this may actually speed up the installation on the new signalling system when that time comes (also with less disruption that is also hinted at in the PR).
Another thought. The improved performance of the S Stock may only be fully utilisable when the last of the old stock is withdrawn and revised timetables can be implemented in which case some of the 30 hidden units at Old Dalby might then be able to be brought into service with out the signalling works?
There is also still plenty of D stock in use (isn’t the current public plan to withdraw it by mid 2016?) – in which case plenty of time to make sure the S stock is reliable?
Thanks for a rapid analysis, PoP. The crux in overall network capacity for some intermediate years lies in your statement “This realism extends to dates and perhaps a good argument could be made that once you miss the 2018 deadline then Crossrail will be open and the pressure is off to improve SSR services.”.
The fact is that between May 2018 and December 2019 Crossrail 1 will open up 72,000 passengers per hour capacity (maximum load 2-way flow, 24 tph).
This compares with a 21,700 net gain maximum load additional capacity on the SSR network, combining 2-way east-west flows on the north side and south side SSR lines before and after resignalling, with 6 passengers standing per square metre. The absolute SSR numbers on that basis would be 134,800 before, and 156,500 after (all S stock). Hence there is some leeway for passengers to use Crossrail rather than the SSR network.
However, by location Crossrail 1 is more oriented towards relief of the Met/H&C/Circle side of the SSR, than the District/south-side Circle (albeit Ealing users may divert to Crossrail). So I would also pose a question about the staging of new signalling – from the press release and from what you say that it looks like the Circle first.
The risk that you draw attention to, of reduced District services on the south-side if Circles are running every four minutes, is that the south-side is exactly where you wouldn’t want to put the suburban SSR capacity reduction. How many District trains will run to Edgware Road in that period? Will the Circle run also to Wimbledon via Earl’s Court in that interim period? More questions than answers at this stage, I guess.
Worst still, I’m having to rewrite my London 2050 Part 5 ‘Peak Tube’ article, as a consequence!
Another great article.
I believe the right (fair?) word to use is tortuous rather than torturous. See http://www.vocabulary.com/articles/chooseyourwords/tortuous-torturous/
[Yes, tortuous would be better. Changed. Thanks. PoP]
Circle line customers will see a train up to every 4 minutes
Call me a cynic, but I think this is clever wording. Circle line customers might “see a train” every 4 minutes; doesn’t mean it’ll be a circle line train does it!
Perhaps Adrian Shooter and pals can adapt the “spare” S stock trains to use as pacer replacements?
Re Other Paul,
Indeed “see” a train every 4 minutes = 1 in each direction every 8 minutes 😉 which is fairly similar to the previous plan which would have been one every 7.5minutes on average see:
https://www.londonreconnections.com/2013/subsurface-railway-big-plan/
Someone spent a lot of time carefully writing that press release?!?
It seems there are mixed messages from TfL around upgrades and extensions. Last week Peter Hendy was quoted as saying the Bakerloo extension could be up and running by 2030:http://www.london-se1.co.uk/news/view/8151
Without the NTfL it just can’t happen, and all the noises and snippets like this suggest that is slipping further and further back.
Re Matt,
“could” being the key word
Just finance the whole Bakerloo extension, new stock and works to existing as 1 separate package and it might…
Great stuff, Pedantic of Purley.
“Once completed most Circle line customers will see a train up to every 4 minutes instead of 10”
I have been pondering this and I thought that perhaps this might be achieved by the simple (ahem!) method of keeping just 2tph on the Hammersmith and City and having 14tph doing the “Circle”. That would still be more than current 12tph via Royal Oak…
Or it might mean that the former Wimbleware trains end up at Olympia instead.
Also, does any of this plan for “longer platforms” mean perhaps more exits at the SSR stations? It would be quite plausible, for example, to put an Euston Station exit at Euston Square.
Given the de-staffing of SSR station, having more entrance/exits – like the DLR would seem sensible. It would make some of the stations much better serve their localities.
Re Briantist,
As PoP noted a lot of the work has already been done and the money spent with it being re-announced post completion.
The platform lengthening for the new stock S7 & S8 probably falls into this category for example:
https://www.heringinternational.com/en/nc/news/article/second-lengthening-of-the-island-platforms-at-londons-baker-street-station/
@Briantist “Destaffing” stations (not that TfL use that word) is not the same as de-gating. It is only with de-gating that any extra entrances become fairly free of staffing implications. And as far as I know, de-gating currently gated stations is unlikely.
Quite seriously, though, what on Earth do they mean by the ‘Circle train every 4 minutes’ announcement? Do they plan to subsume the H&C into the Circle Line and extend the Met to Barking? That wouldn’t make sense – anyone from the East End looking to get to the Farringdon/Liverpool Street area would change for Crossrail at Whitechapel…
It is also sad to see that the resignalling problems are having a serious impact on the fleet replacement on the deep tube. Perhaps it would now make more sense to start the replacement with the Bakerloo (since it is standalone from Queen’s Park to Elephant) and then move on to the others?
@Briantist Olympia? Do you mean Wimbledon to High Street Kensington?
I guess that would assume people would prefer the less crowded circle line trains than a convenient change at Earl’s Court. (That or not stop city-bound trains at Earl’s Court during morning peek.) Few trains would then terminate at Aldgate.
@Captain Deltic
“I am told that there are just under 30 S-Stock trains in store at the Old Dalby track.”
You will need more than that just to replace the remaining D stock.
@Malcolm
““Destaffing” stations (not that TfL use that word) is not the same as de-gating. It is only with de-gating that any extra entrances become fairly free of staffing implications. And as far as I know, de-gating currently gated stations is unlikely.”
Should have been a little clearer. What I mean is, that with the station staff now all at the gateline, it shouldn’t be too much operational trouble to have – as most other metro systems I have been on – exits at both end of the station.
It would be very useful for – say – Euston Square to have another set of steps to the platforms at Gordon Street, in additions to the ones at the top of Gower Street. Ditto Great Portland Street having and “interchange” with the Bakerloo’s Regent’s Park and – say – Westboune Park having an exit onto Aklam Road.
And it goes without saying that there should be a Mount Pleasant Station on the Circle/H&C! Sorry, had a crayon moment.
As someone with no practical experience whatsoever of signalling, I would be interested to know where seemingly ever increasing costs of signalling are coming from i.e. is it on the software development/system design end, the costs of the physical equipment or the installation? I expect there isn’t a straightforward answer to that though…
Hmm where to start?
In the latest TfL Investment Report you can see that LU and Bombardier have agreed to reschedule the deliveries of S Stock trains. It doesn’t say how much slower it will be but it’s there for all to read. Another little warning sign along with works on the depots running late and subject to commercial issues (contractor claims no doubt and following on from the mess that were the works at Neasden Depot). Also tucked away in the report is the cancellation of the new Tunnel Cleaning Train and £13m funding being put back in the pot. That raises an interesting question as to what went wrong with the new train concept and how tunnels will be cleaned in future (recognising they’re already cleaned now but perhaps in a more costly fashion that a TCT would permit).
The Investment Report also highlights resource problems and clashes about the signalling changes needed for the Night Tube and plans for “World Class Capacity” works on the Vic, Northern and Jubilee. If a contract is signed with Thales for SSR then we may even see a further resource problem between J and N works and that for SSR. As Mr Ford of Modern Railways has recently said there is a worldwide shortage of signalling engineers set against burgeoning demand for said resources.
While I appreciate the “air brush” department is working at full throttle on this press release I do find it a tad objectionable to see the PPP being panned yet again. If that were true then everything from that era would have been binned and it simply hasn’t been. As I have said before it “takes two to tango” and LU had a massive learning curve on line resignalling for the Jubilee Line so it wasn’t just a case of the contractor being useless. One day the full truth and an honest account will emerge rather than what suits the political environment at any point in time.
The fact that people haven’t picked up on the NTfL delay is probably down to TfL doing a classic “smoke and mirrors” routine with the media with BBC London being dragged to Edgware Road signal cabin to view the “prehistoric / ancient / medieval” (delete as applicable) but still safe (note!) signalling. I hope someone, somewhere really digs into the detail about the knock on consequences to the deep tube upgrades as I suspect that most of the funding up to 2020 in the capital budget settlement has been shifted to the SSR resignalling and the DfT / Treasury have refused any more funding. I have some sympathy because there isn’t really an external problem here – it’s between LU and its suppliers. It’s worth remembering that we only have a revenue budget settlement to 2016 and capital to 2020. Therefore yesterday’s announcement effectively means the Picc Line upgrade (PLU) is no longer fully funded because substantive spend *seems* to be post 2020 now. That’s a Boris Mayoral promise about the PLU well and truly blown out of the water along with Mary McLeod’s (MP for Brentford and Isleworth) “guarantee” about Turnham Green stopping trains.
The way things are going it will take longer to resignal the SSR and upgrade the Picc Line than it will take to build Crossrail and get it fully running. Obviously I’m assuming Crossrail opens to schedule and isn’t dogged by problems itself.
As you say the only people who really lose out here are the poor passengers who have to tolerate decaying trains and worsening reliability with a receding possibility of a solution being delayed. Perhaps we should call the “New Tube for London” the “Middle Aged Train for London” because the design will be decades old before one runs in service? 😉
I am told that there is now concern within TfL that signalling is becoming a Thales monopoly. Experience suggests that in the perennial cycle of disillusion with contractors Tfl is about to trawl the world’s signalling contractors with the aim of finding a new wonder supplier untainted by experience of the Tube. After all a factor in selecting Bombardier, rather than Invensys or Thales for SSL was that it was the least hated of the three.
@Tom Hawtin
OK. I better explain more carefully.
The Circle Line is a service that starts at Edgeware Road and then goes anti-clockwise via High Street Kensington, Victoria, Tower Hill, Liverpool Street, and Farringdon, via Baker Street, Edgeware Road (again) and then Paddington (north side) to Hammersmith (north station).
Only a few sections of this “line” are not “virtual”: they are the bit between Platforms 1 and 2 at High Street Kensington and Platforms 2 and 3 and Gloucester Road, the section between Tower Hill and Algdate.
The rest of the line is shared with other SSL lines: Edgeware Road to High Street Ken with the “Wimbleware” part of the District, from Gloucester Road to Tower Hill with the District (“proper”), the Met at Aldgate, and then the Hammersmith and City AND the Met to Great Portland Street and the H&C only from Baker Street.
The limit to the number of trains is a function of these interactions. There are several operationally awful junctions. Going anti-clockwise these are Praed Street Junction, Gloucester Road Junction, Minories Junction, Aldgate Junction, Baker Street Junction, Praed Street Junction (again).
Given that, as QI pointed out recently, that you could have gone to see the last public hanging in England (1868) when this line was opened (you would have taken the line to Farringdon Street and a 7 minute walk to Newgate Prison) – the technology is as good as steam-powered.
I digress. To get more circle line trains… “Almost every 4 minutes” means 14tph (as 15tph would be exactly 4 minutes).
I’m going to make the assumption that with the new signalling we can run 32 tph on any part of the line.
Here’s an handy “now” diagram.
http://cdn.pseph.co.uk/styles/images/2015/Peak%20Hour%20SSR%20v1.0.png
The maths says: that means going from 6 to 14. This could be done “mathmatically” by:
– Terminate the services from Wimbledon to Edgeware Road at High Street Kenstington. Then run an extra 8 tph as the circle.
– There are 22 tph on the “district via Embankment” bit of the District and the current 6tph as Circle making 28. That means we need to take 4tph we get from the upgrade AND 4tph from the District to get our new Circle.
– The stretch from Aldgate to Baker Street has 27tph at the moment. Let take 3tph from the H&C and call them Circles, and that gives us 9tph, so we need 5 more tph to get to 14. And as there are (32-27) = 5 left so we are sorted.
– Just need to make sure we run the extra 2ph of trains down to Hammersmith. Sorted.
So…. The only question is where do the 4tph that can’t fit from Wimbledon, Ealing Broadway and Richmond go
… and the answer is: Kensington Olympia!
@ Briantist – if we’ve got a multi year delay and over £1bn cost increase to a key programme we certainly haven’t got money for new station entrances. In fact what this announcement probably means is that the likelihood of major station improvements, beyond what is in build now, are pretty unlikely. I look forward to see a revised TfL Business Plan at some point to see how the numbers and milestones have changed.
It’s also worth saying that you can expect the pressure of staff costs to keep increasing so, other than for the Night Tube, stations currently being expanded and extra drivers for more intensive tube services, there will be no increase in station staffing. I have seen this policy work its way alternately between managerial and then front line staffing numbers over many years. As soon as the managers are “sorted” then the front line staff numbers are reviewed and reduced. It’ll keep going because of the inevitable switch towards more technology, higher reliability and also enforced budget cuts. There will also be more cuts to engineering staff and those in the “centre”. Resources for project management will flex up and down as the investment programme requires and will be managed via fixed term contracts plus limited numbers of contract staff.
WW ( & PoP )
Indeed, one starts to ask will the “New Tube for London” actually ever materialise?
Given the ever-extending timescales & ramping costs, I can see a redesigned, ultra-“cheap” (i.e. even more basic & uncomfortable for the
cattlepassengers) finally starting to enter service about 2028 or 2030. Never mind the semi-separate scenario on the Bakerloo.Not a pleasant prospect.
JR’s point about CR1 taking the load (largely) is right of course – but … it means that those of us who have predicted that it will be completely full within a month of openening seem even more likely to have their prognostications justified as correct.
Searching for yet more mysterious ‘signalling suppliers’ won’t lead to anywhere. Since Bombardier turned out to be a ‘bad idea’ for whatever reason, and Thales has somehow managed to get the Northern line working decently (and the Northern line isn’t exactly simple), then might as well let them get on with it, even if they ask a higher price.
I also don’t see any significant disadvantages of the Jubilee, Piccadilly, and SSR having the same signalling system. In fact, I can see a fair few advantages.
@ Captain Deltic – the monopoly fear may well be true but there are few tube lines that are entirely “stand alone”. The ones that largely are separate have just been resignalled. Given LU tends to have to resignal entire lines rather than sections, as Network Rail can do, then there are always going to be big contract values and step changes in technology plus potential supplier lock in. The related issue is the interworking of different lines on one track or shared signalling on parallel tracks or at complex junctions. The Jubilee Line was only resignalled by effectively closing off every connection between it and the Met Line with Neasden Depot taking years to resolve. The same nightmare afflicts the Sub Surface with its Picc Line connections and NR track working. The Bakerloo has the NR interface and its main depot off NR tracks not LU ones. I think upgrading the Bakerloo will probably make previous upgrades seem like a picnic in comparison. Those complexities probably can’t be entirely removed even if you do muck about with service patterns with the attendant risks of enraging the travelling public and massive disbenefits in your business case if you make journeys more involved / complicated.
Correct me if I’m wrong but aren’t we long past the days of having simple, generic signalling technology that can be bought from a range of suppliers? Once you select a technology you’re locked in for a long while and as outlined above you may also be tied in for other lines too. I’ve lost count of debates on other forums where people say “just buy a flexible technology from a range of suppliers that can work with all other signalling systems”. I don’t believe such a thing exists. If I’m right then some attitudes towards the supplier market and also towards LU’s own requirements probably need to change to get some rationality back. However I’m not an engineer so I may be missing some fundamental aspect that means I’m talking nonsense. 😉
Finding new signalling suppliers
Conveniently Siemens bought Invensys so there is one “new” option available 😉
(Provided Crossrail & Thameslink 2000 work as hoped in a few years time!)
Why does LU have to re-signal entire lines ? I understand that the traditional circle is the busiest part of the SSR lines and so needs high capacity signalling, but couldn’t something a lot simpler be used on the branches ?
@WW: In theory, ETCS is meant to be a flexible standard with different suppliers being able to produce the kit, and with each new version of the standard being backwards-compatible. In practice it has been a mess with serious remedial work needed during each project at each interface between suppliers.
Walthamstow Writer,
I am not sure of the significance of the smiley face and whether you comment was a deliberate provocation concerning one of Captain Deltic’s known great criticisms or not.
It seems you believe that we should have a generic signalling system where manufacturers parts will work with each other and the software etc. Well fairly obviously that already exists to some extent and is called ECTS (or ERTMS) depending on what you are talking about. One of the main reasons for the EU demanding it being installed on railways was interoperability but another was to stop railways being held to ransom by signalling manufacturers and installers.
Metro railways (e.g. London Underground) don’t have to use ECTS/ERTMS. That doesn’t mean they are not allowed to. What is stopping them is that the specification and parts of it that work do not yet extend to intensive urban metros with the additional functionality they need (e.g. platform edge doors). If it were fully specified and fully working Crossrail would be using it. As it was they got a special (hard to come by) exemption from the EU.
The much criticised Thameslink Programme will use ERTMS for its centre section albeit with lineside signals (which destroys a lot of the advantages but allows trains not suitably equipped to use it in a degraded manner). This was a bit of a brave decision, not entirely made through choice, as it will be the first time it will be used in this way but it does point to a more hopeful future. One could well envisage the East London Line being similarly equipped in the early 2020s.
One does wonder. If Thameslink uses ERTMS successfully at 24tph then how much more difficult will it be to get it working to 30tph or more down a tube. Maybe, just maybe, the SSR is the last time a signalling contract will have to go out to a single manufacturer for the entire line and the last time the railways can be held to ransom. Maybe one could then turn to China (the biggest users of ECTS in the world) and get them to do it at a knock-down price.
straphan,
Posts crossed. Yes this is a particular problem at present. But as it matures and the specification gets tighter then this problem should go away. Just having a tight specification means that you could get the voltmeter or similar out and say irrevocably which manufacturer was at fault. That should do a lot to concentrate minds.
I also understand there is open software for ECTS which apparently the manufacturers hate because it is their last hope of a stranglehold on the railways.
ECTS has its faults but I see it as the only viable solution to get over the massive issue of the incredible cost of signalling systems.
As I have remarked elsewhere, ETCS is not a signalling system designed to meet a railway operational requirement, but a political tool to break the monopoly of the national state railways restricting cross border services. The signalling contracts and the national railways are gradually getting ETCS to work, including interoperability.
Note that for 24 trains/h Thameslink ETCS is going to have an ATO overlay – the first of its kind. Luckily Network Rail has chosen the Cambrian Line equivalent in the London Network for this first application.
Meanwhile trains into Waterloo in the peak are running at 24 tph with lights on poles.
I have no problem with monopoly suppliers, provided you have an intelligent and informed customer. English Electric had a 30 year, open-book, monopoly on electric traction equipment for the Southern Railway and then the Southern Region of BR. The fruits of this collaboration can be seen in the eighth most reliable EMU on the Network – the Class 455.
This does require ‘stickability’ when things go wrong, as they do. The resignalling of the Northern line after the struggles with the Jubilee is a case in point.
I think we’re talking here about the basic signalling track to train interfaces, and how urban metros tend to cyclically buy into different proprietary systems that are often fundamentally incompatible, often kept so deliberately by manufacturers so they can continue to sell complete vertically integrated systems right from control room to drivers desk, despite the fact that communications equipment and standards for the physical transmission of safety messages is actually becoming more and more generic.
Main line railways in Europe are being forced down the ETCS route and although there has been resistance I think infrastructure stewards are now coming round to realising that this grand project seen at first to be ostensibly political will actually preserve the continued flexibility for administrations to renew different parts of their trackside infrastructure cost effectively at different times under their own control rather than being forced into the cyclical complete renewal trap of proprietary lock-in, whilst trains remain compatible with whatever mixture of manufacturers products is provided.
Whatever other clever control room and cab overlays and predictive management systems are incorporated at the traffic management level, the key and really expensive, certified safety technologies are the signal interlocking layer and the final track to train message and transmission protocols that together form the movement authority and automatic train protection (ATP) systems.
London Underground used to have an effective universal non-proprietary movement authority and train protection system consisting of colour light signals, drivers’ eyes and hands on the controls and mechanical trackside train-stops operating with the traditional simple trip-cock on the trains. Any form of interlocking could control these items: manual levers, pneumatic remote interlocking machines, relay logic or the latest failsafe computers, and at different sites, even along the same line, these could be supplied by any of the signalling manufacturers traditionally employed.
Compare that with today when all signalling renewals on SSR are on hold pending award of this huge contract that will lock the administration into one supplier’s products for a generation, with impacts felt even on the long term deep level train procurement programme.
Ideally LU, perhaps cooperating with other similar administrations, would have their own urban equivalent of ‘open source’ ETCS so they can once again properly own the track to train interface, a modern equivalent perhaps of the humble train-stop device!
@ PoP – no provocation intended, if anything I was poking fun at myself for potential ignorance of something obvious (to others). I am not an engineer but in my experience with working with many across different disciplines they are typically very clever and experienced people but sometimes cursed (IMO) with very strong views about how things should be. As a non engineer I’ve never quite understood the seemingly fixed views about certain aspects of engineering practice / technology and I have asked them about their views and why they held them. I’ve been left wondering whether the fixed views have held back innovation or change. I noted the “least hated supplier” remark by Captain Deltic earlier and was left wondering if the “firm opinion” syndrome had struck again. Are they chasing the supplier market in the vain hope that a supplier’s offer aligns with the engineer’s views? Legitimate question in my view but others may disagree.
I have no view about generic signalling systems or anything else signalling wise. When I mentioned “other people on other forums” that is precisely what I meant. As a passenger I just want signalling systems that work, are safe and that don’t break down. Thanks for the reminder about ETCS etc but that just reinforces the problems that we have in getting something that works – whether for TfL or Network Rail.
@ Mark T – a very nice summary of the issues and pretty much encapsulates my concern / observation about where we’ve now got to. The other factor is the rules on competitive tendering and the risks of “uncompatibility” if the cheapest / best offer for each line upgrade is with a different supplier. The procurement approach for NTfL based line upgrades will be a real challenge if the aim is to closely link train and signalling technologies to secure maximum operational capacity.
@Briantist
“So…. The only question is where do the 4tph that can’t fit from Wimbledon, Ealing Broadway and Richmond go … and the answer is: Kensington Olympia!”
Are you suggesting these trains should reverse at Earls Court? Or did you mean High Street Kensington rather than Olympia? (10 tph in the two bay platforms might be possible, especially if nothing from Earls Court is going further)
I think it’s more likely that although all stations on the Circle Line will have at least 14 tph, that includes all the other SSL trains that serve those stations.
@Walthamstow Writer
Thanks for the info. I was just wondering if it might just be operationally “easier” to make the SSL platforms by digging down from above and sticking in new stairs and/or (accessible) lifts.
Does it seem likely that the SSL stations won’t get made accessible?
@timbeau
” did you mean High Street Kensington rather than Olympia? (10 tph in the two bay platforms might be possible, especially if nothing from Earls Court is going further)”
Actually I was thinking (to get the 14tph on all the Circle) that the existing Wimbledon-Edgeware Road service would terminate at High Street Ken and then 4 tph would have to go to Olympia. But, yes this would mean using the bits of the current Lillie Bridge Depot to get from West Kensington for that to work.
I think I was trying to prove a negative perhaps?
“I think it’s more likely that although all stations on the Circle Line will have at least 14 tph, that includes all the other SSL trains that serve those stations.”
But that’s almost true already (it’s 12, then 28, then 27, then 12 again) and not much of an “upgrade” if the lines get only 2 more trains an hour!
To perhaps answer the questions about the no. of trains per hour on the various bits (or maybe confuse matters even more) I’ve heard rumours that the western end of the District and Picc lines will be revised.
Plans I’ve got wind of are that the District will only have two western branches – Wimbledon and Richmond, with the Picc gaining the Ealing Broadway branch as well as the two to Heathrow and the Uxbridge service. Easily split four ways if you get the 40+ tph that NTfL may (one day) deliver. Oh there’s also a possible plan to re-locate Chiswick Park stn platforms on to the Richmond branch as part of the re-cast.
With the two western branches on the District you can get a lot more trains from the Wimbledon branch into the city which is a flow where its really needed (until crossrail 2 comes along of course) as haven’t got to cram as many districts in along that South side of the Circle. And so the freed up paths could possibly then be filled by additional Circle line trains?
That still doesn’t really help answer where or how those additional Circles will slot in on the north side though…
As for the cost rises and failure associated with the last contract, serious SERIOUS question ought to be asked of LUs senior managers, in particular the Director of Capital Projects who has overseen this sorry fiasco but who has quite happily remained in post. To top it all off, at the time of the termination of the Bombardier contract he was awarded something in the New Year Honours. Is a joke and he should be hanging his head in shame.
@QPR – these rumours abound (as reported here);sometimes they have to do with the need to provide level access to trains beyond Rayners lane, sometimes for other reasons.
When I went to see Mike Brown a few weeks ago, he came out with the comment about ‘a Circle Line train every 4 min’, so he must have got it from somewhere. Unfortunately I didn’t have an opportunity to follow up on exactly how that might be achieved.
IIRC, the Bombardier signalling spec for SSR envisaged 36 tph through the junction at Baker Street, so that seems to be a common target that LU is aiming for regardless of the physical limitations. It ‘might’ be possible to get more than 30 tph round the Circle if no more trains needed to reverse at Edgeware Road. Adopting the operating pattern used for the S-Bahn ring in Berlin, for example, a Circle train could do two full loops before turning off at Praed Street and going to Hammersmith. But as others have pointed out, threading them between the District Line services at Gloucester Road and Minories Junction will be the biggest challenge.
Regarding signalling supplier lock-in, this is exactly the problem that New York City Transit faced when deciding in the mid-90s to go for CBTC on the subway, which is even more inter-connected than the Sub-Surface Railway. When I went to interview the then President in 1994 (I think), his signalling guru explained that the plan was to maintain interoperability by selecting two contractors in a ‘leader-follower’ configuration, where one company got to supply the technology but had to make its proprietary interfaces available for the second to match.
After a three-stage bidding and demonstration process, the choice went to a consortium including Matra, offering a version of the CBTC then being deployed in Paris. Matra’s signalling business was subsequently absorbed by Siemens, which finally rolled out a prototype installation on the stand-alone L-Canarsie line about 15 years after the project started. The ‘follower’ contract went to Thales, which has fitted its version on a second – also largely independent – line. Only now, after more than 20 years, are the two companies working on an ‘interoperability demonstrator’ on a third route, starting with trials on one track of a short multi-track section, where they can test without interfering with revenue services.
Having followed the NYCT saga since the beginning, I have to say I have always had a healthy degree of scepticism about LU’s anticipated timescales for resignalling the SSR. And sadly it looks as if that caution may have been justified.
Open, non-proprietary systems do seem instinctively a better approach particularly if it subsequently allows upgrades to parts of systems as the need arises, rather than wholesale and hugely expensive replacement of one entire system with another.
Open systems also do seem more sensible from a commercial perspective in what seems like such a restricted supply market.
As I understand it from the comments, ECTS / ERTMS is being developed to meet this aspiration but the above comments also indicate that the design of such a system is still very much evolving and maturing.
Would it not therefore be better to simply defer the SSL signalling upgrade until there is a high level of confidence in ECTS / ERTMS and then go with that – and in the interim redirect spending to one of the other urgently needed projects in the pipeline?
I am assuming that the reason to install highly sophisticated signalling compared with something more traditional / less technologically challenging is to deliver the greater throughput of trains that current and future demand dictates, so clearly delaying the system upgrade has that major downside for the SSL but at least that does not then have a knock-on effect on all the other upgrades on other lines aimed at achieving capacity growth elsewhere.
The existing systems would then presumably require patching to keep them operational in the meantime, but that is similar to what is proposed with regard to refurbishing Bakerloo trains, for example, as covered in another article, so on the face of it should not be dismissed out of hand as a reason to avoid getting things right for the long term.
The big problem with using ETCS on a metro is that the architecture and functionality are specified for a mixed traffic main line environment, so it is sub-optimal for a high frequency service of essentially homogeneous trains.
That said, there is definitely a rapid rate of convergence in hardware between CBTC and ETCS, with most suppliers using the same processors, etc. If the ATO-on-ETCS overlay envisaged in the next Baseline 3 maintenance release actually works for Thameslink, that would be a major step forward. Meanwhile, Siemens is developing an on-board unit and DMI for the Crossrail trains that will work with both systems.
The trouble with saying “the more the New Tube for London gets delayed, the better it should be when it finally arrives” is the law of diminishing returns. By the time it is eventually ready we’ll have stopped needing it as global warming will have flooded London. Well, maybe not *really*, but putting things off repeatedly is the simplest way to never do them at all.
Also, you could “more than double the number will run on the Circle line alone” by simply running it through the night. It doesn’t say if the “double” is peak, off-peak or just a 24-hr average. :-O “Technological lock-in” is not restricted to the rail industry either.
The Other Paul – yes, stand on the right platform at Baker Street and you can see many trains go past in the direction you desire to travel 🙁
ps. EDGWARE *not* Edgeware PLEASE!
Hats off to the TfL comms team, who have managed to sell a 3-4 year delay and big budget overspend as good news, and get the Evening Standard to swallow it AND write a glowing-ish editorial.
Can we have them do some messages about London Bridge, where (almost) best ever train performance is seemingly ‘never ending chaos’?
@Capt Deltic, whilst other main lines do run 24tph (for one hour) with lights on poles, including one through London Bridge, those trains don’t actually stop anywhere, or at least not without at least two platform lines per approach line. At that frequency it is dwell times and platform clearance times that matter.
@ Briantist – we can’t escape the issue that it isn’t just a case of sticking in lifts or stairs. It’s about fire evacuation, lighting, cameras, PA systems, having a safe and operable design, space for ticketing equipment etc. That all assumes there is the land available and there’s a buildable solution. I suspect the actual priority on a lot of sub surface stations is to add more capacity between platform and ticket hall and at the ticket hall. Politically the pressure will always be accessibility – it comes with monotonous regularity and seemingly to the exclusion of everything else. I may be being unfair there but perhaps I read too many tweets from lobby groups?
Having an accessible network is undoubtedly beneficial but it does need to sit alongside providing stations that are able to handle what enhanced train services are throwing at them. Thus far nearly all LU schemes tend to combine both aspects and I suspect that will continue to be the case with a few step free schemes running alongside where simple and affordable schemes can be delivered effectively.
@Chris J
Yes I recall original specs for ETCS level 2 had many limitations that, whilst not being a constraint for typical long distance main line operations once out in rural areas, were practically unworkable on the busiest urban railway, surface suburban operations and metro alike. In the original implementation of GSM-R, for example there were simply insufficient individual simultaneous radio channels available for continuous data communications with all the trains traversing through a complex densely operated multitrack railway typical of most of south London’s terminal approaches. Without continuous communication, an ETCS train rapidly loses its movement authority and will grind quickly to a halt. That shortcoming was hurriedly corrected by adopting later generations of cell technology with subsequent versions of GSM-R, and many other optimisations and performance improvements to hardware and software have since been accomplished, all whilst maintaining the same basic concepts and message protocol principles defined in the original technology.
ETCS, although clearly in use at a number of pilot and early rollout sites throughout Europe, is not quite fully ‘there’ yet but is maturing very rapidly now, and I believe the basis of that technology could also be applied in high capacity metro systems, with communications systems, in particular, especially designed and optimised to ensure continuous coverage in the tunnel environment.
@ Brockley Mike – while I understand your comments I think they fail on two grounds. The first one is credibility. If LU were now to say “we’ll just stop the SSR upgrade and wait until the perfect signalling turns up” they’d be pilloried by London politicians, the DfT and Treasury and the business community in London. There are so many obvious lines of attack that I won’t list them but suffice to say many years of hard work to convince people of the need for upgrades would be lost, possibly forever. I don’t see anyone at the top of TfL or LU voting for that strategy when they’ve probably had a pretty horrendous time dealing with the fall out that’s already happened with the SSR upgrade.
It would also be very damaging to Londoners who’d be lumbered with a large part of the network with declining reliability. People are already moaning about the state of the District Line’s signals and the recent spate of failures. I suspect you can’t patch some bits of the SSR signalling much more and something has to be done. There is a limit to the amount of times you can invite politicians and the media to Edgware Rd signal cabin before people ask “why are we here for a third time?”. There’s also the issue of having S stock trains mouldering away in sidings unused plus the rest of the fleet not being used to their full potential. That’s more money wasted. I also don’t think that stopping work on the SSR lines helps the overall network. All you have is something half finished with a risk of breakdowns and delays. As I write this I am having flashbacks to those Thames News clips about the tube in the late 1980s / early 1990s when things were really dire and the battle for funding really had not been won (apart from the immediate aftermath of the Kings Cross fire when money was shovelled towards LT in order to stop the blame landing at the DoT’s door).
Secondly if we say the Picc upgrade is an urgent scheme you immediately fall flat on your face because of the interfaces with the SSR network in West London. Either way round you have to do something between Barons Court and Ealing Common and South Harrow and Uxbridge. Even if you tried to upgrade the Picc you’d still need to make the SSR trains talk with whatever you bought to resignal the Picc.
On the assumption that a deal can be sealed with Thales then there is at least the benefit that both client and contractor are now familiar with each other. There is a lot of experience and organisational learning that can be deployed by both sides to expedite things quickly. Thales will also be familiar with all of the processes surrounding possessions, eng hours working, assurance, sign offs etc. LU is also up to speed about the training, documentation, engineering, maintenance, upgrading issues that it has to do or take on to make sure the programme stays “on track” (sorry!). Having all that unravel from pausing the possibility of working with Thales would be a massive loss and could take years to rebuild. Organisational morale would be hit – whoever’s in charge of SSR signalling has had to deal with at least one pause so far and will have to rebuild team commitment and enthusiasm when the go ahead with Thales is finalised. It’s no fun trying to manage a team of people who know their roles and personal futures are at risk. I’ve done it and it was seriously hard work. It also explains why the press release talks about there being no pause come 2022 – LU immediately carries on with the NTfL project although clearly scoping, planning, procurement etc will start prior to 2022. There’s no guarantee for Thales at that point but they must be in with a decent chance if they can deliver the SSR works to the revised budget and timescales.
Chris J,
the Bombardier signalling spec for SSR envisaged 36 tph through the junction at Baker Street
On the presumption that you can manage this on plain track, this must be theoretically possible at a junction like Baker Street with a decent centralised computer based system.
Overlaps can be progressively reduced over a short period of time as the speed of the train that might theoretically overshoot itself reduces speed. This can be combined with the reverse situation where the junction is occupied by a train and other trains can only advance at very slow speed to avoid any chance of an overshoot of the platform into the path of the train at the junction.
The platforms at Baker Street are the on the desirable side of the junction for optimal throughput. The timetable can be based on parallel movements to/from either Finchley Road or Edgware Road. Inward trains can be given a bit of extra time and wait at platforms 3 or 5 as appropriate for their exact slot. It all could work but whether you could do this at every junction and, more important, whether you could do it at every junction simultaneously is another matter.
On the issue of a Circle Line train every four minutes, I am struggling to see how that can be possible. If you could run 37½tph I can see how you can manage 15tph on the Circle Line. However 15tph and “a train every four minutes” are not the same thing.
@ PoP – When I saw the 36 tph value for Baker St my immediate reaction was “no way”. I completely understand your comments / logic but I confess I’m still sceptical that a reliable timetable could be operated with such a high throughput at a flat junction. Perhaps I’ve spent too much time on the “wrong” platform at Baker St waiting for a train going east? Are there still driver changes at Baker St on the Circle / H&C or have they moved to Edgware Road? Even a slightly late changeover at Baker St would imperil a 36tph timetable.
Walthamstow Writer,
One would sincerely hope that Circle Line driver changes at Baker Street was a legacy of the old Circle Line when you couldn’t have driver changes at the terminus because there was no terminus. Given that Hammersmith is the both location of one of the termini as well as the main depot one would like to think they change place there.
I too recognise that such intensity through a junction will be very challenging. I did say “theoretically possible”.
WW – thanks for the detailed response – I thought there may be one or two issues…!
I agree with your point on the perils of waiting for the ‘perfect’ solution before acting, but that should be balanced against the desirability of getting the ‘right’ scheme – it seems a bit of a shame to implement a sub-optimal SSL signalling solution mainly in order to protect the wider project delivery programme and to save face.
I would say your second main point was the more important one in the sense that if there is no way to bring forward another project in the overall plan because of dependencies between them then clearly the first issue of explaining away a yet further delay to the SSL signalling disappears.
Assuming that the various upgrade projects are inter-dependent and have to be done in a particular order I would be interested to know if the development and implementation time (on the upgrade projects generally) is capable of accelerating if the flow of money was increased, or whether the timeframe is naturally driven by the actual engineering challenges and the need to keep the network operational throughout the works.
@Pedantic of Purley
The langage seems very specific to me. “almost every 4 minutes” is LESS than 15tph … Might be 14tph?
@Walthamstow Writer
My current employment gets me on the Circle/H&C every day from KXStP to Westbourne Grove.
So I can confirm the drivers change at Edgware Road. Sometimes with a witty signoff! Another thing that CAN happen is trains from Hammersmith sometimes terminate at Edgeware Road without going round the circle.
As for Baker Street Junction. Yes, I have stood and watched it from time to time.
Two of the movements are simple. H&C westbound and Met east are “normal’, but the H&C eastbound has to wait for the Met, and the Met west has to cross over the eastbound services of both lines.
The main issue is having to give east bound priority to the H&C to stop Prayd Street Junction being blocked – the Met has several KM of track to queue services by comparison.
The main issue for 36tph or 40tph has to be the way any two services on the “other” line cause a block because going east the junction goes directly to a platform.
I can’t figure out how you would write software to do this? You can’t re-order the services as they are fixed from aldgate in their order, and you also don’t want to block praed street junction either.
Perhaps there is a way?
Briantist,
The point I was making is that 15tph does not have to be every 4 minutes. If you managed by some miracle to run 37½tph and 15 of those 37½tph were Circle Line trains then they would not be running 4 minutes apart. Basically every 8 minutes you would have 5 trains – two of which would be Circle Line ones. So you could have a Circle Line train, another train, a Circle Line train 3 minutes after the first one, two more other trains and then another Circle Line train 5 minutes after the previous one. That means running 15tph on the Circle Line but that is certainly not “a train every four minutes”.
ngh 15.30 25/03/15
Unfortunately, as uncle Roger pointed out & my friend (who works for Siemens) agrees, they are creaking under the workload they presently have.
Not enough trained people & a shortage of supply.
Two rounds of recruitment bans ( the one in the run-up to privatisation that scuppered me, & another one later on, towards the end of Railtrack) have really put the screws on, 10-15 years down the line.
Brockley Mike
Would it not therefore be better to simply defer the SSL signalling upgrade until there is a high level of confidence in ECTS / ERTMS and then go with that – and in the interim redirect spending to one of the other urgently needed projects in the pipeline?
Err … Edgware Rd signal cabin & internal equipment won’t last that long …
IIRC it’s held together with masking tape, string & spit @ present.
See also WW’s pertinent comments on the very same problem.
Possible service frequencies:
According to interpretation, in 1922 Liverpool St had 25-27 trains arriving 07.30-08.30 over two tracks with all-mechanical signalling.
And your problem was?
Briantist says “I can’t figure out how you would write software to do this”.
The theoretical arrangements which PoP describes are nothing to do with software. If trains always ran exactly to timetable, and if there weren’t other flat junctions to be also integrated, it would be perfectly simple. Just write the timetable so that the crossing is always occupied by a pair of trains, one in each direction, either both met trains or both circle/ham trains.
Only two things can go wrong with this plan. One is that another junctions on the SSL somewhere cannot fit in with this timetable. This problem could be either solved, or proved insoluble, by computer simulation; I think that simulation program would be quite easy.
But of course the other thing which is liable to thrust 36tph firmly back in the land of fantasy is real life. It would only need a few seconds unplanned delay to any train anywhere, and the whole thing would disintegrate. Only to be recovered, if at all, by amazingly clever software in the signalling and control. That is where the big challenge lies.
@ Brockley Mike – Don’t underestimate the importance of reputation and credibility. As mentioned many times on here there is a long standing view in the “corridors of power” that LT / LRT / TfL were incompetent and not to be trusted with public money. Meanwhile the transport network fell to bits. We simply can’t go back to the “bad old days”. The economic damage would be immense never mind the “hell” inflicted on those that use the system plus those who have to use the roads which would get busier if current public transport users took to their cars. I deliberately didn’t mention individuals and their personal reputations – the system is always bigger than a person and life carries on regardless. We may criticise the “spin machine” but emphasising what is actually going well is important in building / maintaining the all important reputation. Crossrail is a good example of this.
I don’t recall mentioning a sub optimal SSR solution. Clearly Thales have demonstrated they can deliver a system that works and is pretty reliable once it’s bedded down. Apart from the obvious commercial issues that need discussion I assume the protracted timescale is also down to LU and Thales wanting to be as sure as they can be that the technical solution can meet the specification and deliver the outputs. Neither party can afford a failed project and therefore I doubt we face a sub optimal solution.
@PoP The other issue about Baker Street, which was raised by LU insiders some years ago, is that the new signalling system (whichever it then was!) had been specified to be slower in changing, locking and detecting the junction points than the existing interlocking. Given that ATP would enforce speed and headways more tightly than at present, there was concern that this would actually reduce capacity, rather than raise it. I am not sure whether that point has been addressed in detail, or if it is one of the ‘other issues that have subsequently come to light’ as TfL puts it.
@ Walthamstow Writer. Engineers have egos just like all other railway managers and want to leave their mark. I call it Gresley Stanier syndrome.
The one right solution is a subset of this. When I joined the industry the then BR CME thought the Sulzer engine was the only suitable engine for Type 4 locos, claiming other engines were not proven.
We all know how another engineer committed LU to moving block for the Jubilee Line extension, then moved to Railtrack and persuaded them that Moving Block was the way forward for the West Coast Main Line.
In the olden days Chief Engineers had real clout and getting to the top required strong personalities. Usually that strength gave clarity of purpose to technical innovation.
Sir Bob Reid, famously, tried to break this power by requiring engineers to be ‘on tap not on top’. Now we have very few engineers of any authority. which may be a good or a bad thing.
Re Malcolm,
Agree – Expecting the system to sort and optimise all issues magically won’t happen. The timetabling needs to be cleverly designed to provide robustness to allow the sytme to do the best it can, the 3rd rail networks have been based on parallel moves for almost a century. The key is regulating the services that will be the conflicting moves at the junction, there is a little more flexibility with the others.
To operate at 36tph there needs to be the theoretical capability to operate just a little bit higher for short periods for recovery. The key would appear to be maximising speed across Baker Street Junction and the improved acceleration of S stock allowing this to happen.
Not many solutions to the interlinked junctions issue apart from grade separation which is a non starter on this section.
The new signalling system is should make the potential blocking of Praed Street mostly a non issue as the trains will be allowed to be far close than at present.
As others have mentioned the penalty for high service frequency will be uneven service intervals.
Chris J,
Sounds like electric points replacing pneumatic points. I think pneumatic points are a thing of the past. I suspect the reason they were popular was because of the speed and because the air main was there anyway. But without tripcocks why bother with an air main? It is a potential source of reliability failure. So yes, any future system will have to have electric points and if it involves conversion from air points then the additional time to throw the points has to be factored in.
Just attended TfL Board meeting at City Hall, gaining insights on various topics. SSR resignalling was mentioned only briefly during the Commissioner’s report, as one of several announcements on tube modernisation since the report was prepared. There was a short verbal comment by Mike Brown that moving to the next stage with signal modernisation would allow us to “fully exploit the new trains”, with the SSR network being “40% of the Underground network as a whole”. No questions were asked about this by Board members.
On the Central and Waterloo & City train re-equipment, all discussion was handled in Part 2. There is of course a Part 1 paper which is available on the TfL website, showing new budget costs arising ( link here: http://www.tfl.gov.uk/cdn/static/cms/documents/board-20150326-part-1-item12-central-line-overhaul.pdf ).
@Herned
The additional complexity is at a software programming level. Within the CBTC system will be the Automatic Train Operation (ATO) algorithms, which are able to optimise the train driving to achieve one or more various different aims. These may be maximum throughput, regulating trains to space them evenly, reducing power consumption, sticking exactly to timetable, etc. Most ATO systems have preset modes that can optimise for different elements at different times (e.g. maximum throughput during the peak, evenly spaced trains and maximum coasting offpeak).
The complexity comes where the software, which tends to be designed for a non-branched line a la Victoria, is being adapted to regulate trains on a branched lines. With each additional branch, the complexity of the algorithm to optimise the positions of all the trains increases exponentially. Even developing the software from a one-branch to a two-branch lines went disastrously for Bombardier’s Cityflo 650 system (the cancelled SSL contract), on the two-branch Brown Line in Taipei (http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/08/21/2003451635).
So to then adapt the software to a line with 13 branches (by my count – or even just the 4 main central flat junctions) is a massive jump in complexity. With complexity comes bugs, with bugs come failures, etc etc. So the huge advantage of the Thales system is they’ve already shown it can work on the 5-branch/2 main junction Northern line, which is less than a third of the SSL complexity, but still more “proven” than any other system out there.
The other thing to add is that the software always has to be adapted to some extent to adjust to the operating rule book of any individual metro. In an ideal world, there would be an international standard rule book and the systems could be more off-the-shelf. But in reality, different countries have different approaches to risk, CBTC resignalling projects need to interact with different legacy systems during migration and so on – therefore procuring a system which has already been adapted to the operator (i.e. Thales) is always going to have a cost/reliability advantage. Even if the cost advantage is cancelled out by the supplier knowing they have a bid advantage, the reliability of the system during migration will still be a benefit – as was seen in the difference between the migrations to the new signalling on the Jubilee (hell) and Northern (heaven) lines.
“40% of the Underground network as a whole” presumably being measured in mileage or, being the Underground, kilometreage.
From its own press release we know that approximately 1.3 million people use the SSR daily and we also know that daily passenger journeys on the Underground are reported to be around the 4 million mark Mondays-Fridays. So, looking it another way, the SSR carries around 33% of all tube passengers. Still very significant but not quite the same. And, in fairness, when talking specifically about resignalling it probably makes more sense to talk about the amount of track involved and not the number of passengers.
Agree with WW’s comment on PPP bashing. While there are some justifiable criticisms of the way the model works in general / specially worked with the tube, a lot of the faults were mutual – especially with Tube Lines. The LR references to PPP sometimes remind me of listening to a divorcee talk about an ex. Sometimes juicy, rarely completely fair. Guardian articles on PPP are like listening to the smug best friend of a divorcee, who never got on with the ex and warned against the marriage the day before the wedding. The Guardian article linked to above is a fine example.
It would be interesting to see a thought through retrospective, now the dust has settled, in LR. Perhaps PoP could do an “against”, and WW a “for”?
@1C – Oversimplifying to the point of irrelevance, but…..
If you consider the “very deep outsourcing” aspect of PPP – and I’ve seen this in other organisations – almost without exception the “intelligence”, size and cost of what’s required on the client-side for it to be fit-for-purpose is underestimated. By the time this is realised, it’s too late to recover.
Re Mike P
I’ve seen plenty of client side issues not involving PPP with “very deep outsourcing” too – it isn’t unique to PPP, similar structures, or just the industry.
Organisations seem very loathed to retain expensive “intelligence”. The risk reward curve is very interesting on this front but they won’t want to see the the down side only the upfront headcount cost reduction.
There is then also an element of Rumsfeld-ism in clients: they don’t know that they don’t know…
The mention of PPP in this press release is a bit of misdirection. The objective is to distract attention from the errors that have been made after PPP was scrapped.
@MikeP – having spent the last 15 years working for PPP consultancy specialists, I totally agree with you – clients of all shapes and stripes have been repeatedly assured by consultancy advisers that it is all so simple. None that I have come across in any country or sector has been warned about the need to become an informed client. (I then proceeded to make a living showing them how to do that….) As ngh remarks,the problem is not limited to PPP schemes (privatisation and franchising pose very similar problems) nor is the reluctance to retain “invested knowledge” limited to the “objects” of those privatisation/PPP schemes – their very advisers are also reluctant to keep on their books anyone who hasn’t earned the appropriately marked up target for even a few weeks.
1C,
I would be the first to admit that PPP was not all bad and good did come out of it. Of relevance here is the fact that you had a steady supply of money for capital investment that you could rely on. Another benefit with PPP it that it forced LU for the first time to identify its asset base. A third was that by putting a value and cash penalty on delays it concentrated minds wonderfully – unfortunately that backfired a bit when companies like Tube Lines allegedly worked out it was sometimes cheaper to “take the hit” and finish the engineering works late (which would avoid having to expensively come back later to complete the job) rather than get the service running again.
In the context of this article though what was terrible was that Tube Lines could close the Jubilee Line at weekends claiming that this was “vital” when on many weekends clearly it wasn’t – or wouldn’t have been if they had their own decent test track. To add insult to injury this also meant they couldn’t be liable for any possible delays that may have occurred if the line had been kept open. So, perversely due to PPP, Tube Lines had an enormous incentive to close the line each weekend whether they needed to or not.
It was also madness that Tube Lines and Metronet could each formulate their own signalling upgrade policy (if they had one) without regard to the other. Even dafter they were not obliged to take future work into account. So Tube Lines could install a new signalling system on the Jubilee Line without taking into any account whatsoever that a few years later the Metropolitan Line, with which it has major interfaces at Neasden depot, would itself need to be resignalled a few years later.
Much as I think the disadvantages of PPP substantially outweighed the advantages, I agree with Guano that the press release really made too much of PPP. A passing reference, where relevant, would have been enough. There is a limit to how long you can continue blaming everything on PPP. Equally, as stated in the article, I think it is rather unfair and misleading to proudly state that the cost of resignalling is expected to be around or below the same cost per kilometre as work done under PPP – certainly not a case of comparing like with like. And probably a lot of the reason that PPP happened in the first place was because of the many fiascos involving the Jubilee Line Extension – which predated PPP.
Re Graham H,
“clients of all shapes and stripes have been repeatedly assured by consultancy advisers that it is all so simple.”
Which begs the question – If it were really that simple why the need for the consultants…
The clients see it as flexible responsive intelligent outsourcing which isn’t how those at the top of the consultancy firms see things.
In terms of risk curves take the example of refurbishing Bakerloo stock refurbishment – the risk curve is very asymmetric, there is very little chance the programme will proceed quicker than average for a given unit but a more substantial chance it will take a lot longer if multiple difficult issues are found.
This asymmetry (call it complexity / realism / cynicism / doommongery etc.) is what many attempt to ignore as it makes most projects far harder for the client to get authorised and far harder for the consultants to sell.
The Board minutes JR linked to above are interesting in that attitudes may be changing:
*TfL in house
But this is probably based on TfL long term ball gazing which is beyond the horizon of most firms/industries where the “will I still be in charge when it could go wrong or cost go through the roof” is the definition of the limit of analysis…
@ 1C – while I found the analogies amusing I must decline your kind offer to write a “pro” article on PPP. I worked on it for a long time (and a PFI before hand) and saw some of the battles, the nonsenses, the good bits and the politics played out. I fear that we are not at a point where a rational discussion could follow an article saying that there were benefits to a PPP or PFI approach. We also have the issue that the “political winds” are also not in favour. I’m therefore not minded to put myself in the firing line.
I completely agree with the remarks from several people about the need for an intelligent client. However it’s hard to be one when your own “side” is split about the merits of the scheme and are therefore not minded to help something they hate. They merely bided their time for the inevitable “I told you so” moment. As is often the case with me I ended up being one of resident experts on the contract and that doesn’t endear you to anyone because you can end up stopping the client side doing what they wanted to do and you also upset the contractor because you tell them they have to do something expensive which they were trying not to do! How to lose friends and not influence people. 😉 Nonetheless there are nice moments where you explain to consultants earning six times your salary that it’s not terribly practical to have a set down only stop at Baker Street p5 for the Virgin Trains express that’s run through from Railtrack to LU metals at Paddington. 🙂 (Old story but always fun to repeat)
I’ve long believed that an intelligent client is essential regardless of what form of contract you’re using but organisations spend their time trying to crush expertise and make every job “generic” in order to lower costs / improve “efficiency”.
@ Superlambanana – thanks for the extra insight on system / algorithm complexity plus why Thales now have an “edge” over their competitors.
@ngh – “Which begs the question – If it were really that simple why the need for the consultants…” To answer that (perfectly reasonable) question,one needs to back a step and note that PPPs were invariably promoted by politicians, not industry managers. Politicians – and I don’t mean just the UK flavours – are simply not interested in the minutiae of running a business, let alone such subtleties as the shape of risk transfer profiles. They do not trust the industries with which they deal, and so they rely on third party “experts” to tell them it will be alright on the night. Such experts – aka consultants -have a natural interest in making the complex seem simple and reassuring, and since they are experts, they will be believed (otherwise the taxpayers would want to know why such exorbitant fees have been paid to them).
Lest this all sound like either a naive assertion, or a bilious fit, let me cite two examples to illustrate. Ridley, when SoS, was always going on about how easy it was to manage the public procurement process, and quoted the example of some minor mid-West town whose councillors met once a year to let the contracts and then dispersed for twelve months. He clearly thought that PPPs worked like that and he was not alone amongst Ministers by any means, carefully indoctrinated by the likes of PwC.
Indeed, the latter firm were brought in in the late ’80s to tell us (second story) how to manage our relationship with BR better. Their principal recommendation was to replace the close working, if inevitably somewhat adversarial relationship with the sponsored industry, with a system of simply using a clutch of metrics which were monitored until such time as they entered a “red zone”, at which point, we all jumped on the fire engine and went round to BR HQ. This model is, of course, exactly that used by PPP contracts and its difficult to see how it could be otherwise in drafting the necessary documentation. The downside is that “watching the dials” is only a small part of management/sponsorship and it’s the “Events, dear boy, events*” which cause all the problems. The latter by definition cannot be anticipated in the legal drafting and only rarely measured.
*The quote is famously from Harold MacMillan, when asked what was the most difficult thing about running the country.
London Underground really has two networks:
1. The connected network, consisting of the subsurface railway and a collection of deep tube lines it is physically joined to by running track connections used frequently by loaded passenger trains or empty stock movements.
SUBSURFACE, JUBILEE, PICCADILLY
also BAKERLOO, as this will either have to interface directly with the SSR signalling at Watford, or have to share NR sjgnalling on the OG network in the same way as the Metropolitan at either Watford, or just as today in the Queens Park area. and the Metropoitan in its own right has to consider compatibility with NR (or the other way round) with respect to the shared running with Chiltern.
2. The standalone lines, consisting of:
CENTRAL, NORTHERN, VICTORIA, W&C
Any or all of the latter might be separately managed by one or more vertically integrated organisations with independent and incompatible control systems, even with different gauges or rubber tyres if desired!
In the former group the technical compaibility requirement for interoperation is best managed by using the same control systems throughout that network, and that policy will have a positive benefit on the quantity, complexity and reliability of lineside equipment and influence a whole host of operational and engineering decisions, including control room boundaries and the structure of infrastructure maintenance organisations.
Perhaps the greatest mistake and lesson learnt of the PPP initiative was it’s failure to take into account of this fundemental issue in the line groupings for the particular contracts. Placing Jubilee and Picadilly in a different group to the Subsurface network, when their trains share significant infrastructure was a baffling desision to me.
It is encouraging to see TfL understanding the interoperability problem and taking positive steps to move forward on the resignalling.
One interesting point to add regarding consultants: during the worst of the crisis, the cuts demanded by central government usually meant that experienced staff had to go in order to reduce cost. Now that the worst appears to have passed, the steer for the public sector appears to be to carry on suppressing internal costs as much as possible, with a more liberal steer on project/capital expenditure, which is meant to assist the economy. This means that many public sector bodies are more keen to hire in consultants than they are to (re-)hire permanent staff, as they are unable to transfer budgets from capital expenditure to their own internal budgets.
As a result, in the interest of ‘efficiency’ you end up with consultants doing the jobs of public bodies at twice the price, given consultancies are not charities and like to make ends meet as well.
@ Mark T – I did propose, in the drafting stage, that a “Compatibility Agreement” (for want of a better term) be put into the PPP Contract to deal precisely with the issue of shared / parallel running and line upgrades. All the clever external lawyers said it wasn’t necessary! Some of us did look far enough forward and were operationally aware enough to see where the problems might be. Your point about the business unit / Infraco line allocation is an interesting one. I don’t recall that particularly coming up during the workstream on asset and scarce resource allocation but there’d already been an initial principle decision to separate sub surface profile lines from deep tube ones.
@mark Townend
“Perhaps the greatest mistake and lesson learnt of the PPP initiative was it’s failure to take into account of this fundemental issue in the line groupings for the particular contracts. Placing Jubilee and Picadilly in a different group to the Subsurface network, when their trains share significant infrastructure was a baffling desision to me.”
Indeed, anyone with much knowledge of the history of the Underground will recognise the Piccadilly Line as what was originally known as the “Deep Level” District Line project, with a couple of other tube projects bolted on. Hence also the historical and proposed swapping of their branches in the west.
The Jubilee’s roots lie in a similar deep-level project in the 1930s to relieve the Met. The arbitrary division of the lines under PPP seems to have been based on a naïve assumption that colours on a map are an accurate guide to the situation on the ground. A new variation on crayon-based planning, perhaps?
There were people who genuinely believed that the appearance of a pink line on the map in 1990 meant a real change in the service. For example, complaints you could no longer go direct from Uxbridge to Barking (when in reality that facility had ceased more than fifty years before (and had run via Acton Town).
@ Straphan – before I left LU there was a massive push to get rid of contract, temps and consultant staff. That also applied across TfL. The process for taking on non permanent staff was also tightened up hugely to prevent old behaviours returning. This was to get costs down and to “protect” permanent staff when the inevitable reorganisations happened. TfL have also said publicly that they want to grow their own expertise on cycling infrastructure, as one example, and not to be tied to the use of consultants. In some fields it’s very hard for the public sector to recruit certain skill sets so there’s always an element of some consultant / external project management resource. If the “bought in” resource is genuinely world class and ensures efficient spend and implementation and minimised risk then it may well be worth the extra cost for the resource. I think that broad policy is the right way to go where you have long term programmes that need planning, resourcing and implementing. Nothing worse than have corporate knowledge walk out with the consultant – seen that happen too many times and there’s no “loyalty” from such staff to effect a good handover and transfer of knowledge.
@timbeau/Mark Townend – you didn’t expect the consultants and Treasury officials who foist the PPPs on the industry to understand, or even care about the points you make, did you? The Treasury were in their usual “the competition market should be organised in threes” mode*, and consultants would have had no knowledge of the detail. These are the self-same consultants (the same individuals) who, during BR privatisation believed that Gatex should be done first because it was so simple and the self same ex-Treasury man turned consultant leading PwC’s input who rang me up in the course of devising the tube PPPs to inquire what I thought the efficiency gain would be …**
* eg 3 ROSCos, three TESCos, etc (I would probably not like to know which 3rd form economics textbook recommends this number as optimum)
** I was aghast at the naivety of the question and mumbled about historic industry trends being around 3%. The rest is alas history.
WW
Your last point, of course is the exact opposite of Railtrack – where engineeers were not wanted, except as grubby spanners.
We all know where that landed us.
@Graham H: I would probably not like to know which 3rd form economics textbook recommends this number as optimum
The Boston Consulting Group, in 1976. It’s simplistic nonsense, of course – even the original article itself notes “The Rule of Three and Four is a hypothesis. It is not subject to rigorous proof. It does seem to match well observable facts in fields as diverse as steam turbines, automobiles, baby food, soft drinks and airplanes”.
You can add the three trainload freight companies to the list – carefully split up by BR, then sold as a job lot to Wisconsin Central who merged them all back together again…
While we’re talking consultants, I see no-one’s mentioned McKinsey yet…. Graham H ??
@Ian J – many thanks for the reference. (I’d at one time assumed that the rule of three was simply a good story about treasury incompetence; nice to have its roots identified).
Yes,freight was another good example. HMT forced the split on industry even after the warnings that open access would damage the sale value of the business as a monopoly, let alone three competing bodies -warnings that were crystallised within a few days of the announcement of open access, when the power industry told our Freight MD that unless he reduced charges, they would haul their own coal. Even so,the Treasury pressed ahead with the split. [Not only was it a blow to management morale to have to undo the split, but it meant that I -and they – had wasted a considerable chunk of time putting in place separate engineering support, station, depot, and track access agreements for each of the components].
Of the other triads, only the ROSCOs survived together; the TESCOs vanished apart from InterFleet.
@MikeP – McKinsey were certainly in there -who didn’t have their snouts in the trough? – but had a lower profile than PwC and KPMG (and Rothschilds, on the banking front, and virtually all the Magic Circle law firms). Much of the theoretical basis for the infrastructure/ops split and the extended use of outsourcing came from PwC; the internal trading rules came from KPMG, who ran a number of tiresome and entirely unbelievable workshops on the topic. Former DfT colleagues openly boasted that the BR privatisation was the “largest single project ever in British legal history”. The total government professional fees – consultants, banks, lawyers – came to £800m at the time, equivalent to perhaps £1.5bn at today’s money.
Graham H
Not one of them with an engineering-based industry experience, at all.
It’s all very well (pace Cap’n Deltic on Bob Reid) having engineers on tap – but you still need them, or the system will fall to bits. As indeed it did.
[Specific mudslinging involving naming individual people deleted (and I don’t have time to waste analysing and picking out the reasonable bit from the rest). PoP]
Even though my opinion is that the press release made too much of PPP, I too think that the disadvantages of PPP substantially outweigh any advantages. In this case, though, PPP is being mentioned as a distraction from the subsequent history and a subtle way of passing the blame to Gordon Brown. Every time TfL and the present Mayor mention PPP, they should be asked “So do you agree that Mr Livingstone was right in his criticisms at the time?”
Part of the justification for schemes like PPP was that “the pubic sector is bad at managing projects”. The problem is that there are thousands of projects for which the client is “the public” so in one way or another the public sector has to manage them. One of the most interesting aspects, for me as an outsider, of the report on the abandonment of the Bombardier SSR signalling project was how hands-on the LUL/TfL staff had to be. This is a million miles away from Ridley’s view that a contract is signed and the private supplier gets on with it. I wonder how many politicians still think in those terms.
Graham H 27 March 2015 at 08:38
” who didn’t have their snouts in the trough? ”
Anderson during the “ban” post De Lorean fiasco?
Rule of Three – I knew one of the BCG directors of the era who left to found his own successful firm – his additional rule was only do work for one of the top two as that was where the easier money was…
The rule is also about viable size of firms to extract maximum strategy consulting fees.
@Guano – one of THE fundamental problems with the whole PPP concept is that it is based around the rules for public expenditure accounting. It effectively substitutes a lower annual cash flow requirement spread over a long period for a one-off hit to the public purse through direct procurement. If public expenditure worked in the same way as the private sector, you wouldn’t do that, and indeed, it’s difficult to think of a private sector case at all. In the private sector, you might, of course, go for a wet lease, but again, the public sector rules are different and the whole value of the lease scores on the day it’ assigned, alas.
@ Guano – the real issue about public vs private isn’t “bad at managing” it’s really about “bad at fulfilling their assigned role”. The public sector has to be a good, intelligent client that supports the contractor by setting clear requirements, providing the required user input at the right times, by being able to “accept” new assets / systems / whatever into service in an efficient manner and by being able to release staff for training. It also needs to manage change control properly and openly and also deal with whatever regulator(s) it’s accountable to. The contractor has to work effectively with the client, be willing to listen and challenge and then to deliver what has been specified to time, cost and spec. It also needs to manage its work properly and co-ordinate with the client side activities to avoid delays and hold ups. There is obviously a choice about who has the lead project management role. On a big project my little list obviously involves legions of people doing the right thing at the right time. Sorry if that sounds a bit like “teaching people to suck eggs” – wasn’t meant to be.
I’ve never been a project manager but I understand some of the basics. I’m realistic enough to know I don’t have the right temperament to be a really good project manager because so much of that job is being able to coax, encourage, force, demand, urge etc etc people to do what they need to do and to do it properly. The best PMs have excellent people skills (IMO, of course) but can also be extremely forceful and demanding when they need to be.
It’s no shock to me that LU had to be “hands on” with signalling works. The contractor can’t design the system unless it has very clear and agrees signalling principles and operational concepts for each stage of the project. One of the big big problems is the phased nature of the work and the fact that signalling doesn’t just sit there by itself. It has to work with and be installed on a massive range of assets all of which have to be known about, their condition understood and approval sought to change / replace / modify them. The assets may not even be in LU’s ownership or control. To be fair Bombardier / Siemens / Thales don’t know all the fine detail of signalling boundaries, overlaps, platform heights, plans for step free access affecting platforms etc. They need the client to tell them or to ensure they are contracted to survey all these things as part of the project scope and to ensure there is the time in the programme to do it. I had some involvement with the SSR upgrade project in my last months at LU which is why I know a little bit about the interface issues.
@WW
You are absolutely right. I am and have been for many years involved in managing work on both public & private assets. Whilst one may have a contract to undertake works on a client site, to actually execute the works requires ongoing informed consent from the client. IMHO the greatest difficulty is where the client is under-informed and thus unable to appreciate the significance of such decisions. Of course consultants can be used to bridge the gap, but it does, frankly, trouble me when no-one in senior management really appreciates the niceties of mission critical assets! As Captain Celtic said in his column some time ago, it’s more than a little surprising that the board in question had no in-house engineering competence. Such an organisation should not be solely run by engineers, nor should it be run without them at the most senior level. After all, as CD says it is heavy engineering in public!
Picking up on Isambard’s remark … consider the two CEO’s of Railtrack.
Neither was an engineer, though the second was experienced in the Oil industry & must be presumed to have some understanding of “heavy engineering in public” problems.
Also, when it (quite literally) broke apart after Labroke Grove & Hatfield, he not only did the honorable thing, but went public, in front of BBC microphones & stated: … identified the Railways problem as its fragmentation. The railway had been “ripped apart by privatisation”. He urged Government and regulators to “think the unthinkable.”
His predecessor, now dead, was another matter entirely – one of the Grahams, here, referred to him recently in unflattering terms & he was unloved, to say the least – though he, too came from the oil industry …..
Also, needless to say, Government did nothing, then at any rate, to follow up or heed the second man’s ( G Corbett ) recommendations.
[Much Better. PoP]
I always find this very funny, when it’s trotted out by politicians: “the pubic sector is bad at managing projects”…
The obviously haven’t had a real job at a large company. I have been involved in several projects at some of these “titans”. One project was canned a year or so after go-live (it should never have been put live). The shenenigans employed by the contractor to hide the fact it wasn’t fit for purpose and the politics by person responsible for signing the contract, was interesting to watch. He left the day before the plug was pulled….
The second at this company was eventually canned after two years of trying to get it live. The contractor in this case was another “titan” and the whole sorry saga ended up in court for quite a number of years.
It’s why I’m actually quite pleased with the progress at London Bridge. That is complicated!
@southern Heights
““the pubic (sic) sector is bad at managing projects”…”
is that why they call it a cock-up?
@Greg
There was another chemical engineer who was put in charge of the railways.
http://news.bbcimg.co.uk/media/images/66630000/jpg/_66630210_66630205.jpg
That went all right, didn’t it……?
I agree with those that say that the simplest way to increase the frequency of the Circle line to “a train up to every four minutes” is to combine it with the Hammersmith & City line,* and extend some of the Metropolitan line trains onto Barking (and Upminster).** This would mean major changes for District line services…
Perhaps the reason that the H&C line is included in the list that follows is that it would be part of the night tube, with Met stations to the north being served by the Jubilee.
*While typing this I had the mischievous thought that you get a “train up to every four minutes” by scheduling them at intervals of 4 minutes and 6 minutes…
**There was a service between Uxbridge and Barking between 1939 and 1941, when the eastern terminus reverted to Aldgate for operational reasons.
@timbeau: I merely copied from guano’s post, maybe I should have read it more closely!
At least Beeching was an engineer, admittedly he was probably “the wrong kind of engineer”, but it could have been worse…. He could have succeeded!
@Isambard: ‘As Captain Celtic said in his column some time ago…’
Is this Uncle Roger’s tartan cousin?
@Graham H “McKinsey were certainly in there -who didn’t have their snouts in the trough? – but had a lower profile than PwC and KPMG (and Rothschilds, on the banking front, and virtually all the Magic Circle law firms). ”
I don’t know about the profile, but I do remember being a first seat trainee in the Asset Finance of one of those law firms and thinking I’d done ok to avoid trains for most of my time…
… until the very pleasant couple of days (and nights) I spent proof reading lists of electric multiple units, including the Blue Trains I used to catch when I’d been younger.
I’d spent most of my time learning how to finance ships instead, including actually doing the mortgage over the Isle of Wight ferry … and I only got to do that because none of the qualified staff thought it was worth learning how to do the paperwork for a British registered ship – there were so few of those!
@ Graham H bis “one of THE fundamental problems with the whole PPP concept is that it is based around the rules for public expenditure accounting. It effectively substitutes a lower annual cash flow requirement spread over a long period for a one-off hit to the public purse through direct procurement”
I was told a good analogy – PPP/PFI is like buying your house on a credit card rather than a mortgage.
@Ronnie MB – 🙂 And despite all the effort that lawyers and engineers put into compiling lists of rolling stock, we collectively got it wrong from time to time (I think I’ve already recounted the story of the last untransferred coach in a VEP unit, so won’t repeat). Interesting about ships – well into the ’90s, DfT’s Shipping Division (a load of ex-Tradesmen, of course) still could not believe that the days of liner conferences were doomed.
One amusing point about the Magic Circle law firms was the paper they used. When you – as I did -had to sign thousands of documents (usually at least in triplicate) every night, it made a real difference as to the paper (and pen used). We did some time trials. Clifford Chance’s cream laid paper signed with a roller ball took only 6 seconds a signature, Freshfields heavy weave with a fountain pen took 20seconds, or 10 with a rollerball. For a typically large TOC 250 stations, with a minimum of 6 documents per station, and up to ten signatures a station, that made the difference between getting the last train home or working through the night…
One other point -to pursue your PPP analogy – is that some authorities found they had maxed out their card and had very little “free” cash left in the budget.
@sad fat dad
Lol
I proof read it too…….
Back to school!
@ Graham H – I have to ask where the “Magic Circle” term for the lawyers came from. It was always nice, as a poor public sector wallah, to be welcomed into the luxurious portals of those firms. A different world and the food was always good. The stupidly long hours answering questions and reviewing drafing weren’t quite so good. 😉
@WW – I don’t know the origins of the term but I agree with you about the ambience – much like the Masters of the Universe syndrome in banks. The Board’s lawyers – Clifford Chance – had very grand modern offices and there was no control over hospitatlity funding. As a daily visitor during the privatisation process, I quickly got to know the ordering arrangements for catering – “17 cafe lunches for conference room 8, please” – and never once was I asked who I was or even what account it should be put down to. As there was no security check on entering the building either and there were pleasant sitting areas replete with today’s newspapers from around the globe, it was very [well, slightly] tempting to use the place as a club.
Other firms invariably supplied champagne and with a daily sales caseload, became so blase that we were simply shown a trolley laden with bottles and invited to take them home instead, which we did (you can get at least 4 bottles in a pilot’s case…)
Cascade Politics. Whether the replacement of Pacers with D stock is a good idea, it seems to be the only show in town for Northern Franchise Bidders (Using a battery raft to even out the engine load, should be explored). ALL D stock is needed (plus others) any delay for the TOTAL withdrawal beyond 2016 (17 at a push) bashes up against the 2020 regs. RailNorth aren’t exactly thrilled with D stock concept but imagine the further outcry if TfL hangs on to stock pushing Northern crowding even further. That said a delay in the excess S stock for enhanced service pattern could be very positive as it might allow Croxley to get the extra train (hoped rethink for S stock swap with pic beyond Ealing) etc
@Saintsman – the terms of the ITT would appear to preclude the use of ex-D78 stock.
Graham H
I presume it did not, unfortunately, go as far as Pol Roger cuvee Winston Churchill? *cough*
[ Note to the unititiated: Champers is as variable & also as prone to enthusiasts’ disagreements as proper beer – f’rinstance I regard Moet as little better than Watney’s … ]
@Graham H, 28 March 2015 at 19:46
‘upcycled’ bogies . . . and bodies?
IEP inspired plug -in diesel alternator rafts?
What’s new?
@graham h
How so? strong political message is Pacers should go. I’m gearing up to supply components for D stock conversation. Northern needs a solution, more than this one project.
@Saintsman – I think you should take urgent legal advice. This month’s Modern Railways includes the complete text of the exchange between the SoS and his Perm Sec on the subject of the ITTs. The relevant sentence appears to be in the SoS letter: ” I believe it is right for us to require bidders to introduce new build diesel vehicles. ” Now it is possible that these are extremely weasely words that would be met by introducing SOME new vehicles to make up the balance between the 290 Pacers and the 140 (?)D78s, and that is why I think strongly that you should take legal advice .
@Saintsman/Graham H
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/407802/northern-invitation-to-tender.pdf
See paras 5.4.2.1.v and 5.4.2.2 on pages 84 and 85
These require that the Pacers have to go by 2020, and that there must be 120 all-new vehicles in service by the same date. Of course this does not preclude the use of D stock, but they would either have to be addition to the all-new trains, or used as a stop gap until the all-new trains are in service to allow the Pacers to go early.
@timbeau/saintsman – in fact.the wording of the ITT is,no doubt deliberately, silent on such issues as timing of the introduction of the all-new fleet (as opposed to the elimination of Pacers which has to be done by 2020). A careful reading of para 6 of Rutnam’s letter also seems to point to a loophole or discontinuity between the Pacers going and the new stock arriving in toto – but then I would assume that the SoS and the Perm Sec had been drafted collusively anyway. It’s this ambiguity which prompts me to suggest the need for proper advice (ie not mine,not timbeaus’s…)
@ Graham H – is it also not the case that the Rail Minister, Claire Perry, has also said “not on my watch” with regard to the use of refurbished ex LU D78s on the Northern franchise? Now I accept her “watch” may well end in early May but the expectation has been set as to what the new franchise will deliver. I endorse your suggestion about seeking legal advice for those who may well be considering / are involved with the D78 refurb project. The government’s public stance has not been at all supportive of that project.
[PPP origins and fault assignment snipped as does not advance the discussion. LBM]
If Edgware Road signal box is that bad then why not build a “temporary replacement” using existing systems but with new equipment until new system comes on line. After all, when one looks at Network Rail they build a new ROC and gradually migrate signalling to it so why can’t TFL do the same ?
As for more circle line trains. Well given the frequency of service at stations like Euston Square where trains are often only a minute apart with many being Metropolitan Trains to Aldgate which empty out at Liverpool Street I cant see how any more circle line trains can be fitted in without removal of some Metropolitan Trains a move which would reduce delays at Baker Street to Circle and H&C trains .
As for increasing frequency well last week I was on a Jubilee Line train which was delayed for about 10 minutes because of a passenger being taken ill at Waterloo …which is several stations away.
The other problem with more trains was raised by Tim O’Toole in an earlier service about the tube where he said ” it’s not worth pushing more and more trains through tunnels if platforms can’t clear of passengers between trains !”. Basically we only think of access re lifts but at many stations passengers have to go up stairs to leave the platform so what’s needed is not only lifts but more platforms with escalators to keep passengers moving .
I got out my box of crayons yesterday morning and drew up a possible timetable that meets the aspirations of the press release, and uploaded it this morning at photobucket. Other interpretations are available. [Anyone know a better image sharing website?]
timbeau / Graham H / saintsman
I see a tiny bit of wriggle-room t(I think), which a canny lawer or needy TOC chief, desperate for replacement stock in there ….
There is a requirement for new diesel stock ( i.e. new-build) – though wehere they are going to get it from, & at what cost is another discussion, given emvironmental requiements.
Ther is no prohibition on fully-refurbishde D78 stock AS WELL, is there?
And they need more train ‘oop North, just to cope with the increasing traffic, same as we do here.
Incidentally, para 5.4.2.1.i Page 84 … Gives exactly such wriggle-room (IMHO) – provided that there are also 120 really new carriages. ( ?? )
[Snip. Snide comment removed. PoP]
@WW – Yes, I forgot to mention Perry’s statement although it had coloured my interpretation of the SoS/Rutnam correspondence. Like you, I wondered whether it wasn’t an act of supreme cynicism -whatever happens at the election, it’s a racing certainty that Ms Perry’s “watch” will terminate on 7 May. On the other hand, she may simply have been stupid. On the third hand, she may actually have meant what she said, in which case the D78 protagonists had better stop work soon. Sorry, saintsman,trying to run a business amongst the political pudder is next to impossible – businessmen are expendable in the last resort…
It was crazy of Tfl to let Londoners suffer all those weekend jubilee line closures, so Thales could develop their signalling system…. and then for Tfl to pay a fortune later to Thales to buy their signalling system for other lines.
As companies like Thales can’t fully develop their systems without such live test environments, Tfl should consider a joint venture next time, so they share the rewards.
…in fact this is exactly what our dirigiste friends have done over in Paris:
http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/urban/single-view/view/state-aid-for-automatic-metro-research-approved.html
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1128_en.htm
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/249320/249320_1530275_143_2.pdf
Sir Herbert Walker would turn in his grave! To reuse major serviceable components from the D78s makes excellent sense. The 442s are running around with the 4-REPs’ 1960s electrics! The rail industry is hooked on new trains – fine when the public purse is left open….but very extravagant from a business perspective.
Running a business which depends on political policy is not easy – they are very quick to tax you & equally quick to kill you off (as GH says). Why does Saintsman need legal advice? He needs to look at the opportunity as a businessman – lawyers need a clear brief to work to and *never* be given a free rein (unless again the public purse foots the bill).
The pacers don’t have a great ride, but *some* attempt to refurbish the interiors (the bus bench seats especially!) would make a big difference (yes I do use them regularly). Many services are busy & the users don’t seem to be clutching sickbags…..just their mobiles, shopping bags and pushchairs like everywhere else.
Ig,
TfL didn’t “let” Londoners suffer. TfL were quite unable to stop it by the terms of the PPP contract. That’s what made various senior TfL people so livid about it all. After that is was a case of “we are where we are” and trying to collaborate rather than have further PPP-style standoffs.
@Isambard – the main reason I recommended legal advice (and I’m no lawyer lover) is that Saintsman is faced with two rather different statements by ministers, one “political” and one “Legal” (in the form of the ITT) and depending on which interpretation is correct, he may or may not have a business. I would expect bidders for Northern to try and clarify the ambiguity as a CQ* but given DfT’s track record and Ms Perry’s very forthright (but again, ambivalent) statement, I’d want the issue nailed to the floor before I spent my firm’s cash on it. The issue is not really about seizing the opportunity but about show stopper risk.
[In my experience of the legal profession -alas, enormous -lawyers seem to come in two flavours: the boring pedant who recites Fledermaus style all the detail,leaving you no wiser than before as to whether you can act, and the can-do operator who begins by asking what you want to do and then finds a legal way of doing it].
*I will ask my spy what bidders think, but i may not be able to spread that word, for obvious reasons.
@ Isambard I take it your post wasn’t submitted using an I pad running on logie Baird valves…. !
Technology today is far more reliable than old systems that often need more space and generate heat that needs to be dealt with.
We may be (a few hundred) miles off-topic, but let’s get some numbers clear.
1. The Northern franchise operates 214 Pacer vehicles (79 x 2-car Class 142, 13 x 2-car Class 144 and 10 x 3-car Class 144). The ITT states that these must not be operated after 31/12/19.
2. The Northern ITT requires at least 120 vehicles (unit/rake configurations not specified) capable of operating on non-electrified routes to be introduced.
3.The Northern ITT also specifies rolling stock requirements for “Northern Regional” services and gives an option of “metro” rolling stock operation of appropriate services with high-density stock which cannot have end doors.
4. Abellio ScotRail’s fleet plans are now public and will make the following available by the Pacer deadline:
– 29 x 3-car Class 170 units (after deduction of the GTR-leased ones)
– 10 x 2-car Class 156 units
– 8 x 2-car Class 158 units
5. The current Northern franchise is committed to taking on 20 x 4-car Class 319 units, displacing diesel stock within the franchise. More electric stock will be required for ongoing electrification; potentially all 86 Class 319s and perhaps the 10 TransPennine Class 350/4s are available for bidders’ consideration if there’s somewhere to run them. A 4-car electric unit may displace more than one shorter diesel units.
6. Based on the more plausible comments on other public forums, First Great Western’s direct award appears to release 17 x 2-car Class 150/1 and 14 x 1-car Class 153 diesel units.
7. It is possible that accessibility modifications may be too awkward for single-car Class 153s so these units may be reformed as 2-car Class 155s or withdrawn by the accessibility deadline (also 31/12/19).
8. Ministerial comments notwithstanding, the ITT allows bidders to propose D stock conversions in addition to the brand new stock.
9. The “metro” option – if offered- could presumably use Classes 150, 170, 319 or D stock conversion.
@Caspar Lucas – in the nicest possible way, what does your recitation of the numbers mean? Is it that there are enough nearly new vehicles coming spare to replace the balance of the 214-120= 94 Pacer fleet? (Which would seem to be the case).
BTW,at your point 2, the ITT requires at least 120 brand new vehicles, regardless of whatever is released from elsewhere or provided by D78 conversions. This was Rutnam’s point.
@PoP. I take your point. TfL’s hands were tied. (And thanks for the interesting article).
@Graham H
What is CQ? Some form of (clarification) question or quotation?
LBM
I “think” CQ could be: “Counsel’s Question” (??)
Oh & seriously, I was not being snide when I suggested the “NIH” syndrome over ministerial
[Snip. Well, we think differently.The point can be made in a less accusative emotive tone. Oh and NIH is not invented here in case that confuses anyone. PoP]
I think that Caspar L’s point #8 is the important one …
D78’s over & above the required orders …
We are going to need quite a lot of new & refurbished trains, or aren’t we?
@LBM – Clarification question (usually a formal process for franchise bidders, and usually quite amusing as, the questions have to be circulated to all bidders and so there is a mass reluctance on the part of everyone – except the Dutch – to say anything at all, lest it reveal their hand)
@PoP /WW/Greg T – My “industry sources” suggest that (a) the ITT doesn’t rule out D78s in the short term (undefined) but that (b) there are not enough spare dmus around anyway, even at the start of the franchise – for example, Chiltern is expected to mop up a fair number. And (c) bidders’ views on Claire Perry’s statement is the cynical one – she will no longer be on the watch when the secondhand top up stuff appears in Northern; that’s quite a charitable take on it really, given the alternative interpretations.
@Edgepedia
The TfL video here https://youtu.be/x8qRtWVtyHg states 32tph for the SSLs – maybe something like your diagram plus an extra 2tph on the circle?
If they can really run 32tph with all the junctions and branches then Thales are certainly proposing a signalling system beyond what’s ever been achieved before.
Perhaps Graham H meant BCQ or Bidder Clarification Question. According to this press release there are three bidders for the Northern franchise; their rolling stock plans are likely to differ.
I’m up the supply chain in specialist adhesives and composites. No contract signed so no legal action. D stock conversation promoters still had the project team working 2 weeks ago. Where a new build is coming from and a what price is interesting. (railNorth would prefer new) What really is happening with nothern tender post election still seems up in the air. My concern is TfL making a decision which then impacts up north, could blow the funding fairness argument right up the political agenda
Yes, BCQ also.
Sorry, Graham H, our posts crossed.
The Other Paul, 32tph is a train every 1 min 52 1/2 seconds and would make Wimbledon passengers happier.
@ Melvyn 2301 – you seem to be unaware that each LU line upgrade has had the creation of a new control centre as a key stage in the project. A new centre for the SSR network is under construction at Hammersmith. This allows old and new to run alongside each other and for the new system to take on larger areas of control step by step while the old control centres are eventually switched off and decommissioned. Therefore LU has done something similar to Network Rail but the nature of the two networks is different – LU’s control philosophy is essentially line based whereas NR is more area based which is sensible given they are managing a national network.
For those people complaining about the Jubilee Line closures and LU “inflicting pain” they need to try inhabiting that interesting place called “between a rock and a hard place”. Then they may understand the opposing pressures and demands that were in play from every angle with respect to the J Line resignalling. Anyone who wants to believe it was “easy” to fix is deluding themselves. I’d also contest the comments about LU “having no choice”. There are always choices even if they are not nice or easy ones.
@Saintsman – it’s terrible and you have my entire sympathy. Clearly, the politicians are grandstanding regardless of the impact on such third parties as you. Maybe all will be clearer on May 7 but I wouldn’t bet on it. I would reckon with a further substantial delay (Northern relet not being at the top of any incoming Minister’s intray).It will be part of that “first hundred days syndrome” but given the likely prospects for a period of intense struggling under the sheets fromMay 8 onwards, it would be a brave man who would say when even that 100 days would start.
There doesn’t seem to be any consenus amongst bidders as to what to do and how best to replace the Pacer fleet. Worse, Rutnam’s letter is evasive on the question of just how much of any DfT base case for Pacer replacement would be new build: it can be read as both all or some, or even none…
@Graham H: [In my experience of the legal profession -alas, enormous -lawyers seem to come in two flavours: the boring pedant who recites Fledermaus style all the detail,leaving you no wiser than before as to whether you can act, and the can-do operator who begins by asking what you want to do and then finds a legal way of doing it].
JP Morgan would approve and it is why I always say of a friend of mine that he is a better lawyer than I was*, even though I know the law better than he does.
Graham H’s tips on translating ministerial utterances into English were quite useful for me in reading between the lines of an MoD statement this week too … (Most skills are transferable!)
* I am doing a different job at the moment (which has involved me this week in reporting election grandstanding in not one country but two as well as the domestic politics here of a third) and was cut to the quick when my colleague told her child that I *used to be* a lawyer!!!
@ Ronnie / Graham H – having worked with both types of lawyer so accurately depicted by Mr H I can say it’s far better to work with the “get things done” type (no offence intended). They can be “hard work” because they tend to need a lot of information to be able to draft the “right answer”.
@The Other Paul “If they can really run 32tph with all the junctions and branches then Thales are certainly proposing a signalling system beyond what’s ever been achieved before.”
I wouldn’t be so sure about that. See e.g. two books published by London Transport, this from “How the Underground Works” (1963):
“The working at Minories Junction, which lies between Tower Hill and Aldgate stations, and is the eastern point of junction of the District and Circle services, will serve as an illustration. The total peak service at this point amounts to 32 trains per hour in each direction; Minories Junction splits the eastbound service into 24 trains on to the District Line and 8 trains on to the Circle, while at the same time combining an equivalent number of westbound District and Circle trains.”
And then this, from “Reconstructing London’s Underground” (1974):
“The District and Circle Lines converged at Cromwell Road, without
physical connection at that point, and ran on parallel but separate pairs of tracks through Gloucester Road and South Kensington stations to a diamond junction east of South Kensington. The combined District and Circle services, running during portions of the peak period at a rate of 40 trains an hour, had to be worked over South Kensington Junction, and with such intensity of service, delays occurred.” (Effectively solved by rearranging the tracks and junction but 40tph still maintained east of South Kensington.)
LBM
OK
Let’s start from the other end & consider the case of the IEP?
Over-weight / over-priced /unwanted by any TOC (as far as we can see)
And yet, according to authoritative sources in “Modern Railways” that is what the DfT forced on to the users & operators of the ex GW & GN main lines.
DfT “invented” it & certainly appear to have been determined that that was (is) the train we are going to get – wanted, useful, fit for purpose, or not as the case may be.
Now, if you turn it around, an enterprising group of railway professionals have come up with what appears to be a very practical method of getting a good-quality fully-refurbished train potentailly available for non-electrified routes, where there are frequent stops.
It certainly looks as though, because it was emphatically “NIH” that DfT are now facing in the exct opposite direction & are determined to kill it, if at all possible, with no real regard (again) for the desires of the operators or the needs of the traveling public.
[Snip. Needless emotionally charged comment removed. PoP]
Graham H
The short term (undefined)
IIRC approx 10 years, if my memory of the Mod Railways interview with the D-train people is correct, but capable of running for another 10.
Clearly, the politicians are grandstanding regardless of the impact on such third parties as you
[Snip. Needless emotionally charged unsubstantiated comment removed. PoP]
@Greg T – another 10-20 years for the D78s? Why not? It prompts the naughty question as to whether a similar refresh went into the S stock appraisal. Of course it did, of course it did.
It strikes me that an appropriate use for D78 conversions would be on the Gospel Oak – Barking line. It would allow an increase in capacity in advance of the completion of electrification, and giving them an interior that is comparable to class 378 would be relatively easy. This would then allow the class 172s to be reallocated elsewhere.
I’ve read Roger Ford’s Informed Sources preview, much of the Invitation to Tender (ITT) and the above. I have a slightly different take from the comments above.
@Graham H 28 March 2015 at 22:18
the wording of the ITT is,no doubt deliberately, silent on such issues as timing of the introduction of the all-new fleet
On the contrary, the clauses quoted by timbeau seem to show a clear date of full service for the all-new fleet by start of 2020. I don’t see how the clause can be imprecise.
@Graham H 29 March 2015 at 12:34
I agree. Claire Perry’s intervention to eliminate D78s clearly contradicts the ITT. Unless Ms Perry’s statement is ‘clarified’, i.e. formally stated to have no bearing on the tender, there is a risk of legal challenge to the result. Whether such a formal statement can be made during the election period, I don’t know. I go with explanation ‘B’.
The exchange of letters Ruttnam / McLoughlin concerns a ‘Letter of Direction.’ This is a Really Big Deal. It means that the civil service thinks that the Minister’s direction is not good ‘value for money’ and requests the Minister to force their hand publicly. Surprise, surprise, these often happen just before a general election. One minister in the pre-2010 government (I won’t say which but this is probably googleable) had 4 such raised against him.
My view, fwiw, is that a ‘Letter of Direction’ does not necessarily indicate a bad deal, still less chicanery, but that the ministry has lost control over the overall policy and needs to make a choice that individually is sub-optimal in order to get the whole policy show back on the road (compare with economic policy post-2008 meltdown).
Roger Ford’s article makes a good case that 300-350 diesel vehicles are needed over the medium term. Which would allow space for both the Northern new build and the D78s. And one could see the government interest in using Northern as a procurement tool in the same way as Southern were used to procure Electrostars to solve the Thameslink stock delay.
But, and here’s the big but. But this leaves Northern with a higher cost of rolling stock than in the absence of the directive to purchase new. This consequence cannot be combined with existing stated policy to limit both subsidy and fare rises and avoid service reduction. The ITT requirement to eliminate Pacers also adds to costs.
Frankly, I don’t see how the ITT can survive in its current phrasing post-election.
@Steve L: I’d love to have he entire D78 converted fleet on the GOBLIN. We’d have a brilliant service!
@answer=42 – I agree that Ms Perry’s intervention has almost certainly given some ammo to any future JR, possibly also the very existence of the SoS/Rutnam exchange, too. It will be difficult for Ministers to claim that the award has been done on the basis of the most economically advantageous offer. Think WC debacle.
I was travelling on the Piccadilly line last week and the connections at Hammersmith now show both the H&C and Circle lines as 150 m connections, although as separate links. Taken with the above I feel there is some “blurring” of the distinctions between the H&C and the teacup line and wonder if this will lead to a complete merger?
@Graham,
…and if the April 2016 start date is missed by a significant period, then replacement for at least some Pacers / modernisation of remaining Pacers can’t be achieved by start 2020 and new disability legislation.
I guess the Coalition would guess that they are immune to attack from Labour on this on the grounds that they are promising goodies:
-no more Pacers
-new trains
-no second-hand London hand-me-down trains (if you believe Ms Perry)
But Labour’s angle would certainly be: ‘Hey look, your franchising policy has tied you in knots, just like we said.’
If they are smart, they would use the situation to split the provision of rolling stock from franchise renewal. The need to link franchise renewal with rolling stock contracts, especially new build, is as we have seen in many contexts, a real cost generator.
I know this problem has also been experienced in Germany. Anyone know anything about this?
One of the major problems in getting high TPH into terminal stations is that the approach to the Train Arrestor has to be very slow to allow the ATP time to stop the train if the train suddenly decides to accelerate. As a result you either end up with low TPH or you end up with a large distance between the stopping mark and the Train Arrestors such as Stratford. The alternative is a design such as Brixton & Walthamstow where the sidings act as the overrun in case of ATC failure.
This is one of the reasons that it should be possible to get 34 to 36 TPH out of a two platform terminal.
You can’t improve the situation by moving the cross over furthur from the train arrestor as the time to clear the points on departure becomes too great. Interesting to see how SSR will solve this at high TPH terminals.
@Graham Feakins
I was thinking more of Praed Street junction, where 14tph to/from Hammersmith plus 32tph from High Street Ken (14 Circle plus 18 Wimbledon) would need it to process 92 train movements an hour. Of which 14 towards Hammersmith would conflict with 32 from HSK.
I’m working on the basis of Edgepedia’s diagram plus another 2tph on the circle to create 14tph (the ‘just over’ 4min claim and the 32tph total in the TfL video). I’m also assuming 18tph from Wimbledon to Edgware Road to give a total of 24tph from Wimbledon and 32tph HSK to Edgware Road.
Perhaps the latter is a step too far – if we indeed lose Ealing Broadway to the Piccadilly, do 8tph Richmond and 10tph Wimbledon to City plus 10tph Wimbledon to Edgware Road that maybe feels more realistic? You still have to accommodate 76 movements per hour through Praed Street though, 12 more than any of the other junctions.
@ WW Thanks for information on new control centre under construction at Hammersmith will will eventually control SSL network ( Hopefully an item on it and plans to introduce it will appear once TFL have worked out how it will be introduced .)
As you mention TFL seem to be learning from how NR do things re signalling but when one considers Edgware Road signal box whether a temporary installation to mimic ER might be worth it ?
It’s easy for politicians to promise new DMUs but given how new EU emission standards made freight companies order new trains last year ahead of a deadline which has now been relaxed raises the question as to what brand new DMUs or indeed DEMUs can be manufactured to UK loading gauge ?
@ Melvyn – I really don’t see the point in trying to mimic Edgware Road’s signal cabin. It will cost money and tie up scarce engineering resources which would be far better employed getting the actual upgrade done, assured, commissioned and implemented.
For those advocating D78 DMUs for the Goblin I can see the attraction of easing capacity problems. However we do not have any info about the nature of the leases for the existing 172s and how easy / hard it is to break those agreements. We also have no idea if there would be any genuine interest in what might be only a 18-24 month use of converted D78s. No one gets their money back in that timescale and surely the promoters of the D78s will want to get a decent lease period so there is a chance of a return on their investment? If a TOC on National Rail is genuinely interested in taking on these trains then a decent period of use is surely sensible. The GOBLIN doesn’t meet that criteria with new EMUs due in 3 years time. I know that doesn’t help the chronic overcrowding issue on the Gospel Oak – Barking route.
Great article, its good to see someone trying to look past the spin.
Regarding Edgware road, correct, there’d be no benefit in further tinkering with that site before the proper re-signalling happens. It was actually the subject of a fairly major job prior to the introduction of S7, involving a new SER and a bunch of new speed controlled signals (which was necessary because of the cancellation of the first signalling contract!). The use of Westrace or similar was considered, but it was concluded that performance wouldn’t match that of the 1920s lever frame with a competent operator.
[This is very off-topic in the first place with the only London relevance being that that the D78-based trains started life in London and I haven’t got time to analyse to what extent the comment is reasonable and how much of it is just stated opinion/prejudice. PoP]
@Malcolm
Just wanted to apologise for not replaying sooner… Had a lot on, sorry.
@pop @ww
The above conversion above the perils of PPP funding is fascinating… I have no doubt a book on the subject could easily be written here.
My own subjective view of Privatisation comes through the prism of British Telecom software house Syntegra… A much happier story!
Anyways… Just wanted to say on the signalling software front (I’ve been writing software professionally since the 5th form at School and put in my first computer network in 1984!) That the “pattern” you would choose for the software would allow for something like Chess Software where any problem could be game-played for hours into millions if futures.
With the system having perfect knowledge and a full view.. The ability to fix problems while keeping service intervals will be almost a miracle to behold.!
@Anonymous 31 March at 00:55: “The use of Westrace or similar was considered, but it was concluded that performance wouldn’t match that of the 1920s lever frame with a competent operator.”
That rather nicely ties in with my comments 30 March at 00:50 concerning activity elsewhere on the Circle.
I’m having a “think the unthinkable” moment:
What if Baker Street (Met) was actually operated/adapted to be the terminus station is was sortof intended as? Yes, there would be some disbenefit to those coming into London but by rafting over the through lines there would be end-of-platform flat access to the now-upgraded East-bound Circle and H&C services.
Is there an opportunity there to remove a point of complexity (sic) and simplify the operation pattern somewhat?
(or do I go and sit on the naughty step?)
@ Alison W – let’s be honest Baker Street station has to be completely rebuilt as it has not been able to cope for the last 20 years. I’ve not had the misfortune to use it in the peaks in recent times but it must be much worse than when I did use it regularly. One staircase off the westbound platform can’t cope. Under your scenario all those people who currently take a Met from the City would be forced to change at Baker St. I’d venture to suggest that that scale of interchange loading would overwhelm the westbound platform completely, resulting in trains having to skip stop as people wouldn’t clear the platform or stairs before the next train arrived. You then have the overload elsewhere in the station to cope with.
Sorry but I don’t think your plan would work without massive redevelopment of Baker St and I’m not aware that is currently planned by LU.
PoP
My comment was more of a musing on the division of responsibility between Ministers & Civil Servants over policy & direction, as applied to the railways (& of course, elsewhere). [snip. PoP]
The publicised disagreements/dispute between the minister(s) & the civil servants in this particular case seem to have reached precisely this semi-impasse.
As to whether it was strictly, narrowly, relevant to our direct subject, you may indeed have had a point, but to bin it without looking was naughty of you.
[I did look and decided it needed considerable editing to be acceptable and given I hadn’t got the time and it was off topic anyway … PoP]
Never mind, given the politicisation of such affairs, I don’t doubt that, unfortunately, the subject will re-appear & it will be directly relevant.
@Alison W
“What if Baker Street (Met) was actually operated/adapted to be the terminus station is was sort of intended as?”
You might simply be moving the problem to the other end of the station. Could Baker Street actually handle the existing Met service if everything terminated there? Dwell times for terminating services are considerably longer than for through services, and the number of conflicts at the station throat would be greater.
If Carto Metro is correct, the only possible parallel moves are a southbound train entering platform 3 or 4 as a northbound leaves platform 1 or 2. Moreover, without modifying the trackwork, trains cannot reverse in platform 3, but have to continue towards the City.
Melvyn, surely the MTU generators that Hitachi are fitting to IEP coaches are compliant, although I understand the floors of these coaches are a few inches higher than coaches without generators. According to Wikipedia these are capable of 940 h.p., so one in a 2-coach train would be about the same as the two 422 hp motors in a Class 170?
@Melvyn
“new EU emission standards made freight companies order new trains last year ahead of a deadline which has now been relaxed raises the question as to what brand new DMUs or indeed DEMUs can be manufactured to UK loading gauge ”
I didn’t know it had been relaxed – has it been merely postponed or have the limits been changed.
I understand that both and the D-train project, and the fitting of new Cummins and MTU engines to half-century-old class 73s, get round this rule: fitting a new engine in an existing vehicle was not the same as building a new locomotive – although that way lies the 4SUB/Trigger’s Broom/Argo (depending on your cultural references)
@timbeau
interview with Adrian Shooter in the new issue of Rail confirms the D trains will have compliant diesel engines.
Again if you would like to work on what the Subsurface or lines train services will be and know exactly what the upgrade service pattern will be there are jobs going in LU’s Transport planning team. Closing date just after Easter
Try:- https://tfl.taleo.net/careersection/external/jobdetail.ftl?lang=en&job=014391
This EU notice indicates repair/replacement/minor upgrade of the Bakerloo signalling control system, which will remain fixed block/mechanical interlocking: http://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:126658-2015:TEXT:EN:HTML&tabId=1
Tellingly the invitation to tender won’t go out till May 2016, and the works are expected to see the signalling last at least another 15 years. What does that mean for the Bakerloo’s place in the NTfL queue, not to mention extension to Lewisham and beyond?
Matt, during 2014 the target date for Bakerloo stock replacement (and line resignalling) moved from 2033 to 2027[compare these board minutes and the Feasibility Report p.51], although in the recent months the expected date for the Invitation to tender has slipped from early 2016 to December 2016.
I think all this ITT tells us that someone has looked at the current Bakerloo line signalling and come to the conclusion that it’s not going to last another 10-15 years.
@Matt, 11 April 2015 at 23:07
To quote from the document:
“The current proposal is to replace the existing SCS with a modern control system which will safeguard operation of the Bakerloo Line for at least 15 years.
— The system shall have, as a minimum, the same functionality as the existing; however, given the improvements in technology since the original system was installed, some increased functionality would be expected.
— The system shall be developed to Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 2 requirements as defined in the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (CENELEC) Standards.
— The system shall interface with the current system constraints; notably the mechanical interlocking, fixed block (trainstop) signalling system.
— There shall be no disruption to the Bakerloo line during migration to the new system.
— The system shall be maintainable and supportable for at least 15 years.
Similar obsolescence issues exist with the associated Communications Control System (CCS) which consists of CCTV, PA, Tunnel Telephone, Voice Recorders, Traction Earth Detection and Telephony. The CCS will therefore be required to be modified as part of this project.”
The way I read this, especially the SIL2 requirement, is that the work is to replace the route setting and remote control telemetry functionality and possibly the control room desks, rather than the interlocking and trackside signalling equipment, hence the requirement to ‘interface’ with those systems, which if they were themselves being specified would be to SIL4, the highest level of safety integrity. This separation of system elements with different SIL levels is common allowing more standard ‘COTS’ (commercial off the shelf) computer and other equipment to be used in the less ‘vital’ parts of the overall system, bearing in mind that the higher SIL interlocking system is mediating any decisions made before allowing any signals to clear or points to move.
Taken together with the communications systems referred to, this might be an opportunity to introduce a fully modernised control room equipped with more sophisticated ARS functionality and other predictive and planning tools.
@ Mark T – I think your hunch is right. The Bakerloo Line control room hasn’t been wonderful for years so replacing it in a relatively simple way to boost functionality, reliability and probably the working environment for controllers using OTS kit is a sensible step given the massive accumulated delay to the upgrade date. There may well be obsolescence and staff relations issues too that are becoming more criticial hence the need to “do something”.
If we assume control equipment renewed and the interlocking and trackside equipment spot renewed and life extended as necessary using existing technology. then there’s no reason why new stock for the Bakerloo could not be delivered initially with trip cocks, just as the Jubilee trains were, and the Northern ones after that. This effectively decouples the new trains from new signalling technically, but clearly the full benefits of new signalling such as ATO and increased capacity would be lost which might in turn mean the full fleet envisaged might not be able to be accommodated.
In reply to @Matt,
As far as I know the Bakerloo signalling control is based on HP600 computers that have not been produced for many years and are now very difficult to get repaired / get spares for hence the need to replace the control system rather than the mechanical interlocking and track circuits. There was some talk about replacing the track circuits with the more modern version used on the Victoria Line some time ago – that was so the track circuits could be canabalised to provide a source of the TMS9995 micro processor that is used on the Central Line. The TMS9995 has also been out of production for over 10 years.
One of the big problems with any electronic signalling is that the availability of parts is getting shorter and shorter and replacing complex integrated circuits in safety critical systems and even in control systems is not a job to be undertaken lightly.
It will be interesting to see how long the JL & Northen signalling systems last.
@ John M – in reply to your last question I would say “not very long”. I suspect Seltrac based systems may have a longer life as there’s a wider customer base worldwide requiring ongoing support. I wonder whether manufacturers are now designing systems so they use hardware that can be readily replaced with new generations from generic suppliers. The big assumption is that there is a reasonably forseeable upgrade path for processers etc.
@WW, @ John M
I understand Seltrac can now be offered without the unloved continuous inductive loop cables between the rails, substituting trackside radio transceivers for communications based on commercial ‘wi-fi’ standards. I expect these elements at least should be fairly future proof. In their Seltrac brochure Thales states:
“SelTrac CBTC solutions incorporate high bandwidth, secure and protected radio communication technology to deliver the most advanced, most efficient Automatic Train Control solution available today. . .
. . . The communication technology follows an open-system philosophy that complies with well-recognized industry standards and protocols, which provide a stable future migration path. Thales advocates the use of open-standard data communication technology, believing that rail transit operators should have the flexibility to buy future components from any supplier that supports IEEE standards (802.3 Ethernet, 802.11, etc.), and software for future purposes. Meeting this demand allows the customer more supplier options primarily at less cost than that of proprietary systems. The implementation of “free space” wireless communication incorporates full redundancy through the use of overlapping radio coverage.”
https://www.thalesgroup.com/sites/default/files/asset/document/SelTracBrochure_CBTCSolutions_eng.pdf
TfL Paper on SSR resignalling. Not read it all in detail yet but very interesting bits of descoping about Picc Line interworking beyond South Harrow to Uxbridge.
https://tfl.gov.uk/cdn/static/cms/documents/fpc-20150617-item17-part-1-four-lines-modernisation.pdf
Came across that very late last night. In my dozy state I noted that full upgrade (32tph in centre sections with 28tph Finchley Road – Baker Street) is not now due to May 2023 and final off-peak enhancements are not due until December 2023. Also that significant closures would be necessary to get the work done. So much for the idea of no closures being needed for the signalling upgrade. Still that is more realistic given the Northern Line had partial weekend closure as each new resignalled area was brought into use. Also not extending current off-peak Tower Hill terminators eastward until “by 2018” which is something I was expecting to see with the next timetable change.
@WW
An interesting and important paper. It appears that the descoping of Hanger Lane Jn to Rayners Lane Jn resignalling, and the exclusion of Piccadilly Line train fitment with ATC, and some other simplification of intended track works, will mean that the costs for NTfL will also have to rise in due course. That would imply that the cost escalation referenced in the paper isn’t the full measure of the additional outlay now required. It may well be more realistic, however.
@ Jonathan Roberts – I think the Picc Line descoping is not only a cost issue. It is also an issue about reducing project risk and also about not damaging the reliability of the Picc Line. Years back when I worked for LU I had a small involvement on this issue and it was clear there were substantive concerns about the impact on the 73 stock.
Given LU has a not inconsiderable task in keeping 73 stock going until the mid 2020s it makes sense not to go about cutting holes in cab floors to fit signalling kit, taking trains apart to fiddle with cabling that will almost certainly break or snap and trying to get old traction equipment working with new signalling that may behave in a way that “upsets” the traction equipment. Not sure how 73 stock would cope with the “on off” jerking movement that you see on the Jubilee and Northern lines as the computers adjust running speeds relative to track occupancy.
Walthamstow Writer,
The desire to avoid the need to modify the 1973 stock was very much my thought when I read this.
@ww
Agreed. Therefore also more realistic. If descoping is pertinent, it will also be interesting to see how far fully automatic mode will actually be extended beyond the tunnel sections on lightly used sections of line, when a revised NTfL scoping is considered.
The Northern Line had lots of partial weekend closures – one branch or another – during the signalling upgrade. OK – most of them were advertised as being for track work, but presumably the signalling project took full advantage. The propaganda about so few closures for the signalling upgrade was only possible because of the number of weekend closures already planned for the track work. Although the number of closures and disruption was still much fewer/less than for the Jubilee.
Applying modern ‘tight loop’ ATP/ATO control techniques to old trains like the 73 stock is fraught with difficulty. They are simply not designed to automatically do the small adjustments to throttle and brake that is demanded, unless you completely renew the traction control system and much of the cab equipment, very expensive, and especially uneconomic for stock with only a limited remaining life. This was one of the factors that encouraged SBB together with other European railways to get a Level 1 ‘limited supervision’ mode built in to the ETCS specifications. Using this mode, classic lines and old classic traction could be equipped with simple train-stop and overspeed protection similar to pre-existing local legacy protection systems using the standard eurobalise and euroloop interfaces. The old traction so equipped would not be able to operate on lines equipped with the higher levels, but the method complies with the pan-European agreements for interoperability, as the new mode, now being part of the standard, is supported by all modern ETCS compliant traction that are also able to exploit the higher levels on main lines so equipped. Switzerland will thus be able to complete fitting their entire (standard gauge) network for interoperability before the UK has achieved it’s first main line. Anyway the purpose of that long off topic excursion was to draw comparisons and lead to the comment that it is technically very easy and low risk to configure the new signalling on the shared SSL sections with a few old tech lineside signals and trainstops (that can be removed eventually) to cater for the low tech Piccadilly stock whilst the alternative of modifying the stock to work with the new signalling has great potential to become a technical, financial and timescale disaster. The NTfL when it first arrives will thus almost certainly have to come equipped (at least initially) with classic trip-cocks just like most tube and sub-surface trains to date (with the possible exception of original 1960s and latest replacement Victoria Line stock).
@Mark The 1967 stock were fitted with tripcocks when being transferred over other lines. The NTfL feasibility study plans line resignalling before the first train arrives. But that was also the original plan for the Met!
Not sure if this is best place but I saw in Modern Rail that Viva rails proposed D78 conversions are going to be tried out on Great Western branch lines. N mention of how many, but implies more if they are successful and also Arriva rail in Wales are in discussion as well.
For Digital Railway and signaling aficionados there will be a live debate organised by Railway Gazette on Wednesday September 9, featuring a panel of high-level speakers will address issues such as:
• What can digital technology offer in the search additional capacity as the demand for rail transport continues to increase? What is the role of communications-based train control and driver advisory systems?
• How might advanced train planning and traffic management systems help to improve operational performance and reliability?
• What degree of automation might be appropriate for main line railways, and what lessons can be gained from experience in the metro sector? Will ERTMS and CBTC converge in the next generation of train control systems?
Panelists:
• David Horne, CEO, Virgin Trains East Coast (invited)
• Wim Fabries, Programme Director, ERTMS, Ministry of Infrastructure & Environment, Netherlands
• Jerry England, Group Director, Digital Railway, Network Rail (invited)
• Dr Jochen Eickholt, CEO, Siemens Mobility
http://live.wavecast.co/the-digital-future/
It seems that LU has finally got to the point of awarding a contract to Thales for SSR resignalling. Note the rather different cost of £760m compared to the cancelled Bombardier contract value of £345m.
http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/news/europe/single-view/view/thales-awarded-london-underground-sub-surface-lines-resignalling-contract.html
Oh well another episode in LU signalling opens up!
As always it pays to read the item all the way to the end. Last line:
Once the Sub-Surface Lines have been modernised, work would begin to introduce new trains and control systems for the Piccadilly, Central, Bakerloo and Waterloo & City lines.
So work due to start on introducing new trains for the Piccadilly and resignal the line in around 2023. So we are 2026/7 before it is complete – assuming all goes well – and then works starts on the Bakerloo. And they are still talking about an extended Bakerloo (to somewhere although that is less clear where now) by 2030.
If the Croxley Rail Link get delayed any further they can go straight to signalling it with the new resignalling. Cue for possible further argument about whether the costs for the go to Croxley Rail Link or Sub-surface Railway?
@ PoP – well I am not surprised to see future upgrades now heading towards 20 years of delay compared to original timescales. We also still face the prospect of further funding changes for TfL and I don’t imagine they’re going to involve largesse. Having checked the capital funding settlement runs to 2021 and we will be into a new Government and possible new Mayoralty by then so there must be significant risk to the scale of funding needed beyond that point. One factor that may work in the opposite direction is that TfL may simply be really struggling to run reliable services on the Piccadilly and Bakerloo lines by then meaning there will be political fall out if something isn’t done. That’s not a criticism of whatever TfL intend to do to keep 72 and 73 stock running, more a reflection that a lot of assets will be very old, worn out and demand is very likely to have kept rising thus increasing the pressure of running reliable services.
@PoP
“start on …Piccadilly resignal in around 2023, so we are 2026/7 before it is complete, and then works starts on the Bakerloo. And they are still talking about an extended Bakerloo by 2030.”
This looks like extending and resignalling the Bakerloo might be done at the same time. Looks quite sensible, until you remember what happened on the JLE.